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An International Journal of Social Research Associated with the Southern Sociological Society

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ISSN 0037-7732 Library of Congress Catalog Number 24-31023

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Social Forces is issued quarterly: September, December, March, June.

Social Forces is published by the University of North Carolina Press for the Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Rev. 2/04

Social Forces is issued quarterly: September, December, March, June. Subscriptions are accepted on a four-issue basis only. We recommend that readers subscribe for a volume year—beginning in September and ending with the June number. Subscriptions entered after the appearance of the first issue in a volume should specify whether the subscriber wants the current volume (including back numbers) or wants to begin the subscription with the next issue.

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
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Critical Discourse and the Cultural Consecration of American Films*

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Abstract

This research examines the effects of contemporaneous critical, professional, and popular recognition, as well as the effects of the extent of subsequent critical discourse about films and their directors, on the retrospective cultural consecration of American films. Specifically, it examines a sample of 1,277 films released from 1929 to 1991 that received three or more major Academy Award nominations or were selected among the ten best films of the year by either the New York Times or the National Board of Review or were among the top ten films in terms of box-office revenues in a given year. The analysis focuses on the characteristics of those films that were retrospectively consecrated either by inclusion among the 100 greatest films by the American Film Institute or by inclusion in the National Film Registry. Contemporaneous professional and recognition of the director of a film is especially important in determining the likelihood of retrospective consecration. In addition, the extent of critical discourse both about a film and about its director is important in determining the likelihood of retrospective consecration. Overall, the findings confirm that the retrospective consecration of films is affected by the discourse produced by film critics and scholars who function, in effect, as reputational entrepreneurs. However, this discourse is influenced by the availability of certain cultural schemas. Specifically, the ascendancy of "auteur theory" as a discourse of value within film studies serves to privilege the director as the primary creative agent in film production. It also serves to privilege certain directors over others.

In 1989, when the National Film Preservation Board selected the first 25 films to be included in the National Film Registry, one of the films chosen was *The*

* The authors are indebted to John Campbell, Mary Blair-Loy, Paul DiMaggio, Denise Bielby, William Bielby, John Mohr, Michael Schudson, Gary Alan Fine, Tom Rotolo, Greg Hooks, Amy Wharton, and the members of the Social Inequalities Workshop at Washington State University for their comments on earlier versions of this manuscript. Please direct all correspondence to Michael P. Allen, Department of Sociology, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4020. E-mail: allenm@wsu.edu.

Searchers, a western directed by John Ford. Nine years later, the American Film Institute included it among the "100 greatest American films of all time." The consecration of this film by these two cultural institutions from the tens of thousands of American films produced over the past century was paradoxical on a number of counts. Although *The Searchers* was one of the top ten films of 1956 in terms of box-office income, it did not garner any professional awards or much critical acclaim when it was released. It was not among the 28 American films that were nominated for major Academy Awards that year. Moreover, it was not included among the ten best films selected by either the *New York Times* or the National Board of Review in 1956. Last but not least, it did not receive any awards from the New York Film Critics Circle. In the words of the reviewer for *Variety*, the major trade publication of the film industry, *The Searchers* was "repetitious" and "overlong." Similar unfavorable criticisms were expressed by Bosley Crowther of the *New York Times*, the most influential film critic in America at the time. Nevertheless, the consecration of *The Searchers* four decades after its release is important because it illustrates some of the intricacies of the process of cultural consecration.

Sociologists have devoted considerable attention to the manner in which the reputations of cultural producers and their products are created and perpetuated (Becker 1982; Corse & Griffin 1997; DeNora 1995; Dowd et al. 2002; Kapsis 1992; Lamont 1987; Lang & Lang 1988), but they have paid much less attention to more formal processes of retrospective cultural consecration (Bourdieu 1991; Zolberg 1990). This lack of attention to formal processes of cultural consecration is somewhat surprising given the fact that the conferring of honors, awards, and prizes is a pervasive and highly visible aspect of everyday life (Goode 1978; Levy 1990). There have been a number of historical studies of the processes by which scientists receive Nobel Prizes (Feldman 2000) or athletes are elected to the Hall of Fame (James 1994). However, these studies have been largely descriptive and atheoretical. There have been no systematic analyses of more formal processes of cultural consecration. Specifically, cultural consecration occurs whenever distinctions are imposed that serve to separate individuals and achievements that are worthy of admiration and respect from those that are not. According to Bourdieu (1991:119-20), cultural consecration is an act of "social magic" that produces "discontinuity out of continuity." Of course, the most important distinctions are those that are imposed by cultural institutions that can legitimately claim that function (DiMaggio 1992).

Consecration is especially important within the field of cultural production, where cultural producers struggle primarily for legitimacy rather than profits (Bourdieu 1993). Ironically, the process of cultural consecration is often more formalized in those fields of cultural production that are less autonomous from the field of economic production. Writers whose books are popular may be ignored by critics, scholars, and other writers. However, they are more difficult to ignore if their works have won important awards and prizes (Todd 1996).

In many cases, cultural producers and their products are consecrated retrospectively rather than contemporaneously. In the field of fine art, the ultimate form of cultural consecration is to be the subject of a retrospective exhibition by a major museum (Heinich 1996). Indeed, cultural organizations and institutions sometimes endeavor to establish the legitimacy of a field of cultural production by identifying the most exemplary achievements by cultural producers within that field over a prolonged period of time. These acts of retrospective consecration are based on the premise that only the most legitimate cultural producers and cultural products survive the “test of time” (Becker 1982:365). This assumption was explicit in the retrospective consecration projects conducted by both the National Film Registry and the American Film Institute.

Previous studies of artistic reputations have consisted primarily of qualitative analyses of the historical processes by which certain individuals have established their reputations as artists. Very few studies (Lang & Lang 1988) have examined historical changes in the reputations of different cultural producers and products over time. None of these studies has examined the more formal process of retrospective cultural consecration. This research proposes a theory of retrospective cultural consecration and examines the empirical adequacy of this theory as it applies to American films. To this end, it examines the implicit criteria employed by both the American Film Institute and the National Film Registry in selecting films for retrospective consecration. The analysis is based on a sample of 1,277 films released from 1929 to 1991 that received popular, professional, or critical recognition at the time of their release. It examines those factors that affect the likelihood of a film being retrospectively consecrated, including the extent of its contemporaneous recognition, its age, and the extent of critical discourse about the film and its director. Finally, it examines the extent to which cultural schemas, which frame the discourse about films and their directors, affect the retrospective consecration of American films.

The Cultural Consecration of Films

The process of cultural consecration can be seen as one aspect of the more general and pervasive process of cultural valorization. Cultural valorization involves the use of aesthetic judgment to assign cultural value to cultural producers and products. Consecration, however, is a distinct form of valorization inasmuch as it imposes discrete distinctions between those cultural producers and products that deserve admiration and respect and those that do not. Valorization imposes distinctions among cultural producers and products, but these distinctions are typically continuous rather than discrete. Consecration, to the contrary, produces “discontinuity out of continuity” by

separating the great from the merely good. The study of cultural consecration and its effects is central in the work of Bourdieu (1984; 1993; 1996). His appropriation of the term *consecration*, with its religious connotations surrounding the “magical” separation of the sacred from the profane, is deliberate. In the introduction to *Distinction* (Bourdieu 1984:6), he proclaims that “cultural consecration does indeed confer on the objects, persons and situations it touches a sort of ontological promotion akin to transubstantiation.”

It is important to note that cultural value is distinct from economic value. Sociologists typically view cultural value in terms of cultural legitimacy. In particular, Bourdieu asserts (1993:50-51) that there are three primary forms of legitimacy: “specific” legitimacy, which is conferred by other cultural producers, “bourgeois” legitimacy, which is conferred by the agents and institutions of the dominant class, and “popular” legitimacy, which is based on public acclaim. Moreover, to the extent that a field of cultural production becomes autonomous from the field of economic production, cultural producers become more concerned with the specific legitimacy conferred upon them by other producers and less concerned with popular legitimacy or even bourgeois legitimacy, which emanate from outside the field of production. In this sense, an autonomous field of cultural production represents “an economic world turned upside down” (Bourdieu 1996:81). Cultural consecration is important because it involves granting cultural legitimacy to certain cultural producers and their products and, by implication, denying it to other producers and their products.

Formal rites of cultural consecration are typically conducted by organizations. These consecration projects usually involve the presentation of honors and awards that recognize achievements of excellence within a field of cultural production. Typically, an award is given to a cultural producer in recognition of their achievement in producing a particular cultural product. Of course, one of the purposes of any award or honor is to provide others with incentives to emulate those exemplary achievements (Goode 1978). However, these consecration projects also achieve another purpose. In recognizing exemplary achievements within a field, these cultural organizations promote the legitimacy of the entire field of cultural production. This is clearly the case, for example, with the Pulitzer Prizes. Joseph Pulitzer, who was denounced during his lifetime for engaging in “yellow journalism,” established these prizes in order to recognize excellence in the nascent profession of journalism. Pulitzer felt that the competition for these awards might foster higher standards among journalists. He also believed that these awards would help establish the cultural legitimacy of journalism as a profession and a field of cultural production.

Any formal consecration project entails an assertion on the part of an organization that it possesses the institutional legitimacy to consecrate certain cultural producers and their products as legitimate. Bourdieu (1988:259) re-

fers to this process as “consecration through contagion.” Moreover, the legitimacy of both the organization and its consecration project are based on the perceived legitimacy of its procedures. For example, the legitimacy of the Pulitzer Prizes derives from the legitimacy of the Pulitzer Prize Committee and the procedures it employs in awarding these prizes. Indeed, as Bourdieu (1991:120) argues, “the distinctions that are the most efficacious socially are those which give the appearance of being based on objective differences.” Formal cultural consecration is especially important in the field of film production because films are both an art form and an industrial commodity. Indeed, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences was established in 1927 by a group of actors, writers, directors, and producers for the express purpose of improving the reputation of films as an art form. The Academy Awards were created the following year in order to recognize “outstanding achievements in the arts and sciences of motion pictures” (Sands 1973:46).

To some extent, the recognition that any cultural product or its producer receives from cultural organizations and institutions immediately following its production represents a form of contemporaneous cultural consecration. For instance, in selecting the “ten best” films of the year, the National Board of Review is imposing a distinction between the best films and all the other films released in that year. In this sense, the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, the *New York Times*, the National Board of Review, and the New York Film Critics are each engaged in their own contemporaneous cultural consecration projects. However, contemporaneous consecration does not typically impart the same cultural legitimacy as that derived from retrospective consecration. In general, retrospective cultural consecration projects are more selective in terms of the number of cultural products and producers that are consecrated. Moreover, retrospective cultural consecration projects often claim that their results are valid because these cultural producers and products have survived the “test of time.”

Recently, two established cultural institutions have engaged in the retrospective consecration of American films. These formal consecration projects were part of larger efforts by these institutions to confirm the legitimacy of film as an art form (DiMaggio 1992). One institution, the National Film Registry, was created by the U.S. Congress in 1988. As part of this legislation, the librarian of Congress is required to identify and preserve films of “cultural, historical, or aesthetic significance.” Every year since 1989, the librarian, in consultation with the 18 members of the National Film Preservation Board and the staff of the Motion Picture Division of the Library of Congress, has selected 25 films for inclusion in the National Film Registry. Only those films that are at least ten years old are eligible for inclusion in this registry. In the past 14 years, the National Film Registry has chosen 350 films, including documentaries. The other institution, the American Film Institute, was created by the U.S. Congress in 1965. According to its charter, one of its missions is to increase the

“recognition and understanding of the moving image as an art form.” In conjunction with the centennial of the film industry in 1995, the American Film Institute initiated a project to identify the 100 greatest American films of the century. To this end, it recruited an expert panel of 1,500 film professionals, critics, and scholars to select the “100 greatest American films of all time” using a list of 400 films compiled by its staff. The American Film Institute (1997) suggested that these films be selected on the basis of such criteria as critical recognition, historical significance, and cultural impact.

These and other retrospective cultural consecration projects proceed from the common assumption that the best art is “what lasts” over time (Becker 1982:365). Indeed, it does appear that many cultural products and their producers fail to survive the “test of time.” One explanation is that the reputations of artists and their works are often eroded by a process of social aging (Bourdieu 1996:254). Specifically, Bourdieu asserts (1966:253) that artists and their works are subject to “banalization” as audiences become increasingly familiar with the artistic conventions associated with particular artists and genres. As a result, films that received professional or critical acclaim when they were released decades ago may seem conventional and unexceptional by contemporary standards. Indeed, some film scholars (Ray 1985) argue that, as a result of repetition, the cinematic and thematic conventions of classical Hollywood films from the 1930s and 1940s have become “transparent” and, therefore, less compelling to modern film audiences.

The effects of social ageing may explain why many films that were once considered exceptional, as witnessed by the professional and critical recognition they received at the time of their release, have not been retrospectively consecrated. A case in point is *The Country Girl*, which received seven major Academy Award nominations and was chosen as one of the ten best films of 1954 by both the *New York Times* and the National Board of Review. Bosley Crowther, who reviewed the film for the *New York Times*, proclaimed it to be “one of the fine and forceful pictures of the year.” It was also one of the top ten films in terms of box-office income that year. Despite this professional, critical, and popular recognition, *The Country Girl* was not included among the films retrospectively consecrated by either the American Film Institute or the National Film Registry. However, the process of social aging does not explain why many of the films that have been retrospectively consecrated were not viewed as being all that exceptional when they were first released. As indicated earlier, a case in point is *The Searchers*, which was chosen by both the American Film Institute and the National Film Registry, even though it did not garner any professional or critical acclaim when it was released.

In their search for artists and works that “last,” retrospective consecration projects inadvertently ignore the fact that the process of collective memory has profound effects on the reputations of those artists and their works. As Becker (1982:365) observes, “what lasting consists of is not very clear.”

Researchers in the field of collective memory have shown that the cultural representations of public figures and historical events often shift over time in response to changing social conditions as well as the efforts of individuals and groups (Ducharme & Fine 1995; Schwartz 1991; Wagner-Pacifici & Schwartz 1991). Specifically, Fine (1996) argues that the reputations of historical figures are often shaped by the discourse produced by “reputational entrepreneurs” who possess the requisite institutional and rhetorical resources to produce and disseminate this discourse. This same process undoubtedly affects the reputations of cultural products and producers as well. It is likely that film critics and film scholars, who possess both the institutional and rhetorical resources to produce this discourse, are able to shape, to some extent, the reputations of films and those who produce them. For example, a seminal study of American film directors (Sarris 1968) identified John Ford, the director of *The Searchers*, as a “pantheon director” but completely ignored George Seaton, the director of *The Country Girl*. Similarly, there have been eight books published about John Ford but only one about George Seaton.

Researchers who have examined the formation of cultural fields have also pointed to the importance of intellectual discourse in the form of texts (Baumann 2001; Ferguson 1998; Santoro 2002). As Ferguson (1998:635) puts it, “in cultural fields, there is no getting around words.” It is apparent that discourse is also important in the process of cultural consecration within these fields. Specifically, Shrum (1996:35) asserts, “quality standards and quality judgments are ultimately created within the contexts of discourse.” Indeed, cultural theorists (Frow 1995; Smith 1983) argue that aesthetic judgments about cultural products are invariably generated within the context of particular “discourses of value” that regulate the social practice of valorization within different groups. This implies, of course, that different groups, employing various discourses, may value cultural producers and their products differently. The existence of competing discourses of value may explain why films that receive professional recognition from other cultural producers are not always the same films as those that receive critical recognition from critics and scholars.

Within film studies, the predominant discourse of value over the past several decades has been auteur theory (Sarris 1968). This theory, which was first articulated in a series of articles published in the French film journal *Cahiers du Cinéma* beginning in 1956 (Hillier 1985), was important to the legitimation of film studies as a field of academic study (Haberski 2001). This theory also had the effect of elevating commercial Hollywood films directed by certain directors to the status of art (Mukerji 1978). Although film scholars have developed a number of other discourses for interpreting films (Andrew 1984), auteur theory still enjoys widespread popularity because it provides a convenient and accessible discourse for evaluating the artistic merits of films (Haberski 2001). In brief, auteur theory asserts that directors are the primary

creative agents in the production of films. It also asserts that certain directors are able to transcend the commercial limitations imposed by the film industry and impart their own unique and personal artistic visions in their films (Stoddart 1995).

It is important to note that discourses of value can be viewed as cultural schemas. According to DiMaggio (1997:267), cultural schemas are “knowledge structures that represent objects or events and provide default assumptions about their characteristics, relationships, and entailments.” These cultural schemas, in turn, determine which “frames” are employed in particular instances of discourse (Bielby & Bielby 1994). More specifically, auteur theory, as a cultural schema, encourages film critics and scholars, as reputational entrepreneurs, to frame their discourse about a film in terms of the contributions of its director. Undoubtedly, the discourse produced by film critics and scholars is important in the creation and maintenance of the reputations of both films and their directors. However, much of their cultural authority derives from their ability to frame their aesthetic judgments about films and directors within the context of an established cultural schema such as auteur theory. In fact, Baumann (2001) found that retrospective reviews of films often focused on the identities of their directors. Moreover, auteur theory celebrates some directors and ignores others. Films directed by auteur directors are considered to possess greater artistic merit than films by directed by other directors, who are often seen as nothing more than highly skilled technicians.

On the basis of these observations, it is possible to formulate a preliminary theory of retrospective cultural consecration, especially as it applies to films. To begin with, it is anticipated that the extent of professional, critical, and even popular recognition that a film receives at the time of its release has a positive effect on its likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated. However, since older films are more subject to banalization, the effects of contemporaneous recognition are likely to be eroded by the effects of age. In addition, it is anticipated that the extent of critical discourse produced about a film has a positive effect on its likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated. Indeed, given the ascendancy of auteur theory as a cultural schema in film studies, it is also anticipated that the extent of discourse associated with the director of a film has a positive effect on its likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated. Auteur theory privileges the contributions of directors over the contributions of other creative artists in the production of a film, but it also privileges some directors over others. Consequently, films directed by directors identified as auteurs by film critics and scholars are more likely to be retrospectively consecrated than other films.

Research Design

The basic theoretical issues posed by this research require an examination of those characteristics that lead to the retrospective consecration of certain films over others. It is not feasible, of course, to analyze all the tens of thousands of films produced in the U.S. in the past one hundred years. However, it is possible to examine the characteristics of a large sample of films that received professional, critical, or popular recognition at the time of their release. After all, these films are more likely to be retrospectively consecrated than less contemporaneously recognized films. For analytical purposes, it is necessary to impose certain restrictions on such a sample. First, the sample employed in this study does not include silent films because they are not generally as available or accessible to modern audiences as sound films. Consequently, the analysis includes only sound films released since 1929. Second, the analysis also excludes films released after 1991 because the National Film Registry does not include any films that are not at least ten years old. Third, the sample does not include animated or documentary films because they are not strictly comparable to live-action narrative films in terms of the forms of professional recognition employed in this analysis.

Professional recognition is bestowed upon artists and their works by other artists. One of the most important forms of professional recognition within the film industry is a nomination for an Academy Award (Levy 1990). These nominations are an important measure of peer recognition because only the members of each individual branch of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences can nominate films in a given category. For example, only members of the Directors Branch can nominate directors for an Academy Award. As a general rule, the academy has permitted only five nominations in any category (Sands 1973). The sample of films examined in this analysis includes every American film that received three or more major Academy Award nominations between 1929 and 1991. For the purposes of this analysis, major nominations include those in the categories of best picture, best director, best actor or actress, best supporting actor or actress, best screenwriter, best cinematographer, best editor, best production designer, and best musical director. Of course, a film can receive more than one nomination in the acting categories. In all, 553 American films received three or more major Academy Award nominations between 1929 and 1991.

In contrast to professional recognition, critical recognition is bestowed on artists and their works by critics and scholars rather than other artists. The sample of films examined in this analysis includes those films that received important critical recognition at the time of their release. Specifically, it includes all the American films selected as one of the ten best films of the year by the *New York Times*. The *New York Times* serves, in effect, as the national newspaper of record and its reviews have an inordinate impact on the critical

reception of films. From 1929 to 1991, the *New York Times* selected a total of 428 American films among its ten best films of the year. Similarly, the sample includes all the American films selected as one of the ten best films of the year by the National Board of Review. The National Board of Review was created by the film industry in 1916 as a censorship body. However, once this function was rendered obsolete by the imposition of the Production Code in 1927, it began publishing reviews that advocated that films represented “a new type of art” (Haberski 2001:49). According to one film historian (Koszarski 1994: 209), the National Board of Review “set the agenda for serious film study in this period.” From 1929 to 1991, the National Board of Review selected a total of 528 American films among its ten best films of the year.

Finally, a film may receive popular recognition even if it does not receive professional or critical recognition. The popular recognition of a film is best measured by how many people paid to see the film at the time of its initial theatrical release. The only reliable measure of audience attendance is the box-office revenue of a film. Box-office revenue is equal to the total box-office receipts minus the exhibition fees charged by theater owners. Using the available data, it is possible to identify the ten most popular films each year from 1940 to 1991. However, for the period from 1929 to 1939, it is possible to identify only the six most popular films each year. In general, the data on box-office revenue were obtained from annual compilations published by either *Variety* or the *Hollywood Reporter*, the two major trade publications of the motion picture industry. Although data on actual box-office revenue were available for most films, it is difficult to compare these data over time due to the effects of inflation. Consequently, the sample of films included in this analysis includes the top six to ten films, in terms of box-office revenue, each year. From 1929 to 1991, there were 582 popular films that ranked among the top six to ten films in terms of their box-office revenue. There is, of course, considerable overlap between these samples. The final sample, which could conceivably include a total of 2,092 films, actually contains 1,277 films.

This analysis seeks to identify those characteristics that contribute to the retrospective consecration of films. Consequently, information was compiled for each of these films on a number of variables. First and foremost, this analysis examines the effects of contemporaneous professional recognition on the retrospective consecration of films. The analysis measures not only the total number of major Academy Award nominations received by each film at the time of its release but also the types of nominations it received. This research also examines the effects of contemporaneous critical recognition on the cultural consecration of films. Specifically, the analysis identifies those American films that were selected as being among the ten best films of the year by the *New York Times* or among the ten best films of the year by the National Board of Review. In addition, the analysis identifies those American films that received annual awards from the New York Film Critics Circle for best picture, best actor

and actress, and best director. There are, of course, other important film awards but they do not span the time period encompassed by this research. Indeed, since the New York Film Critics Circle did not issue any awards prior to 1935, any analysis involving this variable is limited to those films released since then. Finally, the analysis identifies those films that received contemporaneous popular recognition in that they were among the top ten films in terms of box-office revenue in a given year.

The analysis also examines the extent of critical discourse both about each film and its director. For the purposes of this analysis, the extent of critical discourse about each film is measured by the number of times that it has been discussed at length in film anthologies. This information was compiled from a comprehensive index of film anthologies (Bowles 1994). Of the 1,277 films in the sample, 489 were featured in at least one film anthology. Of these, 142 were featured in three or more film anthologies. Similarly, the extent of critical discourse about directors is measured by the number of books published about them. The 1,277 films included in the sample were directed by 411 directors. Of these, 142 directors were the subject of at least one book and 60 were the subject of at least three books. The books about each director were identified using the WorldCat database, an electronic version of the Union Catalog database that includes information on the holdings of all major libraries in the U.S. Only books published in English are included in the analysis. Finally, given the fact that both of these measures of critical discourse have highly skewed distributions, they are subjected to square-root transformations in all the statistical analyses.

Of the 1,277 films in the sample, 83 were selected for inclusion among the 100 greatest films by the American Film Institute and 131 were selected for inclusion in the National Film Registry. The American Film Institute, included only seven narrative films released from 1929 to 1991 that were not among the 1,277 films in the sample. However, the National Film Registry includes 68 narrative films released between 1929 and 1991 that were not included in the sample. This disparity arises because the National Film Registry employs selection criteria that are purposely more eclectic than those employed by the American Film Institute. For example, the National Film Registry includes 16 inexpensive but historically significant "B" films, such as *Gun Crazy* and *The Night of the Living Dead*. It also includes 13 equally inexpensive but innovative independent films, such as *Shadows* and *The Return of the Secaucus Seven*. In all, only 29 of these 68 narrative films were major feature films. They include such diverse films as *Duck Soup* and *The Manchurian Candidate*.

Results

The analysis examines the effects of the different forms of contemporaneous recognition and critical discourse associated with 1,277 films released over a period of six decades on their likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated by either the American Film Institute or the National Film Registry. Since the dependent variable is simply whether a film is retrospectively consecrated, the most appropriate statistical technique for this analysis is logistic regression. In view of the fact that the parameters of logistic regression models are not easy to interpret directly, this analysis presents the odds ratios obtained from the exponentiated coefficients of these models. An odds ratio greater than 1 implies that there is a positive relationship between an independent variable and the odds that a film was retrospectively consecrated (Bishop, Fienberg & Holland 1975). An odds ratio less than 1 implies that there is a negative relationship between an independent variable and the odds of retrospective consecration. The analysis first examines the effects of the various forms of popular, professional, and critical recognition that a film receives at the time of its release, as well as its age, on its likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated. Next, it examines the effects of the significant forms of contemporaneous recognition in conjunction with the extent of discourse about a film and its director on its odds of being retrospectively consecrated.

The results of five logistic regression analyses of the effects of various sets of variables on the likelihood of a film being selected as one of the 100 greatest films of all time by the American Film Institute are presented in Table 1. Model 1 includes only the age of a film and the extent of its popular recognition as independent variables. It reveals that being among the top ten films of the year in terms of box-office revenue has a positive effect on the odds of consecration. Model 2 includes the age of a film and the forms of professional recognition as independent variables. This model reveals that receiving an Academy Award nomination for best director and, to a lesser extent, receiving nominations for best editor and best musical director have positive effects on the odds of consecration. Model 3 includes the age of a film and forms of critical recognition as independent variables. It reveals that being selected among the ten best films of the year by the *New York Times* and the National Board of Review and receiving awards from the New York Film Critics for best picture and best actor have positive effects on the likelihood of retrospective consecration by the American Film Institute. The age of a film has no effect on the likelihood of retrospective consecration in any of these models.

Model 4 in Table 1 includes the age of a film and all these various forms of popular, professional, and critical recognition as independent variables. When these variables are considered simultaneously, only being among the top ten films of the year in terms of box-office revenue and receiving an Academy Award nomination for best director have significant positive effects on the odds

TABLE 1: Logistic Regression Analyses (Odds Ratios) of the Effects of Professional, Critical, and Popular Recognition, Age, and Extent of Discourse on the Selection of Films As One of the 100 Greatest Films by the American Film Institute, 1929–1991

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age of film	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	
Top ten box office	2.97**			3.74**	6.26**
Best picture nomination		1.91		1.38	
Best director nomination		9.05**		10.49**	21.97**
Best actors nomination		1.23		1.81	
Best screenwriter nomination		1.84		1.75	
Best cinematographer nomination		1.03		1.05	
Best editor nomination		2.01*		1.50	
Best art director nomination		0.83		1.05	
Best musical dir. nomination		1.80*		1.83 [†]	2.25*
<i>New York Times</i> 10 best			2.32**	1.70	
Nat. Board of Review 10 best			1.92*	0.85	
N.Y.F.C. best picture			2.59*	0.88	
N.Y.F.C. best director			2.24 [†]	2.40 [†]	2.27 [†]
N.Y.F.C. best actors			1.98*	1.14	
Books about director (square root)					1.43**
Anthology entries (square root)					3.70**
χ^2	21.9	211.8	77.9	228.3	318.3
Pseudo R ²	.035	.345	.135	.395	.551
N	1,277	1,277	1,162	1,162	1,162

[†] $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

of retrospective consecration. However, receiving an Academy Award nomination for best musical director and receiving a New York Film Critics award for best director also have marginally significant positive effects on the odds of consecration. Finally, model 5 includes all these variables as well as the two measures of critical discourse as independent variables. It reveals that both the number of books about the director of a film and the number of anthology entries about a film have significant positive effects on the odds of retrospective consecration by the American Film Institute. Moreover, being among the top ten films of the year in terms of box-office revenue and receiving Academy Award nominations for best director and best musical director also have significant positive effects on the likelihood of retrospective consecration.

The results of parallel logistic regression analyses of the effects of these same sets of variables on the likelihood of a film being selected for inclusion on the National Film Registry are presented in Table 2. As before, model 1 includes

TABLE 2: Logistic Regression Analyses (Odds Ratios) of the Effects of Professional, Critical, and Popular Recognition, Age, and Extent of Discourse on the Selection of Films for Inclusion in National Film Registry, 1929–1991

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Age of film	1.01**	1.02**	1.02**	1.02**	1.01
Top ten box office	1.17			1.35	
Best picture nomination		2.09**		1.86*	1.58
Best director nomination		2.26**		1.94*	1.64
Best actors nomination		1.13		1.06	
Best screenwriter nomination		2.12**		2.11**	2.00*
Best cinematographer nomination		.88		.91	
Best editor nomination		1.16		.98	
Best art director nomination		1.34		1.55†	1.41
Best musical director nomination		.86		.87	
<i>New York Times</i> 10 best			2.45**	1.84**	1.35
National Board of Review 10 best			1.64*	1.14	
N.Y.F.C. best picture			1.48	.72	
N.Y.F.C. best director			3.06**	2.76*	2.36*
N.Y.F.C. best actors			1.71†	1.18	
Books about director (square root)					1.20*
Anthology entries (square root)					3.03**
χ^2	9.0	133.4	90.8	150.3	250.9
Pseudo R ²	.011	.159	.118	.195	.325
N	1,277	1,277	1,162	1,162	1,162

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

only the age of a film and popular recognition as independent variables. This model reveals that only age of film has a positive effect on the odds of consecration. Model 2 includes the age of a film and various forms of professional recognition as independent variables. It reveals that the age of a film and receiving Academy Award nominations for best picture, best director and best screenwriter have positive effects on the odds of consecration. Model 3 includes the age of a film and various forms of critical recognition as independent variables. This model reveals that the age of a film, being selected among the ten best films of the year by the *New York Times* and the National Board of Review, and receiving an award from the New York Film Critics for best director have positive effects on the likelihood of retrospective consecration by the National Film Registry.

Model 4 in Table 2 includes the age of a film and all these various measures of popular, professional, and critical recognition as independent variables.

When these variables are considered simultaneously, only age of film, receiving Academy Award nominations for best picture, best director, and best screenwriter, being selected among the best ten films of the year by the *New York Times*, and receiving a New York Film Critics award for best director have significant positive effects on the odds of consecration. However, receiving an Academy Award nomination for best art director has a marginally significant positive effect on the odds of consecration. Finally, model 5 includes these variables as well as the two measures of critical discourse as independent variables. Once again, it reveals that both the number of books about the director of a film and the number of anthology entries about a film have significant independent effects on the odds of retrospective consecration by the National Film Registry. Moreover, receiving an Academy Award nomination for best screenwriter and receiving a New York Film Critics award for best director also have positive significant effects on the likelihood of retrospective consecration.

These results of these analyses require further explication on two points. First, the fact that the effects of receiving an Academy Award nomination for best director and best picture are not statistically significant in the final model for retrospective consecration by the National Film Registry can be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that these two measures of professional recognition are highly correlated (0.614). If either variable is deleted from this model, the other becomes statistically significant. Indeed, the correlation between these two measures of professional consecration suggests that even members of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences associate the excellence of a film with the achievements of its director. Second, it must be noted that the extent of critical discourse received by a film is undoubtedly affected by the popular, professional, and critical recognition that it receives at the time of its release. The final models in both Table 1 and Table 2 examine only the direct effects of these independent variables. The total effects of these variables, including their indirect effects through the critical discourse variables, are more substantial and significant than their direct effects. Indeed, that is the reason why the effects of these independent variables are examined separately in these models.

As one might expect, there are a number of similarities between the results presented in Table 1 and those presented in Table 2. In both sets of analyses, it is apparent that the contemporaneous recognition received by the director, either in terms of Academy Award nominations for best director or New York Film Critics awards for best director, has a positive effect on the odds of retrospective consecration. The extent of critical discourse about a film, in terms of the number of anthology entries, and the extent of critical discourse about its director, in terms of the number of books about the director, also have a positive effect on the odds of retrospective consecration. However, there are important differences between these two analyses as well. Popular recognition,

TABLE 3: Mean Number of Books about Director and Mean Number of Entries in Film Anthologies for Contemporaneously Recognized Films and Retrospectively Consecrated Films, 1929–1991

	Number	Mean Number of Books about Director	Mean Number of Entries in Anthologies
All films among top ten in box-office revenue each year	582	2.8	0.9
All films with 3 or more Academy Award nominations	553	4.0	1.5
All Films selected by National Board of Review	582	3.8	1.3
All Films selected by <i>New York Times</i>	482	4.8	1.6
Films selected by National Film Registry	131	7.0**	4.2**
Films selected by American Film Institute	83	8.2**	5.3**
Films selected by both American Film Institute and National Film Registry	65	9.2	6.3**

** $p < .01$

in the form of being among the top ten films in a given year in terms of box-office revenue, has an effect on the likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated by the American Film Institute but not by the National Film Registry. Indeed, the odds ratios suggest that receiving an Academy Award nomination for best director has a much greater effect on the odds of retrospective consecration by the American Film Institute than it has on the odds of retrospective consecration by the National Film Registry.

A comparison of the goodness-of-fit statistics for these two models indicates that the variables used in this analysis account for the selections of the American Film Institute better than they account for the selections of the National Film Registry. Overall, the similarities between these two analyses suggest that the implicit criteria employed in these retrospective consecration projects are similar but not identical. Indeed, it is possible to measure directly the association between the results of these two independent retrospective consecration projects. As noted earlier, the 1,277 contemporaneously recognized films in the sample include 131 of the 202 narrative sound films selected for the National Film Registry and 83 of the 93 narrative sound films selected by the American Film Institute. Altogether, there are 65 films that are on both lists. The Yule's Q for the association between the list of best films identified by the American

Film Institute and the list of best films identified by the National Film Registry is 0.958. In short, prior knowledge of whether films are on one list reduces the errors in predicting whether they are also on the other list by 95.8 percent (Bishop, Fienberg & Holland 1975:387-89). By this criterion, it is apparent that these two retrospective consecration projects yield very similar results.

It can be argued that the accumulation of extensive critical discourse about a film and its director contributes to the formation of a consensus that it is worthy of retrospective consecration. Table 3 presents the mean number of books about the directors and the mean number of entries in film anthologies for the films in the sample. It is apparent that those films that are consensus selections for retrospective consecration, those selected by both the American Film Institute and the National Film Registry, have significantly more books about their directors and more entries in film anthologies than films selected by only one of these two institutions. Moreover, those films that were selected either by the American Film Institute or the National Film Registry have significantly more books about their directors and more entries in film anthologies than films that received only contemporaneous popular, professional, or critical recognition. In short, those films that are consensus selections for retrospective consecration are the objects of much more critical discourse than other films. Indeed, the 65 films that were consensus selections for retrospective consecration had four times as many entries in anthologies as did other contemporaneously recognized films. Similarly, the directors of these films had twice as many books written about them as did the directors of the other films in the sample.

Finally, the theory proposed in this study argues that the particular discourse of value applied to films has a differential effect on their likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated. The ascendancy of auteur theory as a cultural schema in films studies serves not only to privilege the contributions of directors over those of other collaborators in the production of films, it also serves to privilege some directors over others. Although there is no definitive directory of auteur directors, they have generally been the subjects of more books by film scholars than other directors. Table 4 presents a list of the 29 directors who had two or more films selected for retrospective consecration, at least one by the American Film Institute and at least one other by the National Film Registry. It also presents the number of Academy Award nominations received by these directors and the number of books written about them. The number of books written about each of these 29 directors is closely related to the number of their films selected by either the American Film Institute ($r = 0.381$) or the National Film Registry ($r = 0.414$). Although the number of Academy Award nominations received by these directors is also closely related to the number of their films selected by the American Film

TABLE 4: Number of Retrospectively Consecrated Films, Number of Academy Award Nominations, and Number of Books about Director for 27 Directors with Two or More Retrospectively Consecrated Films, 1929–1991

Name of Director	AFI List	NFR List	Best Director Nominations	Books about Director
Alfred Hitchcock	4	5	5	42
John Ford	3	6	5	8
Steven Spielberg	5	3	4	19
Billy Wilder	4	4	8	10
William Wyler	3	4	12	5
Martin Scorsese	3	4	3	14
Francis Ford Coppola	3	4	4	9
Stanley Kubrick	3	3	4	12
Frank Capra	3	3	6	16
George Stevens	3	3	5	1
John Huston	3	3	5	10
Howard Hawks	1	5	1	9
Michael Curtiz	2	4	4	4
George Cukor	2	3	5	9
Elia Kazan	2	3	5	12
David Lean	3	2	7	6
Robert Wise	2	3	3	1
Vincente Minnelli	1	4	2	6
George Lucas	2	2	2	7
Orson Welles	1	3	1	21
Woody Allen	1	2	6	23
Robert Altman	1	2	4	9
Sam Peckinpah	1	2	0	5
Milos Forman	2	1	3	3
Fred Zinneman	2	1	7	2
Lewis Milestone	2	1	5	2
Leo McCarey	1	2	3	1
Franklin Schaffner	1	1	1	1
Victor Fleming	1	1	1	0

Institute (0.533), it is not closely related to the number of their films selected by the National Film Registry (0.178).

Given the ascendancy of auteur theory, it is not surprising to find that many of the retrospectively consecrated films were directed by auteur directors. The two directors with the most retrospectively consecrated films, John Ford and Alfred Hitchcock, have been the subjects of several books and were identified by one influential proponent of auteur theory (Sarris 1968) as “pantheon directors.” Indeed, two other “pantheon directors” on this list, Orson Welles and Howard Hawks, have both been the subjects of several books even though

they each received only one best director nomination during their careers. At the same time, however, there are directors who are associated with several retrospectively consecrated films despite the fact that they have been the subjects of relatively few books. For example, neither George Stevens nor Michael Curtiz is generally considered to be an auteur director even though they received several Academy Awards nominations for best director during their careers. In these cases, the particular films directed by these directors were retrospectively consecrated because the films themselves received contemporaneous professional and critical recognition and have been the subjects of considerable discourse in the form of entries in film anthologies. For example, George Stevens directed *A Place in the Sun* and Michael Curtiz directed *Casablanca*. Both of these films garnered Academy Award nominations for both best picture and best director and are routinely mentioned in film anthologies.

Conclusions

This research provides considerable empirical confirmation for the theoretical propositions advanced by this study concerning the process of retrospective cultural consecration, especially as it applies to films. In general, the extent of professional and critical recognition received by the director of a film has substantial positive effects on its likelihood of being retrospectively consecrated. In addition, the extent of subsequent critical discourse about a film and its director has significant positive effects on its odds of retrospective consecration. Indeed, the fact that older films have often been the subject of more articles and books than newer films may account for the finding that age does not have any effect on the retrospective consecration of films. Moreover, despite the fact that the National Film Registry has a slightly broader mandate than did the American Film Institute in selecting films of cultural, historical, or aesthetic significance, the two retrospective consecration projects achieved very similar results. Those narrative films selected by one institution were very likely to be chosen by the other. However, films that received popular recognition at the time of their release were more likely to be retrospectively consecrated by the American Film Institute than they were by the National Film Registry.

In general, these findings confirm the argument that the valorization and retrospective consecration of cultural producers and products is influenced, at least to some extent, by the activities of reputational entrepreneurs who are responsible for producing much of the discourse within a field of cultural production (Fine 1996). With the emergence of film studies as an academic discipline, a large volume of discourse, in the form of articles and books about films and their directors, is produced each year. Film critics and scholars are able to act as reputational entrepreneurs by choosing to study some directors and their films

and ignore other directors and their films. At the same time, however, these findings suggest that the cultural authority exercised by these film critics and scholars is constrained by the cultural schemas employed in this discourse. Given the ascendancy of auteur theory as a discourse of value within film studies, critics and scholars are often compelled to frame their aesthetic judgments of films in terms of the contributions of their directors. Moreover, once certain directors have been identified as auteurs, it is difficult for film critics and scholars to ignore them or their films. The fact that John Ford is considered as an auteur director and George Seaton is not may be the primary reason why *The Searchers* was retrospectively consecrated and *The Country Girl* was not.

The results of these analyses also reveal some of the limitations of auteur theory. Auteur directors, those who have been subjects of numerous books, are more likely to have their films retrospectively consecrated than other directors. The films of less celebrated directors may be retrospectively consecrated but only if they received sufficient professional, critical, and popular recognition at the time of their release. Moreover, this theory does not explain why some directors and their films were the subjects of more books and articles than other directors and their films. Some very accomplished directors, who have received considerable professional or critical recognition, have not been the subjects of very many articles or books. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to explain why some directors are considered auteurs by film scholars and critics while others are dismissed as mere technicians. There is some evidence that the original proponents of auteur theory favored those directors who were seen to possess a distinct and consistent cinematic style (Hiller 1985). In short, these theorists argued that auteur directors, by their characteristic use of lighting, camera, and staging, left an identifiable imprint on their films (Bordwell & Thompson 1993). Whatever the criteria, this discourse produced by the early contributors to the French film journal *Cahiers du Cinéma* and later American proponents of auteur theory (Sarris 1968) has had a profound effect on the artistic reputations of certain directors and their films.

In recent years, auteur theory has been supplemented by a number of other film theories, such as genre theory and feminist theory. These alternative cultural schemas, which are more interpretative than evaluative in nature, have enabled film scholars to examine the historical and cultural influences on both film production (Schatz 1988) and audience reception (Jenkins 1995). However, auteur theory remains the predominant discourse of value with respect to films (Corrigan 1991; Dudley 1993). Its appeal can be attributed, in part, to the romantic assumption that one person, namely the director, is ultimately responsible for the aesthetic merits of a film. Moreover, auteur theory is popular as an evaluative theory because it invites comparisons among the films directed by the same director. Finally, unlike most of the other cultural schemas applied to films, auteur theory is both simple and accessible. At the

same time, the ascendancy of auteur theory as the dominant form of discourse in film studies and film criticism has served to privilege the contributions of directors over those of other creative artists involved in the production of those films (Crofts 1998; Schatz 1988). The problem of ascertaining the contributions of various creative artists to a given film is complicated by the fact that accomplished directors typically collaborate with other accomplished actors, screenwriters, and cinematographers (Faulkner & Anderson 1987).

The results of this study have implications for the development of more general theories of cultural valorization and consecration that are applicable to other fields of cultural production. In particular, these results indicate that theories of collective memory are relevant to the process of retrospective cultural valorization and consecration. Specifically, the fact that certain cultural producers have achieved the status of brand labels contributes to the likelihood that their products will be valorized and consecrated (Lang & Lang 1988). These results also confirm that cultural valorization and consecration are greatly affected by the intellectual and critical discourse surrounding certain cultural products and their producers (Shrum 1996). Critics and scholars, who produce this intellectual and critical discourse, may serve as reputational entrepreneurs, but their intellectual authority is derived from their ability to frame their aesthetic judgments within the context of specific cultural schemas (Beisel 1993; DiMaggio 1997). Finally, the results of consecration projects are important because they provide valuable insights into the cultural schemas employed by various groups and organizations. In so doing, they reveal both the strengths and the limitations of various discourses of value.

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
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Structured Ignorance and Organized Racism in the United States*

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Abstract

A theory of structured ignorance is developed and applied in an analysis of variation in the number of racist organizations in U.S. counties in 1997 and 2000. The theory identifies forms of structural differentiation that would make the worldview constructed within racist organizations seem plausible to a critical mass of individuals. I argue that racial and ethnic heterogeneity, industrial heterogeneity, income inequality, and changes in the economic structure within local communities provide "evidence" that may appear to be consistent with white supremacists' claims if individuals lack an alternative interpretation. Educational inequality, however, inhibits racist organizing by facilitating the exchange of information that could be used to reject the white supremacists' claims and by promoting passive acceptance of the existing order.

Throughout much of the history of the U.S., a majority of white Americans have favored racial segregation based on a belief in the natural superiority of whites over blacks. Over the past fifty years, however, there has been a substantial decline in the number of Americans who openly express attitudes of traditional prejudice. Survey research shows that many white Americans continue to oppose policies such as affirmative action that are designed to promote racial equality (Jackman & Muha 1984; Quillian 1996; Schuman, Steeh & Bobo 1988), yet only a small proportion express attitudes reflecting a belief that whites are innately superior to nonwhites and therefore more deserving of basic rights

**I am grateful to Peter Bearman, Judith Blau, Kathleen Blee, Dan Myers, François Nielsen, Tom Rotolo, David Sikkink, and Mim Thomas for their valuable comments and suggestions. Thanks also to François Nielsen for calculating measures of income inequality. Finally, I would like to thank Mark Potok and the staff at the Southern Poverty Law Center for their assistance and for making their data available to researchers and to the general public. Direct all correspondence to Rory McVeigh, Department of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, 810 Flanner Hall, Notre Dame, IN 46556.*

and privileges (see Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Firebaugh & Davis 1988; Quillian 1996). Although a belief in white supremacy has declined steadily in the United States among the general population, a white supremacy movement has gained strength since the early 1980s (Blee 1998; Ezekiel 1995). According to the Southern Poverty Law Center's "Intelligence Project," more than 600 hate groups were active in the United States in the year 2000 (SPLC 2000).

Currently, the white supremacy movement in the United States is fractionalized and politically powerless in comparison to white supremacy movements of earlier historical eras such as the Ku Klux Klan of the 1870s and of the 1920s. Nevertheless, membership in various racist organizations, particularly neo-Nazi and skinhead organizations, has been on the rise (Perry 2000), and the Internet has provided these groups with a means of reaching new audiences with their messages (see Blazak 2001; Burris, Smith & Strahm 2000). Racist organizations have also been responsible for, or have provided inspiration for, numerous hate crimes in recent years (see Dees & Corcoran 1996; Feagin & Vera 1995; Levin & McDevitt 1993).

In this article I offer a theory of structured ignorance that draws attention to structural conditions that facilitate and sustain racist organizations within advanced industrial nations such as the United States. I develop Michael Schwartz's (1976) concept of "structured ignorance" and draw upon Peter Blau's macrostructural theory of social relations (Blau 1977, 1994; Blau & Schwartz 1984). Following Schwartz's lead, I consider the ways in which different patterns of structural differentiation in society can either conceal or reveal information that is needed to develop an accurate diagnosis of the problems that confront groups and individuals. The term "structured ignorance" is not meant to be pejorative. Instead, the term acknowledges that the world can look quite different to individuals depending upon their position in the social structure. An interpretation of a particular problem may seem bizarre to individuals in one structural context while it may seem perfectly reasonable in another. Yet the term also suggests that some forms of structural differentiation prevent individuals from recognizing the most effective means of solving their problems. Blau's theory is used to identify structural conditions that increase the likelihood that individuals would see organized racism as a plausible solution to their shared grievances.

I begin with a description of the white supremacy movement and of the various groups that comprise it. Following that, I briefly discuss theoretical approaches that have been used to explain racial conflict and social movements before introducing a theory of structured ignorance. I then apply the theory in an analysis of variation in the number of racist organizations in U.S. counties. My central goal is to identify structural conditions that facilitate racist organizing by providing a context in which the worldview that is constructed within racist organizations (e.g., see Blee 2002) appears to be consistent with

what white supremacists are able to observe in their everyday social interactions.

Organized Racism in the United States

White supremacy movements are recurrent phenomena in U.S. history. Of these movements, the Ku Klux Klan has earned the most notoriety. Historically, there have been three major peaks in Klan activity, with each peak occurring at a time when major transformations were taking place in the economic order. The original Klan wreaked havoc throughout the South in the aftermath of the Civil War, using violence and intimidation to suppress African Americans' newly acquired economic and political rights. The Klan was reborn in 1915 and enjoyed tremendous popularity in the early 1920s. Unlike the first Ku Klux Klan, this one was not confined to southern states. The growth of the Klan during this time period was, in part, a reaction to industrialists' accelerated use of unskilled labor, severe shortages of agricultural labor, and high protective tariffs enacted in 1921 and 1922 that exacerbated a sharp postwar agricultural depression (see Blee 1991; MacLean 1994; McVeigh 1999, 2001). A third peak in Klan activity took place in the 1960s, largely in response to the gains made by the civil rights movement (McAdam 1982, 1983). Once again, the Klan used violence and terror in an attempt to deny African Americans their basic economic, political, and social rights.

Like earlier incarnations of the Ku Klux Klan, the contemporary white supremacy movement began to gain strength during a period of economic transition. Declines in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the economy during the 1980s provided fertile recruiting ground for white supremacist organizations within communities that bore the brunt of the changes (Bullard 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997). The Ku Klux Klan has played a role in the resurgence of the white supremacy movement, but its influence, particularly outside the South, has been overshadowed by a number of other organizations that are not burdened by the historical legacy of the Klan and therefore enjoy greater flexibility in formulating a message that resonates with potential recruits outside the South in the contemporary era.

The Ku Klux Klan is but one of a staggering variety of racist organizations that compete and at times cooperate with one another within a broader white supremacy movement. Many of these organizations are loosely linked by their adherence to Christian Identity theology. As Blee (1998) describes it, "Christian Identity is a quasi-theological network of between two and three hundred churches across the nation linked by Christian Identity Family Bible Camps and radio shows that preach that Anglo-Saxons are the lost tribe of Israel and the Jews and African Americans and other people of color are inferiors sent

to earth as a scourge from God" (191). According to this belief system, Eve was impregnated with two seeds. Cain and the Jews are believed to be the product of a seed planted by Satan, while members of the "white" race are descendants of Abel, who was born of Adam's seed (Blee 1998). Nonwhites, while they are not believed to be direct descendants of Satan, are viewed with disdain and considered to be less than human (SPLC 1998).

Not unlike many mainstream conservative religious belief systems in the United States, Identity Theology constructs an absolute dichotomy of good and evil and promotes a belief in absolute moral standards (Robbins & Anthony 1979; C. Smith 1996). Unlike mainstream religions, however, evil is presumed to be located within individuals based on their ascribed characteristics. Identity theology constructs a violent tension between the presumed descendants of Cain and Abel, and it legitimates even the most violent actions that may be directed toward Jews and toward racial and ethnic minority group members (Blee 1998; Bullard 1991; Sharpe 2000).

In recent years new radical religious belief systems have gained strength within the white supremacy movement, challenging the privileged position of Identity Theology among American racist organizations. Most notable among these are the Church of the Creator (COTC), also called "Creativity," and racist adaptations of the Norse pagan religion Odinism and its offshoot Asatru'. Like Identity Theology, COTC and racist pagan religions demonize Jews and racial and ethnic minorities, while encouraging followers to prepare for a race war. They are critical of Identity Theology's ties to Christianity, however, and have a close affinity with Nazism (see Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997; SPLC 1998).

The white supremacy movement contains four primary wings, consisting of Ku Klux Klan organizations, neo-Nazi organizations, skinheads, and adherents of Christian Identity theology (see Bullard 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997; Perry 2000).¹ There are, of course, important differences among organizations within and across the four major wings of the movement, and several organizations defy simple categorization. Differences across racist organizations, however, should not obscure a broad consensus that exists in the white supremacy movement on several central tenets. Members and supporters, first of all, see themselves as being part of a white race that is innately superior to Jews and to racial and ethnic minorities. They believe in racial separation and are particularly sensitive when it comes to interracial sexual relations (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997; Ferber 1998).

White supremacists also believe that they are victims of racial discrimination, as they think that racial and ethnic minorities, with the help of the federal government, have unfair access to jobs and other valuable resources (Berbrier 2000; Blee 2002). White supremacists believe that the white race is losing ground to other groups and that extreme measures are required to reverse the trend (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997; Feagin & Vera 1995; Ferber

1998). They also resent white Americans who are enjoying economic prosperity. Prosperous whites are seen as beneficiaries of, and even conspirators in, the social changes that are leading to the declining position of the white majority. Promotion of free trade and a global economy are viewed as part of a plot that benefits the elite, as well as other races throughout the world, while reducing the standard of living for ordinary white Americans (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997). White supremacist leaders offer a critique of capitalism that is couched in language of Jewish conspiracies and Jewish plots to create a one-world government.

While white supremacist organizations draw members from all social classes, observations of the movement indicate that membership is concentrated in the working class and in the lower middle class (see Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997). The movement's rhetoric concerning the declining position of the white race should be particularly appealing to white Americans who have experienced downward mobility or who are insecure about their economic circumstances. Others may be drawn to the movement not by their own downward mobility and insecurity but by those of their friends and family members. White supremacist leaders have made a deliberate effort to capitalize on feelings of economic insecurity as they have recruited heavily in communities that have been hit hard by agricultural decline and by the decline of the manufacturing economy (Bullard 1991). As Matt Hale, the leader of the racist COTC describes it,

When we send jobs overseas, for example, it's not the rich who hurt, you know, because the rich — a lot of them are actually sending the jobs overseas. But the working class hurt and the working class know what it means to work, to be a productive citizen and they don't like the fact that their livelihood is being taken from them. And they also don't like the fact that there are people on welfare who are just living off them. So, I would say, at looking over our rolls, our membership rolls in my head, that most of our members are working class. (Quoted in Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997:27)

The white supremacist leaders' critique of the global economy seems to have struck a chord with many recruits (SPLC 2000). Commenting favorably on the 1999 protest against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, white supremacist leader Louis Beam claimed,

The new politics of America is liberty from the NWO [new world order] Police State and nothing more. . . . Whatever their political sympathies, the violent Seattle protesters were bravely fighting the Police State goons who were there to protect the slimy corporate interests of free trade at the expense of free people. (Quoted in SPLC 2000:42)

Rhetoric such as this feeds upon the genuine fears and frustrations that come with individuals' feelings of economic insecurity and provides individuals with

a target for their accompanying feelings of anger and resentment. Targets of recruitment are led to believe that they are victims of a grand conspiracy orchestrated by Jews and by elite whites. Jews, elites, and racial and ethnic minorities are portrayed as beneficiaries of the economic transformations that are contributing to the downfall of the white majority.

In their analysis of the contemporary white supremacy movement, Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997) have emphasized the role that economic instability and uncertainty play in promoting the growth of racist organizations. Many members of these organizations, they argue, are concerned with real and pressing economic difficulties and are seeking solutions when the government seems to be unresponsive to their needs. A consequence of economic inequality, they suggest, "is the blending of economic concerns with a broad base of political support among mainstream citizens, such as fear over unemployment and the declining standard of living, with ideological beliefs like white separatism that are held by a much smaller segment of the population" (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997:293).

Blee's (2002) research on women in the contemporary racist movement, however, casts doubt on the notion that economic insecurity is a driving force in the movement. Many of the members she observed were not suffering from economic hardship, and for some members economic hardship was a consequence rather than a cause of their participation in a stigmatized movement (Blee 2002). More important, very few members she interviewed cited economic self-interest as a motive for joining. In fact, many of Blee's interviewees did not claim to have strong beliefs concerning race until after they became members. Describing the experience of one racist member to illustrate an apparent trend, Blee (2002) writes,

Janice did not characterize her entry into organized racism as a heartfelt search for a way to express her beliefs or safeguard her interests. Rather, she presented becoming a white supremacist as something that just happened, tied more closely to her social life than to her ideology. (27)

According to Blee (2002), the most common route to membership is simply through contact with a member of a racist group. Based on her interviews and observations of racist women, she claims that most women come into racist groups with beliefs and ideas that are closer to being mainstream than radical. It is in the group setting (within the racist organizations) that they come to adopt many of the extreme beliefs that are promoted by the movement. Blee's observations are consistent, in many respects, with Bearman and Stovel's (2000) analysis of autobiographical accounts of individuals who joined the Nazi Party in Germany before the Nazis seized power. Bearman and Stovel find that macrolevel events such as World War I and the economic crisis are rarely mentioned in these narratives concerning the process of becoming a Nazi.

Becoming a Nazi is more commonly explained in terms of "ordinary events occurring in the author's local world" (Bearman & Stovel 2000:83).

Is the contemporary racist movement, as Dobratz and Shanks-Meile suggest, a response to genuine economic grievances among those who feel that the federal government is unresponsive to their problems? Or, as Blee contends, are the beliefs expressed by movement members, whether they concern race or the economy, better understood as a consequence rather than a cause of exposure to racist movements? I propose that a theory of structured ignorance can unite these seemingly contradictory claims. The theory should also contribute to our understanding of social movement participation in general by calling attention to the ways in which collective action frames that are developed in a group setting (e.g., within social movement organizations) are also developed and evaluated within a broader structural context. Rather than debating the rationality or irrationality of movement participation, the goal is to identify features of the social structure that make social movement claims appear plausible to a critical mass of individuals, regardless of their accuracy. Before presenting that theory, however, it is necessary to briefly discuss other theoretical approaches that have been used to explain racial and ethnic conflict and social movements.

White Supremacy and Theories of Ethnic Conflict

Although the white supremacy movement began to gain strength in the United States in the early 1980s, it has just recently attracted significant attention from social scientists. As yet there have been only a few systematic studies of variation in the movement's activity across time or geographic location. For the most part, these studies have explained the movement in terms of ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992) or some form of economic or political threat posed by minority group members (Blalock 1967). Ethnic competition theory characterizes intergroup conflict as a manifestation of an underlying struggle over scarce resources (Olzak 1992). This competition can be intensified by increasing intergroup contact or by increasing scarcity of valuable resources within local settings. Ethnic competition theory and, more generally, models of economic and political threat have been fruitfully applied in several studies of overt racial and ethnic conflict and violence. These include studies of labor conflict (Olzak 1989), lynching (Olzak 1990; Soule 1992; Tolnay & Beck 1995), riots (Myers 1997; Olzak, Shanahan & McEneaney 1996), and ethnic and nationalist movements (McVeigh 1999; Nielsen 1985; Olzak 2002).

Beck (2000) applied ethnic competition theory in an analysis of variation in white supremacist activity in southern counties between 1980 and 1990. In his analysis he found that white supremacist activity was more common in

counties in which Asians and Hispanics had gained an increased relative share of aggregate household income. In a time-series analysis Soule and Van Dyke (1999) show that increases in black church arsons from 1989 to 1996 are associated with increasing numbers of black elected officials, higher unemployment, and lower per capita income. Also in support of a political threat model, Van Dyke, Soule, and Widom (2001) find higher numbers of hate crimes committed against gays and lesbians in states with higher numbers of gay elected officials. The authors acknowledge, however, that this finding could be due to more diligent hate crime enforcement and reporting practices in these states rather than to a higher number of actual hate crimes committed in response to a perceived political threat.

While it is likely that competition and threat play a role in explaining the emergence of contemporary white supremacy organizations, there is reason to suspect that this theoretical approach is more useful in explaining violence and criminal activity initiated by these organizations than in explaining the movement itself. While many of the organizations are located in racially and ethnically diverse communities, others are situated in communities that are ethnically homogeneous. While some white supremacists do engage in direct conflict with minority group members, many do not. In addition, models of competition and threat do not help us understand why anti-Semitism plays such a central role in white supremacist discourse. White supremacists in the United States, after all, rarely find themselves in direct competition with increasing numbers of Jewish Americans in local settings. It is also worth noting that the racist women interviewed by Blee did not describe their decision to join racist organizations as a response to economic competition or a political threat. Factors that motivate racial and ethnic conflict could be different, in several important respects, from factors that help sustain racist social movement organizations in the U.S.

White Supremacy and Social Movement Theory

Leaders of the white supremacy movement have attempted to recruit members by capitalizing on the discontent of farmers, manufacturing workers, and middle-class Americans who have been adversely affected by changes in the economy. Clearly, members and supporters of racist organizations are dissatisfied with existing social, economic, and political arrangements in the United States. Organized racism and white separatism are offered as solutions to a wide array of problems that potential recruits may face. Members and supporters of racist organizations use Jews, homosexuals, African Americans, and other racial and ethnic minorities as scapegoats, and they engage in activities that have no realistic chance of solving their problems (see Feagin &

Vera 1995). As Blee (2002) has noted, participation in racist organizations actually exacerbates problems for many members. It would appear that the only benefits to be gained from participation in these organizations involve the psychic satisfaction that may come from expressing one's resentments and prejudices in the company of like-minded individuals.

The preceding interpretation of the white supremacy movement, however, is at odds with the way in which social movement participants are depicted by contemporary social movement theories. The most widely utilized theories in the field, resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald 1973, 1977; Oberschall 1973) and political opportunity theory (see Jenkins 1985; Jenkins & Klandermans 1995; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989, 1994), characterize social movement participants as rational actors engaged in strategic interaction with the state and other opponents to win new benefits for the group (Klandermans 1997; Tarrow 1994). Contemporary research on specific social movements tends to downplay the causal significance of group discontent, focusing attention instead upon the importance of social network ties in recruiting processes (Klandermans 1997; McAdam 1986; Oberschall 1973; Snow, Zurcher & Ekland-Olson 1980) and on the ways in which groups strategically exploit organizational resources and political opportunities to advance collective interests. In the case of the civil rights movement, for example, strategic action was readily apparent in tactics such as bus boycotts, sit-ins, and freedom rides (McAdam 1982, 1983; Morris 1984; Oberschall 1989). By disrupting the normal functioning of society through peaceful demonstrations, the civil rights movement gained leverage against the federal government and against opponents and was able to secure new benefits for constituents (McAdam 1982).

The rationality of organized racism, however, is not as obvious. Preparing for war against the "Zionist-occupied government," after all, hardly seems to be a rational or strategic response to whatever grievances the white supremacists may hold. Yet qualitative research on contemporary racist organizations suggests that white supremacist members, while they may not adhere to a logically consistent ideology and may not even have a firm grasp of the ideology espoused by their leaders (Blee 1998, 2002), do appear to believe that their actions and their participation in the movement will result in collective benefits for their group (see Blee 1996, 1998; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997). As Blee (1996, 2002) describes it, they selectively draw upon the leaders' discourse, shaping and reshaping movement ideology in a way that seems consistent with their own life experiences and understandings of the world.

In recent years an increasing number of social movement researchers have focused attention on processes of meaning construction (or framing processes) within social movements. Proponents of the framing perspective in social movement theory have pointed out that even when conditions seem ripe for

the emergence of social protest (e.g., organizational resources are in place, and the political climate is favorable), individuals are unlikely to participate in collective action if they do not interpret their situation as a collective problem that could be solved through collective action (McAdam 1982; Snow & Benford 1992; Snow et al. 1986). Researchers utilizing the framing perspective have focused on the way that social movement leaders frame the issues, or offer interpretations of the situation that resonate with individuals whom they hope to recruit, bringing the worldviews of the movement organizers and potential members into alignment (Gamson 1992b; Snow & Benford 1992; Snow et al. 1986).

Frame resonance has been identified as a key component of any successful collective action frame (Snow et al. 1986). If a frame is to motivate collective action, it must have some empirical credibility among those targeted for recruitment (Babb 1996; Cress & Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986). Some researchers have compared collective action frames to falsifiable hypotheses or scientific paradigms that can be disconfirmed by empirical observation if they depart too much from the lived experiences of movement members and supporters (Babb 1996; Gamson 1992a; Snow et al. 1986). As yet, however, there have been few systematic studies of the relationship between the frames that are constructed by movement leaders and the objective circumstances that confront targets of movement recruiting (see Benford 1997).

Inattention to the relationship between movement frames and the circumstances of recruitment targets makes it difficult to address questions concerning differential participation among similarly situated individuals. Why do some individuals accept the worldview constructed by white supremacists while others reject it? Why are racist organizations able to take root in some communities and not in others? While individuals act upon their perceptions of reality rather than on objective circumstances, those perceptions are rooted in observable structural arrangements. To fully understand the motives and the worldview of white supremacists, it is essential to situate white supremacist organizations within a structural context.

A Theory of Structured Ignorance

In his case study of the Farmers' Alliance, Michael Schwartz (1976) offered an explanation for the seemingly irrational behavior of some protest participants. His explanation has been largely ignored by social movement researchers, but it is part of a much broader and extensive literature on bounded rationality (see Collins 1989; Gould 1993; Macy 1991; Simon 1957; White 1981). Schwartz (1976) raised the question of why individuals who appear to be faced with the same problem may pursue entirely different, and sometimes conflicting,

solutions to that problem. It is extremely unlikely that both responses are equally effective. So how do we account for the actions of individuals who engage in the least effective response? Rather than assuming, without supporting evidence, that they are acting irrationally, Schwartz argued that it is more analytically useful to recognize that individuals make decisions based on incomplete information. Much like Babb's (1996) comparison of collective action frames to scientific paradigms, Schwartz (1976) compared social movement participants to scientists operating with incomplete or flawed data. Based on such data, the scientist (or the social movement participant) may draw an incorrect conclusion, while behaving in a perfectly rational manner.

Schwartz was not suggesting that social movement participants always act rationally. They don't. He did argue, however, that it is reasonable to assume that social movement participants are at least as rational as the people who study them (Schwartz 1976). To understand the actions initiated by movement participants, it is essential to recognize that individuals make choices and decisions based on limited information. Information that is required to develop an accurate diagnosis of a collective problem is distributed unevenly throughout the social structure. An individual's access to relevant information, therefore, is largely determined by his or her position within that structure.

INEQUALITY, HETEROGENEITY, AND ORGANIZED RACISM

I draw upon Peter Blau's macrostructural theory of social relations to identify forms of structural differentiation that facilitate and sustain organized racism in the United States. Blau (1977) defines social structure as "a multidimensional space of different social positions among which a population is distributed. The social associations of people provide both the criterion for distinguishing social positions and the connections among them that make them elements of a single social structure" (4). A given population is differentiated along nominal parameters such as racial and ethnic categories or occupational categories and by graduated parameters (or hierarchical gradations) such as levels of income or education (Blau 1977; Blau & Schwartz 1984).

Blau demonstrates that heterogeneity on nominal parameters promotes intergroup contact. For example, in the extreme case, if all members of a given population are white, there is no opportunity for interracial contact. In a population that is racially heterogeneous, however, interracial contact is difficult to avoid. Similarly, Blau shows that inequality on graduated parameters promotes status-distant contact. Again, in the extreme case, if all members of a population possess the same amount of wealth, there are no opportunities for contact between individuals of different economic standing. In a population characterized by extreme inequality of wealth, status-distant contact occurs frequently. These basic insights have important implications for a theory of

structured ignorance. Individuals are carriers of information required to diagnosis the causes of social problems and to formulate effective solutions. Varying degrees of intergroup contact should promote different interpretations of collective grievances and may lead some groups to formulate flawed strategies based on incomplete access to information.

Currently, members of white supremacy organizations represent a small numerical minority of the population even within communities in which the movement is relatively strong. As a result, members of racist organizations cannot restrict their social associations exclusively to fellow members. They must, and do, interact on a fairly regular basis with nonmembers within the broader community. As Berger (1969) has noted, the plausibility of a given system of beliefs for the individual depends upon the extent that the belief system is reinforced in various forms of social interaction (see also Billings 1990; Lofland & Stark 1965). Racist organizations, therefore, should have difficulty sustaining themselves within communities in which individuals, through their interpersonal contacts, fail to find evidence that is consistent with the white supremacists' claims. These organizations should also have difficulty sustaining themselves within communities in which individuals, through their interpersonal contacts, have access to information that can be used to reject the white supremacists' worldview.

White supremacists believe that their racial identity, rather than their occupation or their educational credentials, entitles them to certain rights and privileges, as well as a decent standard of living. They believe that the white race is losing ground and that racial and ethnic minorities are claiming what is rightfully theirs. They see themselves as victims of economic transformations such as agricultural crises, the decline of manufacturing, and globalization. These transformations are thought to be part of a grand conspiracy orchestrated by Jews and elite whites, who increase their own wealth and political power at the expense of working-class and middle-class white Americans (Bullard 1991; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997). The task at hand is to determine what forms of structural differentiation lead some people to accept the white supremacists' interpretation of existing conditions based on their own "convenience sample" of empirical observations.

A theory of structured ignorance can make sense of the conflicting views held by those who study contemporary racist organizations. On the one hand, we may find that racist organizations are most likely to take root in communities characterized by economic inequality and economic transition. Within such an environment, white supremacists' claims concerning Jewish conspiracies and elite manipulation of the economy may resonate with individuals who are able to observe disparities of wealth and income along with economic instability yet who do not possess an alternative explanation for what they observe. White supremacist claims would have little resonance, on the other hand, in communities in which wealth is distributed equally and the

economy is stable. At the same time, it may be, as Blee suggests, that individuals do not seek out and join racist organizations in an attempt to solve their problems. Instead, they take on the beliefs of the group once they are exposed to movement ideology in a group setting. Yet if the movement's ideology is radically inconsistent with what potential members are able to observe in their everyday interactions, individuals should be less susceptible to movement recruiting and racist organizations should have greater difficulty sustaining themselves.

Social Structure and Racist Organizing

Blee's observation that contact with members of racist organizations is a key factor in explaining how individuals become members of those organizations is consistent with a large body of research on social movement participation (e.g., see Klandermans 1997; Klandermans & Oegema 1987). This is particularly true of recruitment into "high risk" activism (McAdam 1986, 1988). Observations made by Snow, Zurcher, and Eklund-Olson (1980) on recruitment into deviant religious groups are also similar, in many respects, to Blee's description of recruitment into racist organizations. As Snow and his colleagues note, "It is important to emphasize that people seldom initially join movements *per se*. Rather they typically are asked to participate in movement activity. Furthermore, it is in the course of initial participation that they are provided with the 'reasons' or 'justifications' for what they have already done and for continuing to participate" (795).

Once contacted by a member of such an organization, however, individuals must make a decision to join based on their understanding of the movement's goals and their own understanding of the world. In Klandermans's (1997) terms, they must also come to sympathize with the goals of the movement, they must become motivated to participate, and they must overcome other barriers to movement participation. The argument advanced in this article is that racist organizations will be more likely to thrive within communities in which patterns of structural differentiation provide individuals with evidence that appears to be consistent with the white supremacists' claims while at the same time shielding them from information that could be used to develop an alternative interpretation that is at odds with those claims. Below I identify several forms of structural differentiation that should facilitate racist organizing.

RACIAL AND ETHNIC HETEROGENEITY

In general, I expect that heterogeneity on nominal parameters will have a positive effect on racist organizing. In the case of the white supremacy movement, racial and ethnic heterogeneity should be particularly important.

Heterogeneity promotes intergroup contact, which increases the likelihood that white individuals will observe at least some out-group members who are faring better, economically, than the average member of their own group. It is not necessary that out-group members as a whole be advancing. In a heterogeneous environment, individuals are likely to find some supporting evidence of the white supremacists' claims. White supremacist leaders promote a worldview that subjugates all members of racial and ethnic minority groups to a subordinate status. Evidence that even one member of a minority group in the community is enjoying economic prosperity or occupies a position of power and prestige would be viewed as an affront to the natural order of the world. The more heterogeneous the environment, the more likely it is that a white individual would have contact with minority group members who are not confined to, and do not accept, a subordinate status.

Racial and ethnic heterogeneity also increases the likelihood that individuals will be able to recall at least one unpleasant confrontation with a member of another group. As Blee describes it, women in racist organizations often reinterpret events that occurred earlier in their lives in a way that seems to support or justify white supremacist claims. According to Blee (2002),

[I]n the racist women's stories, members of racial minorities are most often linked to memories of fear, vulnerability, and anger. When they recall being jostled by children in elementary school, being threatened by groups of fellow students in high school, failing to get a desired job, or worrying about their safety on the street, the women recount incidents in which specific members of racial minorities are the protagonists. (85)

Children, of course, get jostled and threatened by fellow students in racially homogeneous settings. And when they get older they lose jobs and fear for their safety in racially homogeneous settings. Racial and ethnic heterogeneity, however, increases the likelihood that these events can later be interpreted in a way that seems consistent with the white supremacist worldview. As Bearman and Stovel (2000) note in their study of Nazi narratives, "The cognitive labor of linking otherwise unrelated elements together is the hallmark of a narrative of identity formation."

INDUSTRIAL HETEROGENEITY

Industrial heterogeneity can promote racist organizing by providing people with evidence of individuals other than one's "own kind" advancing in society. Collective identity can be based not only on race but also on occupation or industry. Supporters of the white supremacy movement are often not in direct competition with minority group members for jobs. Instead, they resent changes in the economic structure that seem to be benefiting members of other groups while leaving them behind. Farmers or manufacturing workers, for example, may resent individuals who are employed in different industrial sectors that

depend upon free trade and increasing globalization of the economy while their own industry is in need of protection from foreign competition. Higher rates of contact between individuals who are employed in different industrial sectors are likely to feed this resentment by providing evidence that some out-group members are prospering. Industrial heterogeneity decreases the likelihood that the majority of the members of the community will share similar interests in regard to free trade and globalization. While this resentment may not be the driving force that leads individuals to join racist movements, the racist interpretation of the economy should appear to some individuals to be more plausible within communities characterized by industrial heterogeneity.

INCOME INEQUALITY

Income inequality should also be positively associated with racist organizing. Inequality promotes status-distant contact. White supremacists' claims that elites are conspiring against them, manipulating the economy to their own advantage at the expense of working-class and middle-class white Americans, would appear to be more plausible in communities in which there is an obvious gap between the rich and the poor. Some individuals may embrace the white supremacists' worldview in an effort to understand their own economic plight. Yet in a setting in which income is distributed unequally, the white supremacists' claims may seem valid even to those who are not suffering from economic hardships. If income is distributed equally, however, there would be a sharp disjuncture between the white supremacists' claims and what individuals are able to observe in their immediate surroundings.

CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

Changes in the economic structure should promote racist organizing by providing evidence that appears to be consistent with the white supremacists' claims. Higher rates of contact between people who are far apart in terms of income or who are employed in different industries should be more noticeable in communities in which inequality and heterogeneity are increasing over time. Within such settings, individuals have not yet had time to accommodate themselves to the changing economic structure. Additionally, economic transformations should contribute to a sense of urgency among those who are being adversely affected by economic change — a sense of urgency that matches that which is communicated by movement leaders. As mentioned previously, racist organizations have made a deliberate attempt to capitalize on these conditions, recruiting in locations where individuals have experienced the ill effects of economic change.

EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY

Observations that some out-group members are prospering and that income inequality is increasing are subject to many different interpretations. I expect that educational inequality plays a critical role in determining whether or not individuals accept the white supremacists' interpretation. Educational inequality within local settings should inhibit racist organizing in three primary ways. First, educational inequality provides members of the community with greater access to information required to accurately diagnose their problems and to reject the white supremacists' interpretation. Second, it promotes quiescence among those who may be bearing the brunt of economic transformations, as they defer to the beliefs and values held by those who have considerably higher levels of education. Finally, educational inequality should inhibit racist organizing by making other forms of inequality in society appear legitimate — that based on achieved status rather than ascribed status. The logic behind these claims is described below.

Educational inequality promotes contact between individuals with relatively little formal education and those who have had many years of schooling. This status-distant contact increases the likelihood that the values and understandings of the world held by the highly educated can diffuse throughout the community at large. A large body of research has shown that individuals with higher levels of education tend to exhibit less racial prejudice, to hold more tolerant views of out-group members, and to be more liberal on a wide range of social issues (Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Bobo & Licari 1989; Davis 1975; Greeley & Sheatsley 1974; Lipset 1960; Phelan et al. 1995; Selznick & Steinberg 1969; Weil 1985). In the U.S., individuals with higher levels of education are also less likely to hold anti-Semitic attitudes (Weil 1985), and they are likely to have a more sophisticated understanding of how the economy works. Research, for example, has shown that education promotes a greater awareness of structural impediments to social mobility (Bobo & Kluegel 1993; Kluegel 1990; Kluegel & Smith 1982).

In short, people with higher levels of education tend to possess the information needed to diagnosis the economic problems facing members of the community, and they are far less likely to diagnose the problems in terms of Jewish conspiracies or discrimination against the white race. Some research suggests that the liberal values expressed by the highly educated are superficial and do not reflect a true commitment to social equality (Jackman 1984; Jackman & Muha 1984; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo 1996). Nevertheless, these values would inhibit racist organizing by offering an effective counterargument to the claims made by white supremacists. In the context of educational inequality, frequent contact between individuals who are widely separated in terms of education provides those who have not had the benefit of advanced

schooling with access to information that could be used to reject the white supremacists' worldview.

Even if individuals with lower levels of education do not embrace the worldview of those with higher levels, educational inequality can prevent them from posing a challenge to the existing order. The white supremacy movement represents a challenge to liberal values and is threatening not only to members of racial and ethnic minority groups but also to the elite, who benefit from the existing order. People with higher levels of education are best equipped to use ideology to control the behavior of other members of their community. As Jackman (1994) has argued, spatial proximity and vast disparities in resources between groups make it easier for dominant groups to control the behavior of subordinates. Rather than relying upon force or coercion, members of dominant groups seek to promote quiescence or passivity among subordinates through paternalism and through ideological manipulation. Vast disparities in years of schooling decrease the likelihood that subordinates will be able to effectively challenge the dominant ideology (Jackman 1994; see also Gaventa 1982; Lukes 1974).

Educational inequality can also serve to legitimate economic inequality. If, for example, vast disparities in income can be attributed to vast disparities in education, individuals are more likely to view these differences as being based on differences in qualifications, efforts, and expertise. When inequalities of wealth or income cannot be easily traced to inequalities in educational credentials, however, the door is open to other interpretations of economic differences, including theories of vast Jewish conspiracies.

INTERACTION EFFECTS

Above I have specified three mechanisms through which educational inequality should inhibit racist organizing. If my argument is correct, educational inequality should also diminish the positive impact that other variables have on racist organizing. For example, the diffusion of liberal values that tend to be held by the highly educated would decrease the likelihood that racial and ethnic heterogeneity would be seen as evidence supporting the white supremacists' claims. The broad diffusion of liberal values would also decrease the likelihood that individuals would see income inequality in their local environment as evidence of a grand Jewish conspiracy. To the extent that educational inequality promotes quiescence, and to the extent that it legitimates existing economic inequalities, it would also decrease the likelihood that individuals would respond to income inequality or racial and ethnic heterogeneity through a white supremacist organization. If income inequality simply seems to reflect inequalities in educational credentials, white supremacists' claims would seem less compelling.

The role that educational inequality plays in racist organizing should also depend upon the relative number of highly educated people within a county. For example, if every person in a county held a college degree there would be very little educational inequality, yet many individuals, by virtue of their college education, would have access to information that could be used to reject white supremacist claims. The negative effect of educational inequality on racist organizing should therefore be weaker when higher proportions of the population hold a college degree.²

Data

As a test of the theory of structured ignorance, I examine variation in the number of racist organizations in U.S. counties and county equivalents. Census data appropriate for testing my argument are available for almost all counties and county equivalents in the United States, resulting in a total of 3,135 observations. Four of these cases are lost to missing data when measures of economic transformation are included in the analysis. Although the choice of any ecological unit of analysis is open to valid criticism, for this particular analysis the use of county-level data has some important advantages. On the one hand, because racist organizations exist in both small towns and large cities, restricting the analysis to standard metropolitan statistical areas would ignore substantial regional variation in the dependent variable. Comparable data are not available for all towns and cities in the United States, but they are available for counties. An analysis at the state level, on the other hand, would miss important intrastate variation in the explanatory variables. I have argued that varying degrees of intergroup contact within local settings can affect views on the plausibility of frames advanced by racist organizations. This argument is more tenable at the county level than at the state level, since individuals are more likely to have contact with individuals residing in their own county than with those living in other regions of the state.

To measure the dependent variable, I use lists of hate groups compiled by the Southern Poverty Law Center's Intelligence Project. The SPLC compiles annual lists of hate groups known to have been active in a given year. The Intelligence Project obtains information on the location of the hate groups by using the hate groups' publications, citizens' reports, law enforcement agencies, field sources, and news reports. "Activity" includes marches, rallies, speeches, meetings, leafleting, publishing literature, and criminal acts. Organizations that appear to exist only on the Internet are not included. The SPLC categorizes the racist organizations into five primary groups. These include Ku Klux Klan organizations, neo-Nazi groups, skinheads, Christian Identity organizations, and "other." Those falling in the "other" category are described as "organizations whose racist behavior stems from a variety of unrelated ideologies. These

groups include Ku Klux Klan offshoots, independent gangs of racist youths and religious groups that cloak their white supremacist beliefs in “quasitheological” terms (SPLC 1997:19). The SPLC also has a separate category for black separatist organizations. I exclude these organizations in my analysis since the grievances and understandings of the world held by black separatists are different in many respects from those held by white separatists.

Some researchers (e.g., Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997) have noted that advocacy organizations such as the SPLC have an incentive to exaggerate the danger posed by racist organizations and that their data, therefore, should be treated with caution. Such measurement bias, if it exists, would be more likely to show up in claims concerning membership or in descriptions of the movement’s goals, rather than in a listing of organizations. The SPLC’s lists of U.S. racist organizations are by far the most comprehensive available. Its outstanding reputation is well established, and the SPLC has been an excellent source of information for social scientists who study racist organizations (Beck 2000; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile 1997; Ferber 1998; Perry 2000).³

There are, however, important data limitations that should be acknowledged. No information is available, for example, on the founding dates of the organizations. There are also no measures of membership size, which undoubtedly varies considerably across organizations. Also, some organizations may have been active in a given year while failing to attract the attention of the SPLC’s Intelligence Project. Many of the racist organizations are unstable and have a short lifespan. They may show up on the SPLC’s list one year and be gone the next. There is also room for debate about what type of organization qualifies as a racist organization and what type does not. For example, in the year 2000 the SPLC made a decision to add numerous chapters of a neo-Confederate organization called the League of the South to its list of hate groups. In previous years the SPLC was familiar with the organization but did not include it in its lists.

While it is important to acknowledge these data limitations, it is also important to develop a better understanding of the causes of racist organizing. Due to the secretive nature of white supremacist groups, it is unlikely that perfectly clean data will ever become available that could be used in a systematic analysis of these organizations. Yet systematic analysis could be extraordinarily useful in identifying the social conditions that foster racist extremism in the U.S. In the analysis that follows, steps are taken to reduce the problems associated with the data limitations described above. Without information on the founding dates of the organizations, we cannot say with certainty that the independent variables had a direct causal effect on the emergence of the organizations. Yet since the list includes only organizations that were active in a given year, we can identify structural features that are related to having an active racist organization in the county. I argue in this article that racist organizations would have difficulty sustaining themselves

within communities in which individuals fail to find evidence that appears consistent with the white supremacist claims. So at any point in time, racist organizations should most likely be active in counties that are, according to my argument, structurally conducive to racist organizing.

In the analysis I also use the SPLC's list of hate groups from two different years. I use the list from 1997, the first year that the SPLC reported the location of all chapters rather than just the primary headquarters of an organization with several chapters. I also use the more recent list from the year 2000. If my theoretical argument has merit, the results should be similar even when there is year-to-year fluctuation in the organizations reported as being active. Some of this year-to-year fluctuation reflects changes in the level of activity among racist organizations, while some of it undoubtedly reflects measurement error. In either case, we should have more confidence in the theory if it can be used to consistently predict racist organization activity reported by the SPLC.

According to the SPLC, 462 hate groups (not counting black separatist organizations) were active in 1997. In the analysis I exclude 9 organizations that could not be located within a county. Of those that are included, 125 are Ku Klux Klan organizations, 99 are neo-Nazi groups, 40 are racist skinhead groups, 80 are Christian Identity organizations, and 109 are categorized as "other." The majority (79) of organizations in the "other" category are chapters of the National Association for the Advancement of White People. For the year 2000, 554 hate groups (excluding black separatist organizations) were reported by the SPLC to be active. For this year I exclude 7 organizations that could not be located within a county. Of those organizations that are included in the analysis, 108 are categorized by the SPLC as Ku Klux Klan groups, 177 are neo-Nazi groups, 39 are racist skinhead groups, and 32 are Christian Identity organizations. The remainder of the organizations fall under the headings of "neo-Confederate" and "other." The vast majority of groups in the neo-Confederate category (79 out of 85) are chapters of the previously mentioned League of the South. Of the 103 organizations listed in the "other" category, 45 are identified as the Council of Conservative Citizens, 17 are listed as the National Association for the Advancement of White People, and 12 are listed as the National Organization for European American Rights.

There are noticeable differences between the lists of hate groups. For one thing, more hate groups are reported as being active in 2000 than in 1997. Much of this difference, however, reflects the addition of League of the South organizations to the list in 2000. Perhaps the most striking differences are the increase in neo-Nazi organizations and a decrease in Christian Identity groups. In general, the differences between the two lists reflect changes in levels of activity among various racist organizations and, to some extent, changes in the SPLC's categorization scheme. A comparison of the two lists also reveals substantial change in terms of which counties had at least one active racist

TABLE 1: Presence or Absence of at Least One Active Racist Organization, 1997 and 2000

		Racist Organization, 1997	
		No	Yes
Racist Organization, 2000	No	2,597 (91.9%)	164 (52.4%)
	Yes	229 (8.1%)	149 (47.6%)
	Total	2,826 (100%)	313 (100%)

Source: Southern Poverty Law Center.


organization. As shown in Table 1, of those 313 counties that had an active racist organization in 1997, less than half (47.6%) had one in 2000. Of those 2,826 counties that did not have a racist organization on SPLC’s 1997 list, 8.1% had one listed in 2000. The geographic distributions of racist organizations for 1997 and 2000 are presented in Figures 1 and 2. As is evident in the maps, racist organizations are distributed unevenly across the entire country. In both years, the vast majority of counties did not have an active racist organization.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent variables utilized in the following analysis include measures of income inequality in 1990, percent increase in income inequality from 1980 to 1990, educational inequality in 1990, industrial heterogeneity in 1990, percent increase in industrial heterogeneity from 1980 to 1990, and racial and ethnic heterogeneity in 1990. Although I am primarily interested in estimating the effects of the inequality and heterogeneity measures, I control for median family income in 1990, the percent of adults 25 years old and older in 1990 who have completed at least 16 years of education (e.g., percent with college education or more), and population density in 1990. As mentioned previously, the effect of educational inequality on racist organizing should depend, to some extent, on the number of college graduates in the county. Population density reflects varying levels of urbanization across counties. It also plays an important role in Blau’s macrostructural theory, since opportunity for contact is one of the theory’s key assumptions. Any social relations, whether they are friendly or hostile, are dependent on propinquity (Blau 1977; Blau & Schwartz 1984).


Table 2 describes the measurement of the variables and lists data sources. Univariate statistics and a matrix of Pearson correlation coefficients are provided in Table 3. While there are strong correlations among some of the independent variables, the large number of observations should be useful in

FIGURE 1: Counties with at Least One Active Racist Organization in 1997



Note: Racist organizations in Alaska and Hawaii are not shown.

FIGURE 2: Counties with at Least One Active Racist Organization in 2000



Note: Racist organizations in Alaska and Hawaii are not shown.

TABLE 2: Measurement of Independent Variables and Data Sources

Income inequality, 1990: Data from the 1980 and 1990 U.S. censuses are used to construct Gini coefficients for family income. The measures were calculated by Nielsen, who has graciously made them available on his Website. A detailed description of the measurement can be found in Nielsen and Alderson (1997). Family income is grouped into 17 categories in the 1980 census and 25 categories in the 1990 census. Nielsen uses a Pareto interpolation to estimate the average income in categories above the category containing the mean income.

Educational inequality, 1990: Data from the 1990 census (table 142) are used to construct a Gini coefficient measuring inequality in years of schooling. The data are aggregated into the following seven categories: (1) 0-4 years, (2) 5-8 years, (3) 9-11 years, (4) 12 years, (5) 13-15 years, (6) 16 years, and (7) more than 16 years. To calculate the Gini coefficient, the average is estimated as the midpoint in the first six categories. The average of the open-ended category is assumed to be 19. The Gini coefficient is calculated using the formula provided by Nygård and Sandström (1981).

Racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 1990: Data from the 1990 census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1998) are used to construct a measure of racial and ethnic heterogeneity. Race and ethnicity are aggregated into five categories: (1) white, (2) black, (3) American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, (4) Asian or Pacific Islander, and (5) other. The heterogeneity measure is calculated as $1 - \sum P_i^2$, where P_i is the proportion of the population in each category. Values can potentially range between 0 and 1. The closer the value is to 1, the more heterogeneous the population.

Industrial heterogeneity, 1990: Data from the 1980 census and 1990 census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1998) are used to construct a measure of industrial heterogeneity. The data are aggregated into the following 13 industry categories: (1) agriculture, forestry, and fishery, (2) mining, (3) construction, (4) manufacturing, (5) transportation, communications, and other public utilities, (6) wholesale and retail trade, (7) finance, insurance, and real estate, (8) business and repair services, (9) personal, entertainment, and recreation services, (10) professional and related services, health, (11) professional and related services, educational, (12) professional and related services, other, and (13) public administration. Heterogeneity measures are calculated as $1 - \sum P_i^2$, where P_i is the proportion of the population in each category.

Increase in income inequality, 1980-90: The measure was calculated using the Gini coefficients described above. Increase in income inequality is measured as the percentage increase in income inequality from 1980 to 1990: $([Gini90 - Gini80]/Gini80) \times 100$.

Increase in industrial heterogeneity, 1980-90: Increase in industrial heterogeneity is measured as the percentage increase in industrial heterogeneity from 1980 to 1990: $([Indhet90 - Indhet80]/Indhet80) \times 100$.

Median income, 1990: Median family income in 1990 (in thousands of dollars) as reported in the U.S. census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1998).

Percent college-educated, 1990: Percent of population 25 years old and older with at least 16 years of education. Data are taken from the 1990 census (table 142).

Population density, 1990: Population density as reported in the 1990 census (U.S. Department of Commerce 1998). The measure represents number of people (in thousands) per square mile.

TABLE 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Univariate Statistics for Independent Variables, U.S. Counties and County Equivalents

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(1) Income inequality, 1990	1.000								
(2) Educational inequality, 1990	.630	1.000							
(3) Racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 1990	.480	.386	1.000						
(4) Industrial heterogeneity, 1990	.084	-.060	.072	1.000					
(5) Increase in income inequality, 1980-90	.384	.045	.132	.028	1.000				
(6) Increase in industrial heterogeneity, 1980-90	.014	-.042	.191	-.398	.102	1.000			
(7) Median income, 1990 (\$1,000s)	-.548	-.544	-.056	.034	.041	.246	1.000		
(8) Percent college-educated, 1990	-.149	-.412	.051	.088	.118	.338	.694	1.000	
(9) Population density, 1990	.087	-.008	.170	.017	.066	.188	.169	.217	1.000
Mean	.380	.142	.179	.825	3.282	2.708	28.471	13.52	.220
Standard deviation	.039	.032	.169	.041	7.065	.868	7.163	6.57	1.432
Minimum	.253	.042	.001	.479	-28.03	-13.31	10.903	3.69	.0001
Maximum	.561	.387	.677	.909	47.10	10.51	65.201	53.42	52.378

TABLE 4: Racist Organizations in U.S. Counties and County Equivalents, 1997 and 2000

Variable	1997		2000	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Income inequality, 1990	12.324** (3.816)	4.977 (4.336)	9.722** (3.198)	2.753 (3.578)
Educational inequality, 1990	-14.823*** (3.929)	-11.124** (4.128)	-15.875*** (3.516)	-12.234*** (3.567)
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 1990	1.660** (.568)	1.567** (.553)	3.087*** (.476)	3.059*** (.470)
Industrial heterogeneity, 1990	1.297 (1.845)	8.593*** (2.370)	-.752 (1.695)	5.566* (2.286)
Increase in income inequality, 1980-90		.045** (.016)		.048*** (.014)
Increase in industrial heterogeneity, 1980-90		.557*** (.118)		.445*** (.106)
Median income, 1990 (\$1,000s)	.075*** (.019)	.056** (.020)	.074*** (.017)	.059*** (.017)
Percent college-educated, 1990	.004 (.017)	.012 (.017)	.003 (.015)	-.011 (.016)
Population density, 1990	.158*** (.039)	.094** (.034)	.059* (.028)	.028 (.028)
Dispersion parameter	2.937*** (.441)	2.570*** (.413)	1.902*** (.285)	1.705*** (.270)
Constant	-8.467*** (2.065)	-13.193*** (2.381)	-5.707** (1.884)	-9.598*** (2.303)
N	3,135	3,131	3,135	3,131

Note: Models are estimated using negative binomial regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

teasing out the independent influence that the variables have on racist organizing.⁴

Analysis

The dependent variable in the analysis, the number of racist organizations in a county, is a count variable. Racist organizing in a county is a relatively rare event, as most of the observations have a value of 0. The mean of the variable is .145 for 1997 and .175 for 2000. In 1997 the variable ranges from 0 to 7, while in 2000 it ranges from 0 to 6. Due to the nature of the dependent variable, I

estimate the models with negative binomial regression rather than ordinary least squares regression (King 1989). I use negative binomial regression instead of Poisson because negative binomial regression allows for overdispersion by relaxing the Poisson model's assumptions that the variance is equal to the mean and that micro events or counts are statistically independent (Greene 1995). An assumption of independence seems unrealistic in this case, since the presence of one racist organization in a county is likely to be dependent to some extent on the presence of other racist organizations in the county. For example, a skinhead group may be more likely to emerge within a community in which adolescents are exposed to literature distributed by a neo-Nazi organization.⁵ Negative binomial regression includes a dispersion parameter to accommodate excess variance (Land, Davis & Blau 1994). The disturbance is expected to follow a gamma distribution, where the expected value of U_i^2 is $\Theta[1 + \alpha\Theta_i]$ with $\Theta_i = E(Y_i) = \exp(x_{iB})$. The models are estimated with LIMDEP.

Results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. The first pair of columns in the table contain the results of the analysis of racist organizing in 1997, and the second pair of columns contain the results of the analysis of racist organizing in 2000. In each case, the first model includes only the 1990 measures of the independent variables. In the second model I add the measures of economic change. The results of the analysis for 1997 and 2000 are strikingly similar. Indeed, the only notable difference is that population density, a control variable that is a statistically significant predictor of racist organizing in 1997, is not a statistically significant predictor of racist organizing in 2000 when the measures of economic change are included in the model. Otherwise, the only differences reflect changes in the magnitude of the coefficients.

For both years, when measures of economic change are not included in the models, population density and median income are positively associated with racist organizing. The percent of adults with a college education has no significant impact on the dependent variable. Among the theoretical variables, racial and ethnic heterogeneity and income inequality are each highly significant and positively related to racist organizing. And, as expected, educational inequality has a strong negative impact on the dependent variable. Contrary to expectations, industrial heterogeneity is not statistically significant. The dispersion parameter is highly significant, indicating that overdispersion is present and therefore negative binomial regression is preferable to Poisson.

As can be seen in the second and fourth columns of Table 4, increases in income inequality and industrial heterogeneity are highly significant predictors of racist organizing in both 1997 and 2000. Interestingly, the coefficient for industrial heterogeneity becomes positive and statistically significant when the change measures are included in the model. This finding suggests that many of the counties in which industrial heterogeneity increased most sharply tend to be those that were still relatively homogeneous in 1990. In fact, the zero-

TABLE 5: Racist Organizations in U.S. Counties and County Equivalents, 1997 and 2000

	1997		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Income inequality, 1990	4.595 (4.344)	31.154** (9.789)	4.844 (4.298)
Educational inequality, 1990	4.004 (5.458)	65.704* (26.888)	-19.855** (6.296)
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 1990	11.896*** (2.382)	1.459** (.557)	1.506** (.566)
Industrial heterogeneity, 1990	8.640*** (2.403)	9.208*** (2.395)	8.322*** (2.360)
Increase in income inequality, 1980-90	.047** (.016)	.046** (.016)	.044** (.015)
Increase in industrial heterogeneity, 1980-90	.564*** (.115)	.539*** (.117)	.542*** (.119)
Median income, 1990 (\$1,000s)	.054** (.019)	.059** (.020)	.055** (.020)
Percent college educated, 1990	-.017 (.017)	-.010 (.017)	-.095 (.052)
Population density, 1990	.093** (.034)	.090** (.033)	.078* (.034)
Educational inequality × racial and ethnic heterogeneity	-71.760*** (15.778)		
Educational inequality × income inequality		-190.905** (63.595)	
Educational inequality × percent college educated			.702 (.435)
Dispersion parameter	2.442*** (.386)	2.472*** (.404)	2.448*** (.403)
Constant	-15.041*** (2.455)	-24.173*** (4.648)	-11.762*** (2.507)

order correlation between industrial heterogeneity and increasing industrial heterogeneity is -.398. After the effect of increasing heterogeneity is controlled, industrial heterogeneity has, as expected, a significant positive effect on racist organizing. Income inequality, however, is no longer significant after controlling for increasing inequality. In this case, many of the counties that are characterized by income inequality in 1990 are also those that experienced increasing inequality between 1980 and 1990. The zero-order correlation between income inequality and increasing income inequality is .384. The results

TABLE 5: Racist Organizations in U.S. Counties and County Equivalents, 1997 and 2000 (Continued)

		2000	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Income inequality, 1990	2.510 (3.571)	27.671** (9.476)	2.382 (3.540)
Educational inequality, 1990	.640 (4.198)	60.791* (23.878)	-22.309*** (5.379)
Racial and ethnic heterogeneity, 1990	10.784*** (2.057)	2.953*** (.470)	2.999*** (.475)
Industrial heterogeneity, 1990	5.512* (2.289)	6.164** (2.282)	5.170* (2.249)
Increase in income inequality, 1980-90	.049*** (.014)	.049*** (.014)	.047*** (.014)
Increase in industrial heterogeneity, 1980-90	.445*** (.105)	.429*** (.106)	.428*** (.104)
Median income, 1990 (\$1,000s)	.057*** (.017)	.060*** (.017)	.057*** (.017)
Percent college educated, 1990	-.014 (.016)	-.010 (.016)	-.106* (.045)
Population density, 1990	.033 (.028)	.029 (.030)	.012 (.029)
Educational inequality × racial and ethnic heterogeneity	-54.445*** (13.828)		
Educational inequality × income inequality		-182.620** (61.337)	
Educational inequality × percent college educated			.805* (.363)
Dispersion parameter	1.663*** (.265)	1.640*** (.265)	1.578*** (.260)
Constant	-11.081*** (2.298)	-19.969*** (4.027)	-7.796** (2.374)

(N = 3,131)

Note: Models are estimated using negative binomial regression. Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

indicate that increasing income inequality, rather than inequality at one point in time, provides more fertile recruiting ground for racist organizations.⁶

The results presented in Table 4 offer strong support for the argument advanced in this article. As suggested earlier, a theory of structured ignorance

TABLE 6: Predicted Number of Racist Organizations at Varying Levels of Educational Inequality and Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity, U.S. Counties, 2000

		Educational Inequality		
		Low	Mean	High
Racial and Ethnic Heterogeneity	Low	.069	.069	.069
	Mean	.155	.116	.087
	High	.349	.194	.108

Note: Low and high values of educational inequality and racial and ethnic heterogeneity are one standard deviation below and above the mean values. All other variables are set at their mean values.

should prove useful in identifying variables that can predict racist organizing in spite of year-to-year fluctuations in the location of active racist groups. The results show that in 1997 and 2000 racial and ethnic heterogeneity, industrial heterogeneity, increasing income inequality, and increasing industrial heterogeneity had a positive impact on racist organizing. Also as expected, educational inequality had a strong negative impact on racist organizing.

INTERACTION EFFECTS

As argued earlier, educational inequality should inhibit racist organizing by increasing contact between individuals with relatively little formal education and those with higher levels, providing community members with greater access to the information necessary to reject white supremacy as a solution to collective grievances. In addition, educational inequality should promote quiescence or passive acceptance of the dominant order, and it can also be used to legitimate other forms of inequality in society. Educational inequality, then, should also diminish the positive impact that racial and ethnic heterogeneity has on racist organizing. To test this argument, I examine interactions between educational inequality and racial and ethnic heterogeneity and between educational inequality and income inequality. I also examine an interaction between educational inequality and the percent of the population with a college education. The results are presented in Table 5.

As Table 5 shows, the interaction between educational inequality and racial and ethnic heterogeneity is highly significant in models of racist organizing in 1997 and 2000. As expected, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative. To gain a better sense of how the interaction effect operates in this nonlinear model, I used the results of the model predicting racist organizing in 2000 to calculate the expected number of racist organizations at varying levels of

TABLE 7: Predicted Number of Racist Organizations at Varying Levels of Educational Inequality and Income Inequality, U.S. Counties, 2000

		Educational Inequality		
		Low	Mean	High
Income Inequality	Low	.111	.105	.101
	Mean	.149	.113	.086
	High	.200	.121	.073

Note: Low and high values of educational inequality and income inequality are one standard deviation below and above the mean values. All other variables are set at their mean values.

educational inequality and racial and ethnic heterogeneity when all other variables are set at their mean values. As seen in Table 6, at low levels of racial and ethnic heterogeneity, educational inequality has virtually no impact on the dependent variable. This should be expected, since in a racially and ethnically homogeneous county the white supremacists' claims would have little resonance regardless of the way education is distributed among the population. At higher levels of racial and ethnic heterogeneity, however, educational inequality has a strong negative effect on the dependent variable. Similarly, it can be seen that at low levels of educational inequality, racial and ethnic heterogeneity has a strong positive impact on racist organizing.

I also tested for an interaction between educational inequality and income inequality (results reported in Table 5). Higher levels of educational inequality should provide county residents with information that could be used to reject white supremacists' interpretation of economic inequality. Educational inequality can also legitimate income inequality by leading people to view disparities in income as resulting from disparities in credentials and expertise. This argument is likewise supported, as the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and highly significant. I also calculate the expected count (number of racist organizations in a county) at varying levels of educational inequality and income inequality when all other variables are set at their mean values. The results are presented in Table 7. When income inequality is low (e.g., one standard deviation below the mean), educational inequality does have a negative impact on racist organizing, but that negative effect is much stronger when income inequality is high. Again, this would indicate that when income inequality in a county is low, the white supremacists' claims would have little resonance regardless of the distribution of education in the county. At higher levels, however, educational inequality has a strong negative impact on the dependent variable. It is also noteworthy that income inequality has a positive

TABLE 8: Predicted Number of Racist Organizations at Varying Levels of Educational Inequality and Percent College-Educated, U.S. Counties, 2000

		Educational Inequality		
		Low	Mean	High
Percent	Low	.175	.102	.060
College-	Mean	.156	.108	.075
Educated	High	.139	.114	.094

Note: “Low” and “high” values of educational inequality and percent college-educated are one standard deviation below and above the mean values. All other variables are set at their mean values.

impact on racist organizing when educational inequality is low but a negative effect when it is high.

The preceding analyses support my arguments concerning the important role that educational inequality plays in racist organizing. Not only does educational inequality have a negative impact on racist organizing, but it also diminishes the positive effect that racial and ethnic heterogeneity and income inequality have on the dependent variable. In fact, the results show that income inequality has a positive effect on racist organizing only when there is relatively little educational inequality in the county. As argued earlier, when education is distributed relatively equally within a community, disparities in wealth and income cannot easily be traced to educational credentials, which can make alternative explanations of societal inequalities seem plausible — even, for some individuals, explanations cast in terms of vast Jewish conspiracies.

I also argued, however, that educational inequality should inhibit racist organizing by promoting higher rates of contact between those with advanced levels of education and those who have not had the benefit of many years of schooling. In the U.S., individuals with a college degree tend to have more liberal views on a wide range of social issues and to have a more sophisticated understanding of how the economy works (Jackman & Muha 1984; Kluegel 1990; Kluegel & Smith 1982; Krysan 1998; Phelan et al. 1995; T.W. Smith 1995). Therefore, the impact that educational inequality has on racist organizing should depend, in part, on the relative number of college graduates in a community. If everyone in the community held an advanced degree, a large proportion of the population, by virtue of their college education, would have access to resources that could be used to reject the white supremacists’ claims. Under these conditions, years of education would be distributed equally yet such a community would presumably not be a breeding ground for racist organizations. In most cases, however, the majority of residents in a county do not have a college degree. Under these conditions, educational inequality can

inhibit racist organizing by promoting higher rates of contact between those who are far removed in terms of years of education.

Results of a model including an interaction between educational inequality and the percent of the population with a college education are presented in Table 5. As expected, the coefficient for the interaction term is positive for both 1997 and 2000. However, the coefficient falls short of statistical significance for 1997 ($p = .106$). Table 8 shows the predicted value of the dependent variable at varying levels of educational inequality and percent college-educated when all other variables are set at their mean values. The results indicate that the negative effect of educational inequality is weaker when higher proportions of the population hold a college degree. Also as expected, when years of education are distributed relatively equally in the county, the percent of the population with a college education has a negative effect on racist organizing.⁷

Conclusion

After several decades of gradual decline, income inequality began to increase in the United States in the 1980s. According to data from the U.S. census, the top 20% of families in the United States received 41.3% of the nation's aggregate income in 1960. That share declined to 40.9% in 1970 and held steady at 41.1% in 1980. By 1990, however, the top 20% of families received 44.3% of the nation's aggregate income, and that group's share continued to rise into the 1990s (U.S. Department of Commerce 1980, 1999). Several factors have contributed to increasing levels of income inequality in the United States. These include the decentralization of industry, increasing foreign competition, plant closings and relocations, agricultural decline, a transition from a goods-producing economy to a service-producing economy, and changes in the tax code during the Reagan administration that benefited the wealthy (see Grant 1995; Morris, Bernhardt & Hancock 1994; Nielsen & Alderson 1997; Sassen 1990; Tickamyer & Duncan 1990).

Measures of growing income inequality at the national level obscure substantial variation in the way that local communities have been affected by these economic transformations. Based on the data employed in this analysis, the majority of counties in the United States (71.4%) did experience an increase in income inequality between 1980 and 1990. In 28.6% of the counties, however, income inequality actually declined. Income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased by 5% or more in 41.6% of the counties. Yet inequality declined by 5% or more in 11.8% of the counties. The economic transformations of the past two decades have had a devastating impact on some communities in the United States, while many others have been untouched or have benefited from the changes.

Structural changes in society often generate new grievances among subsets of the population. These new grievances provide an incentive to engage in collective action (McVeigh 1999). In this article I have argued that varying forms of structural differentiation not only promote varying levels of discontent in society but also promote different understandings of the causes and solutions to social problems. The theory of structured ignorance provides a framework for understanding the causes of racist organizing in the United State by identifying structural conditions that produce a critical mass of individuals who view organized racism as a reasonable response to the problems they face in their daily lives. Interactions with nonmembers in the broader community are insufficient to sway them from their beliefs. While white separatists may not seek out racist organizations in an attempt to solve a particular problem, economic or otherwise, they are most likely to stay with the organization if the movement's ideology seems reasonable based on what they are able to observe from their position within the social structure. As Blee (2002) describes it, "Racist groups draw from the political mainstream. Core elements of racism targeting African Americans, of xenophobia, and even parts of anti-Semitism supply platforms on which racist groups construct extraordinary ideologies about enemies that seem plausible to their members" (106).

As Schwartz (1976) argued in his study of the Farmers' Alliance, information that is needed to accurately diagnose a social problem is distributed unevenly throughout the social structure. To develop an accurate diagnosis of the problem, individuals must be in contact with those who hold the relevant information. Social structure, as defined by Blau (1977), imposes constraints on intergroup contact. The key finding that educational inequality inhibits racist organizing may appear at first to be counterintuitive. We know, for example, that individuals with high levels of education are less likely to possess attitudes reflecting traditional prejudice. When years of education are unequally distributed, it means that aggregate years of schooling in a community are concentrated into the hands of a relatively small proportion of the population. Yet educational inequality promotes contact between individuals who are widely separated in terms of years of schooling, and this intergroup contact proves to be an important ignorance-reducing mechanism when it comes to racist organizing. At the same time, educational inequality can also promote quiescence, and it can serve to legitimate other inequalities. When other forms of inequality within a community do not seem to be linked to educational differences, the door is open to a number of other interpretations.

There is a strong connection between the theory of structured ignorance described above and Granovetter's (1973) important ideas concerning the "strength of weak ties." As Granovetter demonstrates, the stronger the tie between individuals, the greater the degree of overlap in their friendship

networks. Since individuals with strong ties, by definition, spend a great deal of time with one another and have overlapping friendship networks, there is also likely to be considerable overlap in the information they possess. Individuals can most effectively gain access to new information, therefore, by utilizing weak ties or casual acquaintances, who serve as bridges between groups (Granovetter 1973; see also Lee 1969). Without such bridges, information cannot escape the confines of a friendship network and diffuse throughout society at large. Educational inequality plays a similar role by promoting higher rates of contact between those who are far apart in terms of years of schooling. This intergroup contact makes it possible for the liberal values that tend to come with higher levels of education to diffuse broadly throughout the community.

In this article I have discussed structured ignorance only in relation to the white supremacy movement. Yet the diffusion of information should play an important role in the mobilization of a wide variety of social movement activities and campaigns. As recent research on social movements has emphasized, processes of meaning construction play a critical role in mobilizing collective action. In order to recruit members, movement leaders must develop a collective action frame, or an interpretation of a situation that inspires people to participate in a collective endeavor. Researchers have argued that diagnostic framing and prognostic framing are critical elements of a successful collective action frame (Buechler 2000; Cress & Snow 2000; Snow & Benford 1988; Wilson 1973). As part of the recruitment process, movement leaders must offer a diagnosis of a problem and its causes and propose a remedy or course of action that seems plausible to potential recruits. The analysis presented in this article demonstrates that structural constraints can have an important impact on the quality of both the diagnosis and the prognosis offered by movement leaders. Structural constraints also affect the ability of the targets of recruitment efforts to detect a flawed diagnosis and prognosis. Rather than debate the rationality of protest participation, regardless of the ideology of the movement or the accuracy of its claims, researchers can use a theory of structured ignorance to identify features of the social structure that can create a match between movement ideology and the understandings of the world held by potential movement supporters.

The research presented here may also contribute to our understanding of racial and ethnic relations more generally by specifying the conditions under which contact between members of different racial or ethnic groups can lead to intergroup animosity as predicted by ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992) or to assimilation or accommodation (Hirschman 1983; Park & Burgess 1921). The results of the analysis show that racial and ethnic heterogeneity has a strong positive effect on racist organizing in counties with relatively low levels of educational inequality. That effect is weakened substantially, however, at

higher levels of educational inequality. The consequences of interethnic contact, therefore, may be conditioned by patterns of educational achievement within the community.

The research also contributes to our understanding of how ethnic antagonism can develop in the absence of intergroup contact. Individuals may be more open to conspiracy theories that characterize out-group members as the source of the world's problems if they are unable to see a clear connection between disparities in income and disparities in education. A growing body of research on distributive justice indicates that most Americans tolerate (and even approve of) substantial disparities in wealth and income in society as long as they perceive that those disparities result from different levels of skill and educational training (see Jasso 1980; Kelley & Evans 1993). When differences in wealth and income do not appear to be linked to differences in education and training, frames that identify Jews or homosexuals as the source of the world's ills may resonate with a critical mass of individuals needed to sustain a hate group.

Notes

1. In this article I do not include militia or "patriot" organizations in the analysis. Not all of the patriot groups qualify as racist organizations, and at this stage it is difficult to discern which organizations qualify and which do not. After a brief growth spurt in the immediate aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, the patriot movement is currently in steep decline (SPLC 2001). Many members defected when militia groups, in the eyes of the public, became linked with the mass murder perpetrated by Timothy McVeigh. Others, who approved of the bombing, drifted into racist organizations in which their radical views are more widely shared (SPLC 2001).

2. Other researchers have shown that the relative size of a group positively effects homophily in social relations. While inequality and heterogeneity impose constraints on homophilous choices, the larger the group, the easier it is to associate with others who are similar. In this case, while educational inequality promotes status-distant contact, a larger number of college graduates would make it easier for college graduates to interact exclusively with people who have similar levels of education, thereby limiting the potential for the diffusion of information (see Blau 1994; Feld 1982; Fischer 1995; McPherson & Smith-Lovin 1987).

3. I can think of no reason why any errors in the SPLC reporting would vary systematically across counties or that they would be systematically related to the explanatory variables used in my analysis. I did consider the possibility that hate groups located in the state of Alabama or in other southern states might have a better chance of drawing attention from the SPLC since the SPLC is located in Montgomery, Alabama. I tested for this in preliminary analyses by including a dummy variable for counties located in Alabama. I also estimated models with a dummy variable for counties in

southern states. Neither variable is a statistically significant predictor of hate groups. Including the variables has no notable impact on the results of my analyses.

4. When the models are estimated with ordinary least squares regression, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are quite low when the interaction effects are not included in the models. In fact, the VIF does not exceed 3.942 for any of the variables. The VIF is below 3 for all but two of the variables. As is always the case, the VIF is considerably higher for variables that are components of an interaction term.

5. In separate analyses (not shown) I also tested for spatial effects based on a belief that the number of racist organizations in one county may be affected by the number of racist organizations in nearby counties. Using techniques that were employed by Tolnay, Deane, and Beck (1996), no spatial effects were detected.

6. In separate analyses (not shown) I also included measures of increasing racial and ethnic heterogeneity and increasing educational inequality. The coefficients were not statistically significant.

7. In separate analyses (not shown) I tested for interactions between other measures of inequality and heterogeneity. No significant relationships were detected.

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Sources of Mexico's Migration Stream: Rural, Urban, and Border Migrants to the United States*

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Abstract

There are three distinct sources of Mexico-U.S. migration flow: the oldest stream from rural communities in central western Mexico, an incipient stream from interior urban areas, and a small but steady stream from Tijuana, a northern border city. Using the Mexican Migration Project data with expanded geographic coverage, I identify these streams and examine how differences in the origin community in terms of family-based migration-related social capital, internal migration experience, and labor force participation shapes the likelihood that men in the community initiate and continue migratory trips. I find four patterns of Mexican migration that make up the flow from central Mexico to northern Mexico and the U.S.: (1) the well-established flow of mostly undocumented low-skill agricultural labor migrants originating in the rural areas of central western Mexico and moving directly to the U.S.; (2) a newer stream of mostly undocumented U.S.-bound migrants from urban interior communities with a greater range of human capital; (3) internal migrants who move to Tijuana as a final destination, and (4) career migrants who make Tijuana a home base for making repeated, mostly undocumented, trips to the U.S.

During most of the twentieth-century Mexico-U.S. migration flows were predominantly agricultural labor flows from rural areas of Mexico to rural areas of the U.S. In the past two decades this migratory flow has diversified as urbanization and industrialization have advanced in Mexico. In 1950 only 26%

** This research has been supported by grants from the Social Science Research Council International Migration Program and the National Institute of Health, Grants F32 HC08551-01 and R01 HD35643-01. I would like to thank Douglas S. Massey, Nolan Malone, Charles Hirschman, Manuel García y Griego, April Brayfield, Katharine Donato, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. Please send correspondence to Elizabeth Fussell, Sociology Department, 220 Newcomb Hall, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana 70118-5698. E-mail: efussell@tulane.edu.*

of the Mexican population lived in settlements of 15,000 or more, whereas in 2000, 61% of the population lived in settlements of this size and 26% lived in cities of at least 500,000 (INEGI 2001). Mexico's urbanization occurred along with industrialization (1940–present) and the opening of its economy to foreign investment and trade (1986–present). This was also the period during which the Mexico–U.S. agricultural labor migration flow was building and taking on a strong momentum of its own as a result of the accumulation of migration-related social capital in Mexico and evolving immigration policies in the U.S. (1942–present) (Donato 1994; Massey, Durand & Malone 2002; Phillips & Massey 2000). Today the flow of Mexican migrants to the U.S. has a growing number of urban-origin migrants though the majority still comes from rural areas (Durand, Massey & Zenteno 2000; Marcelli & Cornelius 2001; Roberts, Frank & Lozano-Ascencio 1999). In addition, the border cities are an important site facilitating migration, serving as both a home base and a staging ground for career migrants (Fussell 2002). In this research I investigate how the migration dynamics differ between these distinct sources of migrants.

The oldest and largest flow of Mexican migration to the U.S. began in the early 1900s from rural areas of western Mexico when labor recruiters sought workers to build railroads and to labor in the agricultural fields of the western U.S. In 1942, the U.S. government endorsed this flow when it established the Bracero Program to legally engage Mexican guest workers in seasonal agriculture labor. Even though the Bracero Program ended in 1964, the migratory patterns from rural central western Mexico had been established and today migrants continue to follow the same pattern (Calavita 1992). Demand for low-wage immigrant labor has persisted and the migration stream has expanded through the migrant networks established in rural Mexican communities (Fussell & Massey 2004; Massey et al. 1987; Massey 1990; Massey, Goldring & Durand 1994; Phillips & Massey 2000; Winters, de Janvry & Sadoulet 2001). Furthermore, the economic crisis of the 1980s and the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1987 created new incentives and opportunities for rural residents to migrate to the U.S. in the 1980s (Donato & Massey 1992; Massey, Durand & Malone 2002).

The diversification of the migrant stream occurred as Mexico's economy restructured and created new pools of potential migrant labor in urban as well as rural areas. Mexico's primary cities grew as the process of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) concentrated industrial activity in Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey (Kunz Bolaños, Valverde & González 1996). In the 1970s the ISI model of growth stagnated and Mexico took on a heavy debt to foreign banks in order to continue supporting government programs and some state-owned enterprises (Lustig 1992). However, in 1982 Mexico defaulted on its loan payments and was obliged to open its economy and engage in austerity measures (Lustig 1990, 1997). This caused an employment crisis in both urban and rural areas, thereby creating new and replenishing old sources of migrant

labor (Lustig 1990; Rendón & Salas 1992; Ros & Rodríguez 1987). Furthermore, the opening of the economy to foreign trade throughout the 1980s and 1990s caused many manufacturers and businesses to fail or scale back in the face of foreign competition, thus creating a pool of underemployed urban residents who migrated to smaller cities that hold greater advantages in the global economy or who entered the migration stream to the U.S. (Canales 1998; Oliveira & Roberts 1993; Sobrino 1996).

During the 1980s and 1990s, smaller secondary cities experienced rapid population growth as urbanites moved from the primary industrial cities to northern export-oriented industrial cities or coastal cities specializing in tourism and trade (Alegría, Carrillo & Alonso 1997; Canales 1998; Garza & Rivera 1993). The new stream of migrants to the northern border is similar to the new urban stream of migrants to the U.S. (Lozano-Ascencio, Roberts & Bean 1999; Roberts, Frank & Lozano-Ascencio 1999). Migrants in both streams are moving between urban labor markets and are seeking full-year urban employment rather than seasonal agricultural work typical of rural migration streams. Furthermore, it was the economic crisis in large urban areas that instigated these movements.

The foregoing discussion characterizes both rural and urban migration streams from the interior of Mexico, but an additional source of migrants comes from the border region itself. The California transborder region has been characterized as a single urban system (Lorey 1999; Rubin-Kurtzman, Ham-Chande & Van Arsdol 1996). Movement between Mexico and the U.S. is facilitated by both formal and informal institutions. Mexican border residents are allowed to hold "local passports" that allow them to travel within 25 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border for up to 72 hours to visit relatives and friends and shop in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Justice 1999). Although these passports do not allow border residents to work, some do, though they risk losing the passport if they cross too frequently and catch the attention of the border inspectors. Most of Tijuana's border-crossers go to San Diego to shop, work, or pay social visits to friends and relatives (Cox 1994). Undocumented migration is intense here as well, with nearly 45% of apprehensions of undocumented migrants occurring in the San Diego-Tijuana corridor in 1993, although this declined to only 24% of apprehensions by 1997 after the implementation of Operation Hold-the-Line in September 1993 (U.S. General Accounting Office 1997).

In the other direction, many California residents travel to Baja California without needing documentation for social visits, shopping, or tourism, thus contributing to the social and economic ties binding the two sides of the border together. These individual-level movements are complemented by the growth of trade and cross-border enterprises that have long differentiated the border economy from the Mexican national economy (Lorey 1999). Thus, the intensity of cross-border interaction facilitates and promotes the distinct migration

stream of the southern California–Baja California region, though research on the social process of migration from the Mexican border has only recently begun using individual-level quantitative data (Fussell 2002).

In this research I argue that each of these sources of Mexican migrants to the U.S. possess a unique migratory dynamic. While migration from urban Mexico has not been studied as systematically as that from rural Mexico, recent research suggests that the determinants of migration from urban areas are distinct. Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999) suggest that migrants from Mexico City to Austin, Texas, have a variety of motivations and strategies for migrating to the U.S. Low-skill workers are more likely to rely on rural-based social networks for assistance in migrating to the U.S. and do so seeking upward mobility. Those with more human capital are less likely to rely on migrant networks and often migrate in search of urban employment opportunities or for the adventure of it (e.g., Hernández 1999). Professional migrants are more likely to use their occupational networks to find employment in the U.S. and more often migrate with legal documentation, thus finding work within their own field. Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Ascencio (1999) and others (Fussell & Massey n.d.) conclude that in general urban migration streams are more heterogeneous in their social composition than rural migration streams. Furthermore, Fussell and Massey (n.d.) argue that the potential for a self-feeding migration stream of urban migrants is limited by low levels of migration-related social capital and the greater availability of low-skill employment in urban areas, even during times of recession.

There is even less research describing the social process of migration from the northern border region, in part because it is a relatively minor source of migrants (Marcelli & Cornelius 2001; Durand, Massey & Zenteno 2001; Fussell 2002). Some scholars have investigated whether the industrialization of the northern border cities has been a deterrent to emigration, generally concluding that it has been a minor deterrent or none at all (Davila & Saenz 1990; Martin 1997). Others have studied cross-border workers who live in Mexico and work in the U.S. (Hernández, Rodríguez & Hagan n.d.). Though cross-border workers are not technically migrants, Hernández, Rodríguez, and Hagan (n.d.) argue that heightened security at the border has encouraged some of these workers to move permanently to the U.S. so that they can remain employed there. This research suggests that while the border may be a small source of migrants, migration from the border region operates on principles that are very different from migration from the interior of Mexico (Fussell 2002).

This review of research on Mexican migration to the U.S. leads me to expect the individual likelihood of migration from interior and border urban communities to be lower than that from rural interior communities. The overarching expectation of lower levels of urban and border migration is explored by three hypotheses: (1) Family-based migration-related social capital positively predicts both undocumented and documented migration in

all types of communities. (2) Internal migration to the border (Baja California or any of the other border states) is another way of entering the migration stream by gaining access to migration-related information and contacts, such as migrant smugglers or career migrants located at the border. However, for an important percentage of Tijuana's residents internal migration is an equally attractive alternative to U.S. migration. Finally, (3) employment in nonagricultural low-skill occupations, as well as professional, managerial, and other skilled occupations, will negatively predict undocumented U.S. migration in urban areas, including Tijuana where there is greater demand for these types of workers. I expect that service and manufacturing employment will be the occupational sectors that most strongly differentiate types of communities because they offer employment to workers with lower levels of human capital who are most likely to migrate without documentation. In addition, I expect to see different time trends in the likelihood of migration between communities, with steadily increasing likelihoods of both documented and undocumented migration from rural interior communities, and temporary, economically driven periods of raised likelihood of migration from interior urban and border communities.

In the remainder of the article I explore these hypotheses using survey data comparing migration from four urban border communities in the city of Tijuana, Baja California, and from multiple urban and rural communities in central western Mexico. I describe the data and methods used in the analyses in the following section. In the results section I present a life-history analysis of the determinants of first and later documented and undocumented migration by male household heads according to the community in which they were surveyed.

Data and Methods

This research uses data from the first household survey focusing on migration behavior in Tijuana, a northern Mexican border city. This data was collected as part of the Mexican Migration Project (MMP) database of household surveys collected primarily in communities in west central Mexico that has been the basis for much of the research on Mexican migration to the U.S. The database includes seventy-one communities in the Mexican states of Jalisco, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Nayarit, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, San Luis Potosí, Colima, and Baja California surveyed between 1987 and 1998. The first five states have the longest histories of Mexican migration to the U.S., but the expanded geographic coverage of the survey allows for a greater comparison of migration patterns. This database is not a representative sample of the Mexican population, but rather a purposive sample of communities in the primary sending regions. However, systematic comparisons between the MMP and Mexico's National

Survey of Population Dynamics (a representative national survey) indicate that the MMP provides an accurate and remarkably unbiased profile of the characteristics and experiences of Mexican migrants to the U.S. (Massey & Zenteno 2000; Zenteno & Massey 1999).

The community samples consist of 150–200 households selected randomly from a census of each community. In smaller cities (15,000–75,000 inhabitants), towns (3,000–15,000 inhabitants), and ranchos (< 3,000 inhabitants), the entire community was canvassed, but in larger urban areas (areas of 75,000 people or more) selected working-class neighborhoods were sampled instead. Data was collected on social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the head, the spouse, the head's children, and other household members. Basic information was gathered on the members who had been to the U.S. and the dates, duration, and destination of their first and last U.S. trips, as well as their legal status, occupation, and wages while there. A trip is defined as a move to the U.S. that involved a change in usual residence and excludes short visits for vacation, shopping, social visits, and commuting in the case of border residents. Thus, the purpose of the trip, more than the duration, is the criterion for defining a U.S. trip.

These community samples were supplemented with nonrandom samples of U.S. migrants located in destination areas of the U.S., based on references from the Mexican communities' households. The samples are weighted by the inverse of the sampling fraction employed at each Mexican and U.S. site. For the Mexican communities, the sampling fraction is the number of households in the sample divided by the number of households in the sampling frame. In the U.S., sampling fractions are estimated by dividing the number of households surveyed by the estimated number of households in the out-migrant community. The size of the out-migrant community is estimated from the information on the current location of offspring of household heads who are no longer household members. The ratio of the nonhousehold member children living in the U.S. to their counterparts living in Mexico was applied to the Mexican sampling frame to estimate the size of the out-migrant community and to form the basis for the U.S. sampling fraction. Pooling the samples and applying the sample weights provides a profile of the binational communities at the time of each survey (see Massey & Espinosa 1997).

I use an event-history analysis to predict whether a household head makes a documented or undocumented U.S. trip in a given person year, or does not make a trip at all, using time-varying indicators of a respondent's individual and family characteristics and labor and migration histories. The dependent variable in the life-history analysis has three categories: making an undocumented U.S. trip, making a documented U.S. trip, and not migrating in a given person-year. The time-varying independent variables are available only for household heads and therefore I limit the sample to household heads. Furthermore, I limit the sample to men, since female heads of households (by

definition, households without a male head) demonstrate distinct patterns of migration (Cerrutti & Massey 2001; Kanaiaupuni 2000).

An event-history analysis uses each person-year of an individual's life as the unit of analysis. In doing so, it follows each respondent through every year of life, noting changes in the person's characteristics to evaluate how these characteristics affect the probability that he or she will make a U.S. trip in a given year. For the analysis of first U.S. trips I use each year in which the respondent was 15 years old or older beginning in 1965 up until the time of the first U.S. trip, or the time of the survey if the respondent never made a U.S. trip. For the analysis of the most recent U.S. trip, I include in the sample all person-years lived between the first U.S. trip and all subsequent U.S. trips up to the time of the survey. This sample is therefore restricted to respondents who have made at least one U.S. trip.

To demonstrate differences between the types of communities I interact each of the independent variables of interest with an indicator for the type of community in which the respondent was surveyed. Interaction effects in logistic regression are calculated as the product of a variable of interest and a moderator variable, in this case, living in a large urban area in the interior of Mexico (population 75,000 or more) or in Tijuana (population 699,000). I calculate the odds of making a U.S. trip by taking the exponent of the coefficient. The exponent of the coefficient of the variable of interest is interpreted as the odds ratio of making a U.S. trip when the condition measured by the variable is present over when it is absent for residents of rural interior communities (the reference category). For the product terms of the variable of interest and the moderator variables, urban or border residence, the exponent of the coefficient is interpreted as the ratio of the odds ratio of making a U.S. trip when the condition is present over when the condition is absent for residents of urban or border communities over the similar ratio for residents of rural interior communities (Jaccard 2001).

Migration Dynamics from Interior Rural, Urban and Border Communities

SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS

Table 1 presents the means of the variables used in the multinomial logistic analysis of person-years, distinguished by the type of community in which the survey took place. These means and standard deviations represent the characteristics of the sample of person-years contributed by respondents between the age of 15 and the time of the survey in all years after 1964. The means show that the male household heads are fairly similar in all types of communities, though in Tijuana in the average person-year they are a couple years younger, have fewer children and are slightly less likely to have been

TABLE 1: Frequency Distributions and Means of Variables Used in the Event-History Analysis

	Tijuana (Urban Border) Communities		Urban Interior Communities		Rural Interior Communities	
	Mean or Percentage	S.D.	Mean or Percentage	S.D.	Mean or Percentage	S.D.
Demographic background						
Age	35.2	13.9	36.9	13.9	37.6	14.8
Minors	1.6	1.8	2.3	2.3	2.5	2.5
Ever married	.70	—	.77	—	.76	—
Human capital						
Years of education	7.4	4.3	6.5	4.7	4.4	4.2
Cumulative LF experience	168.0	109.8	155.0	98.3	156.2	99.6
Family-based social capital						
Parent migrated prior	.10	—	.12	—	.18	—
Sibling(s) migrated prior	.25	—	.16	—	.33	—
Migration-based social capital						
Internal migrant in Mexico	.58	—	.38	—	.36	—
Internal migrant to Baja Cal.	.52	—	.01	—	.01	—
Number of U.S. trips	.6	1.1	.6	2.1	2.4	4.8
Occupation in previous year						
Not in labor force	.04	—	.05	—	.03	—
Professional/managerial/skilled	.16	—	.17	—	.09	—
Manufacturing	.36	—	.43	—	.26	—
Service sector	.40	—	.27	—	.15	—
Agriculture sector	.04	—	.08	—	.47	—
Period						
1965–69	.08	—	.12	—	.12	—
1970–74	.09	—	.14	—	.15	—
1975–79	.12	—	.17	—	.17	—
1980–84	.16	—	.19	—	.19	—
1985–89	.18	—	.20	—	.20	—
1990–98	.39	—	.18	—	.17	—
Dependent variable						
Percentage undocumented trips	.0081	.090	.0055	.007	.0130	.113
Percentage documented trips	.0023	.050	.0007	.003	.0009	.030
Percentage no trip in person-years	.9897	.101	.9938	.080	.9862	.117
N	12,272		37,590		183,115	

Source: Mexican Migration Project

married. The Tijuana sample also measures more years of education: 7.4 years compared to 6.5 years in interior urban communities and 4.4 years in interior rural communities. The sample means of labor force experience are similar in each place, ranging between 13 and 14 years.

The critical variables for this study are the family-based migration-related social capital, internal migration experience, and the occupational sector of employment in the previous year. There are important differences across communities in the amount of migration experience within families. In an average person-year the parents of men in Tijuana and urban interior communities have less migratory experience than men in rural interior communities (10 and 12% versus 18%). This may be expected from the long history of migration from rural areas of central western Mexico. However, male household heads in border and rural communities report more person-years in which their brothers had already migrated (25% and 33% respectively), whereas few in urban communities have access to migration-related social capital through their siblings (16%). Thus, all types of communities have very different amounts of family-based, migration-related social capital.

As discussed previously, migration within Mexico is a common way of searching for upward mobility. This propensity to move may predict migration to the U.S. simply because someone who moves once is more likely to move again. To control for this, I include measures for both internal migration to any destination within Mexico and migration to the northern border,¹ which would be a strategic move to a major crossing-point to the U.S. Residents of Tijuana are particularly likely to be internal migrants: Male household heads surveyed in Tijuana reported that they were migrants to the northern border in more than half the person-years under study, and a slightly larger proportion were migrants anywhere within Mexico (including the northern border). This is quite different from the interior urban and rural communities: In only 1% of person-years did those residents have migration experience in the northern border, though in 38 and 36%, respectively, of the person-years they had migration experience within Mexico. In the analysis of the most recent U.S. trips I include a measure of the number of previous trips to the U.S. as an indicator of accumulated U.S. migration experience. It is apparent that there is much accumulated migration experience in rural interior communities, for whom in an average person-year a male household head has made an average of 2.4 trips to the U.S. In contrast, in an average person-year in the Tijuana and interior urban communities samples male household heads in urban areas have made only about 0.6 trips to the U.S.

While the foregoing measures have captured the forces that may push a person into a migration stream, I also include measures of the sector of employment of the person in the previous person-year as a measure of how local opportunities may keep a respondent from migrating. Since we do not

TABLE 2: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting First Undocumented Migration Using Person-Year Data

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Type of community</i>				
Current resident of Tijuana community	-1.10**	.13	.12	.49
Current resident of urban interior community	-.96**	.07	-.33	.29
Current resident of rural interior community	—	—	—	—
<i>Demographic background</i>				
Age	.04**	.02	.04**	.01
Age ²	-.001**	.0002	-.001**	.0002
Minors	-.004	.01	-.005	.01
Ever married	-.12*	.06	-.12*	.06
<i>Human capital</i>				
Years of education	-.07**	.006	-.07**	.01
Years of education × Tijuana	—	—	.02	.03
Years of education × urban interior	—	—	.01	.02
Cumulative labor force experience	-.002**	.0005	-.002**	.0005
Cumulative labor force experience × Tijuana	—	—	-.001	.002
Cumulative labor force experience × urban interior	—	—	.001	.001
<i>Family-based social capital</i>				
Parent migrated prior	.66**	.05	.62**	.05
Sibling(s) migrated prior	1.28**	.04	1.26**	.04
Parent migrated × Tijuana	—	—	-.27	.40
Sibling(s) migrated × Tijuana	—	—	-.01	.26
Parent migrated × urban interior	—	—	.60**	.17
Sibling(s) migrated × urban interior	—	—	.26†	.16
<i>Migration-based social capital</i>				
Internal migrant in Mexico	.07†	.04	.06	.05
Internal migrant to Baja California	.41**	.09	.51**	.10
Internal migrant to Baja California × Tijuana	—	—	-.64*	.31
Internal migrant to Baja California × urban interior	—	—	.12	.31
<i>Occupation in previous year</i>				
Not in labor force	.57**	.14	.54**	.15
Professional/manager	-1.49**	.23	-1.57**	.26
Manufacturing sector	.62**	.05	.64**	.05
Service sector	.59**	.06	.70**	.06
Agricultural sector	—	—	—	—
Not in labor force × Tijuana	—	—	1.08	.38
Professional/manager × Tijuana	—	—	.86	.82
Manufacturing × Tijuana	—	—	.27	.34
Service × Tijuana	—	—	-.59	.39
Not in labor force × urban interior	—	—	-.28	.42
Professional/manager × urban interior	—	—	-.31	.66
Manufacturing × urban interior	—	—	-.56**	.19
Service × urban interior	—	—	-1.07**	.23

TABLE 2: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting First Undocumented Migration Using Person-Year Data (Cont'd)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Period</i>				
1965–69	—	—	—	—
1970–74	.83**	.09	.92**	.09
1974–79	1.12**	.09	1.21**	.09
1980–84	.97**	.09	1.05**	.10
1985–89	1.30**	.09	1.35**	.10
1990–98	1.12**	.11	1.21**	.11
1965–69 × Tijuana	—	—	—	—
1970–74 × Tijuana	—	—	–1.11*	.53
1974–79 × Tijuana	—	—	–.81†	.47
1980–84 × Tijuana	—	—	–.82†	.48
1985–89 × Tijuana	—	—	–1.12*	.48
1990–98 × Tijuana	—	—	–1.16*	.49
1965–69 × urban interior	—	—	—	—
1970–74 × urban interior	—	—	–.66*	.30
1974–79 × urban interior	—	—	–.76**	.29
1980–84 × urban interior	—	—	–.76**	.31
1985–89 × urban interior	—	—	–.28	.29
1990–98 × urban interior	—	—	–.55	.36
Intercept	–4.68**	.23	–4.74**	.24
Likelihood ratio	25583.9		25455.5	
df	44		100	
(N = 168,624)				
† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01				

have information on annual wages, this is the best time-varying indicator of the respondent's social class position. As expected, we see that the respondents from interior rural communities were employed in agriculture in nearly half of the person-years contributed by those respondents, followed by a quarter in manufacturing. In contrast, respondents in Tijuana and urban interior communities spent 70% or more of their person-years working in manufacturing or services, as one would expect in urban economies. In Tijuana, there is a slightly greater concentration in the service sector than manufacturing due to the strength of commerce and services in this border city. This may be surprising because of the growth of the export-oriented multinational manufacturing plants (*maquiladoras*) located there, but *maquiladoras* tend to hire more women and are a less important source of employment for men (Fussell 2000).

Finally, I include dummy variables for five-year periods between 1965 and 1998 as indicators of time trends in migration. The period covered is the post-*Bracero* period in which there were few possibilities for gaining legal permission to work in the U.S. The economic crisis of 1982 and the economic restructuring that has occurred since that time has created a pool of unemployed workers for whom migration to the U.S. became a more attractive source of employment. Furthermore the amnesty granted to undocumented migrants through the 1986 Immigration Control and Reform Act opened the possibility for migrants to legalize their status and sponsor their relatives to migrate. Since the early 1990s, increased patrolling of the border was intended to deter migration, but most research suggests it has not slowed migration but rather changed migrants' crossing locations to more remote areas and lengthened their stays in the U.S. (Massey, Durand & Malone 2002).

In the following presentation of results I first consider predictors of undocumented and then documented first U.S. trips from the multinomial logistic regression of person-years lived up to the first U.S. trip or the year of the survey if no trip was made. Then I go on to examine models predicting later undocumented and documented trips among those who have already migrated at least once.

UNDOCUMENTED FIRST U.S. TRIPS

Consistent with my expectations based on the history of migration from Mexico to the U.S., the odds of undocumented migration from Tijuana and urban areas in the interior of Mexico are significantly lower than those from rural areas (Table 2, model 1). All other things being equal, the odds of taking a first undocumented trip by Tijuana's residents are only 33% of the odds of rural interior residents (figured as $[e^B - 1] * 100$), while the odds of urban residents in the interior making a first undocumented trip are only 38% of those of residents of rural interior communities. In order to examine how determinants of undocumented migration differ between places, I compare the results of the multinomial logistic regression without interactions for place of residence (model 1) with a second model that includes interactions of place of residence at the time of the survey with the measures of family-based migration-related social capital and occupation (model 2).

In this analysis of first undocumented migration, I test the three possible explanations for the lower likelihood of undocumented migration from Tijuana and interior urban areas relative to rural interior communities by interacting the measures of family-based social capital, internal migration, and occupation in the previous year with the place of residence of the respondent. Notably, the indicators of residence in Tijuana or interior urban communities drop below statistical significance in the model with interactions (model 2),

suggesting that the interacted variables account for most of the lower probability of undocumented migration from these places.

Overall, most men make their first undocumented U.S. trip while they are young and are less likely to initiate migration at later ages. Having been married slightly decreases the odds of making a first undocumented U.S. trip, although having minor children in the household does not. Notably, having more years of education negatively predicts taking a first undocumented U.S. trip in all communities. Likewise, having more months of labor force experience diminishes the odds of undocumented migration by 2% in all communities. These results confirm earlier research that finds that most men initiating undocumented migrant careers are young, with little education or employment experience (Massey et al. 1987; Massey & Espinosa 1997).

The effect of family-based migration-related social capital is powerful across all communities, and even more so in urban interior communities where it is relatively scarce. In rural interior communities having a parent with migration experience increases the odds of making a first U.S. trip by 86% over those not having a migrant parent, while having a migrant sibling increases the odds by 253% over those not having a migrant sibling. In Tijuana these effects are not significantly different from those in rural areas. This is to be expected because of the large stocks of migration-related social capital in both rural communities and in Tijuana (Table 1). In urban interior communities the family-based social capital has greater effects than elsewhere: Having a parent who has made a prior U.S. trip increases the odds the respondent will take a first undocumented U.S. trip by an additional 82% over those with a migrant parent in rural areas, and having a sibling who has made a prior U.S. trip increases the odds that a respondent will take a first undocumented U.S. trip by 31% over those with a migrant sibling in a rural area, though this effect is just barely significant at the $p < .10$ level. Evidently family-based migration-related social capital counts more heavily in urban areas, where migration experience is less prevalent in the community as a whole.

Another way in which men enter into the Mexico–U.S. migration stream is through internal migration to the northern border, a strategy that operates most significantly among those from rural and urban interior communities. Internal migrants to the border from rural and urban interior communities alike are 67% more likely to take a first undocumented U.S. trip than are those who have never made an internal trip to the border. Migration within Mexico, in general, not specifically to the border, does not have a significant effect on the odds of making a first undocumented U.S. trip. However, not everyone migrates to the border as a steppingstone to the U.S. Among internal migrants to the northern border who are residents of Tijuana, the odds of taking a first undocumented trip are 12% lower than for those who were born in Tijuana. Indeed, Tijuana is a city of internal migrants, for whom Tijuana is an attractive destination as well as a crossing-point to the U.S.

Labor market opportunities also differentiate potential migrants, such that those with skills for which there is demand in the local labor market are more likely to stay at home than to seek employment in the U.S. However, urban and rural labor markets differ distinctly in the types of low-skill work they offer. In rural areas the manufacturing and service sectors of the economy are strongly tied to agriculture and are often small-scale manufacturers and service providers. In large cities, in contrast, manufacturing and service employers are more highly capitalized and jobs in these sectors are likely to offer steady income and benefits. Because of these differences, manufacturing and service workers and the unemployed in rural interior communities have even greater odds of taking a first U.S. trip than are agricultural workers, who make up the bulk of migrants from these areas. I expect this is because the wages in manufacturing and services jobs are low in interior rural communities, since they are disconnected from the growth sectors of the modern Mexican economy. In contrast, in interior urban communities, having been employed in the service sector in the previous year is a significant deterrent to U.S. migration, lowering the odds to 69% of those employed in agriculture. Employment in manufacturing in interior urban communities also lowers the odds of taking a first undocumented U.S. trip relative to those in rural communities, such that the odds of migrating to the U.S. are similar for those employed in manufacturing and agriculture in urban communities. In Tijuana it is surprising, given the *maquiladoras* and cross-border trade there, that the odds of making an undocumented first U.S. trip are not affected significantly by employment in manufacturing or services. Only among those who were not employed in the previous year are the odds of making a first undocumented U.S. trip greater than for those employed in agriculture in the previous year, although this is significant only at the $p < .10$ level. This suggests that in spite of the border economy, young men in general are likely to try their luck in the more attractive labor market just across the border. These sets of variables and interactions demonstrate that interior urban labor markets deter men from making an undocumented first U.S. trip, while rural labor markets seem to promote migration and the border labor markets are neither a deterrent nor a stimulus to migration.

Turning to the period measures, there is evidence of a pattern of steadily growing odds of migration in rural areas and episodic changes in the odds of migration in interior urban and border areas. In each period since 1965-69, the odds of taking an undocumented first U.S. trip are significantly greater and generally larger in each subsequent period in rural interior communities. While the odds of taking a first trip also increase in urban interior communities, the odds are attenuated between 1970 and 1984 relative to rural interior communities. The odds of undocumented U.S. migration only rise after the period of economic crisis and during the restructuring of the economy (1985–

1998). In Tijuana the growth in the odds of taking a first undocumented U.S. trip are increasing at a much slower rate, suggesting that there is some deterrent effect of residing there. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s the deterrent effect diminished somewhat. At this time the border economy was more closely tied with the U.S. economy than with the Mexican economy, thus the recession in the U.S. was felt more sharply in the border than elsewhere in Mexico. Likewise, while the rest of Mexico was experiencing a severe economic crisis in the 1980s, the border economy experienced a boom as more investors and consumers found that their dollars went further in the Mexican border economy (Lorey 1999), explaining the diminished likelihood of migration from those communities in the late 1980s and 1990s.

DOCUMENTED FIRST U.S. TRIPS

Documented migration is characterized by a distinct social process that depends on legalized family-based ties or other means of gaining legal entry to the U.S. Apparently Tijuana's residents have some advantage in generating these ties: overall men there have a greater likelihood of making a first documented U.S. trip than those from interior urban and rural communities (Table 3, model 1). In contrast, residents of interior urban and rural communities alike have lower likelihoods of making a first documented U.S. trip. Notably, these community effects remain significant and the coefficient for Tijuana's residents is even larger in the interaction model (model 2), suggesting that the community of residence has a more generalized effect on documented migration that is not explained by the variables for migration-related social capital, internal migratory experience, or the local labor market that are included in the interaction model.

The demographic profile of documented migrants differs from that of undocumented migrants and reflects the infrequency of making a first U.S. trip with documentation. The age pattern shows that the odds of migration are highest at early ages and rapidly decline. The decline with age is particularly steep in Tijuana (interaction not included in this model). This is consistent with a pattern in which children, most often as teenagers, migrate with documentation along with their parents, and as they age their odds of documented migration diminish. Neither marital status nor having minor children influences the odds of making a documented first U.S. trip, with the exception of Tijuana, where being married increases the odds by a factor of two (not included in this model). However, education is a significant predictor of documented migration from all types of communities; each additional year of education increases the odds of making a first documented U.S. trip by 9%, the opposite of what occurs in the process of undocumented migration. This

TABLE 3: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting First Documented Migration Using Person-Year Data

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Type of community</i>				
Current resident of Tijuana community	1.51**	.19	1.39*	.61
Current resident of urban interior community	-.63**	.21	-1.17	.83
Current resident of rural interior community	—	—	—	—
<i>Demographic background</i>				
Age	-.07*	.03	-.06**	.03
Age ²	.001†	.0004	.001+	.0003
Minors	-.01	.05	-.02	.05
Ever married	-.08	.17	-.06	.17
<i>Human capital</i>				
Years of education	.08**	.01	.09**	.02
Years of education × Tijuana	—	—	-.06	.04
Years of education × urban interior	—	—	-.006	.05
Cumulative labor force experience	-.004*	.001	.002	.001
Cumulative labor force experience × Tijuana	—	—	-.006**	.002
Cumulative labor force experience × urban interior	—	—	-.005†	.003
<i>Family-based social capital</i>				
Parent migrated prior	1.19**	.14	1.17**	.17
Sibling(s) migrated prior	1.03**	.13	1.16**	.16
Parent migrated × Tijuana	—	—	.56	.37
Sibling(s) migrated × Tijuana	—	—	-.59†	.36
Parent migrated × urban interior	—	—	-.49	.51
Sibling(s) migrated × urban interior	—	—	-.10	.49
<i>Migration-based social capital</i>				
Internal migrant in Mexico	-.14	.15	-.19	.15
Internal migrant to Baja California	-.41	.25	-.86	.71
Internal migrant to Baja California × Tijuana	—	—	.79	.78
Internal migrant to Baja California × urban interior	—	—	1.97†	1.04
<i>Occupation in previous year</i>				
Not in labor force	1.81**	.23	2.13**	.25
Professional/manager	-.68	.53	-1.50	1.01
Manufacturing sector	.70**	.16	.55**	.19
Service sector	.45**	.18	.49*	.22
Agricultural sector	—	—	—	—
Not in labor force × Tijuana	—	—	-1.77	1.01
Professional/manager × Tijuana	—	—	1.58	1.29
Manufacturing × Tijuana	—	—	.57	.43
Service × Tijuana	—	—	.08	.47
Not in labor force × urban interior	—	—	-1.18	.88
Professional/manager × urban interior	—	—	1.72	1.51
Manufacturing × urban interior	—	—	.53	.59
Service × urban interior	—	—	.15	.64

TABLE 3: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting First Documented Migration Using Person-year Data (Cont'd)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Period</i>				
1965–69	—	—	—	—
1970–74	–.69**	.21	–.87**	.24
1974–79	–.99**	.22	–1.33**	.27
1980–84	–.92**	.22	–1.30**	.26
1985–89	–.57**	.22	–1.00**	.27
1990–98	–.98**	.26	–1.52**	.35
1965–69 × Tijuana	—	—	—	—
1970–74 × Tijuana	—	—	.86	.58
1974–79 × Tijuana	—	—	.64	.66
1980–84 × Tijuana	—	—	.94	.60
1985–89 × Tijuana	—	—	1.12*	.56
1990–98 × Tijuana	—	—	1.52**	.62
1965–69 × urban interior	—	—	—	—
1970–74 × urban interior	—	—	.05	.90
1974–79 × urban interior	—	—	1.63*	.70
1980–84 × urban interior	—	—	1.52*	.71
1985–89 × urban interior	—	—	1.35†	.74
1990–98 × urban interior	—	—	.97	1.02
Intercept	–5.81**	.48	–5.90**	.49
Likelihood ratio	25583.9		25455.5	
df	44		100	
(N = 168,624)				
† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01				

suggests that those with more education have greater access to either family or employers to sponsor them in their first move across the border.

As expected, given the importance of family sponsorship in the legal migration process, having a parent or sibling that has previously migrated almost always increases the odds of making a documented U.S. trip. In all types of communities, having a migrant parent raises the odds of documented U.S. migration by 222% and having a sibling with migration experience increases these odds by 216%. However, internal migratory experience, whether to the northern border or anywhere throughout Mexico, does not strongly affect the odds of documented U.S. migration for those from interior rural communities or from Tijuana. Only residents of interior urban communities increase their odds of making a first documented U.S. trip when they migrate to the northern

border. While evidence of an urban-to-border-to-U.S. step-migration stream is still new, this supports results of other researchers who find that urban residents may sometimes migrate to the border to enter into the Mexico–U.S. migration stream, though it is not clear why this would improve their chances of documented versus undocumented migration (Lozano-Ascencio, Roberts & Bean 1999; Roberts, Frank & Lozano-Ascencio 1999).

Labor markets do little to deter men from taking documented first U.S. trips regardless of the community of origin. This is reasonable, since migration with documentation allows for a greater choice of employment in the U.S. and reduces the risks associated with migration. Therefore, taking a documented migration is an attractive opportunity in all types of communities regardless of one's current position in the local labor market.

The strongest set of predictors in the interaction model predicting first documented U.S. trips is the set of period measures. Among residents of rural interior communities, the odds of documented migration have been steadily low throughout the period under consideration. For residents of interior urban communities, there was a slight increase in the odds of making a documented first U.S. trip in the late 1970s and 1980s, but this is not sustained in the 1990s. This increase may be related to the accumulation of migration-related social capital stemming from rural-to-urban migration during this period combined with the push effect of the economic crisis. For residents of the Tijuana communities there was no difference in the odds of making a first documented U.S. trip until the late 1980s and especially the 1990s when it increased significantly. This too may have resulted from shifts in the stock of migration-related social capital as Tijuana's population grew from internal migration combined with the sponsorship of relatives who were legalized in the post-IRCA period. The equation for documented first U.S. trips suggests that in rural interior communities documented migration to the U.S. is a process shaped mostly by the accumulated stocks of migration-based social capital in a community. In Tijuana, and for urban residents who travel to the border, documented first trips are more likely to occur overall but are based on advantages accrued in the border environment in addition to family-based migration-related social capital.

To summarize the evidence from first undocumented and documented U.S. trips, it appears that for the most part migration from all types of communities follows a pattern well known to scholars of Mexican migration to the U.S. Making a first undocumented or documented trip depends heavily on migration-related social capital within the family. These results add two findings that further refine our understanding of Mexico–U.S. migration. First, step-migration to the border is a strategy that migrants from interior rural and urban communities engage in when making an undocumented first U.S. trip and sometimes even documented first U.S. trips from urban communities. Second, the shortage of low-skill employment in rural areas whether in

agriculture, manufacturing, or services also pushes men into the rural-origin migration stream. Indeed, the odds of first undocumented migration from rural interior communities have been growing over time, likely as a result of both the expansion of migratory social networks and the persistent decline in agricultural employment in Mexico. In contrast, residents of urban interior communities have ample low-skill employment opportunities in manufacturing and services that are attractive alternatives to taking an undocumented U.S. trip. Furthermore, the vigorous economy of the border makes it a destination in itself for some internal migrants who actually are less likely to take a first undocumented U.S. trip than are Tijuana natives. For all these reasons I expect there is less potential for growth in the urban-origin and border undocumented migration streams than in the rural-origin migration stream under current U.S. immigration policies. This conclusion is supported by the time trends, which show lower likelihoods of first migration from interior urban and border communities with the exception of a few episodes in which their weakened economies diminished their deterrent effect. Nevertheless, the greater access to legal documentation resulting from the IRCA and U.S. immigration policies giving preference to family members of legalized immigrants may continue to increase the odds of documented migration from areas with greater stocks of migration-related social capital, especially from the rural interior and border communities.

LATER UNDOCUMENTED U.S. TRIPS

The deterrent effects of urban and border communities are also evident in the model of later undocumented U.S. trips. Residents of Tijuana and urban interior communities have lower odds of making an additional undocumented U.S. trip than those in rural interior communities, as seen in the model without interactions (model 1). However, when the interactions are included, the odds that a resident of an interior urban community will take additional trips falls in significance so that they are no less likely to take an additional undocumented U.S. trip than migrants from interior rural communities. Remarkably, the odds that a migrant in Tijuana will take an additional U.S. trip become even lower in the interaction model such that they have only 7% of the odds of migrants in rural interior communities of taking an additional U.S. trip (model 2). Apparently, very few migrants in Tijuana go on to make additional undocumented U.S. trips.²

The number of U.S. trips already taken is theoretically the most important measure predicting additional U.S. trips, since it measures the migration-related human capital embodied in the migrant himself. In rural interior communities each additional U.S. trip increases the odds of taking another one by 15%. In urban interior communities the odds are increased by an additional

2% for each previous trip. It is striking that the effect of previous U.S. experience is the greatest in Tijuana: Each previous U.S. trip increases the odds of taking an additional trip by 30%. This suggests that in Tijuana, in spite of the fact that few migrants take additional trips overall, there is a small but important number of repeat undocumented migrants who use Tijuana as a home base for making regular trips to the U.S.

In fact, Tijuana has long been a staging ground as well as a home base for recurrent migrants, so it is not surprising that internal migration to the border is a strategy used by migrants from the interior for taking later undocumented U.S. trips. For interior rural and urban migrants, having spent at least a year in the border region doubles the odds of taking an additional undocumented U.S. trip over those who have not spent time there. This effect is even greater among those residents of Tijuana who have relocated there and have migrated to the U.S. previously, increasing the odds of taking an additional undocumented U.S. trip by a factor of 7. Clearly, living in Tijuana, as in other border cities, facilitates migration for those who choose to make a career of it.

While human and social capital clearly increase the odds of taking additional undocumented U.S. trips, the type of labor market in which the migrant participates has a moderating effect. In the failing rural economies in the interior of the countries, migrants employed in services and manufacturing have similar or slightly greater odds of taking an additional undocumented U.S. trip relative to agricultural workers. Thus, as in the case of first trips, those with the lowest skill levels are most likely to migrate, as might be expected for seasonal agricultural migrants from rural areas. In contrast, migrants in Tijuana and urban communities in the interior who worked in manufacturing and service occupations in the previous year have between 17% and 48% of the odds of those employed in agriculture of making an additional undocumented U.S. trip. Evidently, manufacturing and service employment in the border and in interior urban areas effectively deters low-skill workers from making additional U.S. trips. This suggests that in the border there is some deterrent effect of working in the *maquiladoras* or the service sector, but it is no greater than working in those sectors in other urban economies.

Education, a measure of skills, is a key selection factor into the U.S. migration stream. Therefore it is logical that, like employment, it has distinct effects on the odds of taking additional undocumented U.S. trips in different types of communities. For those in rural interior communities and Tijuana, the odds of taking an additional undocumented trip decrease by 8% with each additional year of education. In other words, those with the lowest levels of human capital in these communities have the fewest local employment possibilities while those with more human capital have more options in the local labor market. In contrast, in urban interior communities the odds of taking an additional trip increase by 6% for each additional year of education. Indeed, the urban middle class in Mexico experienced the economic crisis most

acutely, making international migration a more attractive option. Evidently, the urban-origin migration stream of undocumented repeat migrants is selected for higher levels of human capital than the rural-origin stream, reflecting the distinct types of employment crises in urban and rural interior communities.

The ways in which undocumented repeat migration varies by community type are supported by the time trends in the odds of taking additional undocumented U.S. trips in different periods. The odds of taking additional U.S. trips from rural interior communities has been increasing since the post-Bracero period up through the present, clearly demonstrating the expansion of the recurrent undocumented migration stream from rural communities to the U.S. due to both economic stagnation and the accumulation of migration experience. While there is evidence of a growing stream of recurrent undocumented migrants from interior urban communities, it isn't growing any faster than that from interior rural communities. In fact, the odds that a migrant from an urban interior area would take an additional undocumented U.S. trip appear to decrease by 29% in the post-1980 period. Likewise, there is no significant difference in the time trend between Tijuana and interior rural areas. In short, it appears that urban interior and border communities are hardly a more rapidly growing source of undocumented career migrants to the U.S. than are rural sources.

LATER DOCUMENTED U.S. TRIPS

The same geographic pattern that was evident in the case of later undocumented U.S. trips is also apparent in the model of later documented U.S. trips. Migrants in both Tijuana and interior urban communities are less likely to take additional U.S. trips than are interior rural migrants. However, with the addition of interactions between community of origin and human and social capital, the deterrent effect of Tijuana increases while that of interior urban communities falls in significance. In other words, very few migrants in Tijuana take additional documented U.S. trips, though migrants in interior urban and rural communities are about equally likely to do so.

Human capital, especially migration experience, and migration-related social capital are the best means of accessing documentation that makes later documented trips possible. The migrants in this sample have already been to the U.S. at least once and therefore may have acquired documentation through employer sponsorship, the IRCA amnesty provision, marriage to a U.S. citizen or resident, or other legal means while on a previous undocumented U.S. trip. These effects are evident in all communities, but especially in Tijuana. In interior rural and urban communities, each previous U.S. trip increases the odds of taking additional documented U.S. trips by about 19%. In Tijuana, however, each additional U.S. trip raises the odds of taking an additional

TABLE 4: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting Later Undocumented Trips Using Person-Year Data

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Type of community</i>				
Current resident of Tijuana	-1.90**	.24	-2.65**	.98
Current resident of urban interior communities	-.22*	.08	.39†	.22
Current resident of rural interior community	—	—	—	—
<i>Demographic background</i>				
Age	.01	.01	.005	.01
Age ²	-.0007**	.0001	-.0006**	.0001
Minors	.06**	.01	.06**	.01
Ever married	.09†	.06	.10*	.05
<i>Human capital</i>				
Years of education	-.07**	.01	-.08**	.01
Years of education × Tijuana	—	—	.10	.07
Years of education × interior urban	—	—	.06**	.02
Cumulative labor force experience	-.01**	.0003	-.01**	.0003
Cumulative labor force experience × Tijuana	—	—	.001	.004
Cumulative labor force experience × interior urban	—	—	-.003*	.001
Number of previous U.S. trips	.14**	.002	.14**	.002
U.S. trips × Tijuana	—	—	.26*	.10
U.S. trips × interior urban	—	—	.02*	.01
<i>Family-based social capital</i>				
Parent migrated prior	-.10**	.04	-.09**	.04
Sibling(s) migrated prior	.17**	.04	.18**	.04
Parent migrated prior × Tijuana	—	—	-.90	.80
Sibling(s) migrated prior × Tijuana	—	—	.88†	.53
Parent migrated prior × interior urban	—	—	.10	.19
Sibling(s) migrated prior × interior urban	—	—	-.21	.17
<i>Migration-based social capital</i>				
Internal migrant in Mexico	.34**	.04	.35**	.04
Internal migrant to Baja California	.81**	.12	.75**	.13
Internal migrant to Baja California × Tijuana	—	—	1.28*	.59
Internal migrant to Baja California × interior urban	—	—	.13	.56
<i>Occupation in previous year</i>				
Not in labor force	-.63**	.15	-.55**	.16
Professional/manager	-1.68**	.22	-1.68**	.24
Manufacturing sector	.04	.04	-.08*	.04
Service sector	.06*	.02	-.07	.05
Agricultural sector	—	—	—	—
Not in labor force × Tijuana	—	—	Inf.	—
Professional/manager × Tijuana	—	—	Inf.	—
Manufacturing × Tijuana	—	—	-1.23†	.69
Service × Tijuana	—	—	-1.69*	.78
Not in labor force × interior urban	—	—	-1.17†	.62
Professional/manager × interior urban	—	—	-.44	.65
Manufacturing × interior urban	—	—	-.82**	.19
Service × interior urban	—	—	-.95**	.23

TABLE 4: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting Later Undocumented Trips Using Person-Year Data (Cont'd)

<i>Period</i>	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
1965–69	—	—	—	—
1970–74	.73**	.07	.74**	.07
1974–79	1.14**	.07	1.15**	.07
1980–84	1.45**	.07	1.47**	.07
1985–89	1.80**	.07	1.82**	.07
1990–96	1.62**	.08	1.64**	.08
1965–79 × Tijuana	—	—	—	—
1980–98 × Tijuana	—	—	-.27	.60
1965–79 × interior urban	—	—	—	—
1980–98 × interior urban	—	—	-.34†	.18
Intercept	-3.18**	.20	-3.08**	.20
Likelihood ratio	45072.1		449538.9	
df	46		87	

(N = 75,683)

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

documented U.S. trip by 52% — more evidence of the presence of career migrants in Tijuana.

The migration-related human capital embodied in the migrant is the strongest predictor of taking additional documented U.S. trips, while family-based migration-related social capital plays a lesser though still influential role. In rural interior communities having a parent or sibling who has migrated previously raises the odds of taking an additional documented U.S. trip by 72 and 82%, respectively; less than for first U.S. trips. Parent's migration-based social capital exerts a similar effect in interior urban and border communities. However, in these communities having a sibling who has migrated previously actually equalizes or lowers the odds of taking an additional documented U.S. trip relative to those who do not have migrant siblings. Clearly, this type of social capital matters less for later documented trips.

Internal migration to the border continues to increase the odds of taking an additional documented U.S. trip from all types of communities by about 48%. It is possible that migration to the border allows one access to information or networks that enable one to receive sponsorship for documentation. It isn't clear how this happens precisely, but future research on step-migration may investigate what occurs during a period of residency in the border that facilitates migration.

TABLE 5: Multinomial Logit Coefficients Predicting Later Documented Trips Using Person Year Data

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Type of community</i>				
Current resident of Tijuana	-1.90**	.24	-2.65**	.98
Current resident of interior urban communities	-.33*	.17	-1.54†	.83
Current resident of interior rural community	-.73**	.13	-.80	.45
<i>Demographic background</i>				
Age	.06**	.01	.06**	.01
Age ²	-.0007**	.0001	-.0008**	.0001
Minors	-.04**	.01	-.04**	.01
Ever married	.22**	.07	.22**	.07
<i>Human capital</i>				
Years of education	.04**	.01	.04**	.01
Years of education × Tijuana	—	—	-.02	.04
Years of education × interior urban	—	—	.01	.03
Cumulative labor force experience	-.01**	.0004	-.01**	.0004
Cumulative labor force experience × Tijuana	—	—	.0008	.002
Cumulative labor force experience × interior urban	—	—	-.002	.002
Number of previous U.S. trips	.17**	.002	.17**	.002
U.S. trips × Tijuana	—	—	.25**	.08
U.S. trips × interior urban	—	—	-.01	.01
<i>Family-based social capital</i>				
Parent migrated prior	.52**	.05	.54**	.05
Sibling(s) migrated prior	.56**	.05	.60**	.05
Parent migrated prior × Tijuana	—	—	.27	.38
Sibling(s) migrated prior × Tijuana	—	—	-.72*	.36
Parent migrated prior × interior urban	—	—	-.20	.29
Sibling(s) migrated prior × interior urban	—	—	-.53†	.28
<i>Migration-based social capital</i>				
Internal migrant in Mexico	-.15*	.05	-.15**	.05
Internal migrant to Baja California	.48**	.18	.39†	.22
Internal migrant to Baja California × Tijuana	—	—	.12	.46
Internal migrant to Baja California × interior urban	—	—	.84	.79
<i>Occupation in previous year</i>				
Not in labor force	-.54**	.13	-.43**	.13
Professional/manager	-1.06**	.21	-1.37**	.27
Manufacturing sector	-.53**	.05	-.56**	.06
Service sector	.29**	.07	-.56**	.07
Agricultural sector	—	—	—	—
Not in labor force × Tijuana	—	—	—	—
Professional/manager × Tijuana	—	—	.84	1.20
Manufacturing × Tijuana	—	—	1.14+	.60
Service × Tijuana	—	—	1.00	.62
Not in labor force × interior urban	—	—	-.56	.68
Professional/manager × interior urban	—	—	1.82**	.53
Manufacturing × interior urban	—	—	.67*	.33
Service × interior urban	—	—	-.06	.44

TABLE 5: Multinomial logit Coefficients Predicting Later Documented Trips Using Person Year Data (Cont'd)

	Model 1		Model 2	
	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
<i>Period</i>				
1965-69	—	—	—	—
1970-74	.42**	.10	.42*	.10
1974-79	.39**	.10	.39**	.10
1980-84	.33**	.10	.32**	.10
1985-89	1.66**	.09	1.64**	.09
1990-98	2.17**	.10	2.15**	.10
1965-79 × Tijuana	—	—	—	—
1980-98 × Tijuana	—	—	.48	.50
1965-79 × interior urban	—	—	—	—
1980-98 × interior urban	—	—	.48	.36
Intercept	-6.57**	.24	-6.32**	.24
Likelihood ratio	45072.1		449538.9	
df	46		87	

(N = 75,683)

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

Employment in most sectors of the labor market deters later documented U.S. trips from all types of communities. In part this reflects the fact that even experienced migrants have a difficult time getting documentation, but it also suggests that men with migration experience who have chosen to reenter the Mexican labor market are less inclined to take additional U.S. trips. Indeed, migrants from rural interior communities employed in any type of nonagricultural occupation have lower odds of making additional documented U.S. trips than agricultural workers. Even those who were not in the labor force in the previous year have lower odds of taking additional documented U.S. trips. This is also true in all occupations in Tijuana. However, those employed in manufacturing in the previous year are slightly more likely than manufacturing workers in the interior rural communities to take a documented U.S. trip. In interior urban communities, the pattern of labor market participation is distinct. In accord with Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio's finding (1999), I find that in interior urban areas workers employed in professional, managerial, and transportation and manufacturing occupations have a greater propensity to take additional documented U.S. trips. Thus, we see evidence of documented migrants in the traditional stream of mostly agricultural workers from rural communities and in the new stream of more-educated career migrants from interior urban communities.

The expansion of documented repeat migration is evident from the period indicators: In rural communities the odds of making additional documented U.S. trips have increased steadily over time. This effect is particularly notable in the post-IRCA period (1985–89) when the odds of making an additional documented U.S. trip increase by a factor of 4 and then by a factor of 7 in the 1990s relative to the odds in 1965–69. Expansion of documented migration usually occurs via employer sponsorship or family reunification: Clearly migrant's social networks combined with the U.S. migration policy favoring family reunification have operated in concert to increase the odds of documented migration over time. There are too few cases of later documented U.S. trips from interior urban or border communities to include interactions for all the periods, but this lack of evidence suggests that there has been no significant increase in the odds of documented migration from these communities.

In sum, the analysis of later U.S. trips provides three pieces of additional information about migration from the various sources of migrants within Mexico. First, it demonstrates that the bulk of the career migrants, whether undocumented or documented, come from the traditional rural interior communities of Mexico. These migrants operate on the well-established principles of social networks to make their way into the Mexico–U.S. migration stream. Second, I find evidence of a select group of career migrants who participate in step-migration through the border or even relocate to the border in order to facilitate their repeated, mostly undocumented, trips to the U.S. Third, repeat migrants from urban interior communities supplement their social network–based social capital with their education and occupational skills to enter into the Mexico–U.S. migration stream. Overall, however, there is little evidence that migration streams from urban interior or border communities are expanding any more rapidly than are rural-origin migration streams.

Conclusions

The results of the event-history analysis allow me to distinguish four distinct patterns of internal and international Mexican migration. The traditional rural migration stream from central western Mexico clearly predominates, attracting young men with few skills and employment opportunities in Mexico to the U.S. and expanding through the social capital inherent in migration networks. There is also evidence of a newer stream of more heterogeneous migrants from interior urban communities. These urban career migrants are selected for higher levels of human capital. Within these streams there is a sub-stream of migrants who settle in the northern border, some of whom find gainful employment there and others of whom constitute a specialized group of career migrants who make repeated undocumented and documented trips to the U.S.

Among these migration streams, there are distinct determinants of and deterrents to U.S. migration.

The migration-related social capital that exists within family relationships is a powerful positive influence on the initiation of U.S. migration, whether documented or undocumented, in all communities. However, migration-related social capital is primarily useful in the context of a shortage of attractive employment options in the local labor market. Thus, migration-related social capital is a powerful dynamic in rural interior communities where employment has been steadily declining over the period under investigation. In urban interior communities and in the border, where the local labor markets generally provide more low-skill employment opportunities, there is less motivation to embark on a U.S. trip except during times of economic recession. Thus, family-based migration-related social capital plays a greater role in facilitating migration, whereas economic context is more important in motivating migration.

The effects of economic restructuring in both rural and urban labor markets deserve close attention to assess how they influence Mexico-U.S. migration. Employment in rural areas of Mexico has stagnated in the past 30 years, especially since the opening of the Mexican economy in the mid-1980s lowered prices for agricultural goods produced in Mexico (Ros & Rodríguez 1987). This ongoing crisis has created a pool of unemployed workers for whom migration to the U.S. is an attractive option. The effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement will only reinforce this pattern, since small-scale Mexican farmers will find it increasingly difficult to compete with U.S. and Canadian agricultural imports. In contrast, urban economies have grown over the long run, even as the national economy has experienced periodic recessions and sectoral declines due to economic restructuring (Graizbord & Ruiz 1996). These periodic crises may motivate international migration from cities temporarily, but they are unlikely to create a permanent and growing pool of potential migrant labor as has occurred in rural areas.

As a border city, Tijuana holds attraction for U.S.-bound migrants, as both a home-base and a staging ground, but its binational economy deters migration overall. However, sectoral-specific employment does not appear to be the explanation. Although the export-oriented manufacturers that locate in Tijuana are an important source of employment, it seems that manufacturing employment does not deter men from migrating to the U.S. In fact, employment in the border economy does surprisingly little to diminish the odds of taking a U.S. trip. Thus, although local labor market factors are vital to understanding the dynamics of and potential for Mexico-U.S. migration from different types of interior communities, the border communities continue to be exceptional in ways that must still be explored.

The incorporation of internal migration into the model of international migration provides additional insights into the process of international

migration from different types of communities. Step-migration to the border is another means of gaining migration-related information and assistance to improve one's chances of making a first U.S. trip: It is a strategy used by residents of interior rural and urban communities to improve their chances of undocumented migration and by residents of interior urban communities to improve their chances of documented first migration. Furthermore, some repeat migrants actually relocate to the border to facilitate their continued undocumented and documented U.S. trips. Thus, by examining internal migration and incorporating border communities, I have identified a distinct stream of career migrants based in Tijuana.

However, while Tijuana is clearly an advantageous home-base for career migrants, it is also a destination in itself. Residents of Tijuana who have relocated there from other states are actually less likely to make a first undocumented trip. Furthermore, in general, residents of Tijuana have much lower odds of making first or later undocumented U.S. trips, though they have much higher odds of making first documented trips (but not later documented trips). In other words, Tijuana does not generate a large supply of migrants, though it is certainly a convenient place for repeat migrants to locate. This suggests that a dynamic economy can deter U.S. migration even when the possibility of making a U.S. trip is relatively easy — just a short and carefully planned walk across the border.

Distinguishing migration streams and patterns of movements within the Mexican migrant flow to the U.S. allows us to better understand why this flow continues. It is not just the effect of accumulated migration experience, though this is an important part of the migration dynamic. It is also the strength or weakness of the Mexican urban and rural economies that must generate enough well-paid employment for young men to deter them from seeking their fortunes north of the border.

Notes

1. A person must have spent at least most of one year in a place to have it listed as an internal trip.
2. So few additional trips were made by residents of Tijuana and interior urban communities that I had to collapse the period intervals in the interactions to cover the period prior to 1980 with the period 1980 and later.

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SF Volume 82: Number 4 June 2004

Sources of Durability and Change in Market Classifications: A Study of the Reconstitution of Product Categories in the American Mutual Fund Industry, 1944–1985*

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Abstract

Categories are key elements of classification systems that segregate things into groups and impose coherence. Sociologists have studied how categories shape action in a wide variety of contexts but have spent much less time investigating the sources of category durability and change. We address this gap by investigating how existing product categories are reconstituted by field-level industry media. While standard accounts of industry media suggest that existing product categories will be edited on the basis of changes in the technical features of categories, we emphasize the political nature of markets and argue that powerful producers can preserve the existing structure of categories. We test these arguments in a study of the American mutual fund industry during the period from 1945 until 1985 and outline implications for research on institutional change and the political dynamics of market classification.

Categorization is an ubiquitous process that involves lumping similar things into distinct clusters, rendering them cognizable, and creating shared understandings (Carruthers & Stinchcombe 1999; Douglas 1986; Zerubavel 1997). For instance, we categorize countries into democracies and dictatorships, food into proteins and carbohydrates, and financial assets into liquid assets such as stocks and bonds and illiquid assets like real estate and venture capital (Lamont & Thévenot 2000). Such categorization simplifies thought by delimiting how we allocate attention (Simon 1947), enabling us to process vast

* We would like to thank Martine Haas, Kelly Moore, Anand Narasimhan, and Joe Porac for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Contact Michael Lounsbury, School of Industrial and Labor Relations and Department of Sociology, 367 Ives Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. E-mail: mdl18@cornell.edu.

amounts of information more quickly and with reasonable efficiency (Rosch & Lloyd 1978). Meaning systems embedded in category schemes also shape the identities and interests of actors and provide an important foundation for role conformity in both market and nonmarket settings (Fligstein 2001; Mohr & Duquenne 1997; White 2002; Zelizer 1979; Zuckerman 1999).

Categorization has been an especially prominent theme in institutional approaches that claim that categories influence perception, interpretation, and action and provide the default conditions for making sense of the social world (e.g., DiMaggio 1997; Scott 2001). Institutional analysts, however, have mainly studied the consequences of categories and shown how categories shape imitation (DiMaggio & Powell 1983), circumscribe the range of appropriate strategic actions for firms (Kraatz & Zajac 1996; Sutton & Dobbin 1996), and restrict variety (Powell 1991). Despite calls to study the durability of institutional beliefs such as categories and the mechanisms that lead to their reconstitution (e.g., Clemens & Cook 1999; DiMaggio 1986; Oliver 1991; Tolbert & Zucker 1996), such questions have received little attention (but see Ruef 1999). Recent research on institutional dynamics has tracked how macro-level shifts in beliefs such as logics facilitate changes in organizations (e.g., Dobbin & Dowd 1997, 2000; Haveman & Rao 1997; Ruef & Scott 1998; Thornton & Ocasio 1999) but has glossed over the actual processes by which existing category schemes such as institutional logics get reconstituted. Part of the problem is that institutional logics have been conceptualized as abstract and exogenous forces (Friedland & Alford 1991), and as a result changes in institutional belief systems have been treated as the outcome of external shocks (Fligstein 1990) rather than as outcomes negotiated by participants in organizational fields (Heimer 1985).

To address these gaps in institutional analysis, Porac, Ventresca, and Mishina (2002) suggest that researchers should investigate industry belief systems such as product categories, since they are more proximate and accessible to organizational actors and can therefore be studied as outcomes of negotiation among participants in organizational fields. As consensual conceptual schemes that define goods being exchanged as experientially similar, product categories provide a cognitive interface between consumers and producers (Frenzen, Hirsch & Zerillo 1994). Marketing researchers have shown that consumers rely on product category prototypes to evaluate specific products; some research even suggests that the substitutability of products is influenced by their proximity on the attributes defining the category, even when the products differ on other attributes (e.g., Sujan 1985).

In addition, by classifying producers into clusters, product categories enable producers to identify a set of rivals, providing an important social structural element that stabilizes markets (White 1981). For instance, in their study of the Scottish knitwear industry, Porac and associates (1995) showed how

producers structured their strategic plans and actions according to their location within product categories such as “handknitters making traditional knitwear,” “handknitters making designer knitwear,” and “mass-market contract knitters,” enabling producers to focus their limited attention on a restricted range of competitors who compose predictable market niches. The study of product categories, therefore, usefully extends the literature on structural embeddedness (e.g., Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996) by highlighting how industries and markets are also culturally embedded (Lounsbury, Ventresca & Hirsch 2003; Rao 1994; Zukin & DiMaggio 1990); they provide “rules and understandings that are necessary to make structured exchange possible in the first place” (Fligstein 2001:32),

Often, product categories are maintained by industry media such as purveyors of trade magazines and publishers of trade directories and industry censuses (Hirsch 1972; Rosa et al. 1999). While institutionalists emphasize multilevel linkages between field-level actors such as state agencies and professions, on the one hand, and firms, on the other hand, they have paid scant attention to field-level organizations such as industry media that imbue organizational fields with meaning (Baum & Powell 1995; Pollock & Rindova n.d.). Organizational researchers routinely rely on product categories established by industry media to study specialism versus generalism (Brittain & Wholey 1988) or entry into new markets (Mitchell 1989), treating product categories supplied by industry directories as social facts rather than as negotiated outcomes emanating from interactions among market actors such as industry media and producers (e.g., Bowker & Star 1999).

In fact, industry media such as trade journals and magazines have traditionally been depicted as objective forums where firms can signal strategic moves and countermoves through announcements of new product introductions and capacity additions or cutbacks. By supplying cognitive representations such as product categories, however, industry media are important actors who shape the symbolic environment of industries at the superstructural level (Fombrun 1996).

In this article, we focus on changes in product categories in an effort to shed light on the role of industry media in institutional change and as a way to specify some of the processes and mechanisms that shape the reconstitution of existing categories. More specifically, we concentrate attention on linkages between producer organizations and industry media to highlight how changes in product categories maintained by industry media are shaped by the interplay of interests. Building on the work of organizational researchers who forged the production-of-culture perspective (e.g., Hirsch 1972; Peterson 1977), we draw attention to industry media as field-level organizations that define product market boundaries and help to create a shared symbolic environment that shapes and is shaped by competition among producers (Griswold 1994). We

argue that industry media are not passive observers but important actors who promote stability by maintaining existing categories or creating new product categories from existing product categories so as to preserve comparability among firms (Espeland & Stevens 1998).

While the institutional literature provides little guidance about how and when existing beliefs associated with category schemes will break down and change (Tolbert & Zucker 1996), existing literature on industry media suggests that they will reconstitute product categories when the usefulness of an existing category wanes as a result of increased ambiguity within that category (e.g., Rosa et al. 1999; Weick 1995). Ambiguity can be generated by performance variability (Meyer 1994) or by the growth of new entrants (Aldrich 1999). While it is plausible that industry media rely on such technical criteria to decide whether and when to edit product categories, we argue that there are social structural constraints on industry media that limit the extent to which such criteria will be used to inform editing processes. Accounting for the interplay of interests between industry media and incumbent producers, we argue that product categorization is importantly shaped by the politics of markets (Fligstein 1996). We argue that when powerful producers dominate a category, they can counteract the effects of performance variability and the influx of new entrants and encourage industry media to preserve the existing structure of categories.

We draw on the case of the mutual fund industry to study how existing product categories are reconstituted and spawn new product categories. The mutual fund industry, a key component of the U.S. financial services field, has grown from approximately \$450 million in assets and 296,000 shareholder accounts in 1940 to over \$6.9 trillion in assets and over 247 million shareholder accounts by 2001 (Investment Company Institute 2002). Product categories are at the heart of how mutual fund companies and consumers have historically made sense of the variety of funds available to meet investment needs. Unlike the categorization of products in manufacturing industries that can be undermined through changes in the physical features of products such as new designs for automobiles or new packaging for consumer products, however, mutual funds have no tangible material or technological presence that can be altered. For mutual funds to be categorized, therefore, industry media must identify dimensions of similarity based on factors such as the investment styles of money managers and the underlying risk and content of portfolios.

We study the U.S. mutual fund industry for two main reasons. First, excellent archival data is available on product categories in the industry. Second, during the period from 1944 until 1985, the *Wiesenberger Investment Companies Yearbook*, an annual sourcebook, was considered the bible for the mutual fund industry, and *Wiesenberger* was the sole media agency that compiled information about mutual fund performance and management for investors,

mutual fund producers, regulators, and the general public. Thus, we were able to analyze a situation where product categories are maintained by a single as opposed to multiple organizations.¹

Our research includes quantitative analysis and interviews with industry insiders, as well as extensive historical research and analysis. We test hypotheses developed from our theory by using cross-sectional time series data on mutual fund product categories to marshal evidence in support of our arguments. Formal interviews — conducted with more than 30 founders and CEOs of mutual fund companies, money managers, industry consultants, current and former marketing and editorial staff of Wiesenberger Investment Services, and current and former leaders of the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the main industry trade association — provide substantive insights and examples of the process of product category reconstitution to supplement our quantitative analyses. Our findings are then used to develop implications for the study of categorization in markets.

Theory and Hypotheses

The idea of markets depends on standardization and the comparability of the objects being exchanged (Douglas & Isherwood 1979; Weber 1978). Similarly, pricing depends on traders knowing that goods are essentially the same entity and then comparing them on quantity and quality (Heimer 1985). The creation of product categories is but an instance of commensuration — the transformation of different qualities into a common metric (Espeland & Stevens 1998). Competition and the existence of populations of organizations in a niche, for instance, both depend on the sociology of commensuration so that many buyers and many sellers can enter “the same” product markets (Stinchcombe 2001). Product categories, therefore, are cognitive infrastructures that underpin markets; when the core similarities of goods are obscured by too many functionally irrelevant differences, consumers and producers may not be able to make appropriate comparisons (Frenzen, Hirsch & Zerillo 1994). Like other kinds of social categories, product categories consequently structure cognition and behavior by establishing boundaries around similar kinds of entities (DiMaggio 1997; Lamont & Molnár 2002; Zelizer 1994).

Product categories are often codified and maintained by industry media such as publishers of trade magazines and industry censuses (Rosa et al. 1999). In some instances, trade magazines and suppliers of industry directories and censuses become “critics” and rate products in industries. For example, Michelin guides cluster restaurants according to perceived quality. But more often than not, critics take existing categories as givens and focus their attention on evaluating products or performances based on criteria associated with those categories (Shrum 1991). It is important to emphasize that industry media such

as suppliers of industry directories and censuses play an important role even when they do not rank and evaluate products. Merely by listing and grouping firms within the industry, and maintaining such categorizations, they create commensurability, facilitate social comparison, and allow producers and consumers to make sense of the world (Anand & Peterson 2000; DiMaggio 1986).

Once categories are in place, the behavior of actors increasingly conforms to them because they become default mechanisms to make sense of the world (DiMaggio 1997). What appears as universal or standard is the result of negotiations, but once a system is in place, the practical politics of the decision are buried in archives or built into the cognitive architecture of markets (Callon 1998). We still know very little, however, about the conditions under which categories will be durable and the mechanisms that lead to their reconstitution (Clemens & Cook 1999; DiMaggio 1986; Oliver 1991; Tolbert & Zucker 1996).

TECHNICAL CONDITIONS AND THE EDITING OF PRODUCT CATEGORIES

Part of the reason that institutional analysis has elided the study of category reconstitution is that most neoinstitutional analyses have been based on the claim that beliefs associated with categories are decoupled from the technical features of category composition (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Even though neoinstitutionalists have not gone so far as to claim that actors and practices subsumed by categories will be homogeneous, they have argued that institutionalized categories can withstand a good deal of variation, leading analysts to background such variation in an effort to forge a more cognitively oriented sociological approach (Lounsbury 2001). While the neoinstitutional literature, therefore, suggests that changes in the technical conditions of product categories should not lead to category reconstitution, extant literature on categorization, in contrast, suggests that ambiguity can be a trigger for editing categories (Louis & Sutton 1991; Weick 1995). Ambiguity in product categories can be concretely generated by increases in variability and the growth of new entrants, which often provide a source of novelty (Aldrich 1999; Meyer 1994; Zuckerman 1999).

For instance, in a study of the automobile industry, Rosa and associates (1999) reported that before 1984, trade journals focused on cars and trucks and initially ignored the ambiguity created by car-truck hybrids. After 1984, the existence of carlike minivans became more widely recognized as a new product category in order to reduce the ambiguity about how their attributes and usage conditions were different from those of cars and trucks. In another study, Rosa, Porac, and Saxon (2000) analyzed product review articles and editorials in trade journals pertaining to motorcycling and found that the creation of new product categories was influenced by ambiguity generated by the growing variety of product models in the category. Both studies claimed

that variability within a product category impairs commensurability and that commensurability is restored when new product categories are created from existing product categories. Further, both studies built on sense making arguments to suggest that “product market boundaries and categories remain largely retrospective explanations of the activities of market actors ... [and] while product market representations appear relatively stable, they undergo constant recalibration” (Rosa et al. 1999:65).

Meyer (1994) has argued that if entities within a category are similar on fundamental dimensions, their performance is also likely to be clustered together. A focus on performance variability is especially useful in investment industries, where the performance variation of products such as mutual funds, variable annuities, hedge funds, and venture capital portfolios is a clear result of differences in the investment portfolios maintained. A product category, by definition, implies that entities within the category are similar with respect to performance and can by implication be undermined by increasing performance variability (Carruthers & Stinchcombe 1999). As performance variability increases, the category slowly ceases to serve as a useful symbolic marker, and suppliers of directories or trade magazines, which aim to maintain commensurability, may alter the extant product category and create new categories (Espeland & Stevens 1998). Therefore, we predict that the greater the performance variability within a product category, the more likely are industry media to reconstitute it by creating new categories.

Hypothesis 1: Performance variability within a product category is positively related to the reconstitution of a category through the creation of new categories.

We argue that in addition to performance variability, a second trigger that induces industry media to reconstitute product categories is the entrance of new products created by entrepreneurs from outside the product category. A consistent premise of ecological research is that products introduced by new entrants are sources of variation that create ambiguity and destabilize existing category boundaries (Aldrich 1979; Hannan & Freeman 1989). While the growth of new entrants may also lead to performance variability, that is not a necessary consequence. Further, performance variability may be generated by the actions of new entrants as well as incumbents. Controlling for performance variability, the rise of new entrants can influence changes in product categories by creating ambiguity about the cultural alignments between the identity of incumbent producers and particular product categories (Rosa et al. 1999; Weick 1995). For instance, Bowker and Star (1999) have argued that actors can subvert formal categories through work-arounds, and in turn, work-arounds can create pressure on external observers to accommodate these work-arounds by editing categories (see also Star & Ruhleder 1996).

Hence, the greater the number of new products introduced by new entrepreneurs, the higher is the novelty facing other actors, and the greater is the discrepancy with prevalent understandings about the core attributes that define a product category. As a result, we posit that an increase in the number of new products launched by entrepreneurs in a category will undermine the product category as a stable and unequivocal sense making mechanism for other producers and consumers, increasing the probability that critics will restore order by redefining the boundaries of the product category. Therefore,

Hypothesis 2: Controlling for performance variability, the growth of new entrants in a product category will be positively related to the reconstitution of a category through the creation of new categories.

PRODUCT CATEGORIES AND THE POLITICS OF COMPETITION

Category editing, however, is not merely a technical process but a political process because it establishes new frames of comparability that constitute understandings and may favor some actors over others (Mohr & Duquenne 1997). A couple of studies have shown that the redefinition of existing product categories is the outcome of politics and the interests of actors (e.g., Reddy 1984; Ulin 1996). Ulin (1996), for instance, showed that wine categories in France were outcomes of lobbying by wine elites rather than soil conditions and climate. Thus, Bergerac wine had a loftier reputation than Bordeaux wine before the English hegemony enabled Bordeaux wine elites to pass legislation creating appellations that favored their product and disadvantaged the products of other wine-growing areas.

The capacity to establish new categories is a consequential social power, often associated with states, firms, professions, and other field-level actors such as industry media. Field-level perspectives highlight that actors such as industry media do not often act autonomously, since they have to account for the interests of powerful actors that tend to benefit by maintaining the stability of industry structures (DiMaggio 1986; Fligstein 2001). Industry media, therefore, often have to navigate between changes that strain the usefulness of existing product categories and the desire of incumbents to protect their market positions by maintaining stable category boundaries.

The interplay between field-level actors and producers is at the heart of the production-of-culture perspective that focuses attention on how cultural artifacts such as music albums, books, and artwork are produced in modern societies (e.g., DiMaggio 1986; Griswold 1994; Hirsch 1972; Peterson 1977). This program of research has especially highlighted how the production of cultural artifacts is shaped by a complex apparatus that is interposed between cultural creators and cultural recipients (Peterson 1978). Wendy Griswold (1994:71) suggested that this apparatus includes "facilities for production and distribu-

tion [as well as] marketing techniques such as advertising, co-opting mass media, or targeting." For instance, in one of the pioneering studies in this genre of research, Hirsch (1972) highlighted how disk jockeys provided a key gatekeeping link between producers and consumers. If large music conglomerates did not bribe disk jockeys with "payola," the musical groups and songs they promoted would risk receiving less radio airtime.

In our case, the cultural artifacts that are the object of analysis are product categories. Extending the logic of the production-of-culture perspective, industry media are the creators of product categories and producers are receivers of these product categories. In cases where industry media maintain product categories, their main interest is in providing a set of categories that adequately reflects the empirically evident social structure — similar products should be grouped together (Griswold 1994). If there are too many perceived deviations between product categories and ground-level understandings of product similarities, industry media stand to lose credibility as "objective" observers of an industry. Alternatively, incumbent producers seek stability and to preserve the status quo, since it favors them (Fligstein 1996; Rindova & Fombrun 1999).

In making decisions about category editing, industry media tend to be particularly attentive to the interests of dominant incumbents because they often rely on them for information, support, and revenue (DiMaggio 1986). This is especially true for industry media that do not act as critics; in such cases, industry media are not obligated to maintain a high degree of social distance (Shrum 1991). In addition, industry media often work closely with incumbent producers and other industry insiders to promote the development and growth of an industry in ways that benefit incumbents as well as themselves (Fombrun 1996).

Since industry media are attentive to the social claims and dynamics of industries in addition to the technical analysis of objectively measurable indicators, a more complete account of category reconstitution must also account for the politics of producers. As Fligstein (2001:69) has argued, "incumbent (dominant) firms use tactics and strategies to stabilize themselves and reproduce their position." For instance, Bourdieu (1984) has shown how dominant actors accumulate various kinds of capital in order to reinforce particular cultural codes and solidify statuses within social structures. Marketing researchers have shown that incumbent firms often aim to replicate successful products in order to reinforce product market positions and the associated cognitive classifications that sustain those positions (Loken & John 1993). This is particularly true in investment-related industries such as insurance or mutual funds, where virtually identical products are often created, each with a slightly different marketing spin, to attract different kinds of consumers and control a particular niche (Stern & El-Ansary 1996). Also,

in industries such as mutual funds, multiple versions of the same basic product are often created to provide additional career opportunities for money managers within a firm and to build competence in a particular niche (Gremillion 2001). This suggests that the stability of product categories should be reinforced by the extent to which incumbent firms in a product category replicate an existing product.

Hypothesis 3: The higher the percentage of replicant products in a product category, the less likely an existing product category is to be reconstituted.

In addition, since product categories draw boundaries around market segments and are indispensable for the computation of market shares, and by implication status within a market, dominant firms may actively seek to forestall redefinitions of product categories. Heimer (1985) pointed out that negotiated agreements on how to codify and use information reduce uncertainty and that the outcomes hinge on the relative powers of actors. Espeland and Stevens (1998) observed that commensuration can be manipulated by elites to preserve their own positions. Fligstein (2001) suggested that incumbents preserve their positions by enforcing conventional wisdom to maintain stable product markets. Other institutional analysts have also highlighted how powerful actors in a field will aim to construct stable belief systems and associated practices in an effort to support their positions of dominance (Campbell, Hollingsworth & Lindberg 1990; Strang & Meyer 1993; see Scott 2001 for a review). For instance, Fligstein (1990) illustrated how financial executives helped to construct a finance conception of control that valorized their skills and disciplinary belief structure.

This literature suggests that dominant producers will aim to safeguard the stability of product categories because the status quo favors them and disadvantages challengers (Perrow 2002). This accords with ideas in industrial organization economics that emphasize how firms try to build monopolistic or oligopolistic positions to protect market share (Scherer & Ross 1990). Hence, we posit that product categories that are dominated by relatively few producers will tend to remain stable. More specifically,

Hypothesis 4: The higher the concentration in a product category, the less likely an existing product category is to be reconstituted via new category creation.

We further argue that powerful incumbent producers within a product category seek to preserve their own dominance by lobbying field-level organizations such as industry media to preserve the boundaries of categories that benefit them. While critics may operate more autonomously beyond the control of particular producers (Shrum 1991), industry media are often more receptive to powerful incumbents because they often rely on the endorsement and support of dominant players in order to sell their own products and services (DiMaggio 1986). When a few producers dominate a product category, therefore, industry media will tend to protect the interests of those producers.

Hence, we predict that highly concentrated categories will not be reconstituted even when there is high performance variability.

Hypothesis 5: The concentration \times performance variability interaction term will be negatively related to the reconstitution of a category through the creation of new categories.

Further, extant research suggests that competitive challenges posed by new entrants may lead powerful incumbent producers to engage in efforts to maintain the stability of their product category boundaries and limit the development of new categories (Bowker & Star 1999; Fligstein 1996). Again, we argue that industry media will be receptive to the interests of powerful incumbents because they often rely on established actors for support in selling their own industry-related products and services. Hence, we posit that highly concentrated categories will tend to not be reconstituted even when there are many new entrepreneurial products being created by producers from outside the focal category. Therefore,

Hypothesis 6: The concentration \times new entrants interaction term will be negatively related to the reconstitution of a category through the creation of new categories.

Data and Methods

DATA

In order to empirically investigate our predictions, we analyzed yearly data on mutual funds and mutual fund product categories that were coded from the Wiesenberger Investment Companies Yearbook from 1944 to 1985. In the early 1940s, the mutual fund industry was a small, closely knit community of financial actors whose funds employed relatively conservative investment strategies that emphasized broadly diversified portfolios and long-term investment horizons (Grow 1977). At that time, Arthur Wiesenberger, founder and owner of Wiesenberger Investment Services, had a seat on the New York Stock Exchange and was mainly in the business of brokerage and investment advisory services. Industry correspondence and interviews suggest that Wiesenberger saw the nascent mutual fund industry as a promising growth opportunity for his firm and developed the yearbook to cultivate relationships with powerful mutual fund firms in an effort to increase brokerage revenue. While the brokerage side of the business employed upward of 100 brokers and staff, the editorial staff of the yearbook consisted of only two to five employees for much of the period covered in our study. The annual census of mutual funds, therefore, started out as an appendage to Wiesenberger's main business — really a marketing tool to enhance his brokerage business.

Supporting our emphasis on the politics of competition, interviews with former Wiesenberger editorial staff stressed the fact that decisions about product categories did not only involve attention to technical changes in the industry; since Wiesenberger received lucrative brokerage fees from the trading commissions of large mutual fund producers, he was oriented toward protecting the interests of those producers. A former marketing director of Wiesenberger in the 1960s commented, "Arthur was attentive to mutual fund leaders because he wanted to get his commissions." Wiesenberger was also a central institutional entrepreneur in the industry. A former director of the Investment Company Institute (ICI) commented that "from the 1940s up until the 1960s, the industry was more of a small club and the Wiesenberger yearbook really helped to promote the industry." Wiesenberger, the ICI, and leading mutual fund firms all worked together to construct and promote an industry that emphasized prudent and conservative investment approaches and would experience steady growth. These institutional entrepreneurs actively resisted and lamented disruptive kinds of industry developments such as the rise of more aggressive, riskier funds that they thought would undermine the industry they had built. Nonetheless, new developments over time opened up possibilities for category reconstitution and new product category creation.

Since the yearbooks constitute a complete census of the mutual fund industry, our data include information on all mutual funds. The entries in the Wiesenberger yearbooks provide, for each mutual fund, data on investment category, net assets, and performance. For the purposes of our analyses, we aggregated fund level data to the product category level. This enabled us to develop a number of variables having to do with the funds that compose individual product categories. Hence, our data is organized by category-years.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Our dependent variable was coded as a dummy variable and set to 1 when Wiesenberger reconstituted an existing product category by creating a new product category. Category reconstitution occurred in two main ways — through splitting (6 occurrences) and branching (26 occurrences). Category splitting is the case in which an existing category provided the foundation for two or more newly created categories and was eliminated in the process. For instance, in 1962 the balanced category was reconstituted into three new categories: balanced income, balanced growth, and balanced growth, income, and security. Category branching is the case in which an existing category remained intact, but some of the constituent funds from the existing category moved into a newly created product category. Constituent funds of all newly created product categories in this case stemmed from only one preexisting category.

While product category reconstitution through splitting and branching was the primary way in which the mutual fund product category system was revised, there was a small handful of instances in which categories changed through absorption and merger.² There were six product category absorptions in which a category was eliminated by moving the funds from one product category into another.³ For instance, in 1950, funds from the speculative common stock category were moved into the diversified common stock category and the speculative common stock category ceased to exist. There was only one merger of categories over the time period studied. This occurred in 1954, when the bond product category and the preferred stock product category were combined to create the bond and preferred stock product category. There were no instances in which categories were eliminated for lack of constituent funds. Hence, product category reconstitution was the main way in which the overall system of mutual fund product categories changed.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Performance variance measures performance heterogeneity within an existing category. As is conventional within the mutual fund industry, fund performance is defined as the percentage of change in net asset value from the previous year (Standard & Poor's/Lipper 1995). Our measure of performance variance is calculated in the standard way by summing the squares of differences between the performance of individual funds in a category and the mean performance in a category and dividing that sum by the number of funds in a category less one. Even though we do not have access to data that details the contents of specific fund portfolios nor particular management styles, performance variability provides an indicator of the divergent portfolio management strategies used by fund managers, since heterogeneity across portfolios almost always results in performance differences.

New entrants are defined as the number of new mutual funds introduced into a particular category in the previous year by firms outside that product category. Percentage of replicants is the number of duplicate fund products offered by firms relative to the aggregate number of funds in a category. Concentration tracks the degree to which the products of a few firms control a large percentage of assets managed in a particular product category. For each year, we calculated the four-firm concentration ratio in each category. We used this operationalization rather than other operationalizations such as the Herfindahl index because we are mainly interested in tapping into the extent to which a small number of firms dominate a particular product category. Other concentration measures such as the Herfindahl index capture the overall extent of inequality or heterogeneity in a category, providing a less direct measure of whether a small number of firms control a category.

CONTROL VARIABLES

We also sought to control for the influence of environmental variables. Because munificent environments may facilitate greater variation (Aldrich 1979), we used the total number of mutual fund shareholders by year to capture mutual fund industry growth. Since resource variability may also affect the boundaries of product categories, we calculated the yearly percentage of change in the Dow Jones 30 Industrial Average Index to control for stock market dynamics that affect resource flows into mutual funds.

We constructed a number of category-level control variables to account for influences on the longevity of product categories. Time since category was last reconstituted was defined as the number of years since a new product category was created with funds from the focal product category and used to control for duration dependence. In addition, since some categories may have experienced repeated reconstitution, total number of category reconstitutions was computed to account for occurrence dependence. Category mass tracks the total assets in a category for each category year and provides a measure of the resources available in a category. Category age is defined as the number of years that the product category has been in existence.

We also developed a number of intracategory control variables. Product density is the yearly aggregate number of funds in a category and performance average tracks the mean performance of all funds in a category year. In addition, we wanted to control for the effects of other sources of heterogeneity in categories in order to provide a more conservative test of our predictions. Fund age average is the mean age of all funds in a category. Fund age variance tracks the heterogeneity of fund age in a category. Fund size average provides a measure of the mean assets of a fund within a category. Name changes is a count variable that tracks the number of mutual fund product name changes in each category year. This is mainly an indicator of fund family branding, since name changes often involve amending an existing fund name by adding the name of the fund management company (Gremillion 2001). Ownership changes is a count variable that includes all mutual fund product ownership changes via product acquisitions in each category year. All control variables were lagged and updated annually.⁴

METHODS

We estimated the reconstitution of existing mutual fund product categories in Stata using a logit model estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. The general likelihood function for logit is

$$\ln L = \sum_{j \in S} \ln F(\mathbf{x}_j \mathbf{b}) + \sum_{j \in S} \ln [1 - F(\mathbf{x}_j \mathbf{b})]$$

where S is the set of all observations j such that $y_j > 0$, $F(z) = e^z / (1 + e^z)$. Since our data structure consisted of category years and had multiple observations per category, the observations for each category were not independent of each other. In such cases, a recognized option is to use robust estimators (White 1980) that estimate variances in a way that relaxes assumptions about independence within groups. The effect of the robust estimator is to increase standard errors of estimates by controlling for heteroskedasticity, and thereby provide a more conservative test of our predictions. Logit models were estimated with robust standard errors. Further, we standardized our data through mean centering in order to minimize multicollinearity in our models (Kim & Ferree 1981).

Results

Figure 1 plots the density of product categories and the number of categories reconstituted by year. The overall number of product categories remained fairly low up until the early 1960s and then began to increase dramatically through the early 1970s before leveling off with more minor increases and decreases. While there were only 2 category reconstitutions before 1960, there were 30 category reconstitutions that were fairly evenly spread out from 1960 to 1985. Up until the 1960s, there was little competition and innovation in the industry, and most funds employed relatively conservative investment strategies that emphasized broadly diversified portfolios and long-term investment horizons (Grow 1977). Therefore, product category reconstitution did not become a routine activity by Wiesenberger until the 1960s, when competition and innovation intensified.

Table 1 reports basic descriptive statistics and correlations for the category reconstitution analysis. Correlations are in the expected direction and there are no egregiously high correlations among the variables. Consistent with our hypothesized relationships, concentration is negatively related to both performance variance and new entrants.


Table 2 shows the results of our logistic regression analysis of mutual fund product category reconstitution that leads to new category creation. Model 1 shows that the probability of product category reconstitution increases as the number of mutual fund shareholders increases. Alternatively, high growth in the stock market as proxied by the Dow Jones Index lowers the probability of category reconstitution. In addition, if a category gets reconstituted multiple times, it is more likely to be reconstituted in the future. This indicates that some categories are prone to being reconstituted more than once, and, therefore, may provide incubators for product innovation. But as time passes, a formerly reconstituted product category will be less likely to be reconstituted. All these effects hold up in all of our models.

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Mutual Fund Reconstitution Analysis

	Mean	s.d.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1. Ln (mutual fund shareholders) _{t-1}	15.83	.67																	
2. Percentage of change in Dow Jones Index _{t-1}	.04	.11	-.07†																
3. Ln (time since category last reconstituted) _{t-1}	.41	.85	.17*	.04															
4. Ln (total number of category reconstitutions) _{t-1}	.14	.39	-.02	.04	.30*														
5. Ln (category mass/1000) _{t-1}	5.31	2.57	-.09*	.04	.21*	.18*													
6. Ln (category age) _{t-1}	2.07	.88	.37*	.04	.33*	.08*	.37*												
7. Ln (category age ²) _{t-1}	.80	.70	.37*	.04	.33*	.08*	.37*	.24*											
8. Product density _{t-1}	4.88	18.99	.03	.02	.07*	.41*	.34*	.24*	-.01										
9. Performance average _{t-1}	.01	.13	.01	.45*	.07*	-.01	.10*	.17*	.05†	-.03									
10. Ln (fund age average) _{t-1}	.68	.42	.20*	.04	.11*	-.05	.06†	.30*	.11*	.01	.05								
11. Ln (fund age variance) _{t-1}	.86	1.51	-.02	.03	.08*	.04	.49*	.45*	-.08*	.22*	.04	.24*							
12. Ln (fund size average) _{t-1}	3.21	1.79	-.28*	.02	.19*	.07*	.41*	.44*	-.09*	.23*	.03	.05	.33*						
13. Ln (name changes) _{t-1}	.12	.39	.05	.01	.15*	.21*	.36*	.02	.03	.29*	-.01	-.01	.07*	.09*					
14. Ln (ownership changes) _{t-1}	.15	.44	.04	-.02	.15*	.45*	.31*	.01	-.02	.36*	-.06†	-.01	.01	.05†	.53*				
15. Ln (performance variance) _{t-1}	-5.61	2.59	-.20*	.05	.02	.21*	.18*	-.17*	.01	.05	.09*	-.07*	.05†	.04	.16*	.25*			
16. Ln (new entrants) _{t-1}	.23	.65	.43*	.11*	-.16*	.14*	.02	-.24*	-.04	-.08*	.01	.02	.02	-.05	-.05	-.01	.21*		
17. Percentage of replicants _{t-1}	12.37	17.57	.05	-.02	-.06†	-.08*	.04	.01	-.12*	-.01	.07*	.03	.02	.04	.06†	-.01	.03	.08*	
18. Concentration _{t-1}	81.46	27.69	-.08*	-.14*	-.11*	-.14*	-.24*	-.12*	-.15*	-.39*	-.07*	.04	-.06†	-.20*	.22*	-.16*	-.10*	-.03	.01

† p ≤ .10 * p ≤ .05

FIGURE 1: Observed Product Category Density and Number of Product Category Reconstitution Events, 1945-1985



Model 2, which provides a significant improvement in fit over model 1, shows that performance variance significantly increases the probability of category reconstitution, supporting hypothesis 1. Further, model 2 indicates that new entrants significantly increase the probability of category reconstitution, supporting hypothesis 2. Our interviews and research lend further credence to these factors as triggers of product category reconstitution.

For example, producers of growth funds in the 1950s, which employed new aggressive money management techniques, were initially subsumed in the established “diversified common stocks” product category. Historically, most diversified common stock funds employed conservative investment strategies focused on maintaining a broadly diversified portfolio that would track overall stock market trends. Growth funds invested more narrowly in companies that promised more rapid growth. While the investment approach of the new growth funds was riskier, it also provided more of an opportunity to obtain performance that outpaced the overall trends of the stock market and other fund products in the diversified common stocks category.

As these new funds grew in popularity and more mutual fund sponsors sought to employ growth fund money management strategies, performance variability in the diversified common stocks product category increased. While there was only 1 growth fund in 1950, that number increased to 40 by 1960, and by the end of the 1960s, there were close to 100 such mutual funds available

TABLE 2: Logistic Regression Models of Mutual Fund Category Reconstitution

Covariates	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Constant	-4.716** (.994)	-2.331† (1.317)	-2.624* (1.312)
Ln (mutual fund shareholders) _{t-1}	.434** (.122)	.409** (.148)	.533** (.153)
Percentage of change in Dow Jones Index _{t-1}	-2.038† (1.235)	-3.462** (1.374)	-3.804** (1.418)
Ln (time since category was last reconstituted) _{t-1}	-1.599** (.410)	-1.946** (.443)	-2.010** (.429)
Ln (total number of category reconstitutions) _{t-1}	2.219** (.492)	1.730** (.431)	1.872** (.484)
Ln (category mass/1000) _{t-1}	-.100 (.106)	-.251† (.145)	-.268* (.133)
Ln (category age) _{t-1}	-.202 (.292)	.439 (.454)	.273 (.457)
Ln (category age ²) _{t-1}	-.276 (.315)	-.591† (.316)	-.361 (.320)
Product density _{t-1}	.014 (.011)	.009 (.009)	.015† (.008)
Performance average _{t-1}	-1.420 (1.155)	-1.757† (1.066)	-1.480 (1.099)
Ln (fund age average) _{t-1}	.632† (.388)	.926 (.666)	.735 (.568)
Ln (fund age variance) _{t-1}	.133 (.110)	.113 (.138)	.172 (.145)
Ln (fund size average) _{t-1}	-.038 (.143)	-.095 (.144)	-.067 (.149)
Ln (name changes) _{t-1}	.881 (.548)	.736 (.494)	.797 (.505)
Ln (ownership changes) _{t-1}	.213 (.182)	.120 (.159)	.136 (.153)
Ln (performance variance) _{t-1}		.320** (.118)	.958** (.337)
Ln (new entrants) _{t-1}		1.480** (.316)	3.639** (1.165)
Percentage of replicants _{t-1}		-1.296** (.595)	-1.531** (.633)
Concentration _{t-1}		-.026** (.007)	-.032** (.007)
(Concentration × ln (performance variance)) _{t-1}			-.008** (.003)
(Concentration × ln (new entrants)) _{t-1}			-.028** (.014)
Log-likelihood	-204.54	-175.10	-168.77
Δ Likelihood χ^2 ratio (relative to model with no independent variables)	142.08**	200.96**	213.62**
Δ Degrees of freedom (relative to model with no independent variables)	14	18	20
Number of observations	843	843	843

Notes: tests are two-tailed for control variables and one-tailed for hypothesized effects. a. Standard errors in parentheses are robust standard errors.

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

to the public. In 1962 Wiesenberger decided to reconstitute the existing diversified common stock category by creating a new growth common stock category in which all growth funds that were previously categorized as diversified common stock products were recategorized.

Interviews and historical research also suggested that as the industry grew, it experienced a lot of new entrants who were eager to carve new niches for themselves. A former editor of the Wiesenberger yearbook said that "many industry leaders would visit our offices and demand that we slice and dice categories to make their funds look better." The story of maximum performance go-go funds was recounted in several interviews. In the late 1960s, new fund management companies who created aggressive growth funds that were managed by younger money managers emerged. Top-performing money managers in some of these funds gained celebrity status in the late 1960s, and many popular magazines such as *Time* and *Newsweek* devoted cover stories to the "heroic" deeds of these glorified stock pickers (Mayer 1968). These new money managers and their funds were referred to as the "new breed on Wall Street." The emergence of go-go funds did not, however, generate more performance variation than had already existed among established growth funds. Nonetheless, by 1969, Wiesenberger acknowledged the distinctiveness of the new breed of funds by creating a common stock maximum performance product category and moving all the self-proclaimed go-go funds from the growth stock category to this new category.

Incumbent producers, however, often engaged in efforts to ensure the stability of product categories and their positions in the mutual fund marketplace. The negative and significant finding for the percentage-of-replicants variable highlights the fact that to the extent that incumbent firms in a category establish multiple fund products, the stability of a category will be reinforced, supporting hypothesis 3. Historical research uncovered many instances of product categories stabilizing as a result of the actions of prominent incumbent firms such as Eaton & Howard and Fidelity that developed several virtually identical funds within a product category such as money market fund A and money market fund B.

Model 2 also shows that as more concentration is achieved within a product category, the likelihood is reduced that that category will be reconstituted, supporting hypotheses 4. Model 3, our full model, which provides a significant improvement in fit over both models 1 and 2, shows that the concentration \times performance variance interaction term is negative and highly significant, providing support for hypothesis 5, which posited that highly concentrated product categories will not be reconstituted even under conditions of high performance variance. We further hypothesized that the concentration \times new entrants interaction would be negatively related to the probability of product category reconstitution. Model 3 shows that this variable is also significant,

providing support for hypothesis 6. In addition, all hypothesized independent variables from model 2 remain highly significant in model 3.

We checked the two-way interactions to assess the robustness of our results. Figure 2, which plots the estimated relationship between the predicted probability of category reconstitution and our interaction terms, shows that the negative effect of our interaction variables is robust over the entire range of each of those variables, supporting our interpretation of the interaction effects.⁵ That is, these plots show that as concentration increases in a category, increases in performance variance or new entrants does not trigger product category reconstitution.



Our research uncovered a number of examples of how the dominance of a small handful of powerful funds countered pressures to reconstitute categories. For instance, the balanced fund product category has historically had periods of high performance variation, but since it was dominated by a small number of funds offered by powerful mutual fund firms such as Wellington Management, the Parker Corporation, and Eaton and Howard, it avoided reconstitution. Similarly, the number of funds founded by outside entrepreneurs during the late 1940s and early 1950s in the preferred stock fund category was historically high, but it was not reconstituted because of the dominance of a small handful of prominent firms, including Keystone Custodian Funds, National Securities and Research, Investors Diversified Services, and Lord Abbott.

As we suggested earlier, powerful incumbents were in a good position to prevent category reconstitution because they had developed very close relationships with Wiesenberger. Even though Wiesenberger Investment Services was mainly in the brokerage business, they undertook the massive task of compiling their comprehensive mutual fund yearbook as a service to the industry, often giving copies away without charge to mutual fund producers and other industry insiders. In exchange, many prominent mutual fund companies used Wiesenberger as their primary broker to buy and sell securities for their portfolios. As a result, Wiesenberger's yearbook editorial staff was quite open to the views and influence of top mutual fund firms because they provided a significant source of brokerage revenue.

ROBUSTNESS TESTS

We performed a number of complementary analyses to ensure the robustness of our findings and interpretations. While we employed widely accepted logistic regression techniques in our analysis of category reconstitution, the number of product category reconstitution events in the data is relatively small, and logistic regression could lead to biased estimates (King & Zeng 2000). In our case, product category reconstitution occurs in fewer than 10% of our spells. We therefore estimated a different set of models using rare events logistic

FIGURE 2: Plots of Estimated Relationship between the Predicted Probability of Category Reconstitution and Interaction Terms, 1945-1985



regression techniques developed by Tomz, King, and Zeng (1999). Since our results using logistic regression were similar to the rare events models for our main predictors, we report only the logistic regression results.

Even though there is a low correlation between our performance variance and new entrant variables (.21), we also conducted factor analysis as a way to statistically examine their independence. This analysis indicated that there was virtually no relationship between our variables.⁶ Further, in an unreported analysis, we found that the interaction between performance variance and new entrants was not a significant predictor of category reconstitution. Hence, we have a higher degree of confidence that our performance variance and new entrant variables are tapping into two distinct mechanisms that drive product category reconstitution in the mutual fund industry.⁷

We also performed extensive robustness checks on our concentration variable as well as the interactions between concentration and performance variability and new entrants. While we employed the standard four-firm concentration ratio as an indicator of the extent to which a small number of funds dominate a particular product category, in unreported analyses we obtained virtually identical patterns of results with a three- or a five-firm concentration ratio operationalization as well as with more relational measures such as the Herfindahl index.

Discussion

We began by noting that while institutionalists have demonstrated how cultural categories consequently shape organizational behavior, there has been little research directed toward questions about category durability and change (Clemens & Cook 1999). Our study sought to address this gap by showing how product categories get reconstituted, and how they are shaped by relationships between industry media and producers. Our interview data and results from the logistical regressions suggest that changes in product categories are not driven merely by technical processes but are fundamentally shaped by the politics of markets. As pragmatic agreements among industry media and producers about the similarity of goods exchanged in markets, product categories last as long as dominant producers counteract the effects of performance variability and new entrants. Like other institutional beliefs that Fligstein (2001:90) has compared to sandcastles, product categories are fragile cognitive structures that can be brought down when there is high performance variability and new entrants embody variations and disturb the status quo.

Our interviews indicated that Wiesenberger was particularly attentive to the interests of powerful incumbents and avoided product category reconstitution if a category was dominated by a few incumbents. Our

quantitative analyses revealed that the effects of performance variance and new entrants were importantly moderated by concentration in a category. While highly concentrated categories were less likely to experience reconstitution, this was even the case under conditions of either high performance variance or entry by new players. These results support Fligstein's (1996) contention that incumbents in a category will try to construct a stable order that protects their positions in a product market.

Our results also demonstrate the role of industry media as editors of product categories and establish a linkage between the sociology of markets and the production-of-culture perspective. To date, sociocognitive studies of markets (Rosa et al. 1999; Rosa, Porac & Saxon 2000) treat industry media as an *arena* rather than as an *actor* in an organizational field. Industry media are more than forums that record stories of producers and consumers; instead, trade journals and magazines, purveyors of industry directories and censuses, and specialized rating services pertaining to a given industry are actors at the superstructural level of industries who play an important role in shaping the symbolic environment within industries (Hirsch 1986). Our study suggests that there are constraints on the discretion of industry media: Our interviews and quantitative analyses revealed that Wiesenberger was caught between a rock and a hard place — between maintaining a credible set of product categories that provided the key market interface by which funds were understood and serving the needs of powerful incumbents who were sources of revenue. Industry media have to navigate between the Scylla of being responsive to performance variability and new entrants that undermine existing product categories and the desire of incumbents to protect their market positions by maintaining stable category boundaries.

By focusing on how product categories are influenced by the interplay of interests among industry media and producers, our results usefully extend the sociological understanding of markets by foregrounding the role of culture and cognition (DiMaggio 1997). Frenzen, Hirsch, and Zerillo (1994) note that there have been very few studies of the "market interface" between producers and consumers. Product categories are one such cognitive interface. Absent product categories, producers do not know whom to watch, and consumers do not know how to value products. To date, sociological models that depict production markets as tangible cliques of producers observing each other (White 1981) suggest that markets are arenas of cool cognition where producers watch each other to develop an understanding of consumers. By doing so, they assume that product categories are preexisting social facts and elide how product categories are constructed, elaborated, and established (e.g., Abolafia 1996; Smith 1989; Zelizer 1994). By showing how product categories are products of practical politics (see also Zuckerman 1999), our study responds to Fligstein's (2001) call for a political-cultural approach to markets and suggests that cultural constructions such as product categories are implicated in a system of power.

They last as long as dominant producers can compel industry media to maintain them.

In a broader vein, our study contributes to institutional analysis by shifting attention from the study of how cultural categories shape organizational behavior toward questions about the durability of categories (Clemens & Cook 1999). Much of institutional theory treats category schemes as exogenous variables affecting organizations (Leblebici et al. 1991; Scott 2001). Recently, some scholars have argued that institutionalists should study category schemes such as product categories that are endogenously related to organizational actors (e.g., Porac, Ventresca & Mishina 2002). Institutional scholars focusing on the study of law, organizations, and society have been promoting such analytical imagery through their investigations of how organizational responses to laws actually contribute to subsequent interpretations of those laws (e.g., Dobbin et al. 1993; Edelman & Stryker n.d.; Edelman & Suchman 1997; Sutton & Dobbin 1996). Our study builds on and extends this nascent line of inquiry by showing how the editing of product categories by industry media is not merely a technical process but is embedded in industry politics.

Our findings also suggest some directions for future research. We studied a situation in which there was one media actor that edited product categories and was dependent on producers for brokerage business. In a situation where there are multiple editors, strategic actions and interests can become more complex, since editors may compete with each other and new entrants have more opportunities to gain a foothold in the industry. Moreover, during the period of our study there was no critic that evaluated the performance of mutual funds. In some markets, critics play an important role as surrogate consumers and limit the power of incumbents, and new entrants can collectively organize in order to promote a particular critic. For instance, White and White (1965) showed that French artists who wanted to appeal to the growing bourgeoisie rather than the upper class in the mid-nineteenth century helped to create a dealer-critic system that challenged and replaced the Royal Academy, which narrowly defined respectable art as huge portraits of classical, patriotic, and religious subjects and depreciated paintings of landscapes or of common folk.

After our window of observation, Wiesenberger was challenged by new critics such as Lipper and Morningstar, and it would be interesting to study whether there was a change in the politics of category redefinition. When critics like Morningstar use product categories to rank-order producers, then producers have stronger incentives to misrepresent themselves and may, in fact, want a broader array of categories to present themselves in the best possible light. In such cases, producers may pressure editors to locate them in product categories in which they look better, and here, the study of categorization could

be usefully connected to research on impression management (Elsbach & Kramer 1996).

Finally, while our study focused on category reconstitution via new category creation, it would also be useful to study situations where categories are merged. Since segregating and blending are two sides of a coin (Hannan & Freeman 1989), it would be particularly fruitful to find contexts where both those mechanisms are operating in order to develop a more complete understanding of how category boundaries change. Critics may play an important role in segregating and blending genres. For example, Greenfeld (1989) highlighted how Israeli art is divided into two distinct worlds focusing respectively on abstract art supported by intellectuals and state bureaucrats and representational art mainly sponsored by the business class. Each of these worlds has a different set of critics that help to maintain boundaries segregating these two art worlds. By contrast, critics also facilitate blending, just as financial analysts covering a wide range of industries coalesced to become Internet specialists. Research on critics as segregators and blenders would not only enhance our understanding of organizational and institutional change but could valuably contribute to the efforts of cognitively oriented sociologists to understand the political foundations of classification.

Notes

1. While readers of this article may be familiar with mutual fund product categorizations and rankings from Lipper, Standard & Poors, Morningstar, or popular business magazines, these services did not begin to systematically track and offer information to consumers on the mutual fund industry until the mid-1980s.
2. We do not consider category merger a reconstitution event because we are focused on the processes that shape the creation of novel categories. We view category merger as alternatively involving the collapse of an existing category. Nonetheless, inclusion of the one merger event in our data does not alter our pattern of results.
3. There was one product category absorption in 1950, there were two in 1979, and there were three in 1985.
4. We tried a number of other variable operationalizations including product failures, fund size variance, product replicant foundings by incumbent firms in a category, and intracategory percentage of new entrant products to replicant products. These variables were omitted from reported analyses because of correlational problems with reported variables and lack of substantive effect on overall results.
5. Further, descriptive plots not shown here indicate that a wide range of values for our performance variability and new entrants variables is observed across the entire range of values for the concentration variable.
6. In our factor analysis of performance variance and new entrants, the eigenvalue of the principal factor was .03. Typically, an eigenvalue should be equal to or greater than

1 for a factor to be considered useful (Kaiser 1960). Further, the performance variance variable had a $-.13$ correlation with the principal factor, while entrepreneurial fund foundings has a $.13$ correlation with the principal factor.

7. We also conducted an analysis predicting performance variation as the dependent variable. This analysis showed that entrepreneurial fund foundings in the previous year did not significantly predict performance variance. In fact, the sign of the parameter estimate was negative. This provided additional support for our contention that performance variance and new entrants provided distinct mechanisms that led Wiesenberger to reconstitute categories.

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Love Thy Neighbor? Moral Communities, Civic Engagement, and Juvenile Homicide in Rural Areas*

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Abstract

While juvenile homicide garnered a tremendous amount of attention from the general public, the media, and policymakers around 1990, macro-level research examining intercommunity variations in juvenile homicide is generally sparse. In addition, most studies addressing this topic focus on urban areas, neglecting the equally important issue of juvenile homicide in rural communities. This analysis extends prior research by investigating the structural sources of variation in rural juvenile homicide rates and by examining the influence of religion on this phenomenon. Informing our analyses with theoretical insights drawn from the moral communities and civil society literatures, we investigate the protective effects of civically engaged religious denominations on juvenile family, acquaintance, and stranger homicides in rural counties. For comparative purposes, we also perform parallel analyses on a sample of urban areas. The empirical analyses of county-level data using negative binomial regression estimation techniques indicate that the presence of civically engaged religious adherents is inversely associated with juvenile homicide in rural areas (net of the effects of a range of control variables), but that this protective effect is primarily confined to juvenile family homicides. In contrast, the measure of civically engaged denominations has no effect on juvenile homicide in urban areas. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical importance of these findings and directions for future research.

* Partial funding for this project was provided by grant number SES 0237968 from the National Science Foundation to the first author. Funding was also provided to both authors by grant number 4 D1A RH 00005-01-01 from the Office of Rural Health Policy of the Department of Health and Human Services through the Rural Health Safety and Security Institute, Social Science Research Center, Mississippi State University, and through a grant from the Criss Fund at Mississippi State University. Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the National Science Foundation, the Office of Rural Health Policy, or the Criss Fund. A previous draft of this article was presented at the 53rd annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology in Atlanta, Georgia, November 2001. We thank J. Michelle Estis for help with data set construction and anonymous Social Forces reviewers for helpful comments on a prior draft of the manuscript. Direct correspondence to Matthew R. Lee, Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Social Work, Mississippi State University, P.O. Box C, Mississippi State, MS 39762. E-mail Lee@soc.msstate.edu.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the phenomenon of juvenile homicide garnered national attention, claiming cover stories in prominent newspapers and popular periodicals throughout the U.S. (see, e.g., Fox & Pierce 1994; Gibbs & Grace 1994). Two factors were largely responsible for catapulting this issue to the forefront of American life. First, urban juvenile homicide rates rose dramatically during this period (see Blumstein 1995; Blumstein & Wallman 2000; Fox 1996; Fox & Zawitz 2001). Second, juveniles appeared to be engaging in school-based violence with greater frequency (see D. Anderson 1998; Holmes & Holmes 2001).

A great deal of speculation surrounded this issue, with some observers attributing the increase to the transformation of American youth from good kids to “super-predators” with a penchant for extremely violent behavior (Bennett, DiIulio & Walters 1996). Other investigators highlighted the presence of concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage and the frustration it generated among youth (E. Anderson 1998). Still others pointed to the proliferation of drug markets as the driving force behind increased youth violence (Blumstein 1995). Although these and other explanations for the surge in juvenile homicide rates are compelling, the scholarly literature continues to be marked by a lack of empirical research addressing cross-community variations in juvenile homicide. In addition, most research in this tradition focuses on explaining community-level variation in urban juvenile homicide rates, thereby neglecting the equally interesting and important phenomenon of rural juvenile homicide. This propensity to focus on urban areas can be partially attributed to the fact that macro-level theories have widely been considered urban theories (see Osgood & Chambers 2000) and also results from the empirical reality that juvenile homicide rates on average are higher in urban than in rural areas (see Fox & Zawitz 2001).

Despite these facts, we see no compelling reason to dismiss the need for structural analyses of rural juvenile violence out of hand. Like urban areas, rural communities exhibit tremendous variation in rates of crime. And as Lee and Ousey (2001:582) note, “by neglecting rural settings, researchers have ignored important data that may yield new insight into the factors that explain crime rate variations across diverse geographic communities.” Moreover, the differences in rates of crime between rural and urban areas are not as great as commonly believed, and the absolute difference has actually been declining over time (Weisheit & Donnermeyer 2000). Considering these issues, the first goal of this study is to provide a macro-level analysis of rural juvenile homicide.

In addition, we also hope to advance the literature by examining the role of religious organizations in creating moral communities. The one study of which we are aware that investigates the structural covariates of rural juvenile violence fails to take into account the theoretical tradition in sociology suggesting that moral communities and civically engaged religious denominations may provide protective effects against juvenile violence (Osgood & Chambers

2000). Yet sociologists have long studied the effects of religious organizations on the communities in which they are situated. One of the most formidable theories on this topic is the religious ecology hypothesis — otherwise known as the moral communities thesis (Chadwick & Top 1993; Cochran & Akers 1989; Junger & Polder 1993; Regnerus 2000; Stark, Doyle & Kent 1980; Stark, Kent & Doyle 1982; Welch, Tittle & Petee 1991; Woodrum & Hoban 1992). Durkheimian in origin (see Stark 1996; Wolf 1970), this thesis posits that religious institutions create a moral ecology fostering community integration and social control while discouraging deviance and criminal activity. We extend the moral communities hypothesis by arguing that the benefits of religious involvement are especially derived from the presence of civically engaged denominations.¹ Specifically, when a substantial proportion of a community's population adheres to civically engaged religious institutions, horizontal social networks may be strengthened, normative consensus on acceptable and unacceptable behaviors may be elevated, interpersonal trust may be enhanced, and the community's ability to express and pursue collective goals may be bolstered.

Furthermore, given the profamily character of religious organizations (e.g., Abbott, Berry & Meredith 1990; Bartkowski 2001; Christiano 2000; Eberly 1999; Gay, Ellison & Powers 1996; Hertel & Hughes 1987; Pankhurst & Houseknecht 2000; Wilcox 2002), the theoretical model we delineate below suggests faith-based forms of civic engagement may be particularly effective for retarding juvenile family violence. Thus, protections afforded to those outside the nexus of family relationships are anticipated to be less robust. While an evolving body of research has begun documenting the benefits of moral communities or civically engaged religious denominations for other aspects of community life such as population stability (Irwin, Tolbert & Lyson 1999), residential integration (Irwin et al. 2002), and socioeconomic well-being (Tolbert, Lyson & Irwin 1998), no studies to date have investigated the possible beneficial effects of a civically engaged population base on juvenile violence at the ecological level.

Finally, we take a cue from research on the centrality of religious institutions to rural civic life by anticipating an especially robust deterrent effect of civically engaged denominations on juvenile homicide in nonmetropolitan areas. Religious institutions have shown themselves to be crucial in creating and strengthening the civic infrastructure of nonmetropolitan communities (Bartkowski & Regis 2002, 2003; Goreham 2002; King, Elder & Whitbeck 1997; Parisi et al. 2002). In fact, it is not an overstatement to say that religious entities such as congregations, ministerial programs, and interfaith alliances are the key institutional conduit through which rural communities in America generate their most formidable civic bonds. Research has shown that religious participation is a particularly critical resource in southern nonmetropolitan communities for marginalized groups such as blacks, for whom rural churches

are considered a “semi-involuntary” social institution (Ellison & Sherkat 1995; Hunt & Hunt 2000; Sherkat & Cunningham 1998). Thus, scholars now recognize that rural religious communities provide an important springboard for the cultivation of social ties and the facilitation of civic engagement.

More germane to our focus on juvenile homicide, it is worth noting that religious institutions play a central role in the civic participation of youth in rural areas. Although there is not a great deal of evidence on this score, that which is available points to the importance of rural religious institutions in the lives of youth. Survey data have revealed that youngsters raised in rural areas are more supportive of religious values and more involved in religious institutions, including church-based youth groups (King, Elder & Whitbeck 1997). And, in their recent book on the social standing of youth in the rural Midwest, Elder and Conger (2000) provide interview data which underscores the profound attachment that rural teens exhibit toward youth ministry programs. Thus, religion seems to exercise an especially important influence on the lives of rural youth. On the whole, the lack of research attention to rural juvenile homicide rates and the failure of analysts to explore more fully the links between religiously based civic engagement and crime rates signals a substantial void in the research literature. Among its other aims, our analysis is designed to redress these omissions.

Background on Juvenile Homicide

Social scientists are acutely aware of the fact that from the mid-1980s until the early 1990s, homicide rates in the U.S. skyrocketed.² One of the most noteworthy aspects of this trend is the increase in homicidal offending perpetrated by certain segments of the population, specifically juveniles. For example, the homicide rate for juveniles 14 to 17 years old changed from 7.0 to 19.1 per 100,000 people between 1985 and 1994, a 173% increase (Fox 1996). This same age group experienced a 40.5% increase in their rate of arrest for homicide between 1989 and 1994 (Fox 1996). All the available evidence indicates that juvenile homicide rates reached an all-time high around 1990, even as adult homicide rates were generally declining (Fox 1996; Rosenfeld 2000).

Although longitudinal trends in juvenile homicide are interesting in their own right, national trends mask a great deal of community-level variation in juvenile homicide rates. Some communities experience extremely high rates of juvenile homicide, while others witness none at all (see Ousey & Augustine 2001). Such variations characterize urban as well as rural areas. And while some attention has been directed toward explaining cross-sectional variation in urban juvenile homicide rates (see Ousey & Augustine 2001; Sampson 1987; Shihadeh & Steffensmeier 1994), we are aware of only one study that examines the correlates of cross-sectional variation in rural juvenile homicide rates (Osgood

& Chambers 2000). Yet there are several compelling reasons to devote research attention to this issue.

Consider first the fact that several substantially rural states have some of the highest juvenile homicide rates in the nation. In 1990 the homicide offending rates per 100,000 juveniles age 14–17 were 18.79 in Georgia, 42.11 in Louisiana, 19.39 in Tennessee, 31.48 in Texas, and 24.28 in Virginia. These rates were observed in a year when the national rate for this age group was 16.2. Consider next, however, that several other rural states had extremely low rates of juvenile homicide, including Idaho (1.65), North Dakota (0.00), and Wyoming (3.71).³ This tremendous variation clearly underscores the need for further research on the structural sources of rural juvenile homicide.

Consider next that juvenile homicide in rural areas is likely to endure as a social problem. While rural areas in the U.S. are home to roughly a quarter of the population, nonmetropolitan communities have been experiencing population growth. Approximately 74% of nonmetropolitan counties experienced population growth between 1990 and 2000, resulting in a net gain of 5.6 million people (Johnson & Beale 2001). Moreover, evidence is accumulating that drug production, distribution, and use are emerging in rural areas (Donnermeyer 1992; Herz 2000). Given the longstanding concern over population change and crime (Barnett & Mencken 2000; Lee, Martinez & Rosenfeld 2001; Shaw & McKay 1942) and the more recent concerns expressed over drugs and crime (discussed below), it is likely that juvenile crime will continue to be a problem in rural areas.

Theoretical Models

CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE

The bulk of research on juvenile homicide has focused on two primary explanations: concentrated disadvantage and drug markets. A great deal of research in the last two decades has examined the links between structurally embedded disadvantage and rates of homicide. From a social disorganization perspective, socioeconomic disadvantage may undermine community social control (Bursik 1988; Sampson & Groves 1989; Shaw & McKay 1942), while from a strain perspective it may generate frustration and anomie (Blau & Blau 1982; Merton 1938; Williams & Flewelling 1988). Early research tended to focus on the association between absolute or relative deprivation (poverty or income inequality, respectively) and crime, but the publication of Wilson's (1987) work on the concentration of multiple forms of disadvantage has led to the routine use of multidimensional disadvantage indices. Encouraged by the landmark work of Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990), which demonstrated that much of the divergent findings of prior aggregate research on homicide could be accounted for by

methodological problems like multicollinearity, scholars now routinely employ multidimensional disadvantage indices consisting of several indicators of disadvantage (such as poverty, unemployment, and female-headed households). The general idea behind this research is that the effects of high levels of poverty or unemployment may be exacerbated by the presence of other forms of disadvantage. Results for research employing this tactic are very consistent, with most studies reporting that socioeconomic disadvantage indices and homicide rates are positively associated across macro-level units of analysis (see Baller et al. 2001; Land, McCall & Cohen 1990; Messner & Golden 1992; Ousey 1999; Parker & McCall 1999; Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer 2001).

Although almost all the research in this tradition is based on urban units of analysis, the available evidence (though somewhat mixed) suggests that socioeconomic disadvantage and homicide are positively associated in rural areas as well. For example, Kposowa and colleagues (Kposowa & Breault 1993; Kposowa, Breault & Harrison 1995) report that poverty and homicide are positively related across rural counties. In contrast, Petee and Kowalski (1993) find no association between the percentage of low-income households in the population and violent crime, and Osgood and Chambers (2000) report no association between poverty and juvenile homicide in rural counties. Recent studies using the now conventional multidimensional disadvantage indices discussed above, however, have tended to detect the expected positive association between concentrated disadvantage and homicide outside metropolitan areas (Barnett & Mencken 2000; Lee, Maume & Ousey 2003; Lee & Ousey 2001).

DRUG MARKETS

The second leading explanation employed to account for cross-sectional variation in juvenile homicide rates explores the influence of open-air drug markets (Blumstein 1995). In the mid-1980s crack — a highly addictive and cheap cocaine derivative — was introduced to American streets. Demand for this drug skyrocketed, leading to its distribution on street corners at a level far exceeding that of previous drug epidemics such as heroin. Concomitant with the increasing use of crack cocaine was the inflation of juvenile homicide rates. Although many observers asserted unequivocally that crack and violence were causally connected, several distinct explanations for the crack–homicide link emerged (see Goldstein 1985). The most relevant structural explanation is the systemic violence model (Goldstein 1985). The systemic model argues that in the competitive world of illegal crack markets, where the police cannot be relied on to resolve disputes, violence is often used as a means of regulating competition, ensuring product quality, and protecting the business and turf of drug dealers. The level of violence in drug markets may be augmented by the fact that they are often staffed by young people with few ties to conventional institutions of social mobility and social control, who have ready access to

handguns, and who lack fundamental dispute resolution skills and impulse controls. The growing body of research examining intercity differences in the presence of drug markets and levels of lethal violence for the most part provides support for the systemic model (Baumer 1994; Baumer et al. 1998; Cork 1999; Ousey & Lee 2002).

The drug market explanation for juvenile violence is interesting and appears to hold scientific merit, but all the studies (both empirical and theoretical) testing this model share a common limitation: their inductively generated expectations are derived from observations on urban drug markets. Although Weisheit and Donnermeyer (2000:320) report that “nonmetropolitan 12th graders in 1995 had similar rates for past-year use of inhalants and powder cocaine, and slightly higher rates for crack cocaine, stimulants, barbiturates, and tranquilizers,” the nature and extent of rural drug markets essentially remains a black box for the time being. Yet we consider it fair to suggest that where there are drug markets in rural areas, they deviate substantially from those normally found in large urban areas. The distinctiveness of rural drug markets stems from the ecological layout of rural communities, which are not likely to be conducive to the street-level dealing widely observed in urban locales, the posited source of much urban violence. Hence, while we expect a positive association between concentrated disadvantage and juvenile homicide in rural areas, we expect a rather weak, if not nonexistent, association between drug market indicators and juvenile homicide in rural communities.

The Neglected Model: Moral Communities, Civic Engagement, and Crime

Although useful, the concentrated disadvantage and drug market explanations for juvenile violence have been applied to the exclusion of another potentially powerful explanation for cross-sectional community-level variation in violence — namely, the moral communities thesis. This thesis asserts that communities characterized by a proreligious climate will experience fewer crime problems. By introducing this framework, we hope to broaden the perspective of scholars beyond a narrow focus on community deficits (such as family breakdown, economic underdevelopment, and drug markets) to the repository of cultural resources that communities may use to their collective benefit (in this case, those provided by religious organizations; Lee & Bartkowski 2004). Such a shift in focus is well overdue because sociologists of religion are themselves engaged in a debate about the extent to which religious values effectively deter people, especially young people, from engaging in illicit and deviant activities.

Evidence on the inverse relationship between religious activity and juvenile delinquency is mixed (for recent reviews, see Baier & Wright 2001; Donahue & Benson 1995; Johnson et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2001; Regnerus 2000; Stark 1996).

Most germane to the focus of our study, there remains some disagreement about the means and extent to which religion exerts a deterrent effect on juvenile crime, with some scholars debating whether protective effects of religion exist at the ecological or contextual level (e.g., Chadwick & Top 1993; Cochran & Akers 1989; Elifson, Petersen & Hadaway 1983; Higgins & Albrecht 1977; Regnerus 2000; Stark 1984, 1996; Stark, Kent & Doyle 1982). To complicate matters further, several studies have shown that religion exerts a deterrent effect primarily against those types of action that are strongly condemned by faith communities (e.g., antiascetic behaviors such as substance abuse and premarital sex among teens; Burkett & White 1974; Cochran & Akers 1989 — see Baier & Wright 2001 and Johnson et al. 2000 for reviews). Yet even evidence in this line of inquiry is conflicted, in that some studies point to broadly protective effects of religiosity and others suggest effects that are more specific to the type of behavior in question (e.g., criminal act versus status offense; see Cochran 1988; Cochran & Akers 1989).

Given these debates, authors of current reviews and empirical studies have urged scholars to pay careful attention to measurement issues — i.e., the conceptualization of religion and the specification of particular types of delinquency — as the key in clarifying the nature of this complex relationship (Johnson et al. 2000; Sloane & Potvin 1986; Stark 1996). Stark (1996) has suggested that debates in the research literature result from faulty efforts at operationalizing social context and religious ecology. He argues convincingly for spatial context — namely, five broad regions of the U.S. — as the primary means by which moral communities deter criminal behavior (see also Stark 1984). To this end, Stark encourages sociologists to “discard the assumption that religion is primarily an individual trait . . . and substitute the assumption that religion is, first and foremost a *social structure* . . . a *group property* . . . [namely,] the *proportion* of persons in a given ecological setting who are actively religious” (Stark 1996:164, emphasis in original; see also Stark 1984). Drawing largely on survey data from the Study of High School and Beyond, Stark (1996) finds striking regional variations in high school seniors’ self-reports of having trouble with the law. The “hellfire effect,” as Stark has long called this protective influence (see Hirschi & Stark 1969), does not hold in irreligious climates (the Pacific West), is robust in highly religious parts of the country (the South), and strikes a middle range in modestly religious locales (the Mountain region). Stark notes that these results lend strong confirmation to his definition of religion as a “group property.” In this way, then, religion seems to serve as the institutional framework around which moral communities are sustained.

Yet there are several issues left unaddressed by this pioneering effort. First, despite the strength of his findings, Stark (1996:168) concedes that it is “impossible to demonstrate empirically . . . *why* the relationship between religion and delinquency waxes and wanes” (emphasis in original). In other words, the specific

mechanism through which religious communities deter delinquent behavior remains unexplored. In this sense, Stark's study is more exploratory than explanatory.

Second, while Stark argues strongly for an ecological approach to studying religion, his use of survey data to do so leaves much to be desired. As is well known by demographers and others who regularly conduct ecological analyses, survey data on "having trouble with the law" collected from a select sample of the population — in the case of Stark's study, high school seniors — do not readily lend themselves to community-level analyses. If religious organizations in fact promote moral *communities*, then researchers should use the community itself as the unit of analysis and explanation (see Bartkowski, Howell & Lai 2002; Lee & Bartkowski 2004). Clearly, the data most appropriate for studying moral communities are ecological in nature, rather than individual-level responses drawn from a sample of survey respondents.

Third, Stark himself concedes that his operationalization of social context as five regions of the U.S. is crude and begs for refinement. Here again, if scholars are to learn about religiously based moral communities, then great care needs to be taken concerning the boundaries and character of such communities. Given subregional social and cultural variations in the South as well as other parts of the country, it is difficult to speak of any region in the U.S. as a homogeneous community. Since communities in the U.S. are typically defined by more local boundaries, there is much to be gained from defining moral communities more narrowly.

Finally, in its current form, the moral communities thesis, while speaking directly to juvenile crime, is incapable of addressing another important issue — namely, identifying the types of persons that juveniles are most likely to victimize. From a theoretical standpoint, it is desirable to delineate as clearly as possible the scope conditions under which the theoretical perspective is most applicable. Given that heterogeneity in the victim/offender relationship is evident among juvenile crimes, subtle yet important variations in the explanatory power of the moral communities thesis across victim type may be expected. Although prior research generally has not extended the moral communities thesis to the issue of juvenile offenders and whom they victimize, much might be gained from doing so. Note also that this goal of theoretical precision is consonant with a broader trend in macrocriminological research, where analysts are increasingly moving toward more specificity in both their theoretical frameworks and their outcomes of interest (see Jacobs & Wood 1999; Parker 2001; Parker & McCall 1999; Steffensmeier & Haynie 2000a, 2000b).

The civil society literature provides theoretical tools for refining the moral communities thesis and addressing the shortcomings evident in prior research. Civil society theorists highlight the role of civic engagement and its correlate, social capital, in promoting a vibrant public sphere and fostering integrative social bonds. Recent scholarship has highlighted the immense benefit derived from civic

engagement and high stocks of social capital for Americans at large and U.S. youth in particular (see Baron, Field & Schuller 2000; Lin 2001; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000). Within this literature, social capital is broadly defined as integration within social networks that promote norms of reciprocity, trust, and an ethic of civic engagement. Thus, *networks*, *norms*, and *trust* are considered by many leading scholars to be the three defining features of social capital. When working in concert, this triad promotes social integration, effective action, and the pursuit of the collective good (Putnam 2000).

On the heels of these theoretical advances, a nascent literature within the sociology of religion has begun to examine the ways in which religious organizations promote civic engagement and generate robust forms of social capital (e.g., Ammerman 1997; Bartkowski & Regis 2003; Cnaan 2002; Lee & Bartkowski 2004; Wuthnow 1999; see Sherkat & Ellison 1999 for a review). Religious congregations and faith-based organizations have a long history of facilitating dense social ties in local communities via the worship services, youth groups, special events, and social ministry programs they offer to disadvantaged citizens. Moreover, religious organizations often imbue their social norms and networks with theological dictates and scriptural edicts. The organizing principles and ethical frameworks that govern religious culture — ideologies of faith and deity, as well as moral codes rooted in sacred texts and communal traditions — are markedly distinctive from those found in secular voluntary associations (e.g., Bartkowski 2001; Bartkowski & Regis 2003; Becker 1999). Yet many researchers have noted that religious involvement promotes secular volunteering and engagement with the broader civil society as well (Becker & Dhingra 2001; Greeley 1997; Skocpol 2000; Smidt 1999; Wuthnow 1999).

One element of the civic engagement thesis advanced by Tolbert and colleagues (1998) and Putnam (2000) is that civically engaged religious denominations — those whose members are actively involved in other community organizations and affairs apart from the core religious activities — provide benefits to communities (see also Ammerman 1997; Wuthnow 1999). Broad-based religious commitment strengthens local social networks, elevates interpersonal trust, and helps to cultivate common community-level norms and values. While there has been much speculation to the effect that communities possessing large stocks of social capital have lower crime rates, empirical evidence on this point is just beginning to emerge (Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer 2001), and we are aware of no published empirical studies assessing the relationships between civically engaged religious denominations and crime. This shortage of research is largely attributable to the fact that the theoretical mechanisms by which civic engagement would explain crime have rarely been explicitly articulated. Yet both the systemic social disorganization perspective and the community-level strain (institutional anomie) perspective suggest that these factors should be associated with lower crime rates.

From a systemic social organization perspective (Bursik & Grasmick 1993; Kasarda & Janowitz 1974; Sampson 1988; Sampson & Groves 1989), religious communities may foster horizontal social networks among community members. Social disorganization theory in sociology has long relied on the notion that strong social networks enable communities to stave off criminal behavior among their residents because the community members are able to formulate collective goals and cooperatively work toward realizing them (see Bellair 1997, 2000; Bursik 1988; Sampson & Groves 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush & Earls 1997). This normative social control argument assumes that civically engaged populations should function with shared normative understandings of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Variation across communities in their crime rates may then partially be a function of variation in the level of civic engagement exhibited by their members.

From a community-level strain or institutional anomie perspective (Agnew 1999; Messner & Rosenfeld 1997), overwhelming cultural pressures to achieve financial success or status at any cost may be attenuated or mediated by ties to noneconomic civically engaged institutions (see also Chamlin & Cochran 1995; Messner & Rosenfeld 1997; Piquero & Piquero 1998; Savolainen 2000). These positive social outcomes may be traced to the way in which civic engagement promotes an ethic of helping others through volunteering and associational participation instead of taking on an extreme individualistic orientation. The presence of civically engaged religious denominations may then attenuate or moderate criminogenic pressures induced by an overwhelming cultural emphasis on the primacy of economic success at any cost. Put another way, widespread commitment to civic engagement may alleviate some of the materialist pressures engendered by a strong emphasis on economic success.

There is also strong reason to expect widespread civic engagement to affect subtypes of crime in different ways. Specifically, there are theoretical reasons to expect that homicide rates based on relational distance between victims and offenders (i.e., family, acquaintance, and stranger homicides) will have different levels of association with any measure of civic engagement. As Coleman (1988:100–101) notes, social capital (a latent construct, of which civic engagement is one dimension — see Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer 2001) exists “in the relations among persons.” Hence, people who are not connected can accumulate no social capital because there is no relation among them (i.e., a diffuse network without closure). Further, Putnam (1993:3) argues that “social capital typically consists in ties, norms, and trust transferable from one setting to another” and concludes that “those who have social capital tend to accumulate more — them as has, gets.” In short, because there are not networks, norms, and trust among people who do not know each other, they should derive no benefit from living in a civically engaged community, whereas those who do know each other should derive benefit from it.

It is important to point out that we are not making the ecological fallacy here (see Robinson 1950). Our analytical interpretation does not assume that homicide offenders are civically engaged or that their victims are civically engaged. To the contrary, we argue that communities exhibiting high levels of civic engagement will have lower average rates of juvenile violence committed against family members because the normative social control processes central to our perspective operate through social networks and cannot produce benefits outside the network structure. Hence, we would expect community levels of civic engagement to have a depressing effect on the volume of crime among people who know each other, because on average said communities will have strong networks, norms, and trust among those having relational associations but not among those lacking such associations.

Summary and Expectations

Taken together, a civic engagement perspective on the moral communities thesis is consonant with and significantly extends at least two main theoretical perspectives in macrosociology. Moreover, considering the potential for a civic engagement perspective to explain some subtypes of crime better than others, we expect that widespread participation in civically engaged religious denominations should provide particularly strong protective effects against juvenile family homicides, as opposed to juvenile acquaintance or stranger homicides. Hence the following empirical analyses test the working hypothesis that juvenile homicide rates will be lower in rural communities having a larger proportion of their population base associated with civically engaged denominations. Further, given the institutional linkages between religion and family, we anticipate that this protective effect will be particularly salient for juvenile family homicide rates.

Data and Measures

In order to test our main expectation that rural juvenile homicide rates will be lower where a larger proportion of the population adheres to civically engaged religious denominations, we employ counties as our unit of analysis. Counties are reasonable proxies for rural “communities” because their population size is similar to that of urban neighborhoods (see Osgood & Chambers 2000). In addition, counties are widely used in macro-level criminological research (see Baller et al. 2001; Kposowa & Breault 1993; Lee & Ousey 2001; Osgood 2000; Osgood & Chambers 2000) and the data necessary to test our hypothesized link between faith-based civic engagement and juvenile homicide is available for counties but not for other levels of analysis such as central cities. In addition, Land, McCall, and Cohen (1990) and Parker, McCall, and Land (1999) assert that the selection of macro-level units of analysis in aggregate research is

essentially arbitrary because there tends to be convergence in findings across studies employing various units of analysis. Because we are particularly interested in rural juvenile homicide rates, we base our selection criterion on population size and select those counties with a population less than or equal to 20,000 people.⁴ For comparative purposes, we also examine a sample of urban counties, employing the commonly used criterion in the literature of counties having a total population base of 100,000 or more people. All measures described below are derived from data sources around the year 1990.

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

We measure juvenile homicide with data drawn from the Supplementary Homicide Reports offender file (Fox 2000). Because we employ various disaggregation techniques (i.e., by age and type of relationship), we follow convention in the literature and select only those cases having a single offender and a single victim (Peterson & Krivo 1993; Williams & Flewelling 1988). To be consistent with other studies, we operationalize juvenile homicide as the pooled (summed) number of juvenile homicides from 1990 to 1992 committed by offenders under the age of 18 (see Osgood 2000; Osgood & Chambers 2000; Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer 2001). In addition, we identify the nature of the relationship between juvenile offenders and their victims and partition them into juvenile family, juvenile acquaintance, and juvenile stranger homicides. Limitations of these data have been discussed at some length elsewhere (see Maxfield 1989; Reidel 1999). Nevertheless, they remain widely used by researchers, and to our knowledge they are the only data available providing a reasonable degree of national coverage on juvenile homicide offenders and whom they victimize.

KEY EXPLANATORY VARIABLE

Our key explanatory variable is a measure of the proportion of the population adhering to civically engaged denominations. Data used to construct this measure are drawn from county-level measures found in the *Census of Churches* produced by the Glenmary Research Center (Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies 1992), which is featured online in the American Religion Data Archive <www.arda.tm>. This data set provides detailed information on more than 100 denominations, the number of churches and adherents. We use the county-level measures found in this data set. We use the same method as Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin (1998) to identify civically engaged denominations and express the number of adherents to these denominations per capita as our measure (see also Lee & Bartkowski 2004). Briefly, Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin (1998) use data from the General Social Survey to estimate

the level of civic engagement exhibited by members of various religious denominations. As they describe,

we take data on individuals' denominational affiliation and number of voluntary associations and other group memberships. In the GSS, the aggregate number of memberships item sums affiliations with groups such as fraternal organizations, service clubs, labor unions, sports clubs or teams, hobby or garden clubs, and professional or trade associations. . . . We identify as civically engaged those denominations (or other forms or religious organizations) whose adherents in our GSS sample reported an above-average number of voluntary association membership (i.e., > 1.58). (p. 424)⁵

CONTROL VARIABLES

By necessity we employ a number of control variables that prior research has identified as potentially important covariates of homicide rates. First is a disadvantage index, constructed as the average of the standardized scores of the percentage in poverty, the percentage unemployed, the percentage over age 25 with less than a high school education, the percentage of the population that is black, the percentage of female-headed households, and the degree of spatial concentration of the county's poor residents.⁶ In addition, measures of the size of the population at risk (the juvenile population), the percentage of adults divorced, and the proportion of the population in the 15–29 age range (the most crime-prone age group) are constructed. Because a good deal of research has been conducted on the unique aspects of conservative Protestant culture and family life (Ellison 1991; Ellison, Bartkowski & Segal 1996a, 1996b; Ellison & Sherkat 1993), we control for the possibly confounding effects of a large conservative Protestant population in the county with a measure of the proportion adhering to a conservative Protestant denomination (also derived from the Glenmary data).⁷ Moreover, taking into account the literature suggesting a link between the presence of drug markets and lethal violence discussed above, we construct a measure of juvenile arrests for possession of cocaine and opiates as the average rate for the three-year period 1990–92.⁸ We also account for potential regional effects identified in some research with an indicator variable coded 1 for counties in the South and 0 otherwise. Finally, there is the possibility that any observed association between faith-based civic engagement and crime may be due to a nonreciprocal relationship. That is, high rates of juvenile homicide may actually undermine the degree of faith-based civic engagement, in much the same way that crime is often cited as a cause of depopulation and community instability more generally (Liska & Bellair 1995; Morenoff & Sampson 1997). To try to address this possibility, we control for the relevant lagged (1980) juvenile homicide rates, constructed in the same fashion as the dependent variables. The final samples consist of 1,440 rural counties and 449 urban counties.

Analytical Method

Because homicide is a rare event in rural areas, and is actually also rare relative to population size in most urban areas, our data exhibit extremely skewed distributions and subsequently violate the assumptions of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Current convention in the literature dealing with rare event data is to employ one of a variety of Poisson class estimators, the choice depending on the nature of the data (Osgood 2000). In the presence of events that are rare relative to population size, a Poisson estimator provides several advantages over traditional OLS estimation. First, in light of low crime counts and a small population base, such data are typically not normally distributed, violating a crucial assumption of OLS estimation. Second, as Osgood (2000) notes, crime rates computed with a small population base as the denominator rapidly become imprecise and unstable as the size of the denominator decreases. Third, such data are usually heteroskedastic because the error variance decreases as the population size of the units of analysis increases. Poisson estimation provides a means of overcoming these problems.

There are two additional issues related to our estimation technique. First, the Poisson estimator assumes that the mean and variance of the outcome of interest are equal. When this assumption is violated, the variable is said to be overdispersed, and a modification to the estimator is required that allows the introduction of an error term. The negative binomial estimator is widely employed to deal with this problem. Our data exhibit this quality, and so the negative binomial estimator is the model we employ here. Second, while Poisson class estimators typically are used to model counts of rare events, they can also be used to model rates of rare events by specifying the logged size of the population at risk as an offset variable, which constrains the population size for all counties to 1. Taking these two issues into account, we therefore employ the negative binomial estimator to predict the logged rate of juvenile homicide across U.S. counties.⁹

Results

We begin our analysis with a description of our key variables of interest, the juvenile homicide rates and the faith-based civic engagement indicator, which are presented in Table 1.¹⁰ In the rural sample, the mean juvenile homicide rate is roughly 3.1 homicides per 100,000 juveniles, although as the standard deviation of 14.31 suggests, there is tremendous variability across counties in this measure, underscoring our assertion that rural communities differ widely in the level of lethal violence committed by juveniles. In addition, juvenile acquaintance homicide is more frequent than the other relationship-specific types in rural communities, although all exhibit a good deal of variation, as is evident in their standard deviations. As expected, the urban juvenile homicide

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics

	1,440 Rural Counties		449 Urban Counties	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
<i>Dependent variables</i>				
Juvenile-family homicide rate/100,000	.81	6.82	.97	1.65
Juvenile-acquaintance homicide rate/100,000	1.73	10.83	4.73	7.03
Juvenile-stranger homicide rate/100,000	.28	3.65	1.56	2.95
Total juvenile homicide rate/100,000	3.11	14.31	7.98	10.63
<i>Key explanatory variable</i>				
Civically engaged denominations	.17	.13	.12	.08
<i>Control variables</i>				
Poverty rate	.19	.08	.12	.05
Unemployment rate	.07	.04	.06	.02
High school dropouts	.33	.11	.22	.07
Proportion black	.07	.15	.11	.12
Female-headed households	.05	.03	.06	.02
Poverty concentration	.22	.09	.22	.09
Juvenile population (ln) ^a	2,863.16	1,533.94	105,417.06	177,508.5
Proportion divorced	.07	.02	.08	.02
Proportion age 15–29	.19	.04	.24	.04
South	.43	—	.35	—
Drug arrest rate (ln) ^a	1.65	12.70	23.03	38.05
Conservative Protestant	.48	.23	.30	.16
Juvenile-family homicide rate, 1980	1.13	8.37	1.14	1.99
Juvenile-acquaintance homicide rate, 1980	1.78	10.98	2.92	3.96
Juvenile-stranger homicide rate, 1980	.68	7.30	1.07	2.33
Total juvenile homicide rate, 1980	3.62	15.70	5.63	7.37

^a Variable transformed to natural logarithm in multivariate analysis because of high skewness (see text).

rate is much higher, and the pattern observed in rural areas — that acquaintance homicides are the most frequent — also holds true in urban areas. Our key measure of moral communities, the proportion adhering to civically engaged denominations, indicates that on average 17% of the population in rural areas can be considered civically engaged, with a standard deviation of 13%. In contrast, the prevalence of faith-based civic engagement in urban areas is markedly lower, and there is on average less variation across communities, as indicated by the standard deviation.

Turning to the multivariate analysis, model 1 in Table 2 presents the results from the baseline negative binomial model predicting the rural juvenile homicide rate with the vector of control variables. As expected, the presence of overlapping forms of socioeconomic disadvantage captured in our disadvantage index is associated with higher juvenile homicide rates. The coefficient for this variable indicates that a one standard deviation increase (.79) in the level of disadvantage results in a 34.9% increase in the juvenile homicide

rate, a relatively substantial effect.¹¹ It is interesting that none of the other coefficients in the model attains statistical significance. Model 2 of Table 2 extends this specification with the introduction of our main indicator of interest, the faith-based civic engagement variable (i.e., the proportion of the population affiliated with a civically engaged denomination). As expected, the faith-based civic engagement variable exhibits a statistically significant negative effect on juvenile homicide rates. Like the effect of the disadvantage index in model 1, the effect of faith-based civic engagement on juvenile homicide is relatively sharp, with a one standard deviation increase in adherence to civically engaged religious denominations (13%) translating into a 28.7% decrease in the juvenile homicide rate. In common terms, rural counties with a larger proportion of their population adhering to civically engaged religious denominations experience lower juvenile homicide rates. We also note that with the introduction of the measure of civically engaged denominations, the coefficient for the disadvantage index declines by about 12.4%, and this translates into a standardized effect size of 29.9% (as opposed to 34.9% in the previous model).

Models 3 and 4 in Table 2 report the same specifications for the sample of urban counties. There are several noticeable differences between these results and those for the rural sample. As model 3 indicates, juvenile homicide rates are higher in urban counties experiencing higher levels of disadvantage, a larger juvenile population, a higher divorce rate, a larger proportion of the population in the crime-prone age group, and where there is more drug market activity. It is notable that urban juvenile homicide rates are also associated with the lagged juvenile homicide rates. And as model 4 indicates, our measure of faith-based civic engagement exhibits no association with the urban juvenile homicide rate. As we noted above, this finding is not surprising, especially in light of the fact that it is clear from these models that concentrated socioeconomic disadvantage and drug activity play important roles in explaining cross-sectional variation in the prevalence of juvenile homicide in urban areas. It is also notable from these models that model fit is much higher for the urban sample than for the rural sample.

The basic specification reported above generally supports our expectation; however, researchers are increasingly recognizing the importance of moving toward specificity in measuring homicide rates (see Parker 2001). While the operationalization of juvenile homicide in Table 2 does capture what we intend, there are subcategories of juvenile homicide as well, and as discussed above, our reading of the literature suggests that the effects of faith-based civic engagement on them may not be constant. Indeed, as we argue above, there is reason to believe that religiously based civic engagement may have particularly strong protective effects with respect to family homicides because of the paramount importance that religious groups in the U.S. place on family cohesion and the socialization of youngsters (e.g., Abbott, Berry & Meredith 1990; Bartkowski 2001; Bartkowski

TABLE 2: Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Total Juvenile Homicide Rates, Urban and Rural Counties*

	Rural Counties		Urban Counties	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Civically engaged denominations	—	−2.602* (1.242)	—	.123 (.593)
Disadvantage index	.379* (.152)	.332* (.152)	.927** (.083)	.929** (.084)
Juvenile population size (ln)	.083 (.246)	.111 (.249)	.226** (.063)	.226** (.063)
Divorce rate	6.379 (6.582)	4.670 (6.503)	.107** (.027)	.107** (.028)
South	.206 (.311)	.284 (.309)	.049 (.109)	.045 (.111)
Age 15–29	1.903 (3.206)	.830 (3.156)	.029* (.013)	.029* (.013)
Drug arrest rate (ln)	.092 (.131)	.062 (.130)	.112** (.031)	.112** (.031)
Conservative Protestant	.048 (.565)	−.281 (.573)	.417 (.343)	.415 (.343)
Lagged juvenile homicide rate	.112 (.099)	.114 (.089)	.198** (.059)	.197** (.059)
χ^2 ^b (overdispersion parameter)	40.19**	39.08*	991.99**	991.72**
Normed maximum likelihood R ²	.036	.044	.542	.542
Likelihood ratio test	21.43**	26.45**	348.08**	348.12

^a Standard errors in parentheses.
^b Likelihood Ratio test of $\alpha = 0$ (i.e., no overdispersion). Significant value indicates data overdispersed and negative binomial model is appropriate.
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

& Wilcox 2000; Bartkowski & Xu 2000; Christiano 2000; Eberly 1999; Pankhurst & Houseknecht 2000; Wilcox 2002; Wilcox & Bartkowski 1999). Moreover, because people who are situated outside closed social networks cannot share norms and trust (Coleman 1988), they should derive considerably less benefit from residing in a community characterized by a preponderance of civically engaged denominations. To test this expectation, Table 3 presents the results of our models predicting juvenile family, acquaintance, and stranger homicide rates in rural counties with our main explanatory variable of interest, civically engaged denominations, and our vector of control variables.

The results of these models are rather stark and straightforward. In model 1 it is apparent that the measure of civically engaged denominations has the expected effect on juvenile family homicide rates. The statistically significant

TABLE 3: Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Juvenile Family, Acquaintance, and Stranger Homicide Rates, 1,440 Rural Counties*

	Model 1 Family	Model 2 Acquaintance	Model 3 Stranger
Civically engaged denominations	-6.528* (2.962)	-1.899 (1.520)	1.095 (3.613)
Disadvantage index	.154 (.327)	.444* (.188)	.835 (.502)
Juvenile population size (ln)	.227 (.486)	.196 (.323)	1.608 (1.124)
Divorce rate	-15.943 (13.003)	19.352* (8.489)	-21.773 (24.357)
South	1.109 (.603)	.085 (.404)	.788 (1.155)
Age 15-29	-15.650 (10.290)	2.320 (3.680)	-5.365 (15.097)
Drug arrest rate (ln)	-4.552 (567.220)	.104 (.154)	.174 (.327)
Conservative Protestant	.315 (1.038)	-1.070 (.760)	1.415 (2.169)
Lagged juvenile homicide rate	-.015 (.325)	.024 (.182)	-3.926 (.322.412)
χ^2 ^b (overdispersion parameter)	5.78**	17.87**	14.28**
Normed maximum likelihood R ²	.066	.058	.109
Likelihood ratio test	16.90*	24.28**	14.45

^a Standard errors in parentheses.
^b Likelihood Ratio test of $\alpha = 0$ (i.e., no overdispersion). Significant value indicates data overdispersed and negative binomial model is appropriate.
* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

negative coefficient indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion adhering to civically engaged religious denominations is associated with 57.20% decrease in the juvenile family homicide rate. In contrast to model 1, the only variables achieving significance in model 2 predicting juvenile acquaintance homicide are the disadvantage index and the divorce rate, whereas in model 3 predicting stranger homicides, none of the variables exhibits an effect significantly different from zero, and the likelihood ratio test statistic, as would be expected, is insignificant. In short, these models provide another layer of support for our argument, while at the same time highlighting the importance of disaggregating homicides along important dimensions.

Table 4 reports the results of parallel analyses on the urban sample. As expected, the measure of civically engaged religious denominations has no association with any of the disaggregated homicide rates in urban areas.

TABLE 4: Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting Juvenile Family, Acquaintance, and Stranger Homicide Rates, 449 Urban Counties

	Model 1 Family	Model 2 Acquaintance	Model 3 Stranger
Civically engaged denominations	.138 (.874)	.422 (.722)	-.319 (1.011)
Disadvantage index	.497** (.093)	.923** (.099)	.976** (.125)
Juvenile population size (ln)	.033 (.069)	.180* (.076)	.386** (.102)
Divorce rate	12.224** (3.798)	9.978** (3.369)	12.265** (4.366)
South	-.134 (.156)	-.017 (.137)	-.006 (.187)
Age 15–29	3.250 (2.053)	3.929* (1.611)	.678 (2.420)
Drug arrest rate (ln)	.157** (.056)	.154** (.038)	.135** (.052)
Conservative Protestant	1.608** (.519)	.534 (.426)	-.085 (.572)
Juvenile homicide rate	.031 (.107)	.216** (.073)	.067 (.119)
χ^2 b (overdispersion parameter)	8.21**	854.53**	320.34**
Normed maximum likelihood R ²	.220	.448	.338
Likelihood ratio test	97.67**	262.93**	172.73**

* p < .05 ** p < .01

However, several other important variables perform as expected. For example, concentrated disadvantage clearly plays an important role in driving all forms of juvenile homicide in urban areas. Similarly, the measure of drug market activity is positively and significantly associated with all forms of juvenile homicide. Taken together, the effects of the disadvantage index and the drug market measure appear to provide support for the two main theoretical explanations of urban crime that have surfaced in recent years. It is also notable that increases in the rate of divorce in urban areas contributes to higher juvenile homicide rates.

It is important to probe the sensitivity of our results to alternative model specifications, especially since the effect of our main indicator of interest, civically engaged religious denominations, varies across type of juvenile homicide. For the models reported above, a number of diagnostic measures

were implemented, primarily to probe for multicollinearity and omitted variable bias. First, we reexamined the models reported above using an OLS estimator to secure variance inflation factors (VIFs) and tolerance estimates. The results of these models indicate no signs of multicollinearity, as all VIFs were below 2.0, well below the usual criterion of 4.0 employed in macro-level research and the conservative criterion of 2.5 suggested by Allison (1999). A series of auxiliary models were also estimated to ensure that the observed effect of faith-based civic engagement on juvenile family homicide was not due to sample composition and that it was not accounted for by the introduction of other potentially important covariates into the model. The results from the auxiliary models are presented in Table 5.

For example, in model 1 we report the coefficient and standard error for our civic engagement measure derived from a full model (reported in Table 3) with a 10% random sample deletion. This change in our sample has little effect on the size of the coefficient or the standard error. In model 2, we follow Osgood and Chambers (2000) and introduce a dummy variable coded 1 for rural counties adjacent to urban counties, and 0 otherwise.¹² The introduction of this variable could capture spatial autocorrelation or detect a spatial spillover effect wherein criminal activity or criminal norms and values filter over to the countryside. Despite the theoretical integrity of this measure, it does not wipe out the main effect of the faith-based civic engagement variable when predicting juvenile family homicides.

In addition, some research indicates that crime rates are lower where welfare expenditures are higher or where social altruism is higher in the form of giving to the United Way (Chamlin & Cochran 1997; DeFronzo 1997; Hannon & DeFronzo 1998). To address the potential of this variable to also account for the effects of faith-based civic engagement (because civic engagement may actually be higher where there is a social climate of concern for the welfare of fellow citizens; Cnaan 2002), we included a measure of public assistance and report the effect of civically engaged denominations in the presence of this measure in model 3. Again, however, this potentially key variable failed to account for the negative relationship between civically engaged religious denominations and rural juvenile family homicide. Then, given a longstanding tradition in sociology concerned with the effects of population turnover on crime, we reestimated the model introducing this measure, but as model 4 demonstrates, this has little effect on the relationship between civically engaged denominations and juvenile family homicide. In models 5 and 6 we take into account the local religious climate more generally by including variables measuring the proportion of the local population adhering to churches of any kind and a measure of access to churches (number of churches per 1,000), but these too have little effect on our substantive outcome of interest.¹³ Finally, in models 7 and 8 we introduce measures of secular forms of civic engagement, average voter turnout for the 1988 and 1992 presidential

TABLE 5: Coefficients and Standard Errors for Civically Engaged Denominations Variable Predicting Juvenile Family Homicide under Alternative Model Specifications, 1,440 Rural Counties

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Model 1: 10% random sample deletion	-6.653*	3.005
Model 2: controlling for adjacency indicator	-6.402*	2.973
Model 3: controlling for public assistance	-6.358*	2.955
Model 4: controlling for population turnover	-6.557*	2.978
Model 5: controlling for percent adhering	-6.725*	3.164
Model 6: controlling for churches per 1,000	-8.124*	3.447
Model 7: controlling for voter turnout	-6.686*	3.022
Model 8: controlling for social and civic organizations	-6.681*	3.000

* $p < .05$

elections and a measure of the number of social and civic organizations per capita in the county in 1990.¹⁴ However, neither variable accounts for the observed relationship between our main measure of civically engaged denominations and juvenile family homicide. In sum, our results indicating that juvenile family homicide in particular is lower where local populations are more invested in civically engaged denominations appear to be rather robust.

Discussion and Conclusions

This analysis was designed to address the intersection of several significant voids in prior macro-level research on homicide. First, although all indicators suggest juvenile violence was a major social problem around 1990, few empirical studies have examined the structural antecedents of juvenile violence. Second, while a sizeable body of research on aggregate rates of violence has been conducted employing urban areas as units of analysis, the literature on rural violence is comparatively slim. Third, despite what we consider a high level of theoretical integrity, our reading of the literature suggests that no studies to date have provided an adequate empirical test of the moral communities thesis with respect to homicide, and only one study of which we are aware (Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer 2001) has attempted to link the related concept of civic engagement from the social capital literature to macro-level homicide rates. Finally, we are aware of no direct theoretical or empirical attempts to specify a relationship

between religiously based civic engagement and relationship-specific homicide rates.¹⁵

Our theoretical contribution to the research literature lies in more clearly delineating the nature of moral communities and identifying the specific mechanisms through which they may serve to depress crime rates. Drawing on the social capital and civic engagement literature, our framework posits that the effect of religious adherence is transmitted through its cultivation of social activities outside the core religious realm. The classification scheme developed by other analysts (e.g., Tolbert, Lyson & Irwin 1998) identifies certain religious denominations as more civically engaged than others. Correspondingly, we employed this measure with the expectation that communities having a substantial population adhering to such denominations would have lower juvenile crime rates, not solely because of a “hellfire effect” (the notion that religions condemn antisocial behavior), but because of the strengthening of the local social fabric engendered by faith-based civic engagement.

Our conceptualization of moral communities is broadly consistent with what Athens (1998) has termed “civil communities.” Civil communities are characterized by norms of nonviolence and the rule of law. The dominant values in civil communities place nonviolent persons in positions of power. Moreover, disputes in these communities are settled through nonviolent, juridical means. Athens contrasts civil communities with what he calls malignant communities. In malignant communities, violent persons occupy positions of dominance and illegal conduct sometimes confers status. When disputes arise in malignant communities, they are settled through violent confrontation — through the “tooth and claw” exercise of power rather than the rule of law. According to Athens, turbulent communities are characterized by a moderate degree of violence and occupy a middle ground between the poles of civil communities on the one hand and malignant communities on the other. In this typology, future research might compare the ecological role of religion in civil, turbulent, and malignant communities. It is quite possible that civil communities use religion (particularly civically engaged religious denominations) as a public resource through which they create an ecology of nonviolence and enforce a moral code of law-abiding conduct. It is also likely that religion is a largely absent civic resource in malignant communities and is only marginally present in turbulent communities. Such a perspective would dovetail nicely with the Durkheimian notion of religion as form of collective conscience.

Yet our study also suggests that overly sanguine perspectives that equate religion with a “sacred canopy” of protection from violence are flawed. The social capital literature clearly suggests that civic engagement is beneficial for those embedded in social networks. But such is not the case for those outside these networks. Consistent with social capital theory, we find that the resources engendered by faith-based civic engagement retard the volume of crime

occurring between family members but fail to do so for people who are unfamiliar with one another. Where juvenile homicide is concerned, the prosocial character of religious ties are most pronounced within kin networks and lose considerable force outside them. Thus, civically engaged religious denominations provide a circumscribed “umbrella” of protection against some forms of violence, rather than a thoroughgoing “canopy” of protection of violence writ large.

Of course, it is important not to reduce our theoretical argument to the individual level. Our conceptual argument does not suggest that individual juveniles who are involved in religious activities will be less likely to kill a family member. Rather, our perspective expects communities with a large proportion of the population involved in civically engaged religious denominations to have a lower volume of family homicides committed by juveniles. This expectation is based on the premise that the normative social control and trust engendered by faith-based civic engagement should be particularly strong for those with close interpersonal relations but weaker as relational distance increases. It may also be a product of the specific linkages between religion and family, which are, after all, often cast as complementary social institutions. Given these premises, we expected faith-based civic engagement to have a less robust dampening influence on acquaintance and stranger homicide rates than on family homicide.

Our empirical analysis of rural juvenile homicide rates disaggregated by victim/offender relationship reveals that our measure of faith-based civic engagement has a negative relationship with juvenile family homicide rates in particular. Further, this relationship appears to be rather robust, as it is stable in the face of a series of well-established covariates of homicide. In addition, our extensive sensitivity analyses, including a 10% random sample deletion and the introduction of other potentially relevant variables (including secular forms of civic engagement), indicate that the results are relatively invariant to alternative model specifications. Hence, these data indicate that rural juvenile family homicide rates are on average lower where a greater proportion of the population adheres to civically engaged religious denominations.

Still, why would these same deterrent effects not be manifested in urban areas? In explaining this disparity, we point to research that has underscored the centrality of religious institutions to rural civic life (Bartkowski & Regis 2003; Ellison & Sherkat 1995; Parisi et al. 2002), particularly for youth in nonmetropolitan communities (King, Elder & Whitbeck 1997). Religious organizations are a most critical civic institution in rural areas, where the local culture and public life are strongly informed by religious conviction and by the plethora of religious organizations in such areas. By contrast, network density in urban areas may dilute the influence (and, hence, the protective effects) of religious participation by providing an array of alternative avenues for civic engagement that are quite different in character from faith-based civic engagement. Although our data

limitations make such statements speculative, urban civic alternatives might include workplace associations and political activist groups for adults, as well as peer networks cultivated in schools, secular clubs, and urban sports leagues for youth. This is not to say that such secular alternatives are wholly absent in rural areas. But urban network density means that nonreligious forms of civic engagement are likely to be more widely utilized in metropolitan locales.

While the macro-level literature on age-disaggregated crime rates remains in an early developmental phase, the study of age-graded crime in rural areas is literally in its infancy. This degree of development is partially attributable to conceptual issues surrounding the definition of what exactly constitutes a rural locale. As we noted above, our selection criterion was intended to tap into rurality at a fundamental level while allowing for variation along its primary dimension — population size. However, other analysts may wish to consider exploring more thoroughly whether results obtained from empirical models hold across other selection criteria. Augmenting this issue is the problem of specifying meaningful age-specific theoretical models. Although some in the past have successfully delineated meaningful age-specific relationships between theoretical variables and crime rates (see Allan & Steffensmeier 1989), criminological theory in general is still evolving to reach the point where it can accommodate age-graded specifications. However, if our results are any indication, future scholarship in this area is warranted. Finally, we would encourage scholars to examine the extent to which a preponderance of civically engaged denominations in local communities might deter other forms of violent juvenile crime and nonviolent forms of adolescent delinquency as well.

The fact that we focused in part on marrying the moral communities and civic engagement literatures to explicate more thoroughly the role of faith-based civic engagement on crime at the community level should not detract from the insight that civic engagement exhibits both a secular and religious character (see Rosenfeld, Messner & Baumer 2001 for measurement of the secular character). Although our key findings held when controlling for two such secular measures (voter turnout and the number of social and civic organizations), social researchers are well advised to pursue more sophisticated measures of both faith-based and secular forms of civic engagement. In anticipation of the achievement of that goal, our study clearly underscores the significant, though circumscribed, role of religious communities in promoting a crime-deterrent civic infrastructure for American youth.

Notes

1. Following Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin (1998), we view as civically engaged those religious denominations whose members exhibit high levels of participation in voluntary associations and other noneconomic groups (such as sports clubs). It is worth noting that the moral communities thesis underscores the prosocial character of religion on

the social ecology of a locale. The converse of a moral community may best be described as what Athens (1998) calls a “malignant community” — those in which criminal elements occupy high-status positions and disputes are commonly settled through the use of violence. The closest approximation of moral communities in Athens’ typology are what he calls “civil communities.” (What Athens calls “turbulent communities” are situated in the middle of this continuum.) We revisit the relationship between religion and these community types in the concluding section of our study.

2. Indeed, several complete volumes are now available on the problem of juvenile violence and the general topic of the crime rate increase and decrease. See Blumstein and Wallman (2000), Tonry and Moore (1998), and the 1998 summer issue of the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*.

3. These figures are derived from data available at <www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/dtdata.htm#crime>

4. There is currently no standard criterion for identifying rural ecological areas (see Weisheit & Donnermeyer 2000). Although our selection criterion is somewhat arbitrary, we suggest that focusing on counties with populations less than or equal to 20,000 people helps us address the challenge put forth by Weisheit and Donnermeyer (2000:312): to “capture the essence of rural while also appreciating wide variations among rural areas.”

5. This method identifies the following denominations as civically engaged (listed alphabetically): African Methodist Episcopal Zion, American Baptist, Church of Christ, Congregational Christian, Disciples of Christ, Episcopal, Jewish, Latter-Day Saints, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Unitarian (see Tolbert, Lyson & Irwin 1998).

6. The spatial concentration measure is formulated using a class-based P^* index of poverty concentration derived from block-group-level data. See Bell (1954) for the computation. The block-group-level data are drawn from Summary Tape File 3A of the 1990 U.S. Census, while the other measures are drawn from Summary Tape File 3C of the 1990 U.S. Census.

An unrotated principal components analysis of these measures indicates that they load on a single dimension for both the rural and the urban samples. For the rural sample, the component matrix loadings range from .923 to .646, with an eigenvalue of 3.877 explaining 63.616% of the variance. For the urban sample, the matrix loadings range from .852 to .417, with an eigenvalue of 3.908, which explains 65.139% of the variance.

7. Adhering to convention in the religion literature, we identify the following denominations as Conservative Protestant: Baptist, Missouri Synod Lutheran/Evangelical Lutheran, Assembly of God, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Christian Reformed Church, Christian Scientist, Church of God, Church of God in Christ, Church of the Nazarene, Church of Christ, Community Churches, Evangelical Covenant, Evangelical Free, Full Gospel Fellowship, Foursquare Gospel, Jehovah’s Witness, Mennonite, Pentecostal/Pietist/Holiness, Seventh-Day Adventists, Independent Fundamentalist.

8. These data are drawn from county-level UCR arrest files. We acknowledge that this measure is less than perfect because it conflates cocaine and opiates, but it is currently the best proxy measure for drug markets available for a large sample of rural counties. See Ousey and Lee (2002) and Rosenfeld and Decker (1999).

9. For more on Poisson and negative binomial modeling, see Agresti (1996), Land, McCall, and Nagin (1996), and Long (1997). For recent examples in macro-level research, see Lee, Martinez, and Rosenfeld (2001), Lee and Ousey (2001), Osgood (2000), and Osgood and Chambers (2000).

10. So as not to confuse the reader, for our descriptive statistics in Table 1 we provide the juvenile homicide rates per 100,000 juveniles.

11. In order to interpret the negative binomial coefficients as standardized coefficients, the standard deviation of the independent variable of interest is multiplied by the raw coefficient, the product is then exponentiated, 1 is subtracted from this, and the result is multiplied by 100. The formal formula for this equation takes the form

$\{[(\exp(\beta_k * s_k)) - 1] * 100\}$, where s_k is the standard deviation of the independent variable, and β_k is the raw coefficient from the negative binomial equation. In addition, the normed maximum likelihood R^2 statistic provides an adjusted estimate of the reduction in the log-likelihood between intercept only and full models (see Long 1997). Finally, the likelihood ratio test statistic, when statistically significant, indicates that the independent variables account for more variation in the juvenile homicide rate than would be expected simply by chance.

12. This coding scheme comes from the rural-urban continuum codes (see Butler & Beale 1994).

13. These measures are derived from the same data source as the civic engagement measure.

14. The voter turnout data are derived from the USA Counties CD-ROM, and the measure of social and civic organizations are derived from the 1990 County Business Patterns data set from the U.S. census.

15. Still, it is worth noting that Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer (2001:301) pose the following question at the conclusion of their study: "Given the nature of the linkages between social capital and intervening causal processes, is social capital more relevant to the explanation of selected forms of homicide (e.g., stranger homicide) in comparison with other forms (e.g., intimate partner homicide)?"

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Collective Benefits, Exchange Interests, and Norm Enforcement*

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Abstract

Under what conditions are norms likely to be enforced? What processes lead to the punishment of deviant behavior? While social relations are thought to be a key part of the answer, their role is not well understood. In this article I develop one approach to explaining how exchange interests contribute to norm production. I argue that when the benefits resulting from enforcement enhance the ability of individuals to engage in profitable exchange, metanorms and norms are more likely to be enforced. Predictions are tested using experimental methods and are confirmed.

How do social norms emerge? Why do people punish deviant behavior? An issue of particular interest to scholars is the way in which community structures affect the enforcement of social norms. Characteristics such as the strength of social ties are thought to increase enforcement and enhance norm strength. Variants of this idea are found in a variety of substantive areas — social psychological literature on group cohesion (Homans 1950, 1974), research by legal scholars on the enforcement of norms in close-knit communities (Ellickson 1991), work on social capital (Coleman 1988, 1990; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000), studies of embeddedness in organizational literature (Gargiulo 1993; Granovetter 1985; Uzzi 1996), and criminological research explaining variation in crime rates across neighborhoods (Sampson & Groves 1989).

Despite widespread belief in the importance of social ties for norm enforcement, the reasons for such a connection remain unclear. In part, this lack of clarity is due to sociologists' incomplete understanding of the role of exchange

**I appreciate the research support of the College of Family, Home, and Social Sciences at Brigham Young University, as well as the research assistance of Melissa Richardson. I thank Michael Hechter, Satoshi Kanazawa, James Kitts, and participants in the Iowa Workshop on Theoretical Analysis for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. Please address all correspondence to Christine Horne, Department of Sociology, 800 SWKT, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602. E-mail: christine_horne@byu.edu.*

relations in enforcement. Because scholars do not understand the conditions and processes leading to a relation between network ties and informal control, they may be puzzled by situations where such correlations are not observed. People in different substantive areas work separately, developing explanations for inconsistent findings. General theoretical understanding of the relation between social ties and norm enforcement therefore is potentially useful for a variety of scholars.

Just how do interpersonal relations contribute to the production of norms, and under what conditions do they do so? Key to answering this question is the recognition that individuals are interested both in the benefits that result from a norm being enforced and in the rewards they can obtain through interaction with fellow group members. Failure to acknowledge these sets of interests may lead to incomplete understanding of social norms and flawed predictions regarding norms in particular community contexts. Accordingly, accurately identifying individuals' interests in collective goods and in their exchange relationships is important for understanding norm emergence and enforcement processes.

Substantial amounts of research investigate each of these interests. Some scholars treat collections of people as groups — arguing that individuals join groups and accept social obligations because of the collective goods that are provided (see, e.g., Hechter 1987). Others emphasize networks — the characteristics and structure of relationships between individuals and the benefits they can accrue through exchange (see, e.g., Cook 1987; Molm 1997; Willer & Anderson 1981).

In actuality, of course, individuals are motivated by interests driven by both structures. The desires of self-interested individuals for collective benefits produced at the group level create social dilemmas; their interests in interpersonal exchange create a distinct but related set of dynamics. Predictions regarding norm enforcement will be more accurate if theories incorporate both of these sets of interests. In addition, however, it is important to specify the connection between the two. In this article I focus on one kind of connection — the extent to which the collective benefits associated with social norms enhance the ability of individuals to engage in interpersonal interaction. I argue that this link between sanctioning benefits and exchange is important for explaining norm enforcement. That is, norms are more likely to be produced if the benefits that result from a norm being enforced enhance the ability of individuals to participate in profitable exchange. Hypotheses are tested using experimental methods.

Theory

When studying norms, the first challenge for the researcher is to decide exactly what is meant by the term. Social norms generally are defined as “rules, about which there is some degree of consensus, that are enforced through social sanctions” (Horne 2001:5; see also Axelrod 1986; Coleman 1990). A difficulty with the definition is that it includes several components. “Because [these components] are not necessarily covariant . . . it is preferable to decompose norms into their constituent elements” and consider these elements separately (Hechter & Opp 2001:404).

This is the approach taken in the present article. I focus on one component of norms — sanctioning. Whatever the requirements of a normative rule, if it is not enforced, the norm is not in effect (for a similar treatment, see Ellickson 1991; Scott 1971).¹ Deviance is behavior that violates normative rules, producing externalities that affect other group members (Coleman 1990). These externalities can be positive or negative — people can engage in activities that are seen as worse than expected or better than required. Here I focus on reactions to behavior that has negative consequences. That is, I seek to explain why people punish others for antisocial activity.² Theoretical work suggests that it is more difficult to explain why people punish than why they reward (Coleman 1990). I examine this arguably harder case. For my purposes, then, a norm exists when individuals who engage in deviant behavior are treated more harshly than those who do not.

If social enforcement is necessary for norms to be effective, how can the existence of such sanctions be explained? That is, why do people personally bear the costs of punishing behavior that violates social norms and produces negative externalities? For the individual, punishing deviance may take time and create emotional distress, financial burden, and the threat of physical harm.³ But when norms are enforced the community gains; sanctioning benefits everyone. Thus “[a] sanctioning system is . . . a public good because its benefits can be enjoyed by all members regardless of their contribution to its provision” (Yamagishi 1986:110; see also Oliver 1980). Self-interested actors would prefer to free ride on others’ sanctioning efforts rather than take costly action themselves. What motivates people to accept these costs? How is the reluctance to sanction overcome?

Two general solutions are widely recognized. One source of motivation is the benefit that is produced as a result of a sanctioning action. In Heckathorn’s (1988, 1989) terms, people have a regulatory interest in others’ behavior. The larger the benefits associated with sanctioning, the larger the regulatory interest. In turn, the greater this interest, the more likely people will be to attempt to exert control. Therefore, one possibility is that an individual’s share of the group

benefit produced as a result of sanctioning is sufficient to offset the sanctioning costs. Norm enforcement results in a variety of such benefits. Deviant behavior may be reduced or its increase restrained. In addition, individuals may be less fearful, they may feel that justice has been done, they may be better able to evaluate who is a “good type” worth interacting with (Posner 2000; see also Mackie 1996), the standards of the community may be clarified (Tyler & Boeckman 1997), and so forth. All group members benefit from these effects. This argument suggests that people are willing to personally bear the costs of sanctioning in order to receive the benefit that results.

Scholars note, however, that in many situations this benefit is insufficient (Yamagishi 1995). Sanctioning costs to individuals often outweigh the gains they might personally receive. Therefore, other sources of motivation are necessary. Metanorms are one proposed source of additional incentives that can help offset costs (Axelrod 1986; Coleman 1990; see also Ellickson 1991 for a related discussion).

A metanorm is a particular kind of norm that regulates the sanctioning of deviant behavior. Like norms more generally, metanorms are socially enforced through punishments imposed on those who violate them or through rewards given to those who comply with them (Coleman 1990). In order to avoid confusion between norms and metanorms, I talk about norms in terms of sanctions or punishment, and metanorms in terms of the *rewards* that people give to those who sanction or ignore deviant behavior. Metanorms are enforced to the extent that there is a gap between these reward levels — regardless of whether the gap results from people giving lower rewards to those who fail to sanction or higher rewards to those who do sanction.⁴ These reactions of group members to individuals who are in a position to sanction deviance affect the rates of such sanctioning.⁵ The more rewards given to those individuals who are able to sanction and do so compared with those in the same position who fail to do so, the more likely they will be to punish deviant behavior.

Of course, this solution to the second-order free-rider problem creates a third. Why do people give larger rewards to those who punish deviant behavior than to those who do not? After all, someone who has received fewer rewards may be less inclined to interact in positive ways with the metanorm enforcer in the future. Why then are individuals willing to bear the costs of enforcing metanorms? Again, there are two potential incentives — a share of the benefit produced as a result of another person imposing a sanction, and the reactions of others. Thus the same kinds of issues arise for the enforcement of metanorms as for the enforcement of norms.

As discussed above, the existing literature on norms suggests that benefits are key for enforcement. If punishing deviance produces insufficient benefits, sanctioning will not occur. The essential problem underlying the enforcement of both norms and metanorms is created by the fact that, in many situations,

the individual's share of the benefit produced as a result of sanctioning is insufficient to offset the costs of producing the sanction. A purposive actor making a decision to impose a punishment or to encourage another to sanction will take into account the costs and the resulting benefits. Individuals will be more likely to act if the payoff from doing so is greater, and less likely if the payoff is smaller. Accordingly, as benefits decline, the likelihood that norms will be enforced is reduced.

One approach to encouraging sanctioning, therefore, is to increase the size of the benefit or the value of the benefit relative to the cost.⁶ What mechanisms might produce such an increase? A variety of solutions have been proposed. Heckathorn (1988) argues that collective sanctions (punishing the group for a single individual's misdeeds) will increase group members' interest in regulating their fellow members' behavior and, in turn, encourage norm enforcement — at least when the costs of control are low. Ostrom (1990) describes a sanctioning system in which sanctioners are allowed to take cash from a violator and use it for their personal entertainment. The size of the benefit is increased, not for all group members, but for the individual imposing the punishment — thus creating a selective incentive encouraging sanctioning. Such solutions, however, are limited in their scope. These means of augmenting benefits are not always available — sanctions may not create losses for the group, and sanctioners may be unable to take resources from a deviant.⁷

I propose another solution — one that is more widely useful. It applies broadly to settings in which groups are made up of individuals who are all able to interact with each other and who have opportunities to engage in interactions over time.⁸ In addition, it applies to situations in which people know when deviance occurs and are aware of each other's reactions to norm violations. This new solution has the virtue not only of being more generally applicable than existing arguments but also of at least partially accounting for observed correlations between social ties and norm enforcement.

I suggest that we can divide the benefits associated with sanctioning into two types — direct and indirect. The role of direct benefits is not controversial; it is what scholars typically mean when they talk about sanctioning benefits. Here, I focus on the indirect benefits that group members may experience as a result of sanctions being imposed. I also look at the strength of their social relations — in particular, the level of interdependence between individuals. These concepts, the connections between them, and the resulting predictions are described below.

INDIRECT BENEFITS OF SANCTIONING: THE ABILITY TO EXCHANGE

What are indirect benefits? Legal and economic scholarship on property rights (one kind of norm) provides a useful discussion of this concept. Work in these areas recognizes that the benefit resulting from property rights has two

components. Such rights protect individuals' use and enjoyment of their land. But they also enhance people's ability to engage in profitable exchange (Barzel 1997:90). In economic terms, property rights consist of "the individual's ability . . . to consume the good (or the services of the asset) *directly* or to consume it *indirectly* through exchange" (Barzel 1997:3, emphasis added). Similarly, legal scholars distinguish between the portion of a right that allows individuals to use a piece of property — for example, by renting and living on it — and that portion that allows an actor to convey the property to others.⁹ This conceptualization suggests that property rights are more valuable, and therefore more likely to be enforced, when people are able to transfer and not simply enjoy their property.

This insight regarding property rights is useful for understanding social norms more generally. Property rights are more valuable if they contribute not only to the ability to directly consume an asset but also to the ability to profit by transferring it. In a similar way, the benefits of sanctioning include two components — a direct portion that is consumed or enjoyed and an indirect portion that enhances the ability of individuals to engage in exchange.

The direct benefits of sanctioning have intrinsic value. Such benefits may include, for example, a reduction in violence in a community or a tidy neighborhood that results from people caring for their yards. There are other benefits as well.¹⁰ When deviance is sanctioned, the norms of the community are affirmed. People are assured that they are part of a group in which others are like them and adhere to the same values (Tyler & Boeckman 1997). And they have a sense that justice has been done. All group members experience these direct benefits, each of which is valuable in and of itself. To the extent that benefits are only direct, however, they are limited. In turn, if sanctioning is costly, then individuals will be unlikely to impose punishments for a share of the benefit. Individual interests conflict with group interests, and norms are unlikely to be enforced.

The indirect benefits of sanctioning may supplement direct benefits, thereby providing greater incentive to enforce norms. Indirect benefits increase the ability of individuals to engage in exchange. In other words, these benefits can be used by individuals to obtain further gains. Such benefits might include time (that need no longer be spent in ensuring security and therefore can be spent engaging in productive interactions), the value or security of property (that itself can be used in exchange), a greater understanding of community norms (that helps people act effectively), a sense of personal safety (that allows individuals to interact more freely), and so forth. Thus sanctioning may produce a variety of consequences. To the extent that those consequences in some way increase people's ability to exchange, sanctioning results in indirect benefits.

Demsetz's (1967) famous discussion of the emergence of property rights among the Labrador Indians provides one example of indirect benefits.

Property rights in Labrador gave actors greater control over the rate at which the beaver supply was depleted. The direct benefit of this norm was that beaver were available for use. The indirect benefit was that beaver were available for exchange. Only if the beaver supply was maintained could Indians trade furs for European goods. Property rights facilitated the preservation of these resources, thus contributing to the ability to engage in trade with Europeans. That is, for the Labrador Indians, enforcement of a property rights norm produced a direct benefit as well as an indirect benefit — the protection of goods for trade.

INTERDEPENDENCE OF INDIVIDUALS: THE PROFITABILITY OF EXCHANGE

Interdependence is defined here as the extent to which individuals value their relationships with others and the goods they can obtain through these relationships (Emerson 1962, 1972). When individuals depend on each other, they need each other to obtain valued goods. They will be motivated to engage in exchange because doing so produces goods for them that they could not otherwise obtain. In other words, when individuals are interdependent, exchange is more profitable.

Demsetz's (1967) discussion of property rights again provides a concrete example. For centuries, the Labrador Indians were separated from the European continent. They could, presumably, exchange furs with each other. But because individuals could trap beaver themselves, they did not need to interact in order to obtain beaver pelts. Thus they were not dependent on each other; there was little profit to be had from exchange. With increased contact between Labrador and Europe, however, Indians discovered a new market. Europeans were willing to pay for furs — they had something of value to offer that Indians wanted. Interdependence in this situation was higher; exchange was more profitable.

THE EFFECTS OF INDIRECT BENEFITS AND INTERDEPENDENCE ON ENFORCEMENT

Why and how do these two factors — indirect benefits and the strength of social ties — matter? If the benefits of sanctioning enhance the ability of individuals to engage in exchange, then the value of sanctioning is not simply its direct effects but also the potential for profit from the additional exchanges made possible. People gain not only from the direct effects of the sanction but also from the indirect benefits — those that enhance the ability to engage in interaction.

The ability to exchange will be of little import, however, if individuals have no interest in it. In particular, indirect benefits will be more valuable when people are dependent on each other and exchange is lucrative. If potential profits from exchange are high, people will place greater value on indirect sanctioning benefits that increase their ability to exchange. If potential profits

are low or nonexistent — group members have no resources the individual values — indirect benefits will have little impact. In other words, there is an interaction between people's interest in exchange and the extent to which the collective goods produced as a result of sanctioning enhance the ability to exchange. Thus the ability to exchange (indirect benefits) in conjunction with the potential for profits associated with such exchange (interdependence) will increase the gain that group members experience when sanctioning occurs.

This argument can be applied to explain the emergence of property rights in Labrador. Among the Labrador Indians, property rights would *always* have provided a means of protecting the beaver supply. But this contribution to the ability to exchange meant little when the only available exchange (with fellow Indians) was not particularly profitable. As trade with Europeans developed, however, the profits that could be obtained through exchange increased. In other words, the ability to trade (ensured by the protection of the beaver supply that property rights facilitated) provided greater incentives to enforce norms *only* when the value of goods that could be obtained through trade increased. Thus property rights did not emerge until after the development of trade with Europe.

This argument suggests that the ability to exchange (the indirect benefits of sanctioning) in conjunction with the profitability of exchange (interdependence) increases the gains associated with norm enforcement. These gains affect actors' regulatory interests — their interests in sanctions being imposed. More interest in sanctions leads to more sanctioning. In other words, these gains interact to affect sanctioning rates.

Hypothesis 1: Indirect benefits and interdependence will have an interaction effect on sanctioning rates.

It is important to point out that if sanctioning does not enhance group members' ability to engage in exchange — if its only benefits are direct — then interdependence may not produce an increase in norm enforcement. In fact, under such conditions, it may have the opposite effect. Scholars suggest that when people can profit from interpersonal exchange, they are less likely to want to use their resources to contribute to the public good and are more motivated to engage in non-control-related interaction (Flache 1996; Flache & Macy 1996). Rather than having a positive effect, therefore, interest in exchange alone actually reduces the likelihood that social dilemmas will be solved. In this view, the *costs* of contributing to the public good and of exchange are negatively related — an actor who uses more resources in contributing must spend less in personally desirable interaction. The theory presented here suggests that this depressive effect of exchange interests can be overcome if the collective good (norm enforcement) produces benefits that enhance the ability of individuals to interact — in other words, if sanctioning *benefits* and exchange are positively connected.

So far, I have suggested that indirect benefits and interdependence interact to affect sanctioning rates. But sanctioners are affected not only by the collective gains associated with sanctioning but also by the personal reactions they receive from others. The same argument regarding the interactive effect of interdependence and indirect benefits applies to the production of metanorms — the informal enforcement of rules regarding sanctioning behavior. I assume here that metanorms are enforced during the course of interaction.¹¹ Individuals who are dependent on each other exchange goods (or “rewards”) to increase their profits. But if they have information about another person’s sanctioning behavior, they may also use their resources to express approval or disapproval of that behavior. Thus exchange provides opportunities not only to increase one’s personal well-being but also to influence the behavior of one’s exchange partners — including their sanctioning activity.¹² Such efforts constitute metanorms. In exchanging rewards, then, individuals will consider both the personal profits they would like to result from the exchange relation and the benefits that will be produced if the other party engages in sanctioning.


Why do individuals bear the cost of enforcing metanorms rather than simply use interpersonal exchange to get as much as they can from the other? The payoffs for enforcing a metanorm will be larger if the benefits received as a result of the sanction are greater than the extra costs of reacting to the sanctioner’s decision.¹³ And, as described above, the value of the benefits associated with sanctioning is magnified to the extent that the benefits increase the ability of people to engage in exchange. These indirect benefits in conjunction with interest in exchange lead to stronger metanorms favoring sanctioning. In other words, the ability to exchange (indirect benefits) together with the profitability of exchange (interdependence) increases the gains that group members experience when a sanction is imposed — or their regulatory interests. In turn, these interests lead to increased efforts to encourage sanctioning — in other words, more enforcement of metanorms. Thus indirect benefits and interdependence interact to affect metanorms.

Hypothesis 2: Indirect benefits and interdependence will have an interaction effect on metanorms favoring sanctioning.

These metanorms, in turn, affect the likelihood of punishment. As described above, when sanctioning does or does not occur, individuals may react accordingly (assuming that they are aware of the sanctioning choice). When group members take action — enforcing metanorms that encourage sanctioning — their behavior provides greater incentives for imposing such sanctions. Accordingly, the stronger the metanorms favoring sanctioning, the more likely it is that individuals will bear the costs of imposing sanctions.

In other words, individuals are influenced by the reactions of others to their decisions. An increase in the strength of metanorms favoring punishment of

FIGURE 1: Indirect Benefits, Interdependence, and Norm Enforcement



deviance increases the incentive to sanction and, therefore, affects sanctioning frequency.

Hypothesis 3: Metanorms favoring sanctioning will have a positive effect on sanctioning rates.

Indirect benefits, then, along with interdependence have a direct effect on sanctioning. They also have an indirect effect on sanctioning through their influence on metanorms. The theoretical argument is represented visually in Figure 1. As norms scholars have suggested, direct benefits matter, of course. Here I focus on the role of indirect benefits and interdependence in norm enforcement.

An Experimental Test

The three hypotheses were tested using experimental methods. The experiment had a two-by-two between-subjects design. It crossed interdependence (interdependence vs. no interdependence) and indirect benefit (indirect benefit vs. no indirect benefit) to produce four conditions. Fourteen experimental groups were run in each of the conditions for a total of 56 groups.¹⁴

SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURES

Subjects were recruited from undergraduate classes by offering them the opportunity to earn money. They were individually contacted by telephone to schedule their participation and were told to come to the experimental laboratory in the Sociology Department. They participated in the experiment in groups of four. Upon arrival, each individual was escorted into one of five separate subject rooms. At no time were subjects allowed to see each other. Their only interaction occurred over the computer network. Once all participants had arrived and were in their places, they read instructions on their computer screens and engaged in some practice trials to ensure their understanding. During this preliminary period, they were able to ask questions of the experimenter by seeking help over an intercom. The experiment consisted of five practice trials and 48 actual trials. Subjects were not told the number of rounds beforehand. At the end of the session participants were individually debriefed and paid money based on the number of points they had earned. They then were escorted from the laboratory one at a time so that they had no contact with each other even after the experiment was over.

OVERVIEW OF THE EXPERIMENT

The experimental setting was designed to be as simple as possible while still meeting the scope conditions and operationalizing the theoretical concepts.¹⁵

The Setting

Subjects were told that they were participating in a study of social interaction. Five actors were involved — four participants (W, X, Y, and Z) who could exchange points with each other, and a fifth actor (V) who could steal points from any of the four.¹⁶ If V decided to steal from someone, that person would have an opportunity to impose a punishment. Participants were given information about the profits that could result from engaging in exchange, as well as the consequences of punishing the thief. Subjects therefore knew that their outcomes would be affected by the decisions that they and others made regarding exchange and punishment.

Deviance

In every trial, participants were each given an income of 30 points, which was displayed in the “personal income” window on their computer screen. Next, V, in actuality a computer-simulated actor, stole 10 points from one randomly chosen subject. In a particular round, any one subject or no subject might be

the victim of theft.¹⁷ The stolen points were subtracted from the victim's income.

Theoretically, deviance is seen as behavior that violates rules, creating externalities affecting group members. The deviant behavior in the experiment is consistent with this conceptualization. V's actions are described as "stealing" — a behavior that is generally seen as nonnormative. In addition, they created costs for individuals and, over the course of the experiment, for all group members.¹⁸ Other kinds of behavior could be appropriate as well, of course. In experimental settings, however, many such behaviors are unworkable as a practical matter. Stealing was an action that was comprehensible to subjects and that produced negative externalities.

Sanctioning

After each theft, the victim had the opportunity to respond.¹⁹ Subjects were told that they could decide to punish the thief or to do nothing. These options were listed on the victim's computer screen.²⁰ A decision to impose a sanction would cost the victim 15 points. It would result in points being taken away from the thief. Further, everyone in the group would receive four points. After the victim made his or her sanctioning decision, information about the victim's choice was displayed on all subjects' screens. If a sanction was imposed, then four points were added to each subject's income. Sanctioning therefore produced a benefit for all four subjects in the group (the victim as well as the three others). While the victim lost points by sanctioning (four points benefit minus 15 points cost), the group as a whole gained (16 points benefit minus 15 points cost). If the victim decided to do nothing, no one received any points.

As discussed above, in natural settings the gains of sanctioning may take different forms — reduction of theft, affirmation of the norms of the group, a sense that justice has been done, and so forth. Regardless of the precise form of the consequences, however, theoretically they can be seen simply as benefits. The operationalization therefore is consistent with the conceptualization of sanctioning as a response to deviance that produces gains for a community. When people respond to such behavior by sanctioning, they bear the cost and the group as a whole benefits. Theft creates costs; sanctioning produces benefits that help offset those costs.

Rewarding

After the victim made her or his sanctioning decision and everyone was told what that person decided, all subjects were able to exchange points. Everyone, including the victim, could give any number of points from their income box to any person, including themselves.²¹ They could reward the sanctioner, they could keep points for themselves, and they could give points to nonvictims.

Decisions to give points to others were made simultaneously. The choice about giving to a sanctioner was made in conjunction with choices about giving to other participants and about keeping points. Exchanges were reciprocal, not negotiated. Participants proceeded at their own pace (limited only by the speed with which others made their decisions). No time limits were imposed. Subjects could use their knowledge of the victim's sanctioning decision as well as their experience from earlier trials in making their choices.

After all subjects had made their rewarding decisions, each individual's screen showed how many points he or she had given to each other person and how many points had been received from each. Points that subjects had given away were subtracted from their personal income display, and points they had received were added to it. Participants were not told others' exchange outcomes — only their own.

Finally, after all exchanges in a particular trial were completed, subjects' personal incomes were transferred into their "total savings" windows. Points in savings accumulated during the experiment and could not be used in any future trials. The transfer of points into savings marked the end of a round. A new trial then began, and subjects again were given an income of 30 points. The number of points in each subject's savings at the end of the experiment determined that subject's earnings.

MANIPULATIONS

The extent to which sanctioning created an indirect benefit was manipulated by placing the four points of sanctioning benefit either into each participant's personal income box or into his or her savings account. Recall that points in subjects' income boxes could be used for exchange, but those in their savings merely accumulated throughout the experiment and could not be used for any purpose. Points placed into subjects' personal income boxes, therefore, provided an indirect benefit. They increased the ability of individuals to interact. By contrast, benefit points placed into subjects' savings accounts could not be used for exchange. They provided no indirect benefit — only the direct value of the points themselves. In these conditions, there was no connection between the sanctioning benefit and interpersonal interaction. This manipulation is consistent with the theoretical conceptualization of an indirect benefit as something that enhances the ability of individuals to engage in exchange.

Interdependence was operationalized by varying the value of points that subjects received from others relative to the points that they kept for themselves. The higher the value of the points received from others, the greater the potential profits from exchange. Subjects were given information regarding these values, as well as the value of their points for others. In the interdependence condition, points from others were worth three times the

amount that the individual's own points were worth. In other words, if subject W gave subject Z 10 points, Z actually would receive 30 points. This meant that exchange was very profitable in this condition.

By contrast, in the no-interdependence condition, points received from others were worth the same amount as points individuals kept for themselves. So if W gave Z 10 points, Z would receive only 10 points. This meant that there was little benefit to exchanging. Subjects could do just as well alone as if they interacted (and might even do worse if they tried to exchange). They were not dependent on others. Interest in exchange therefore was low.²²

DEPENDENT MEASURES

Norms are difficult not only to define but also, as an empirical matter, to measure. Simply asking people what norms are is subject to all of the problems associated with measuring internal, "psychological" states (see Hechter et al. 1999 for discussion of these issues). But observing patterns of behavior is equally problematic because it conflates behavior with the norm or the metanorm alleged to cause it. Here I use what is arguably the best measure of norms and of metanorms — the reactions of group members to the behavior of others (Ellickson 1991).

Social norms (sanctioning rates) were measured by counting the number of times that sanctions were imposed over all 48 trials in an experimental group and dividing that by the number of sanctioning opportunities (the number of times the thief stole).

Metanorms (rewarding patterns) were measured by calculating the mean number of points given to victims in the trials in which they chose to sanction and the mean number of points given to victims who chose not to sanction. The difference between these two sets of reward values was calculated to produce a measure of metanorms for the group. In addition, the rewards given to nonvictims were measured by calculating the mean number of points given to subjects who were not the victim of a theft.

Note that when I describe the mean rewards given to a subject, I am referring to the reward amount *before* it is altered by the exchange ratio, not the amount the person actually receives. Accordingly, in the no-interdependence condition, a mean reward of five indicates that the mean amount that subjects gave the sanctioner is five points. In order to determine the amount actually received, one would have to multiply that number by three (the number of subjects potentially giving rewards) and multiply the product by one (the exchange ratio in the no-interdependence condition). In the interdependence condition, one would multiply the number by three (the number of subjects) and then multiply that product by three (the exchange ratio in that condition).

TABLE 1: Mean Sanctioning Rates across Conditions

	Indirect Benefit		No Indirect Benefit	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
Interdependence	.898	.136	.597	.293
No interdependence	.690	.182	.745	.149

(N = 56 [14 groups in each condition])

TABLE 2: OLS Regression Coefficients for the Relation between Sanctioning and the Independent Variables

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
Intercept	.745****	.0535	.631****	.0640
Interdependence	-.148 ⁺	.0756	-.157*	.0709
Indirect benefit	-.0543	.0756	-.0412	.0693
Interdependence × indirect benefit	.356***	.107	.263*	.108
Metanorms	—		.0356**	.0129
R ²	.24		.37	
N	56		54	

⁺ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .005 **** p < .0001 (two-tailed tests)

Results

The experiment produced a data set that included sanctioning and rewarding decisions for every subject in each round of the experiment. These data were pooled across subjects and trials, producing a group-level data set containing the mean sanctioning frequency and rewards given in each experimental group. This group level data set was used for all analyses.

Table 1 presents the mean sanctioning frequencies (norms) across conditions. Interestingly, in all conditions groups sanctioned at least half of the time. Research suggests that people experience negative emotions when group members behave in antisocial ways. These emotions motivate the sanctioning of bad behavior (Fehr & Gächter 2002). Thus internalized values regarding deviance and punishment may account for some baseline amount of sanctioning. In other words, the results suggest that internal states may help partially overcome the second-order social dilemma associated with norm enforcement.²³

Sanctioning rates do, however, vary in different conditions — ranging from a mean of .597 (S.D. = .293) to a mean of .898 (S.D. = .136). This variation

TABLE 3: Mean Metanorms and Rewards across Conditions

	Indirect Benefit		No Indirect Benefit	
	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.
<i>Interdependence</i>				
Metanorms	5.47*	1.96	2.58*	2.81
Reward to sanctioners	12.0	1.97	10.9	2.78
Reward to nonsanctioners	6.46*	2.81	8.27*	2.72
Reward to nonvictims	6.91	1.01	6.27	1.28
<i>No interdependence</i>				
Metanorms	2.82	1.43	3.19	1.58
Reward to sanctioners	4.92	1.77	5.02	1.40
Reward to nonsanctioners	2.10	1.53	1.83	1.24
Reward to nonvictims	1.74	.795	1.36	.591

Note: $N = 14$ in each condition, except for starred items, where $N = 13$. This difference is due to the fact that in two experimental groups, subjects chose to always sanction. For these groups there are no measures of metanorms or of rewards given to nonsanctioners. Apparent discrepancies between metanorm values and the difference between rewards to sanctioners and nonsanctioners are due to rounding.

indicates that participants did not simply act according to their internal states but also responded to the experimental conditions.²⁴

Hypothesis 1 predicts an interaction effect of indirect benefit and interdependence on sanctioning rates. The results support this conclusion. Neither interdependence nor indirect benefit on its own produces increases in sanctioning. Rather, a change in both is necessary. Results of regression analyses show that this positive interaction effect is statistically significant (see model 1 in Table 2).

Note that increasing profitability when controlling for the amount of indirect benefit, and the interaction of indirect benefit and interdependence, has a negative effect on sanctioning. In other words, when there is no indirect benefit, norms in groups where interest in exchange is high are actually weaker. This makes sense. As discussed above, people would rather use their resources to strengthen their relationships than to enforce group norms — they prefer investing in private over public goods (Flache & Macy 1996). Greater interdependence increases interest in exchange relative to sanctioning of deviance. Therefore, if there is no relation between the collective good and interaction, if the collective benefit does not enhance the ability to exchange, then we would expect an increase in interdependence to decrease sanctioning. By contrast, if the collective good contributes to exchange, then as cohesion increases, interests both in exchange and sanctioning benefits grow. Only in this situation would we expect interdependence to have a positive influence on sanctioning.

TABLE 4: OLS Regression Coefficients for the Relation between Metanorms and the Independent Variables

	Metanorms	
	Coefficients	S.E.
Intercept	3.19****	.535
Interdependence	-.609	.771
Indirect benefit	-.370	.756
Interdependence \times indirect benefit	3.27***	1.09
R ²	.26	
(N = 54)		
*** p < .005 **** p < .0001 (two-tailed tests)		

Indirect benefit and interdependence have the predicted effect on sanctioning. When metanorms (the difference in rewards given to victims who sanction and those given to victims who do not sanction) are included in the equation, the correlation between metanorms and sanctioning is also statistically significant (see model 2 in Table 2). These results are consistent with the hypothesis that metanorms favoring sanctioning will have a positive effect on norm enforcement (hypothesis 3).²⁵ In addition, as predicted by hypothesis 2, indirect benefit and interdependence have the predicted effect on metanorms (reward differences) (see Tables 3 and 4).

The results thus are consistent with the predictions. In conditions in which people are interdependent *and* in which sanctioning increases the ability to exchange, participants are more likely to enforce social norms and to encourage others to do so.

Note that in all four conditions, the group as a whole was better off if sanctioning occurred. But individuals did not always punish deviance, because it was not in their personal interest to do so.²⁶ Variation in indirect benefits and interdependence increased the ability of the experimental groups to produce the norm enforcement that contributed to group welfare.

Discussion and Conclusion

The findings of the experimental study are consistent with the argument that indirect benefits and interdependence interact to produce positive effects on norms (sanctioning) and metanorms (reward differences). They suggest that interdependence will increase the strength of social norms *if* the benefits produced as a result of sanctioning enhance the ability of individuals to engage in interpersonal exchange. If the benefits do not facilitate interaction, however,

then an increase in interdependence will actually weaken norm enforcement. These results point to the importance of understanding the incentives created by group and exchange structures, as well as how these two structures together affect norm-related behavior.

SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, researchers in a variety of substantive areas — criminology, social psychology, organizations, political sociology, and so forth — express interest in the connection between social relations and collective outcomes. By articulating a set of conditions and mechanisms that explain how and when social ties might contribute to norm enforcement, the theory presented here provides insight that may be widely relevant.

Consider, for example, work in criminology that links characteristics of communities to crime rates. A traditional argument in the social disorganization literature is that strong social ties reduce rates of criminal and deviant activity. More recently, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls (1997) found that cohesion and social control — together termed “collective efficacy” — reduce crime. But this explanation for crime variation begs the question of when cohesion (conceptualized in this article as interdependence) is linked to social control (norm enforcement) and when it is not. Simply lumping social ties and control together into one variable ignores the possibility that they may not always be correlated. And, in fact, recent research suggests not only that high levels of cohesion do not necessarily increase norm enforcement but also that in some situations the strength of ties among community residents actually discourages the exercise of social control (see, e.g., Pattillo 1998). Criminologists do not have a coherent theoretical explanation for these contradictory findings. The research described in this article suggests a possible approach to developing such an explanation — one that emphasizes the importance of social relations between law-abiding citizens and the nature of the benefits that neighborhood residents experience when deviance is punished. The theory suggests that particular configurations of these two factors contribute to informal enforcement; others do not.

The relation between social ties and norm enforcement is also relevant for the widely used concept of social capital. Like criminologists, scholars interested in social capital often conflate norms and networks (Putnam 1993, 2000). But, as this article shows, under different conditions, strong social ties produce different levels of norm enforcement. We cannot always assume, then, that particular networks will always be associated with expected outcomes. If we want to understand how to produce social capital and to explain its effects, then we might do well to articulate the relations between its component parts

and the conditions under which strong social ties are or are not associated with effective norms.

Embeddedness is another related term, used in organizations research, that refers to network structures that are thought to lead to positive outcomes (Gargiulo 1993; Uzzi 1996). Again, if we want to understand how organizational embeddedness facilitates the production of collective goods, such as the solving of joint problems or exercise of control, we might do well to pay attention to the same factors.

These are just a few of the substantive areas that focus on social ties and their importance for effective norms. The theory and results presented in this article identify one condition under which closely tied, interdependent actors are more likely to enforce norms — an issue relevant for scholars working in a variety of areas.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

As it is, the theory presented here has potentially useful empirical implications. But it can also be developed and extended. The conditions under which norms produce indirect benefits could be more fully articulated. The theoretical predictions presented here are tested in a situation in which sanctions provide an indirect benefit by increasing the resources with which individuals can exchange. The discussion of the emergence of property rights among the Labrador Indians treats indirect benefits in a similar fashion. But, in principle, the theory has wider implications. That is, norms may produce indirect benefits in a variety of ways.

The *content* of a norm may affect the ability to engage in exchange. For example, the norm of reciprocity provides individuals with the assurance that if they initiate an exchange they will not be taken advantage of (Gouldner 1960). Similarly, norms of honesty and trust may facilitate interaction. We would expect these norms to be more widespread than those that encourage deceitfulness. Future research should explore the extent to which norms with particular contents enhance the ability to engage in exchange.

Social *conditions* may also affect the extent to which a norm contributes to exchange. If characteristics of the situation already facilitate interaction, then there is little incentive for enforcing a redundant norm. For example, when social institutions guarantee prosocial behavior, the norm of reciprocity makes a relatively smaller contribution to the ability to exchange (Gouldner 1960). The norm provides assurance regarding people's behavior. But if such assurances already exist, the norm provides little value added. Future research should further explore the relation between social structural conditions and the indirect benefits associated with social norms.

It is also possible that direct and indirect benefits could produce contradictory incentives. For example, group benefits resulting from the enforcement of a norm, while desirable in and of themselves, could reduce rather than increase group members' ability to engage in exchange. In other words, sanctioning may have indirect costs. Where this is the case, we would expect increases in cohesion to weaken social norms and decrease sanctioning frequency. Consider norms supporting discrimination and segregation in the American South. While they produced a perceived benefit for white southerners, they also limited opportunities for exchange in business settings. Therefore, in many instances, business leaders facilitated desegregation (Rosenberg 1991; for another example of conflict between direct and indirect benefits, see the discussion of footbinding and female genital mutilation in Mackie 1996).²⁷ Eventually segregation norms declined.

The present study points to the importance of understanding the incentives created by sanctioning that benefits the collective, interpersonal exchange structures that potentially profit the individual, and the connection between the two. It suggests an approach to specifying this relation — recognizing that norm enforcement produces both direct gains and indirect benefits that enhance the ability of individuals to engage in interpersonal exchange. This insight may aid researchers in making more accurate predictions regarding the emergence and enforcement of norms in a variety of substantive contexts. The theory presented here suggests a mechanism through which exchange interests may be related to norm enforcement, thus providing an explanation for observed associations between social ties and norm strength.

Notes

1. Some scholars emphasize the importance of internalization and self-control in norm effectiveness, but even they recognize the need for continued social reinforcement (Durkheim [1903] 1953; Parsons 1952).

2. While “sanctioning” is often used to refer to both positive and negative reactions, in this article I use the term synonymously with “punishing.”

3. Costs also include monitoring — determining whether a deviant act has occurred.

4. Note that this conceptualization of metanorms assumes that people are engaged in ongoing exchange. They react to sanctioning decisions by increasing or decreasing exchange levels.

5. Computer simulations consistent with this argument suggest that if interpersonal exchange decisions are affected by a potential partner's contributions to the public good, then the good will be produced (Takagi 1999; see also Takahashi 2000).

6. Another approach is to focus on reducing costs rather than on increasing benefits. Yamagishi (1995), for example, suggests that if provision of a public good requires that almost everyone cooperate, identifying and sanctioning the few defectors will be relatively costless. Horne (2002) finds that the costs of sanctioning reduce sanctioning frequency but increase the strength of the metanorms that encourage norm enforcement.

7. More generally, Heckathorn's argument suggests that any sanction can have negative effects not only on the immediate target but also on those with whom the target interacts. Those acquaintances, therefore, will have an interest in controlling the target's behavior so as to reduce those negative effects. Of course, in many situations the negative effects the group experiences as a result of the target being sanctioned are outweighed by the benefits. My argument focuses on benefits and how they affect group members' behavior.

8. Relatedly, actors are unable to leave the group. That is, they have a limited supply of exchange partners and cannot simply move to a new relationship whenever they please.

9. Such distinctions have a long history in the law. In feudal England, for example, rights differed for those who held a "fee simple" interest in a property or merely a "life estate." A fee simple allows owners not only to use their property but also "to convey and to devise it to whomever they please. It allows them to use it in ways their own self-interest dictates" (Burke, Burkhart & Helmholz 1999). A life estate, by contrast, gives individuals only the right to use property, but not to devise it to others.

10. Public support for the recent execution of Timothy McVeigh provides an example of a non-deterrence-related interest in punishment.

11. Of course, like metanorms, norms also may be enforced in conjunction with ongoing interactions. I do not, however, explore the effects of varying the relationships between sanctioners and deviants. Instead, I focus on the relations between group members who are negatively affected by deviance and who, therefore, are potential norm enforcers. For this reason, exchange relations between deviants and potential sanctioners are not discussed here.

12. Note that interdependence also may affect the extent to which the enforcement of a metanorm is effective. That is, a person who is dependent on another will be more hurt by their disapproval.

13. Such costs might include, for example, retaliation in the form of reduced exchange.

14. Subjects were assigned to same-sex groups. In each condition, seven sessions were conducted with all-male subjects and seven with all-female subjects. Gender was not a factor of theoretical interest in the present experiment. It was included as a block variable for control purposes (see Molm 1997 for a similar treatment). Statistical analyses revealed no change in the effects of the independent variables when gender was included, however. Therefore, in the present article I combine male and female groups in the analyses and present the results without controls for gender.

15. The scope conditions identify the characteristics that the setting must have in order to provide an adequate test of the theory. Within those parameters, however, a variety of circumstances could be appropriate. Accordingly, in designing the setting many questions had to be addressed for which the theory itself did not provide guidance. The resulting

experiment, therefore, is not the only setting in which the hypotheses can and should be tested. As is true for any study, it is possible that other settings might involve factors not taken into account here. If those factors interact with the variables of interest, then we might expect different results. Nevertheless, to the extent that the results in this setting support the hypotheses, we can have greater confidence in the theory.

16. Several steps were taken to ensure that this setup was believable. Participants were escorted separately to the lab and therefore never saw each other and were unable to count the number of people involved. Inside the lab itself, there were seven identical doors — five leading to subject rooms and two to the control room. Consequently, there was clearly space for five subjects to participate. In addition, so that subjects would not wonder why the instructions were directed only at them and not at the thief, they were told that V had been given a separate set of instructions that they would not see. In this experiment, as well as several others that created deviance in the same way, subjects rarely expressed any suspicion of the experimental framework. Only a handful of subjects asked at the conclusion of the experiment whether they had actually been interacting with real people. Further, when describing their motivation for their decisions, subjects frequently talked as if the thief was a person like them.

17. Thefts occurred with a probability of 7/8, with the particular trials chosen randomly by the computer.

18. In this study, group members experience the costs of deviance sequentially rather than simultaneously. It would also have been appropriate to have the thief steal less often but from all subjects during a single round. It is possible that in such a situation, overall levels of sanctioning and rewarding would shift. The logic of the theory would still predict, however, a positive interaction effect of indirect benefits and group cohesion on sanctioning and rewarding and a positive effect of metanorms on sanctioning. If the hypotheses were supported in this setting as well, we could have even more confidence in the theoretical argument.

19. Only one individual in each round, rather than several, was the victim of a theft. And only the victim had the opportunity to sanction. Note that it also would have been appropriate to give a group member other than the victim that opportunity. I expect that such an actor would also be positively motivated by the gains that the indirect benefits in conjunction with exchange produce. Consistent findings in this alternative setting would provide further support for the theory.

20. The instructions described the options as follows:

Option 1: Punish the thief. If you choose this option, points will be taken away from the thief. It will cost you 15 points to punish the thief. As a result of punishing the thief, you, X, Y, and Z will each receive 4 points.

Option 2: Not punish the thief. If you choose this option nothing will happen to the thief. It will cost you nothing and no one will receive any points.

21. Note that subjects could not give points to the thief, nor could the thief give points to them. Research suggests that ties to the deviant affect sanctioning; people are more willing to punish strangers than fellow group members, but punishment may be more effective when directed at closer acquaintances. The focus of the present study, however,

is the relationship between those who enforce social norms and the other group members who benefit from their action. Therefore, I hold constant the relationship between the deviant and group members across conditions by not allowing them to exchange rewards. Future work should bring together these two streams of research by allowing both sets of relationships to vary simultaneously.

22. One might expect that in low-profitability conditions subjects would engage in no exchange at all. In fact, however, during pretesting and earlier experiments with a similar design, I learned that subjects did engage in exchange even when there was only a 1:1 exchange ratio. While to an objective observer this might not seem rational, subjects had reasons for their actions — reporting using strategies that they hoped would encourage others to give more points to them. Participants apparently were purposive, though they did not necessarily excel at pursuing their objectives.

23. If so, this suggests that subjects interpreted the experimental framework as involving deviant behavior. In this article I conceptualize sanctioning as a collective good — creating the same kinds of challenges as other collective goods. It is possible that sanctioning raises unique issues, however, because it involves a response to harmful behavior. The experimental framework creates a setting that subjects seemed to perceive as involving reaction to deviance, not simply production of a collective good. Thus the data produced ought to be relevant to understanding sanctioning as a potentially unique form of collective good. This setting does not, however, allow me to disentangle the collective good payoff structure from the deviance framing. Future research should explore ways in which contributions to collective goods that are framed in terms of donations differ from contributions that take the form of punishing deviant behavior. Such differences should be explicitly articulated theoretically and tested empirically.

24. Future research ought to measure individuals' values with regard to theft and punishment and explicitly examine the effect of these internal values in conjunction with variation in external conditions. (For an example of one approach to evaluating the effects of internal and external factors, see Horne 2003.)

25. I evaluate the effects of metanorms on sanctioning using statistical analyses, which of course merely provide support for the existence of a correlation. Stronger evidence of a causal relation would be produced using a design in which the strength of metanorms was manipulated experimentally.

26. In the interdependence condition, subjects would have acquired the maximum number of points if all of them had given away all their points. In the no-interdependence condition, there was no reason to exchange. Yet subjects did engage in exchange in this condition — although at lower rates. And they did not profit from exchange as much as they might have in the high-interdependence condition because they did not use all of their available points for exchange.

27. Rosenberg (1991) argues that the U.S. Supreme Court did not play the vital role in school desegregation that is often assumed. He provides evidence that other factors were responsible for the change.

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Symbolic Gender Politics, Religious Group Identity, and the Decline in Female Genital Cutting in Minya, Egypt*

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Abstract

The introduction of female genital cutting to Egypt predates the arrival of Christianity and Islam. Elsewhere, a belief that the practice is religiously significant has justified its continuation, and a belief that it contradicts religious tenets has instigated its abandonment. Findings from Minya, Egypt, show more rapid declines in the prevalence of female genital cutting and more negative effects of maternal education on the odds of circumcising daughters among Christian compared to Muslim families. Such differences have emerged as Islamists have engaged the state in public debates over women's authentic roles and as Christian voluntary organizations have adopted alternative "gender symbols" as indicators of group identity in public discourses on development.

Although the origins of female genital cutting¹ are uncertain, scholars believe that its introduction to northeastern Africa predates the arrival of Christianity and Islam (Assaad 1980; Gruenbaum 2001; Mackie 1996, 2000). According to

**Comments from Frank Lechner on the manuscript and advice from Sunita Kishor, Kenneth Hill, and Ray Langsten during the development of the circumcision history and the fieldwork are greatly appreciated. The data for this analysis were collected while the author was a doctoral student in the Department of Population and Family Health Sciences at the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health. The fieldwork for this study would not have been possible without the support of Hoda Rashad and staff at the Social Research Center of the American University in Cairo. Assistance from Rebecca Warne Peters in the formatting of this manuscript is greatly appreciated. A grant from the Sociology Program of the National Science Foundation (SBR-9632340) supported the study design and data collection, and the Departments of International Health and Sociology at Emory University supported the final preparation of the manuscript. Direct correspondence to Kathryn M. Yount, Ph.D., Department of International Health and Sociology, Emory University, 1518 Clifton Rd., NE, Room 724, Atlanta, GA 30322. E-mail: kyount@sph.emory.edu.*

Hosken (1993), signs of excision were detected among female Egyptian mummies of the sixteenth century B.C., and Herodotus found ancient Egyptians practicing excision on his visit in the fifth century B.C. One theory holds that the center of the distribution of female genital cutting was the Meroite civilization of the Middle Nile, which was prominent from the second millennium B.C.E. to the beginning of the first millennium C.E. (Adams 1977; Mackie 2000). Scholars argue that, within the region, trade of female slaves who were genitally cut initiated discourse about the fidelity-promoting purposes of the practice, which spread within one group as a convention sign of marriageability before spreading to overlapping groups (Mackie 1996, 2000).

Today, female genital cutting is practiced among various religious groups globally (Population Reference Bureau [PRB] 2001). In five northern provinces in Sudan, 98% of Muslim women compared to 1.2% of (mainly Coptic) Christian women were circumcised in 1982 (El Dareer 1982). At the same time, female genital cutting is not practiced in 80% of the Islamic world, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Iraq (Gordon 1991; Joseph 1996) and occurs among Coptic Christians in Egypt, several Christian groups in Kenya, and the Falasha Jews of Ethiopia (Gordon 1991; Gruenbaum 2001; Hosken 1993; Joseph 1996; Lane & Rubenstein 1996; Obermeyer 1999). Among the Sara, one of Chad's largest ethnic groups, the highest rates of female genital cutting occur among rural Catholics (96%) and the lowest rates among urban Protestants (53%) (Leonard 1996). Among the Sara of Myabe village in Chad, adolescent girls reportedly initiated the practice only two decades ago, citing "neither religion nor 'tradition' to bolster their claims that 'female circumcision is good'" (Leonard 2000:181). Female genital cutting is more prevalent among non-Muslims than Muslims in Tanzania and Kenya and among Muslims than other religious groups in Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, Egypt, Eritrea, Mali, and Sudan (PRB 2001).

The pre-Judeo-Christian roots of female genital cutting and its widespread prevalence among various religious groups globally refute a popular belief that the origins of the practice lie in formal religious doctrine (e.g., Gordon 1991). Contemporary interpretations of religious tenets are cited as reasons to adopt or continue the practice, however, and beliefs that the practice reflects religious or ethnic ideals provide a means to assert group identity. Among Mandinga men and women in Guinea Bissau, the three ethnic groups that practice female genital cutting are Muslim, and the practice is considered to be a cleansing rite that enables Muslim women to pray in the proper fashion (Johnson 2000). In Sudan, religion has been one of the most commonly mentioned reasons among men and women to favor the practice (El Dareer 1982), and two groups living near each other in Sudan have considered different forms of female genital cutting to be important markers of ethnic identity: the Zabarma women previously of West Africa believe that clitoridectomy is religiously correct, whereas their Arab-Sudanese neighbors believe that infibulation is religiously superior (Gruenbaum 1991).

Just as local interpretations of religious doctrine are used to rationalize continuation of the practice, alternative interpretations are used to justify minimizing or abandoning it. Some Islamic practitioners in Sudan have advocated less severe forms of the practice on religious grounds (Gruenbaum 1991, 2001), and religious prohibition has been among the most commonly mentioned reasons that northern Sudanese men and women reject the practice (El Dareer 1982). "Respondents said it was contrary to . . . Islam because it is mentioned neither in the Koran nor the Hadith, and is not practiced in many other Muslim communities" (El Dareer 1982:79). Among the 46 women who opposed the practice in Leonard's (1996) study in Chad, 40% cited a religious injunction against it, and all but one of these women were members of the local Protestant church. "Through the denigration of all 'traditional' practices, including . . . female circumcision, the [Protestant] church is attempting to bring about a radical shift in perspective" (Leonard 1996:262). The ability of the Protestant church to affect change has been limited to its membership, however, since local Catholic clergy are more tolerant of the practice.

The above discussion suggests that formal religious affiliation may be less relevant than local religious ideology as a determinant of change in the practice of female genital cutting. To develop hypotheses about patterns of change in this practice among religious groups in Minya, Egypt, I draw on the theoretical work of Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989) regarding the participation and representation of women in ethnic group processes. Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1989) argue that "gender symbols" like female genital cutting and others that concern the sexual behavior of women serve to reproduce religious boundaries and to signify religious differences when used strategically in public discourse. These authors argue further that this process of differentiation may arise in a context in which representatives of one group lobby the state to reinforce certain customs and religious norms through the passage of national legislation. Applied to the case of Egypt, I show that as Islamists attempted during the 1970s and onward to assert national political power by engaging the Egyptian state in debates over women's "authentic" roles in the private sphere, local Christian voluntary organizations began to promote ideals and activities that reflected a different vision of women's empowerment and included the eradication of female genital practices.² I anticipate that religious tensions arising from the unequal institutional relationships of Muslims and Christians to the state likely hindered the diffusion of these competing ideas about women in public discourses on development, instigating greater declines in the prevalence of female genital cutting among Christians than Muslims during this period. I anticipate also that support among Christian voluntary organizations for women's empowerment in the public and private spheres catalyzed negative effects of higher maternal education on the odds of circumcising daughters. In the following section, I draw on historical context to substantiate the

above hypotheses regarding the interplay between symbolic gender politics, religious group identity, and female genital practices in Egypt.

Symbolic Gender Politics, Religious Group Identity, and Female Genital Practices in Egypt

Egypt is home to the largest percentage of Sunni Muslims and the largest number of Orthodox Christians in the Middle East. Constituting some 6% to 18% of the total population (Ibrahim 1996; Zeidan 1999),³ Coptic Christians are spatially concentrated in the governorates of Assyut, Sohag, and Minya in Upper (southern) Egypt, where some 60% of all Copts live and where they comprise around 20% of the population in that region (Zeidan 1999). Historically, Christians and Muslims alike have practiced female genital cutting; the latest estimates of national prevalence suggest that the practice remains nearly universal among ever-married Egyptian women of reproductive age (El-Zanaty & Way 2001).

Relations between Christians and Muslims, each consisting of diverse subgroups (Hatem 1994; Ibrahim 1996; Kurzman 1998), have varied historically, and have been reconfigured and renegotiated as both groups have adapted to changing political and economic circumstances (Ibrahim 1996; Zeidan 1999). As a consequence, scholars have variously characterized the relationship of Christians to the larger body of Muslims in Egypt as “equal,” “protected” (*dhimmi*), and “persecuted” (Armanios 2002; Nikolov 2002; Zeidan 1999).⁴ It is not the task of this article to explicate historical shifts in Muslim-Christian relations in Egypt, but rather to focus on selected events of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that are significant to explain potential variation by religious affiliation in the practice of female genital cutting.

According to Shukrallah (1994), “modernization” became associated early on in Egypt with colonialism and Western influence. The Napoleonic invasion and Muhamed Ali’s rise to power in 1804, for example, aligned Egypt ideologically with Western ideals of “progress,” which practically involved expansion of the military and industry, “modernization” of the educational system (including the founding of a school of midwifery in 1831-32 and the granting of scholarships for Egyptians to study in Europe), and the state’s assumption of control over Al Azhar, an Islamic institution (Badran 1991; Shukrallah 1994). Economic decline and the subsequent colonization of Egypt by Great Britain initiated advocacy for reforms among the Egyptian ruling classes, intellectuals, and religious leaders, and a social movement for “modernization” merged with a nationalist movement against British occupation. Shukrallah (1994) argues further that secular and Islamic trends developed from this movement, both of which initially saw “progress” as consistent with Western ideals of modernity and women’s liberation.

Under Gamal Abdel-Nasser's regime, religion and secularism were tied to its political ideology and agenda (Shukrallah 1994). On the one hand, efforts to expand and secularize the public sectors of education, health, and employment brought new groups into the new nation's identity and citizenship. On the other hand, Arab *de facto* secularism has distinguished itself from Western *de jure* secularism insofar as the latter has called for formal separation of church and state whereas the former has to some degree recognized Islam as the religion of society either to solidify political alliances or to face Islamist political challenges (Hatem 1999; Hermassi 1993). Shukrallah (1994) argues that the decision of Nasser's regime not to secularize all sectors of civil society led to a "denial of full citizenship" (21) to women and Christians, and she illustrates this point by contrasting codes of personal status that continued to allow coresident men to forbid women to work with new laws that gave women equal opportunities for education and paid employment. According to Shukrallah (1994), "[T]his denial of full citizenship for both categories of citizens can be seen as an early form of what would be used . . . in the later Muslim revivalist movement" (21).

The growth of Islamic revivalism and the Egyptian state's strengthening of its Muslim identity emerged more clearly following Anwar Sadat's project of economic liberalization (*infatah*), which led to rapid increases in prices, unemployment, inflation, and a "crisis of faith" among some groups in socialist and capitalist pathways to "modernization." The state under Sadat promulgated a constitution that made Islam the official state religion, politicized the role of Shari'ah law, and articulated a dichotomy between women as public citizens and private family members governed by Shari'ah law (Hatem 1994, 1999; Shukrallah 1994). For example, although the constitution of 1971 stated that "citizens are equal before the law . . . in public rights and duties, with no discrimination made on the basis of race, sex, language, ideology, or belief," it simultaneously guaranteed a "balance . . . between a woman's duties towards her family . . . [and her] equality with man in the political, social, and cultural spheres . . . without violating the laws of the Islamic Shari'ah" (Badran 1991:222). The balance that was struck in the early 1980s became clear when Islamic revivalists successfully pressured the High Constitutional Court to overturn reforms to the Personal Status Law that had been instituted in 1979. Whereas reforms curtailed privileges previously held by men in the private spheres of marriage, divorce, and child custody, the Personal Status Law of 1985 compromised certain of these changes. One compromise involved removal of the assumption of injury occasioned by a polygamous marriage and addition of the requirement for a wife to establish having suffered "harm" from her husband's polygamous union in order to obtain a divorce. A second compromise pertained to the requirement that a divorced wife in custody of minor children have exclusive rights to the marital home for as long as she

retained custody (unless her former husband provided another dwelling). Although the requirement to provide accommodation for the custodial mother remained in the 1985 legislation, the former husband gained exclusive rights over this dwelling.⁵

These debates over women's rights in the private sphere exemplify a strategy among Islamists to regulate family life as a means of exercising national political power and of asserting a distinct Muslim national identity (e.g., Hegland 1999). Revivalist Islamic discourses in particular have emphasized "cultural authenticity" in opposition to Western cultural influence and the "moral and ethical structure of society versus the structural insecurities caused by modernization" (Baykan 1990 in Shukrallah 1994:17). Like the discourses of non-Muslim and Muslim groups elsewhere (Chhachhi 1989; Jalal 1991), a major site of this symbolic politics is gender, whereby women come to represent cultural authenticity and bear responsibility for transferring traditional identity (Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1989; Kandiyoti 1991; Shukrallah 1994). One of the best-known gender symbols is the practice of veiling, which itself is not a political act but becomes one when its meaning is publicly debated. "Control of the symbol" becomes tied to control of the state (Sedra 1999:220).

A similar "frenzy of interpretation" arose in Egypt over female genital cutting after the 1994 International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD).⁶ After a broadcast by CNN depicting a lay practitioner's circumcision of a young girl, the mufti of Egypt publicly declared that female genital cutting has no foundation in the Koran. Following this declaration, Sheikh Gad al-Haq Ali of Al Azhar issued a *fatwa* (religious ruling) that "female circumcision is a part of the legal body of Islam and is a laudable practice that does honor to the women" (Kassamali 1998).⁷ Others sought to strengthen the foundations of the practice by calling upon custom as a source of Islamic law (Abu-Sahlieh 1994).⁸ Opposition to support for eradication motivated the minister of health to seek advice on the subject from an expert medical committee, which issued statements about the dangers of procedures that are performed by untrained practitioners (Seif El Dawla 1999). On these grounds, the minister of health decreed in late 1994 that doctors could circumcise girls in designated facilities and at fixed times and prices, claiming that medicalization of the practice would reduce complications and eventually end the practice. Subsequent pressure from international agencies, as well as the reported deaths of girls who were circumcised in hospitals, instigated a renewed ban on the practice in public hospitals (which was overturned and then reinstated in late 1997). Such contestations highlight the way in which customary and revivalist Muslims have engaged the Egyptian state in "symbolic gender politics" as a means to assert a national Muslim identity in opposition to transnational influences.

Internal responses to the increasingly Muslim character of the Egyptian state during the last 25 years have been at least twofold. Most widely publicized has been

periodic but increasing levels of sectarian strife, particularly in Upper Egypt, where Coptic Christians are more numerous (Ibrahim 1996; Nisan 1991). Less widely publicized but no less significant has been the proliferation of religious-based social services and private voluntary organizations, including private religious schools and health facilities that are affiliated with mosques or churches (Ibrahim et al. 1996; Nikolov 2002; Shukrallah 1994; Sullivan 1994). Whereas Shukrallah (1994) argues that the increasingly religious character of previously secular public institutions has created a "crisis of identity" (24) for women and Christians, Nikolov (2002) argues that local Christian services are "part of the larger mission of the Church to bring the stray . . . back into the ecclesia" (3), and Zeidan (1999) asserts that the growth of Coptic voluntary organizations (especially in Upper Egypt) is a "marker of Coptic activism" (60) (see Sullivan 1994).⁹

Several Christian voluntary organizations have endorsed the ideals of comprehensive community development, women's public and private empowerment, and the rights of children, and several such organizations have initiated activities to eradicate female genital practices. Sullivan (1994) notes that the Christian community also is known for its ability to seek assistance from international sources. The Coptic Evangelical Organization for Social Services (CEOSS), for example, began as a literacy project in the 1950s. In 1960, CEOSS was registered with the Egyptian government and charged with serving Muslim and Christian communities. CEOSS separated from its parent organization — the Egyptian Evangelical Church — and undertook activities in Beni Suef, Minya, and metropolitan Cairo. Its programs grew to include agriculture, income generation, education, infrastructural development, and health. In 1976, CEOSS established the Family Life Education Unit, which identified female genital cutting, early marriage, and "bridal deflowering" as customs that were harmful for women.¹⁰ CEOSS has helped establish women's committees in the villages in which it has worked as part of a "deliberate effort" to empower women (Tadros 2000:26). As of 1994, CEOSS received 75% of its funding from Europe, the U.S., and Canada and at one point was the only private voluntary organization to be registered with the U.S. Agency for International Development (Sullivan 1994).

Similarities between the mission and implementing strategies of CEOSS and those of other Christian voluntary organizations in Egypt are striking. The Bishopric of Public, Ecumenical, and Social Services of the Coptic Orthodox Church (BLESS), for example, was established in 1962 to provide comprehensive services to the poor in Cairo and included among its goals the eradication of female genital practices (Nikolov 2002). As early as 1974, the bishopric developed a comprehensive program to expand the services that it offered to women and to develop the skills of women and girls, and its strategy for implementation explicitly identified women's participation as integral to the process of development. As of 2000, BLESS's campaign against female genital practices has been undertaken in 24 communities

throughout Egypt (Nikolov 2002). The missions and activities of these and other Christian organizations arguably reflect a wider trend within the Christian social service community to adopt an integrated vision of women's public and private empowerment as a marker of religious identity (see Sullivan 1994 for other examples).¹¹

The previous discussion suggests that efforts of customary and revivalist Muslims to engage the Egyptian state in symbolic gender politics as a means to assert an "authentic" national Muslim identity created an obstacle to the efforts of liberal Muslims to alter popular support for female genital practices. Although Christians were marginalized from public debates over the meaning of this and related gender symbols in Shari'ah law, the proliferation of social services of Christian origin since the 1960s provided a public space in which Christian identities could be enacted and by which Coptic Christians in particular could address social problems "according to the values and norms of the Coptic Orthodox tradition" (Nikolov 2000:2). Not facing the same ideological conflict over female genital cutting within their leadership (Abdel-Hadi n.d.), Christian activists were able to form state-approved voluntary institutions that operated under a politically acceptable umbrella of nonsectarian community development while promoting a vision of women's empowerment that differed from revivalist Islamic discourses on gender. This alternative vision emphasized the integrated empowerment of women in the public and private spheres and included the eradication of female genital practices.

I therefore anticipate that the adoption by Christian voluntary organizations of these ideals and related activities fostered declines in the prevalence of female genital cutting among Christians before its practice in Egypt emerged on the international political agenda in 1994. Adoption of a unified view of women's empowerment in the public and private spheres by some such organizations also likely catalyzed negative effects of higher maternal education on the odds of circumcising daughters. By contrast, I expect that reactionary views of some Muslims regarding women's public and private roles may have stalled declines in the prevalence of female genital cutting and similar effects of higher maternal education on its practice within the wider Muslim community. To test these hypotheses, I use population-based data representative of seven districts in Minya governorate to compare trends in the practice of female genital cutting among daughters of Christian and Muslim families, beliefs about the effects of circumcision and noncircumcision among Christian and Muslim mothers of these daughters, and the influence of maternal education on perceived effects of the practice and the odds that Christian and Muslim daughters are circumcised.

The Setting of the Minya Governorate

Minya governorate is a relatively poor area in Upper Egypt located about 200 kilometers south of Cairo and extending about 80 kilometers along the Nile. The cultivated (and thus habitable) land is about 30 kilometers wide at the widest point and lies mostly on the west bank of the river. The capital city is Minyatown (population about 1 million), and the governorate houses several large district towns and rural villages. Some of the villages on the east bank of the Nile are quite isolated from health facilities. About 20% of the residents of Minya are Coptic Christians, and most remaining residents are Muslim. The economy is largely agrarian, levels of fertility and mortality are high compared to levels in governorates in Lower Egypt, and formal educational attainment continues to be particularly low among women. Despite evidence of a decline in the overall prevalence of female genital cutting in Minya, the probability that girls aged 10-14 years are circumcised is still .75 (Yount 2002). Secondary or higher education among ever-married mothers aged 15-54 years in Minya is associated with markedly lower odds of circumcising a daughter, and adjusted odds of circumcising a daughter are 4.5 times higher among Muslims than Christians in the governorate (Yount 2002).

Since the adoption of Islam as the state religion in Egypt, Minya has been the site of periodic and increasing levels of sectarian conflict (Ibrahim 1996; Nisan 1991). Before and during this period, Minya also has been the site of efforts by religious and secular voluntary organizations to promote comprehensive community development and to curb the practice of female genital cutting (Abdel-Hadi n.d.; Abdel-Tawab & Hegazi 2000). In 1982, CEOSS founded a committee of 12 female representatives of all churches in the predominantly Christian village of Deir El Barsha (Abdel-Hadi n.d.). Members of the committee received training to improve their skills, to supervise projects, and to engage in consciousness-raising to prevent practices including female genital cutting (Abdel-Hadi n.d.). In 1995, CEOSS initiated an intensified educational program in 22 communities in Minya governorate that focused on girls at risk of circumcision (aged 7-13 years) and their mothers (PRB 2001). CEOSS established committees in these villages that included a village leader (*omda*), a sheikh, and a priest, and coeducational implementing teams from CEOSS lived with designated families, registered all girls aged 7-13, and introduced them to topics related to health, literacy, and eventually female genital cutting. These activities reportedly reduced the rate of female circumcision in 8 of the 22 communities (World Health Organization [WHO] 1999), but more so in homogeneous, Christian villages (PRB 2001). Recently, some Catholic organizations have undertaken activities to reduce the prevalence of female genital practices in Minya (Masterson & Swanson 2000), and other organizations, including the Upper Egypt Society and CARITAS Egypt, have implemented programs to raise awareness of the effects of female genital practices (Abdel-Hadi n.d.).

Despite indications that religious boundaries may increasingly demarcate levels of female genital cutting in Minya, no research has compared systematically and with attention to the historical political context attitudes toward female genital cutting, levels of various types of cutting, and trends and determinants of change in the prevalence of the practice among Muslims and Christians throughout the governorate. The present analysis is intended to fill this gap.

Data

Questionnaires for this study were implemented in conjunction with the Two Governorate Linkages Survey (TGLS), a five-round longitudinal study of child morbidity and adult women's reproductive behavior that was undertaken in Qaliubia and Minya governorates during 1995-97 (Langsten & Hill 1996). In each governorate, eligible participants from a representative sample of approximately 3,000 households were interviewed at three-month intervals, and information about household composition and characteristics of ever-married women aged 15-54 years was collected. A women's status module was implemented in Minya during the fifth round of the TGLS, from which part of the data for this study is drawn.¹²

In structured interviews with all ever-married women aged 15-54 in identified households, local interviewers collected information about their sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., marital status, pregnancy and contraceptive histories, education) and characteristics of their husbands and households. Survey respondents also answered closed-ended questions about their own circumcision status (whether or not circumcised, type of circumcision, age at circumcision, and attendants) and open-ended questions about the perceived effects of circumcision and noncircumcision. For each resident or nonresident daughter who was at least five years of age at the time of the respondent's interview, respondents completed a circumcision history that included questions about the current age and circumcision status of daughters, mother's intention to circumcise uncircumcised daughters, and age at circumcision and person who performed the procedure for already circumcised daughters.¹³

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Dependent variables in this analysis include whether a daughter at least five years of age was circumcised, whether she was excised,¹⁴ and whether the mother of an uncircumcised daughter intended at the time of the interview to have her daughter circumcised. Also analyzed are perceived effects of circumcision (alternatives identified, bleeding, scarring, desired by religion, good for girl, satisfies husband, normal or tradition, cleansing or purifying, beautifying, other positive effect, some

positive effect, no effect)¹⁵ and perceived effects of noncircumcision (marital problems, problems with fertility, health problems, psychological problems, unattractive or unfeminine, unclean, not good for girl or girl's reputation, excessive sexual behavior or commission of a "sin," other problems, should not imitate foreigners, required or a norm).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Independent variables of interest in this analysis include religious affiliation of the family (Christian = 1, Muslim = 0)¹⁶ and maternal educational attainment (none [reference], primary or preparatory, secondary or higher). Control variables in the analysis are those that have been associated with attitudes and behavior pertaining to female genital practices in Egypt (El-Gibaly et al. 1999, 2002; Yount 2002), including age group of the daughter in years (5-9 [reference], 10-14, 15 or older), birth order of the daughter among living sisters (1 [reference], 2, 3, 4 or higher), maternal circumcision status (not circumcised [reference], circumcised), paternal educational attainment (none [reference], primary or preparatory, secondary or higher), residence (rural [reference], urban), and household assets (none [reference], 1, 2 or more).¹⁷

Analytic Methods

In descriptive analyses, I compare the sociodemographic characteristics of Muslim and Christian residents in Minya. I also compare relative frequencies of the circumcision status of daughters, type of attendant at circumcision among circumcised daughters, and maternal intent to circumcise uncircumcised daughters, by religious affiliation of respondents. Standard errors of these estimates are adjusted to account for nonindependence of the circumcision experiences of biological sisters in the sample ($N = 3,212$ daughters, 1,776 circumcised, 1,424 uncircumcised).

I then use life table techniques to compute age-specific probabilities of circumcision for age cohorts of daughters, by religious affiliation. Let τ_i be individual failure or censoring times and aggregate these data into intervals t_j , $j = 1, \dots, J$ and $t_{J+1} = \infty$. Let d_j and m_j be the number of failures and censored observations that occur during the interval t_j and N_j the unadjusted number alive at the start of the interval t_j . Using actuarial methods to adjust for censored observations, the adjusted number at risk at the start of the interval is $n_j = N_j - m_j/2$. The product limit estimate of the survivor function is

$$S_j = \prod_{k=1}^j \frac{n_k - d_k}{n_k},$$

and the cumulative "failure" time is $G_j = 1 - S_j$ (StataCorp 2001).¹⁸ Finally, I compare relative frequencies of responses to open-ended questions about the perceived effects of circumcision and noncircumcision among Christian and Muslim mothers of daughters in the sample, adjusting standard errors of these estimates to account for the stratified, cluster-sample design (Rao & Scott 1981, 1984).

In multivariate analyses, I use logistic regression to estimate unadjusted and adjusted odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals (Christian vs. Muslim) that daughters are circumcised or excised ($N = 3,212$), that mothers intend to circumcise uncircumcised daughters ($N = 1,424$), and that mothers perceive certain effects of circumcision and noncircumcision ($N = 1,504$). A robust variance estimator is used to estimate standard errors of coefficients in models based on the sample of daughters to account for nonindependence of the circumcision outcomes of biological sisters, and robust standard errors are estimated for coefficients in unadjusted and adjusted regression models based on the sample of daughters' mothers to account for the stratified, cluster-sample design. All adjusted models include maternal age, maternal education, paternal education, household assets, and urban-rural residence, and adjusted models for daughter's circumcision status also include daughter's age, birth order among living sisters, and maternal circumcision status. Finally, interaction terms between religious affiliation and maternal education are added to selected full main effects models to assess the extent to which effects of maternal education on attitudes and behavior vary by religious affiliation of the family.

Results

Figures in Table 1 provide a comparison of the sociodemographic characteristics of Christian and Muslim families in Minya who had daughters at least five years of age at the time of the survey. Figures are presented for the sample of daughters and for their mothers. Except for a slightly higher percentage of Muslim than Christian mothers who were circumcised at the time of interview (99% vs. 96%), there are few differences in the sociodemographic profiles of Christian and Muslim families. The modal age for mothers in both groups is 35-44 years. About two-thirds of all mothers and about one-half of all fathers have no formal education. However, educational attainment is higher among younger cohorts of women, and a higher percentage of Christian than Muslim mothers aged 25-34 and 35-44, respectively, have secondary or higher education (21.8% vs. 15.5% among those aged 25-34 and 15.0% vs. 7.0% among those aged 35-44; results not shown in Table 1). Just over half of all households own none of the assets about which questions were asked, and about 20% of families live in urban settings. Although the age distributions of daughters of Muslim and Christian families do not

TABLE 1: Background Characteristics by Religious Affiliation, Minya, Egypt

	Daughters ≥ 5 Years		Mothers of Daughters ≥ 5 Years	
	Christian	Muslim	Christian	Muslim
Age group				
5-9	31.6	32.4	—	—
10-14	26.8	28.4	—	—
15-19	19.5	20.9	—	—
20-24	12.6	11.2	—	—
25 or older	9.5	7.1	—	—
Birth order (among living sisters)				
1	50.4	46.7†	—	—
2	29.0	28.6	—	—
3	14.2	15.3	—	—
4 or higher	6.4	9.4	—	—
Maternal age				
Less than 25	2.6	2.6	4.1	4.7
25-34	25.3	27.1	32.6	34.8
35-44	43.2	44.5	39.5	40.5
45 or older	28.8	25.8	23.7	20.1
Maternal level of education				
None	69.0	70.9	63.5	68.4
Primary/preparatory	19.5	20.8	21.7	21.1
Secondary or higher	11.6	8.4	14.8	10.3
Mother circumcised	96.6	99.5***	95.9	99.4***
Paternal level of education				
None	49.9	58.2	47.8	55.1
Primary/preparatory	28.6	23.7	27.3	24.0
Secondary or higher	21.5	18.1	24.9	20.9
Household ownership of assets				
None	56.2	57.8	56.4	59.4
1	29.9	30.6	30.0	29.6
2 or more	13.9	11.6	13.7	11.1
Residence urban	18.7	18.5	20.8	19.4
District				
Minia	17.6	18.9	17.5	19.8
Abou Qarqas	14.6	6.0	15.4	6.6
El Edwa	1.0	5.3	1.2	5.5
Beni Mazhar	3.5	20.7	3.9	19.3
Samaloot	39.2	26.3	38.0	25.1
Matai	8.8	9.1	8.0	9.0
Maghagha	15.2	13.7	16.0	14.7
N	683	2,529	337	1,167

Note: Significance levels are based on χ^2 test statistic adjusted for the stratified cluster-sample design.

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

differ, Muslim daughters tend to have marginally higher birth orders than their Christian counterparts.

In addition to the higher rates of secondary or higher education among Christian than Muslim mothers in the younger age cohorts, a higher percentage of daughters of Christian than Muslim families were not circumcised at the time of interview (54% vs. 42%), and a lower percentage of daughters of Christian than Muslim families had experienced more extensive forms of cutting (30% vs. 43% excised) (Table 2). A lower percentage of Christian than Muslim mothers of uncircumcised daughters also intended at the time of interview to have their daughters circumcised (54% vs. 85%), such that the percentage of daughters already or expected to be circumcised was lower among Christian than Muslim families (75% vs. 94%, assuming that mothers who “did not know” their intentions would not circumcise their daughters, and 81% vs. 96% assuming that mothers who “did not know” their intentions would circumcise their daughters). Except for small differences in the percentage of circumcised daughters who had their procedure performed by a health barber or *tamargi* (male nurse), there are no differences by religious affiliation in choice of circumciser for daughters who were circumcised at the time of interview.

Figure 1 compares the cumulative probabilities of circumcision among age cohorts of Christian (left) and Muslim (right) daughters. Estimation of 95% confidence intervals for point estimates permits visual assessment of significant differences in these cumulative probabilities by age group. As shown, the cumulative probability of circumcision is lower for each successive age cohort of daughters, regardless of religious affiliation. Declines in this probability are greater among daughters of Christian than Muslim families, however. For example, the cumulative probability of circumcision by age 10 is .68, .65, .47, and .28 among Christian daughters aged 25 or older, 20–24, 15–19, and 10–14, respectively. Although the cumulative probability of circumcision by age 10 among Muslim daughters aged 25 or older is similar to that among Christian daughters aged 25 or older at the time of interview (.73), and although this probability is lower for each successive age cohort of Muslim daughters, the decline is less pronounced among Muslim than Christian daughters (.70, .64, and .49 for daughters age 20–24, 15–19, and 10–14, respectively). Among cohorts aged 25 or older, 20–24, and 15–19, the cumulative probability of circumcision by age 13 (e.g., the likely end of the “risk period” for Egyptian girls) declines from .98 to .88 and .68 among Christians but remains relatively constant among Muslims (.95, .95, and .93, respectively). Therefore, although the probability of circumcision appears to be declining among both religious groups in Minya, a much larger percentage of Christian than Muslim daughters can expect to remain uncircumcised by age 13. A majority of Christian and Muslim daughters continue to be circumcised in Minya, however.

TABLE 2: Circumcision Status of Daughters ≥ 5 Years by Religious Affiliation, Minya, Egypt

	Christian	Muslim
Circumcised, by type		
No	53.6	41.8 ^a
Clitoridectomy only	1.9	2.0
Cutting of labia only	4.0	4.9
Excision (clitoris and labia)	29.9	42.9 ^b
Other/unspecific/no response	10.7	8.4
N	683	2,529
Provider (circumcised daughters)		
Doctor	10.2	15.2
Daya	82.2	74.6
Health barber/ <i>tamargi</i> (male nurse)	1.0	3.3 ^c
Other	6.7	7.0
N	314	1,452
Maternal intention to circumcise uncircumcised daughters		
Yes	54.1	84.9 ^{***}
No	35.3	9.2
Do not know (DK)	10.7	6.0
N	366	1,058
Expected level of circumcision		
Circumcised + intended circumcision (DK assumed to be no)	75.4	93.7 ^{***}
Circumcised + intended circumcision (DK assumed to be yes)	81.1	96.2 ^{***}
N	683	2,529

Note: Significance levels are based on χ^2 test statistic adjusted for the stratified, cluster-sample design.

^a "No" versus "yes/other."

^b "Excised" versus "other."

^c "Health barber/*tamargi*" versus "other."

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

Table 3 summarizes the responses of daughters' mothers to open-ended questions about the perceived effects of circumcision and noncircumcision, by religious affiliation. In general, Muslim mothers perceive more often than do Christian mothers that female genital cutting has positive effects: 17% versus 7% respond that the practice is good for the girl, 34% versus 21% suggest that it is cleansing or purifying, and 81% versus 68% state that the practice has some positive effect. A higher percentage of Muslim than Christian mothers indicate that the practice is associated with bleeding, and a lower percentage of Muslim

FIGURE 1: Daughters' Cumulative Probability of Circumcision by Age and Religious Affiliation, Minya, Egypt




TABLE 3: Attitudes about Female Genital Practices by Religious Affiliation, Mothers of Daughters ≥ 5 Years, Minya, Egypt

	Christian	Muslim
Effects of circumcision		
Alternatives identified	3.6	2.3
Bleeding	20.2	30.6**
Scarring	4.5	6.0
Desired by religion (a)	.0	2.3*
Normal/tradition (b)	55.2	60.3
Beautifying (c)	6.8	9.6
Good for girl (d)	7.1	17.0***
Satisfies husband (e)	2.4	3.9
Cleansing/purifying (f)	20.5	34.0**
Some positive effect (a-f)	68.0	81.4*
Other	8.0	8.9
No effect	19.3	12.1†
Effects of noncircumcision		
Marital problems	9.2	12.4
Unattractive/unfeminine	5.3	9.0†
Fertility problems	4.2	3.9
Unclean	1.5	1.5
Not good for girl/girl's reputation	3.0	8.4***
Excessive sexual behavior/commission of a "sin"	14.2	22.1**
Health problems	3.9	2.6
Psychological problems	.3	.3
Should not imitate foreigners	.0	.3
Other problems	.0	.2
Required/a norm	5.0	2.1†
N	337	1,167

Note: Significance levels are based on χ^2 test statistic adjusted for the stratified, cluster-sample design.

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

than Christian mothers state that the practice has no effect — findings that are consistent with the higher percentage of Muslim than Christian daughters experiencing more severe forms of cutting.

Regarding the perceived effects of noncircumcision, some mothers believe that such a decision would lead to marital problems, problems with fertility, excessive sexual behavior or commission of a "sin," health problems, psychological problems, or other problems and that it would be unattractive or unfeminine, unclean, or not good for the girl or the girl's reputation. Some mothers state that the practice is required or is a norm and that one should

TABLE 4: Unadjusted and Adjusted Odds of Behavior and Attitudes Related to Female Genital Cutting, Christians vs. Muslims, Minya, Egypt

	Unadjusted		Adjusted ^a	
	OR	(95% CI)	OR	(95% CI)
Daughter's circumcision status ^b				
Circumcised (vs. not)	.62***	(.50, .77)	.27***	(.19, .39)
Excised (vs. other)	.57***	(.44, .73)	.41***	(.30, .57)
Circumcision intended (vs. not, uncircumcised daughters)	.21***	(.15, .30)	.18***	(.11, .28)
(N = 3,212)				
Mother's perceived effects of circumcision ^c				
Alternatives identified	1.56	(.56, 4.31)	1.42	(.51, 4.01)
Bleeding	.57**	(.40, .82)	.56**	(.38, .83)
Scarring	.73	(.34, 1.59)	.70	(.32, 1.52)
Good for girl	.38***	(.22, .65)	.38***	(.22, .66)
Satisfies husband	.61	(.24, 1.51)	.60	(.24, 1.46)
Normal/tradition	.81	(.50, 1.32)	.85	(.54, 1.35)
Cleansing/purifying	.50**	(.32, .77)	.50**	(.32, .78)
Beautifying	.69	(.36, 1.32)	.68	(.35, 1.32)
Other	.89	(.52, 1.53)	.83	(.47, 1.46)
Some positive effect	.48*	(.26, .90)	.50*	(.27, .91)
No effect	1.74†	(.92, 3.29)	1.73†	(.92, 3.25)
(N = 1,504)				
Mother's perceived effects of noncircumcision ^c				
Marital problems	.71	(.42, 1.23)	.74	(.43, 1.26)
Unattractive/unfeminine	.57†	(.29, 1.11)	.58	(.29, 1.16)
Fertility problems	1.08	(.43, 2.73)	1.15	(.45, 2.95)
Unclean	.96	(.35, 2.66)	.98	(.36, 2.69)
Not good for girl/girl's reputation	.33**	(.16, .71)	.34**	(.16, .71)
Excessive sexual behavior/ commission of a "sin"	.59**	(.40, .85)	.59**	(.40, .85)
Required/a norm	2.43†	(.88, 6.67)	2.48†	(.92, 6.71)
(N = 1,504)				

^a All models are adjusted for maternal age, maternal educational level, paternal educational level, household assets, and urban/rural residence. Models for daughter's circumcision status are also adjusted for daughter's age, daughter's birth order among living sisters, and maternal circumcision status.

^b Standard errors in all models are adjusted for nonindependence of reported behavior of mothers with more than one daughter aged 5 years or older.

^c Standard errors in all models are adjusted for stratified, cluster-sample design.

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$

not refrain from circumcising a daughter simply to imitate foreigners. A marginally higher percentage of Muslim than Christian mothers indicate that not circumcising a daughter would be unattractive or unfeminine (9% vs. 5%), and a higher percentage of Muslim than Christian mothers report that it would not be good for the girl or the girl's reputation (8% vs. 3%) or would lead to undesirable or excessive sexual behavior (22% vs. 14%). Only Muslim mothers indicate that not circumcising a daughter is disadvantageous because one should not imitate foreigners — although few Muslim mothers offered this response.

Table 4 shows unadjusted and adjusted odds of a daughter's circumcision status and maternal perceptions of the effects of circumcision and noncircumcision among Christian and Muslim families. Results are consistent with expectations. The unadjusted odds that a daughter is circumcised or experiences a more severe form of cutting (excision) and that a mother intends to circumcise uncircumcised daughters are consistently lower among Christian than Muslim families. After adjusting for other variables, the magnitudes of these odds ratios are reduced even further: the adjusted odds that a daughter is circumcised are .27 (95% CI .19–.39) times lower and that a daughter is excised are .41 (95% CI .30–.57) times lower among Christian than Muslim families. The adjusted odds that mothers intend to circumcise uncircumcised daughters are .18 (95% CI .11–.28) times lower among Christian than Muslim families.

Although not all are significant, the unadjusted and adjusted relative odds that a mother reports specific perceived effects of circumcision are in directions that are consistent with the relative odds of circumcision, excision, and intended circumcision. Namely, the adjusted odds of reporting that bleeding is an effect of circumcision are .56 times lower among Christian than Muslim mothers, and the adjusted odds of reporting that circumcision has no effect are 1.73 times higher among Christian than Muslim mothers. Christian mothers also have significantly lower adjusted odds than Muslim mothers of reporting that circumcision is good for the girl (OR = .38, 95% CI .22–.66), is cleansing or purifying (OR = .50, 95% CI .32–.78), or has some positive effect (OR = .50, 95% CI .27–.91).

Regarding the perceived effects of *not* circumcising a daughter, Christian mothers have marginally lower unadjusted odds than Muslim mothers of reporting that noncircumcision is unattractive or unfeminine; however, the adjusted odds that Christian and Muslim mothers report this effect are not significantly different. Christian mothers have .34 (95% CI .16–.71) times lower adjusted odds than Muslim mothers of reporting that noncircumcision is bad for the girl or her reputation and .59 (95% CI .40–.85) times lower adjusted odds than Muslim mothers of reporting that noncircumcision leads to excessive sexual desire or the commission of a "sin." In sum, Christian daughters have lower adjusted odds than Muslim daughters of being circumcised, of experiencing more severe

TABLE 5: Predicted Probabilities of Daughters' Circumcision and Maternal Attitudes about Circumcision, by Religion and Maternal Education, Minya, Egypt

	Christian		Muslim	
	Pred. Prob.	(95% CI)	Pred. Prob.	(95% CI)
Circumcised (Daughters ≥ 5 Years) ^a				
Maternal education				
None	.92	(.88, .95)	.97	(.96, .98)
Primary/preparatory	.88	(.77, .94)	.97	(.95, .98)
Secondary or higher	.47	(.18, .78)	.92	(.83, .97)
N	683		2,529	
Some Positive Effect (Mothers of Daughters ≥ 5 Years) ^b				
Maternal education				
None	.80	(.65, .89)	.87	(.79, .92)
Primary/preparatory	.76	(.57, .88)	.84	(.69, .93)
Secondary or higher	.48	(.24, .72)	.81	(.66, .91)
N	337		1,167	

Note: Variables other than religion and maternal education are set to the following values: mother's age = 35-44 years; father's education = none; household assets = none; residence = rural. For models of daughters' circumcision, daughter's age is 15 years or older, daughter is the first of all living daughters, and mother is circumcised.

^a Standard errors are adjusted for nonindependence of reported behavior of mothers with more than one daughter aged 5 years or older.
^b Standard errors are adjusted for stratified, cluster-sample design.

forms of cutting, and of having their mothers report an intention to circumcise, and Christian mothers have lower adjusted odds than Muslim mothers of reporting selected positive effects of circumcision and selected negative effects of noncircumcision.

Table 5 shows predicted probabilities (and their 95% confidence intervals) of circumcision among daughters and predicted probabilities that their mothers report some positive effect of circumcision, by religious affiliation. These probabilities are based on adjusted logistic regression models (Table 4) that also include an interaction between maternal education and religious affiliation. In the case of a daughter's circumcision, predicted probabilities are computed for first daughters aged 15 years or older with mothers aged 35-44 years who have no formal education and are circumcised, with fathers who have no formal education, and who live in rural households that own no major assets. Estimated coefficients of this model (not shown) indicate a marginally significant interaction between religious affiliation and secondary or higher education of the mother: the adjusted odds that daughters of mothers with

secondary or higher education versus daughters of those with no education are circumcised is .23 times lower among Christians than Muslims. This significant interaction is apparent in the sharp decline in predicted probabilities of circumcision among daughters of Christian mothers with secondary or higher education compared to daughters of Christian mothers with less education (.47 vs. .92 and .88, respectively). By contrast, there is no difference in these predicted probabilities among daughters of Muslim mothers with secondary or higher education and those of Muslim mothers with less education (.92 vs. .97 and .97, respectively).

In the case of maternal reports that female circumcision has some positive effect, predicted probabilities are computed for mothers aged 35–44 years who have no formal education, with husbands who have no formal education, and who live in rural households that do not own any major assets. Estimated coefficients of this model (not shown) indicate a highly significant interaction between religious affiliation and secondary or higher education of the mother: the adjusted odds that mothers with secondary or higher education compared to mothers with no education report that female genital cutting has some positive effect is .30 times lower among Christians than Muslims. This significant interaction is apparent in the sharp decline in predicted probabilities of reporting some positive effect of circumcision among Christian mothers who have secondary or higher education and Christian mothers with less education (.48 vs. .80 and .76, respectively). By contrast, there is no difference in these predicted probabilities by educational level among Muslim mothers (.81 vs. .87 and .84, respectively).

Conclusions

This article adds to feminist theory on the strategic use of gender symbols to articulate religious group identity by describing how transnational political discourse and evolving institutional alliances of majority groups with the state can condition the gender ideals and actions of minority groups (Anthias & Yuval-Davis 1989; Sedra 1999; Shukrallah 1994). This article also adds to feminist research on this topic by undertaking the first population-based comparison of maternal attitudes about and levels and determinants of female genital cutting among Muslims and Christians in Egypt. Findings are consistent with expectations and show that daughters of Christian families in Minya have lower adjusted odds of circumcision, lower adjusted odds of experiencing more severe forms of cutting, and lower adjusted odds of having their mothers report an intention to circumcise them if they were uncircumcised at the time of interview. Declines in the age-specific probability of circumcision also have been substantially more dramatic among Christians than Muslims and suggest that abandonment of the practice has been under way among Christians in Minya since at least

the late 1980s. Christian mothers also have lower adjusted odds than Muslim mothers of perceiving customarily positive effects of circumcision and customarily negative effects of noncircumcision. Negative effects of higher maternal education on the odds that daughters are circumcised and that mothers report some positive effect of circumcision are substantial among Christians and absent among Muslims.

These findings are consistent with the argument made at the outset of this article that popularization during the last 25 years of an Islamic ideology identifying women as the keepers of “cultural authenticity” and “traditional identity” may have hindered declines in the prevalence of female genital cutting and potentially negative effects of women’s higher education on the odds of circumcising daughters among Muslim families in Minya. By contrast, sustained opposition to “traditional practices” among Christian voluntary organizations may have encouraged rapid and dramatic declines in the prevalence of female genital practices among Christians. Finally, the strong negative effect of higher maternal education on female genital cutting among Christians is consistent with the argument that the promotion by Christian voluntary organizations of an integrated view of women’s empowerment in public and private life may have catalyzed negative effects of women’s formal education on the odds of circumcising Christian daughters. Growing sectarian tensions in Minya during this period due in part to unequal relationships of Christians and Muslims to the state also may have limited the diffusion of competing ideals about women and development and contributed to the growing divergence by religious affiliation in the prevalence of female genital cutting in the governorate.

Notably, other environmental factors may have had direct, indirect, or synergistic effects on emerging differences in the prevalence of female genital cutting in Minya (Abdel-Tawab & Hegazi 2000), and views about the practice may not have been homogeneous within religious groups (Meinardu 1967 in Lane & Rubenstein 1996). Nevertheless, marked declines in the prevalence of the practice among Christians suggest that activities and ideologies favoring decline spread among Christians as Islamists were advocating a revival of women’s “traditional identity.” Therefore, the findings of this study are consistent with the idea that variation in the prevalence of customary practices like female genital cutting in Egypt may be understood in the context of historically unequal relations of religious groups to the state and their strategic use of competing gender symbols in national and transnational discourses on development.

Future research should include population-based studies of the patterns and determinants of female genital cutting in other Egyptian governorates where faith-based organizations are working to eliminate the practice. Also needed are experimental design studies that examine the impact in different religious communities of comprehensive, community development programs that incorporate activities to improve women’s position in the public and

private spheres. Comparisons of change in the practice of female genital cutting in Egypt and other customary practices elsewhere would permit assessment of the cross-cultural generalizability of this hypothesized interplay between symbolic gender politics, religious or ethnic group identity, and practices that reflect the position of women in society. Finally, since the passage in 1997 of national laws prohibiting the practice of female genital cutting in Egypt, national levels of support for it have reportedly declined (El-Zanaty & Way 2001). Whether this new ideological backdrop encourages abandonment of female genital cutting among all Muslims and Christians remains a worthy question for future research.

Notes

1. The World Health Organization (1997) uses the term “female genital mutilation” to refer to all types of female genital practices. Here, I use the terms “female genital cutting” or “female genital practices” for this purpose. Yount and Balk (forthcoming) provide a detailed rationale for this choice of terminology.
2. Several variants of Islam exist in Egypt. I use the terms “revivalist,” “customary,” and “liberal” Islam in accordance with the definitions proposed by Abu-Sahlieh (1994) and Kurzman (1998). Customary Islam is characterized by a combination of regional and shared practices. Each region of the Islamic world has forged its own version, and some Muslims have tried to strengthen the foundation of practices like female genital cutting by calling upon custom as a source of Muslim law (Abu-Sahlieh 1994). Revivalist Islam, also known as Islamism or fundamentalism, opposes local deviations of Islam, emphasizes the illegitimacy of local political institutions, privileges revivalists as the unique interpreters of Islam, and calls for an “authentic” Muslim identity that opposes Western influence. The several variants of Liberal Islam commonly critique customary and revivalist traditions for being “backward” and argue that Islam is compatible with Western liberalism (Kurzman 1998). Liberal interpreters of Islam argue that discrimination on the basis of gender in Shari’ah law is unacceptable and that Islamic law must be reconciled with universal human rights (An-Na’im 1998).
3. The true percentage of the Egyptian population that is Coptic Christian is uncertain. Government figures from the 1976 census suggest that the correct percentage is 6.3, whereas Coptic sources indicate that the true figure is closer to 20. Zeidan (1999) and Ibrahim (1996) offer detailed discussions of this debate.
4. Use of the term “minority” with reference to the Christian population in Egypt is highly contested. Where I use the term, I do so to refer to differences in the relative sizes of Muslim and Christian populations in Egypt.
5. Amendment to the Law of Personal Status in January 2000 gave women more options for divorce.
6. The International Conference on Population and Development was held in Cairo, Egypt, on September 5–13, 1994. Organized jointly by agencies of the United Nations (UN), the conference convened over 11,000 registered representatives of governments,

UN specialized agencies and organizations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and the media. Over 180 states participated in drafting a Programme of Action, which focuses on the association between population and development and on meeting the needs of individuals rather than on achieving demographic targets. The acknowledged key to this new approach is the empowerment of women and the provision of choices through expanded access to education, skill development, employment, health services, and policy- and decision-making processes. Among the actions identified to address the needs of girls is the elimination of “female genital mutilation.” Paragraph 4.22 states: “Governments are urged to prohibit female genital mutilation . . . and to give vigorous support to efforts among non-governmental and community organizations and religious institutions to eliminate such practices” (United Nations Fund for Population Activities [UNFPA] 1994).

7. A mufti is a religious leader in Islam who deals with questions on Islamic jurisprudence. In Egypt, the president appoints the mufti, who fills the top governmental post for a religious scholar. The Sheikh of Al Azhar heads the Supreme Council of Al Azhar and represents the highest religious authority within Sunni Islam. A *fatwa* is a legal statement in Islam that may be issued by a mufti or a religious lawyer in cases where the legal rulings of Muslim scholars are undecided or uncertain.

8. Historical banning of the practice in Egypt reportedly arose due to uncertainty about whether the Hadith (a collection of the sayings and acts of Prophet Muhammad) considers the practice to be *sunnah* (a duty) or *makrama* (an embellishment) (Abu-Sahlieh 1994; El Dareer 1982; Gordon 1991; Gruenbaum 2001; Lane & Rubenstein 1996).

9. According to Ibrahim et al. (1996), the number of Egyptian private voluntary organizations (PVOs) grew from 65 in 1900 to 12,832 in 1990. Others estimate that there were approximately 14,000 total registered private voluntary organizations by 1990 (Sullivan 1994). Sullivan (1994) argues that although Islamic PVOs have extensive services, Christian PVOs are more active per capita and more efficient in the generation of revenue and expenditures.

10. “Bridal deflowering” refers to a range of practices that are performed to demonstrate the sexual purity of a new bride, including the breaking of the hymen by a midwife on the wedding night and the public display of a bloodstained cloth. Such tests have been important in some settings to preserve the honor of the new bride and her natal family (Antoun 1968).

11. Two caveats to this argument are noteworthy. First, Armanios (2002) argues that the construction of gender identity has for centuries been central to the Coptic church’s construction of a Coptic identity but that the role of women in this project was in part to uphold certain patriarchal ideals. Armanios (2002) writes that the “threat of eradication as a ‘race’ was never far from the minds of Copts. . . . Thus a significant emphasis was placed not only on the reproductive responsibilities of all Copts (mainly directed at women), but also on the literal breeding of a specific type of woman. A woman was not only to bear children but must herself be intelligent, proficient, and skilled to bring up the future sons of the nation” (114). Thus, enhancement of the skills and educational attainment of Coptic women has in part served to maintain men’s authority in the Coptic family and community. A second caveat is that views on female genital cutting have varied historically across Christian denominations in Egypt; however, leaders in the Coptic

Christian community have either been silent on the practice or have favored its abandonment (Abdel-Hadi n.d.).

12. Round 5 occurred from October 1996 to January 1997, when public debate about the legal status of female genital cutting was under way. Notably, these debates may have biased responses to questions about intent to circumcise daughters who were uncircumcised at the time of interview.

13. The attitudes of Christian and Muslim fathers with regard to female genital cutting are unknown because fathers were not interviewed. However, even though the origins of the practice are believed to lie in patriarchal views about women's sexuality and marriageability, studies show that mothers are often the immediate decision makers about the type and timing of a daughter's circumcision (e.g., Yount 2002). In addition, this analysis controls for paternal education, and results (not shown) suggest that paternal education is not associated with the odds of circumcising a daughter and that the effects of paternal education do not vary by religious affiliation.

14. Excision usually involves removal of the clitoris and labia minora rather than clitoridectomy or removal of the labia minora only. See WHO (1997) for descriptions of standard types of female genital cutting.

15. The Arabic word for "bleeding" that was used in the questionnaire (*naziif*) is a general term, the connotations of which vary according to the context. With reference to female genital cutting, the term may have positive or negative connotations depending upon whether the practice itself is perceived to be positive or negative. With reference to a wedding night, the term may have positive connotations in places where proof of a bride's purity is valued, but the term may have negative connotations when used in reference to an accident that causes someone to bleed. "Some positive effect" includes the following responses: desired by religion, normal or tradition, beautifying, good for girl, satisfies husband, and cleansing or purifying.

16. During data collection, questions that would distinguish people of different Christian denominations were not asked. However, Shari'ah rules of personal and private law state that a Muslim man may marry a Christian or Jewish woman but that a Christian or Jewish man may not marry a Muslim woman. According to An-Na'im (1998), this rule derives from sura 4, verse 141, of the Qur'an, which states that a non-Muslim may never exercise authority over a Muslim. In addition, a Muslim may neither inherit from nor leave inheritance to a non-Muslim. For these reasons, intermarriage of Christians and Muslims is believed to be rare in Minya, Egypt.

17. Assets about which questions were asked include a residential building other than the dwelling unit, commercial or industrial buildings, private car, motorcycle, bicycle, transport equipment (truck, van, bus, etc.), farmland, other land, livestock (horses, goats, sheep, etc.), poultry, farm equipment (tractors, etc.).

18. This formula is a Kaplan-Meier product-limit estimator with an actuarial adjustment and aggregation of events into interval lengths of one year. The actuarial adjustment accounts for censored observations in the product-limit formula by use of the equality $n_j = N_j - m_j/2$, and deaths are assumed to occur evenly over each interval, as indicated by the straight lines connecting estimated proportions circumcised at each year of age.

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What Happened to the “Long Civic Generation”? Explaining Cohort Differences in Volunteerism*

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Abstract

In Bowling Alone Robert Putnam argues that the passing of the “long civic generation,” whose values were molded by the Depression and the Second World War, has resulted in a decline in civic engagement. In this analysis we test the generation hypothesis by comparing the volunteer behavior of two successive generations of women at the same age. No support for Putnam’s thesis is found. Once appropriate controls for sociodemographic trends are imposed, generation differences disappear. However, there are cohort differences in the type of volunteer work performed.

Each year, volunteer workers contribute billions of dollars in value to the U.S. economy (Boris 1999). Even so, there are rarely enough volunteers to meet the demand, as a glance at any local newspaper will reveal. In light of this shortage of volunteers, any social change that discourages volunteering is worrisome. Two recent changes suggest that balancing supply and demand in the market for volunteers will become more difficult in the future. The first is the Reagan administration’s cut in government spending initiated in the 1980s. A deliberate policy of shifting social welfare from public to private agencies meant that nonprofit agencies were expected to assume an even greater burden in the provision of human services. Alongside increasing demand, the supply of volunteers is threatened. Americans simply have less free time today. But lack of time is not the primary reason that a decline in volunteering is expected. In a recent publication, Putnam (2000) has suggested that younger generations

**The Aspen Institute’s Nonprofit Sector Research Fund provided partial support for this research. We would like to thank Phil Morgan and Emilio Parrado for their comments on an earlier version of this article. Direct correspondence to Thomas Rotolo, Department of Sociology, 204 Wilson Hall, Washington State University, Pullman, Washington 99164.*

of Americans are simply not as civic-minded as those who experienced the Great Depression and the Second World War. Unlike this older generation, younger Americans have not acquired a sense of civic duty. They have not been taught that the nation has to pull together in order to survive. As the older generation departs the scene, volunteerism will fall out of favor.

Trends in Volunteering

A glance at the data on volunteering seems to contradict Putnam's generational theory. The rate of volunteering "for charitable causes" actually rose from 26% in 1977 to 46% in 1991 (Ladd 1999). While the proportion of the population volunteering at least once a year remained flat between 1975 and 1997, the average number of times people volunteered rose from 6.3 times a year in the mid-1970s to 7.6 times a year in the mid-1990s (Goss 1999). And yet these trend data do not necessarily disprove the thesis that Americans are becoming less disposed to volunteer, because the increase in volunteering is found mainly among Americans sixty years or older (Putnam 2000). Goss (1999) examines the frequency of volunteering per year among four cohorts of Americans: a cohort born before 1930, a cohort born between 1930 and 1945, a cohort born between 1946 and 1960 ("baby boomers"), and a cohort born after 1960. She finds that the increase in the number of times people volunteered between 1975 and 1997 is almost entirely attributable to those who grew up during the Depression and the Second World War. Succeeding generations show no increase in volunteering.

Of course, these results alone are not enough to validate the generation hypothesis. Older people might be volunteering more often because of changes in the resources available to them or because more volunteers are needed. Goss attempts to rule out these other explanations by controlling for changes in the various social factors that influence the supply of volunteers and by including a dummy variable for year of survey to control for period effects. She does find a period effect and speculates that it might have something to do with an increase in the demand for seniors' services fueled by an explosion in the number of organizations catering to age-related concerns (Goss 1999). Nevertheless, she also finds a positive effect for the 1910-30 cohort.

Thus we have an intriguing hypothesis with some empirical support for it. And yet there is widespread skepticism among social scientists about the validity of generation theory (Jennings 1987; Ladd 1999; Schuman & Scott 1989). In the view of these skeptics, age differences in volunteering, even if they can be demonstrated, are more likely to be the result of improvements in education and health among the old, favorable shifts in public attitudes toward aging, and expanded opportunities for older volunteers in the public and private sectors (Chambre 1993).

In this article we take up the challenge of testing the generation hypothesis, using a different data set and a different method of analysis to that employed by Putnam and Goss. We believe our approach is a more rigorous test of generation theory. Under this test the theory fails. We then go on to examine a subsidiary hypothesis that the change is more a matter of the type of volunteering taking place than the amount. Some have argued that the more traditional forms of civic engagement, such as the PTA, the League of Women Voters, the Kiwanis, or the American Legion, are waning in popularity in favor of “looser connections” to groups of various kinds that demand less of their members and permit more episodic forms of volunteer work (Skocpol 2003; Wuthnow 1999). In the second part of the article we test for cohort differences in types of volunteering. We expect to see a decline in popularity of the old-style service organizations and a rise in popularity of work-oriented and political groups.

Generation Theory

The theory of generations has a venerable history in sociology. It originated as part of Karl Mannheim’s ([1928] 1952) search for an existential basis of social knowledge independent of social class. Just as shared class location limits individuals to particular ranges of experiences and predisposes them to a characteristic mode of thought, so too does generational location. “Thus, those born at the same time may share similar formative experiences that coalesce into a ‘natural’ view of the world. . . . People are thus fixed in qualitatively different eras” (Scott 2000:356).

Generation theory is an alternative way of accounting for age differences in behavior and attitudes when using cross-sectional data. Rather than attributing age differences to maturation and life-course events and assuming that the young will one day behave and think like the old, the differences are assumed to be permanent. It is further assumed that period effects, which influence all age groups in the population alike, will leave these generational differences intact. Generation theory informs Glen Elder’s (1974) classic work, *Children of the Great Depression*, in which he argues that being raised during the Depression engendered “a psychic framework of self-sacrifice and earned success in the nation’s causes which still finds expression in views of contemporary events and developments” (295). Generation theory has also been used to explain why people born and raised during the Depression did not become more conservative as they aged but remained loyal to the Democratic Party (Braungart & Braungart 1989), why voter turnout has declined since the Second World War (Miller & Shanks 1996), and why Americans are becoming less trusting (Robinson & Jackson 2001).

Generation theory is a cultural theory. It attributes cohort differences in behavior to values and attitudes. Mannheim ([1928] 1952) uses the term “generational location” to refer to what demographers today would call a birth cohort. He uses the term “generation of actuality” to describe a birth cohort among whom a “concrete bond” has been forged by virtue of the cohort’s common exposure to “social and intellectual” conditions. Unfortunately, this crucial distinction is not always observed and the terms are used interchangeably (Marshall 1983). But cohort — or “generational” — location, while necessary, is not a sufficient condition for a generation to exist (Pilcher 1994). Only “when events occur in such a manner as to demarcate a cohort in terms of its ‘historical-social’ consciousness should we speak of true generation” (Scott 2000:356). A birth cohort is thus similar to a class *in itself*. It is distinguished from other birth cohorts by structural characteristics, such as size and racial composition, of common conditions of existence, such as educational opportunities, family size, an economic boom or depression (Easterlin 1987; Ryder 1965). A generation is similar to a class *for itself*. It is a birth cohort that has become aware of itself as different from other birth cohorts because of some set of events that occurred during its formative period (Marshall 1983). Not every birth cohort becomes a generation. For example, the birth cohort succeeding the baby boomers has been labeled “Generation X” precisely because it lacks a generational consciousness. “Few, if any galvanizing events or movements occurred around which a special identity could be formed” (Jennings & Stoker 2001:4).

Structural Contingencies

Putnam unequivocally rejects the view that the differences in civic engagement he observes are merely the result of changes in structural conditions. The older generation of the 1970-90 period is more civic-minded “*despite* the fact that it received substantially less formal education than its children and grandchildren” (Putnam 2000:254; our emphasis). This point is crucial, because it is possible to agree that succeeding birth cohorts exhibit different volunteer behaviors in the same historical period and at the same age without accepting the cultural argument. One could simply attribute these differences to structural changes. If younger birth cohorts simply have less (or more) of what it takes to volunteer, then controlling for this explains away any apparent “generational effects.”

In order to understand how cohorts might vary in their proclivity for volunteer work, it is necessary to turn to the existing research on who volunteers. For reasons given below, we focus on women in this study. Volunteer work has traditionally been thought of as a female activity, especially for mothers (Daniels 1988). Women are more likely than men to be allocated the

kinds of chores that are an extension of housework and childcare, such as attending PTA meetings or organizing a bake sale for the local library. Mothers act as “keepers of friends, neighbors, and even those strangers served by local volunteer groups” (Gerstel 2002:258). Bianchi (2000), using a soccer metaphor, describes the role of mothers as the “sweeper”: “Their job is to be ever attentive to what needs to be done to assist in covering the goal — to what they must do to ensure their well-being and that of their family” (412). Lareau (2002) observes, “Even when fathers were coaches or had other prominent roles in organizations . . . mothers provided ‘hidden’ assistance (e.g., calling team members to reschedule rained-out practices), a pattern that was not generally reciprocated when women had leadership roles” (41).

Recent research has demonstrated that the following factors are associated with volunteering.

EDUCATION

Education “is the major predictor of hands-on volunteer time” (Rossi 2001c:452). This is highly significant because of the increased educational opportunities enjoyed by women in the U.S. (Blau, Ferber & Winkler 1998; McLaughlin et al. 1988). Putnam and Goss are well aware of the positive effects of the upward trend in education and control for this throughout their analyses. In their opinion, however, the upward trend in education has not been enough to outweigh the fact that young women today are less civic-minded than their mothers. It is a little understood implication of Putnam’s thesis that, were it not for the improvement in educational opportunities they have enjoyed, the younger generations would be volunteering even less than they are and the cohort difference would be even greater (Jackman & Miller 1998).

WORK TIME

Another factor associated with volunteering is paid work time. If paid employment imposes opportunity costs on volunteering, any increase in the labor force participation of women should limit how much volunteering they do. This is a matter of common speculation in the social sciences (Blau, Ferber & Winkler 1998; Hamilton 2001; Handy et al. 2000; Schor 1992). And data analysis seems to substantiate it. “Comparing two women of the same age, education, financial security and marital and parental status, full-time employment appears to cut . . . volunteering by more than 50 percent” (Putnam 2000:195). Tiehen (2000), analyzing time diary data from 1965, 1975, 1985, and 1993 recorded by married women, observes a decline in volunteering across this time period. Although women were more highly educated in each successive study, which should have increased the rate of volunteering, the increase in education was counterbalanced by an increase in the overall rate

of employment and especially an increase in the rate of employment of married women with children, the result being a decline in volunteering across the two decades. Tiehen (2000) estimates that "given the other characteristics of married women in 1993, if married women's employment rate had maintained its 1965 level, their volunteer rate would have been almost 30% higher in 1993" (521). It seems likely that the movement of women into the paid labor force would bring about a decline in volunteering, especially since working women continue to do most of the childcare and housework.

The percentage of women working full time, year-round, increased from 37% in 1963 to 54% in 1995 (Blau, Ferber & Winkler 1998). "Between 1970 and 1980, 14 million women joined the work force, the most rapid increase in any single decade in this century" (Moen, Downey & Bolger 1990:232). Not only are more women working, women with young children are entering the labor force in unprecedented numbers, thus intensifying the "time squeeze" on women, who must become "supermoms" to be able to perform the combination of roles that used to be performed sequentially. The proportion of women with children younger than six years in the household who were working for pay rose from 43.3% in 1970 to 57.5% in 1990 (Blau, Ferber & Winkler 1998). We should therefore expect to see that later generations of women work more hours for pay outside the home and therefore volunteer less than their predecessors.

OCCUPATIONS

People who have professional or managerial occupations are more likely to volunteer than those who work in clerical, sales, or blue-collar occupations (Wilson & Musick 1997; Wuthnow 1998). Community service is expected of people in professional and managerial occupations, and many such workers belong to associations that actively promote volunteer work. Professional and managerial workers also tend to have more flexible work schedules, and "women who feel they have control over their daily schedule at work are almost twice as likely to volunteer as those who do not control their schedules" (Wuthnow 1998:76). Professional and managerial workers are also more likely to be asked to volunteer. Favorable changes in the occupational status of women should encourage more of them to volunteer. Between 1972 and 1995, roughly the period covered by the time series used in this study, the proportion of women in managerial positions rose from 4.6% to 12.8%, and the proportion of women in professional positions rose from 12.4% to 16.7% (Blau, Ferber & Winkler 1998).

FAMILY ROLES

Women's family roles are linked to volunteer work in a number of ways. Much of the time they devote to volunteer work can be seen as an extension of those roles, or as being limited by those roles. Any change in household composition should therefore have an impact on volunteering.

Married people are more likely to volunteer than single people (Hodgkinson & Weitzman 1996), regardless of whether or not they have children (Sundeen 1990). Rossi (2001a) sees this as a sign of the greater "social embeddedness" of married couples. However, there is also likely to be some measure of "mutual support" for volunteering in marriages (Freeman 1997). The falling marriage rate should bring about a decline in volunteering.

Parental status is also related to volunteering. Children can either function as connections to others or serve to isolate parents socially (Gallagher & Gerstel 2001). The difference is the age of the child. Infant children notoriously limit their mothers' social activities (Knoke & Thompson 1977). Parents of preschool children have about four hours less free time per week than those with older children and about nine hours less than married couples without children (Robinson & Godbey 1997). Once children enter school, they not only provide mothers more free time but their extracurricular activities draw mothers into community activities. In short, the impact of children on their mothers' volunteer work is moderated by the children's age. This finding is robust (Clain & Zech 1999; Garcia & Marcuello 2002; Hayghe 1991; Vaillancourt 1994). As a working hypothesis for this study, we will assume that the more infant children a mother has, the fewer hours she will volunteer. The more school-age children she has, the more hours she will volunteer.

In summary, generation theory predicts that a "civic generation" of Americans is largely responsible for most of the recent increase in volunteering in the U.S. This generation of Americans is continuing a practice of high-level involvement in civic life, inspired by values of social responsibility and mutual sacrifice learned during the Depression and the Second World War. The effects of this learning are independent of any structural differences that might exist between the birth cohorts and of any period effects that might have influenced the volunteer rate. This hypothesis is substantiated if, with sociodemographic conditions and period held constant, the rate of volunteering for older generations is higher than for younger generations.

Analytical Design

Putnam is well aware of the methodological problems of teasing out the differences between age, cohort, and period effects. As already noted, he observes a more rapid decline in social participation among the younger than the older

birth cohorts (Putnam 2000) and concludes that “about half the overall decline in social capital and civic engagement can be traced to generational change” (266). Putnam is aware that this method of detecting “generation” effects compounds birth cohort and period effects because each successive birth cohort reaches a given age in a different year, often decades apart. He cannot rule out the possibility that any differences in volunteering might be due to changes in social context that occur in the time that elapses between the different birth cohorts reaching a given age. As far as separating generation and period effects is concerned, Putnam (2000) finds that “if both year of birth and year of survey are included in the same regression, year of survey becomes virtually insignificant in these measures” (485). Unfortunately, he is unable to control for age in these analyses because it overlaps with cohort (year of birth). He cannot rule out the possibility that the generation effect is actually the result of a change in the composition of the sample due to age-related factors, such as retirement or lower morbidity.

The analytical dilemma posed by age, period, and cohort effects is simply stated: “In the cross-sectional design, life course and cohort effects are confounded; in the longitudinal design, life-course and period effects are interrelated; and in the time-series design, cohort and period effects cannot be separated” (Braungart & Braungart 1989:314). Our strategy for solving this problem is to compare how much volunteer work two succeeding generations of women performed at the same stage of their life. This controls for age while testing for generation. However, it measures volunteering in two different periods. To rule out the possibility that there are period effects on volunteering that could be mistaken for generation effects, we conduct a pooled time-series analysis to see if either of the two periods we select for comparison are unusual in their rate of volunteering (see our description of the sample). We then enter sociodemographic variables into the model to see if generation differences remain.

Data

We test the generation hypothesis by comparing the volunteer behavior of two succeeding cohorts of women studied in the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Labor Market Experience. The survey, which began in the 1960s, follows four population cohorts: men 45-59 years of age, women 30-44 years of age, young men 14-24 years of age, and young women 14-24 years of age. We use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women and the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women because only women were asked questions on volunteering in their preretirement years. The mature sample was first surveyed in 1967, when it consisted of 5,083 women, ages 30-44; the young

sample was first surveyed in 1968, when it consisted of 5,159 women, ages 14–24.

Questions on volunteering were included in only some of the NLS panels. The mature women were asked about their volunteer work in 1974, 1976, 1979, 1981, and 1984; the young women were asked in 1973, 1978, 1988, and 1991. The exclusion of men from our study is regrettable and unavoidable. However, the focus on women is appropriate in light of the concern that “as more and more women enter the labor market and have less time to spend on unpaid work, their contributions to worthy causes will be greatly missed” (Blau, Ferber & Winkler 1998:58).


Besides offering us good longitudinal data on two cohorts of women, the NLS data is valuable in that, by coincidence, the two cohorts of women closely match the two generations compared by Putnam. The mature women in the NLS were born between 1923 and 1937. For Putnam (2000), the “core of the civic generation is the cohort born in 1925–1930” (254). The young women in the NLS were born between 1944 and 1954. Putnam identifies people born between 1944 and 1954 as members of the “baby boom generation.” It is members of this generation, he believes, who have disengaged from community life.

Figure 1 presents a Lexis diagram illustrating the aging of the two cohorts we consider in this research. The horizontal axis represents the calendar year (allowing us to classify a group of individuals born in the same series of years as a cohort), and the vertical axis is the age of the individuals. Thus, the diagonal lines we have drawn in the two-dimensional system allow us to calculate the age of individuals in a cohort in any given calendar year succeeding birth. Along the horizontal axis, we have identified the NLS survey years we use in our analysis (1974 and 1991), and the shaded section of the diagram illustrates how our choice of these years allows us to analyze a sample of women from the two cohorts that overlap in age, between 37 and 48 years. Below, we discuss our rationale for this age restriction.

Sample

Our design calls for us to pool age-selected data from the two NLS modules and use a cohort variable to identify the generation effect. However, we cannot pool the data from *all* the women. The brief period of time during which the women were asked about their volunteer work constrains us to limit our attention to women between ages 37 and 48. Recall that the earliest measure of volunteering for the mature women occurred in 1974, when the youngest of them was 37. The latest measure of volunteering for the young women was taken in 1991, when the oldest of them was 48. We therefore pool the mature

FIGURE 1: Lexis Diagram of NLS Mature and Young Cohorts of Women Matched with Putnam's "Civic" and "Baby Boom" Generations



women who were between 37 and 48 in 1974 with the young women who were between 37 and 48 in 1991. This results in a total sample size of 6,337, with 3,196 observations from the young cohort and 3,141 observations from the mature sample.

By limiting our study to women from two cohorts with overlapping ages, we avoid confusing cohort and age effects. However, we are pooling women from two different cohorts and therefore two different periods, 1974 and 1991. We cannot rule out that period effects might be determining any difference we find between the 1974 women and the 1991 women. Our method of dealing

with the period effects problem is as follows. We have volunteer data on young women extending from 1973 to 1991 and on mature women extending from 1974 to 1984. We are thus able to see if, within each cohort, year of survey makes a difference to the volunteer rate of women in that cohort, net of other variables. Preliminary paired t-tests, by cohort, suggested that only the young women 1988 panel stood out in this regard: for some reason the volunteer rate among these women was unusually high that year. To rule out the possibility of period effects biasing our results more definitively, we conducted a pooled time-series analysis of the separate cohorts of women. By including a dummy variable for year in these analyses, we can see if any particular panel was exceptional in its level of volunteering. Net of control variables, the pooled time-series analysis confirmed our preliminary findings. For the mature women, there were no “year effects” on volunteering. The rate of volunteering remained the same over time. For the young women, however, the 1988 panel recorded a much higher rate of volunteering, net of the other variables in the model, than all the other panels. The volunteering rate among young women in the other years showed no significant variation. To ensure that we conduct the most conservative test of the generational hypothesis, we therefore select for the overlap analysis young women from the 1991 wave. We are reasonably confident that any cohort differences we find are not the result of period effects.

Dependent Variables

The NLS contains two measures of volunteering. The first is weeks volunteered, a measure of the number of weeks of unpaid volunteer work reported by respondents in the past year. This variable ranges between 0 and 52 weeks. The second is hours volunteered. This variable indicates the average number of hours per week spent on unpaid volunteer work in the past year. The range is 0-120 hours, including six respondents in the analysis who volunteer 80 or more hours. We analyze both measures of time spent volunteering because they are only moderately correlated ($r = .31$). The wording of the question is simple: “In the past twelve months did you do any unpaid volunteer work?” Unlike specialized surveys on volunteering, the respondent is given no prompts, nor is she asked about specific types of volunteer work, although those who indicate some volunteer work are subsequently asked for which type of organization they volunteered the most hours.

Independent Variables

AGE

For each respondent, we use the most recently reported birth date in our calculation of respondents' ages. Using this birth date, and the date of survey administration, we calculate the age of each respondent at the time of the survey.

COHORT

Cohort is measured using a dummy variable (0 = young, 1 = mature).

EDUCATION

Education is measured as the highest grade attained by the respondent, ranging from 1 (first grade) to 18 (6 or more years of college).

PAID EMPLOYMENT

For the analysis of number of weeks volunteered, we include a control variable for the number of weeks worked for pay in the last 12 months. This variable ranges from 0 to 52. For the analysis of number of hours volunteered, the employment variable represents the number of hours worked in the survey week. This variable is coded into a set of dummy categories: no hours worked, between 1 and 39 hours worked (part-time), 40 hours worked (full-time), and over 40 hours worked.

OCCUPATION

We use two dummy variables to represent occupation, created from the three-digit occupation census codes. A respondent can report work in a professional occupation (1 = yes, 0 = no), a managerial occupation (1 = yes, 0 = no), or one of the other occupations (omitted category). We include those not in the labor force in the omitted category because previous research has shown that their volunteer behavior resembles that of blue- and white-collar workers more than that of professional and managerial workers once work hours and education are controlled (Wilson & Musick 1997).

MARITAL STATUS

A dummy variable is used to measure marital status (1 = married, 0 = unmarried).

PARENTAL STATUS

The NLS asked respondents to list all persons related to the respondent who are living in the household and identifies the age of each. Using this information, we identify children of the respondent and construct four different measures of parental status, each indicating the number of children within a certain age range living with the respondent at the time of the survey. Specifically, we calculate the following: number of children 4 years of age or under, number of children between 5 and 12, number of children between 13 and 17, and number of children 18 or older.

Statistical Model

We estimate Tobit regression models (Tobin 1958), a statistical procedure designed for censored dependent variables that is appropriate when a significant proportion of the observations take on a value of zero for the dependent variable (Roncek 1992). In our case, the measures of volunteering are censored at a lower limit of zero because respondents cannot report less than zero for either indicator. Further, approximately 72% of the respondents report no volunteering — an indication that we might find important differences between those who report no volunteer activity and those reporting at least some level of volunteering.

A Tobit model specifies two equations, each corresponding to the different classes of effect described above (McDonald & Moffitt 1980). The first equation, for those cases where the dependent variable is greater than zero, is

$$y_t = X_t\beta + u_t, \quad (1)$$

where y_t is a measure of volunteering; X_t is a vector of independent variables, including our measure of cohort; β is a vector of coefficients; and u_t is a normal, independently distributed error term. The second equation, for cases where the dependent variable is equal to zero, is

$$y_t = 0. \quad (2)$$

Although Tobit regression output from software programs typically resembles ordinary least squares regression results, the results of the Tobit coefficients are not readily interpretable. Through the use of the normal distribution, Tobit coefficients can be transformed to several readily interpretable forms. Space limitations prevent us from discussing the mathematical procedures by which Tobit coefficients can be decomposed; interested readers are encouraged to refer to Roncek (1992) for a lucid discussion of how to interpret Tobit effects. With this in mind, we now turn to a general discussion of how volunteering can be understood from the results of our Tobit models.

For all respondents, the Tobit model coefficients can be used to estimate how the independent variables affect the probability of volunteering. Given that a respondent reports some volunteering, the Tobit coefficients can be decomposed to represent variation in the level of volunteering. Further, the Tobit model allows us to determine “the fraction of the total effect of an independent variable that is attributable to the effect of being above the limit” (Roncek 1992:505). That is, we assess whether the change in volunteering resulting from a change in the independent variables is generated primarily by marginal changes in the level of volunteering (i.e., volunteering > 0) or due more to changes in the probability of volunteering at all (McDonald & Moffitt 1980).

In our presentation of the models below, while paying special attention to cohort differences, we discuss the effects of independent variables on the probability of volunteering for those respondents not volunteering and the effects of independent variables on levels of volunteering for those reporting some volunteer activity.

Results

Table 1 compares the two cohorts of women. Asterisks indicate that the mean difference is significant. The young women are more educated, are more likely to be in the labor force, and work more weeks. The mature women are more likely to be married and have more children over age four. They are slightly more likely to have professional and managerial jobs. There are no cohort differences in the number of weeks volunteered, nor are there differences in the number of hours volunteered.

HOURS VOLUNTEERED PER WEEK

Table 2 shows the results of the Tobit analysis, where hours volunteered per week is the dependent variable. The first Tobit regression model includes only cohort and age. The young women volunteer more hours than the mature women. Our initial model thus produces a result opposite to that predicted by the generation hypothesis.

The remaining models in Table 2 are intended to show whether the significant cohort effect observed survives the introduction of controls for sociodemographic characteristics. In model 2, we see that, as expected, more highly educated women volunteer more hours. The coefficient for cohort has reversed its sign. Now mature women volunteer more than young women. The higher rates of volunteering for young women shown in model 1 are a function of their higher education. In model 3, we introduce a set of dummy variables representing hours worked in paid employment (with no hours worked as the

TABLE 1: Comparison of Means, by Cohort, National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (1974) and Young Women (1991), Ages 37-48

	Young Cohort	Mature Cohort
Weeks volunteered (last year)	6.77 (15.13)	6.18 (14.73)
Hours volunteered (per week)	1.81 (1.60)	1.53 (1.36)
Age	42.13** (3.05)	42.68 (3.47)
Education	13.18** (2.61)	11.18 (2.76)
Weeks worked (past 12 months)	39.19** (20.03)	28.78 (23.33)
Paid employment		
None (omitted category)	.33** (.47)	.43 (.49)
Part-time (0-39 hrs./week)	.27 (.44)	.24 (.43)
Full-time (40 hrs./week)	.23 (.42)	.23 (.42)
Over 40 hrs./week	.17** (.38)	.09 (.28)
Parental status		
Number of children age 4 or younger	.08 (.33)	.09 (.34)
Number of children age 5-12	.45** (.75)	.77 (1.04)
Number of children age 13-17	.49** (.70)	.96 (1.01)
Number of children age 18 or older	.45** (.70)	.53 (.76)
Marital status (0 = unmarried, 1 = married)	.66** (.47)	.79 (.43)
Occupation		
Professional (0 = no, 1 = yes)	.14** (.35)	.09 (.29)
Managerial (0 = no, 1 = yes)	.09** (.29)	.03 (.17)
N	3,196	3,141

Note: Asterisks indicate a significant difference between cohort means. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

** p < .01

TABLE 2: Tobit Model Regressions of Number of Hours Volunteered per Week during Past Year on Cohort and Selected Controls, National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (1974) and Young Women (1991), Ages 37-48

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	.20 (.27)	-24.04** (3.01)	-22.06** (3.05)	-24.36** (3.08)	-28.77** (3.31)
Cohort (0 = young, 1 = mature)	-.85** (.42)	2.21** (.45)	1.98** (.45)	1.58** (.45)	.85 (.47)
Age	-.19** (.06)	-.13** (.06)	-.12 (.06)	-.11 (.06)	-.03 (.07)
Education	—	1.60** (.09)	1.55** (.09)	1.51** (.09)	1.52** (.09)
Paid employment ^a					
Part-time (1–39 hrs./week)	—	—	-1.45** (.55)	-1.45** (.55)	-1.51** (.55)
Full-time (40 hrs./week)	—	—	-5.01** (.61)	-4.58** (.61)	-4.43** (.62)
Over 40 hrs./week	—	—	-3.30** (.72)	-2.69** (.72)	-2.44** (.73)
Occupation					
Professional			1.07 (.70)	1.28 (.70)	1.32 (.70)
Managerial			1.50 (.91)	1.47 (.90)	1.64 (.90)
Marital status (0 = unmarried, 1 = married)	—	—	—	3.37** (.50)	2.97** (.51)
Parental status					
Number of children age 4 or younger	—	—	—	—	-2.33** (.66)
Number of children age 5–12	—	—	—	—	1.11** (.24)
Number of children age 13–17	—	—	—	—	.99** (.25)
Number of children age 18 or older			—	—	-.04 (.30)
Scale	13.07 (.25)	12.74 (.24)	12.64 (.24)	12.60 (.24)	12.57 (.23)
Likelihood ratio χ^2	13.76	407.69	483.94	530.39	582.11

(N = 6,337)

Note: The number of censored observations (hours volunteered = 0) is 4,579.

^a No paid employment is the omitted category.

omitted category) and two dummy variables for occupation (professional and managerial). We observe a curvilinear relationship between hours worked and hours volunteered: respondents not working or working part-time volunteer the most; those working 40 hours volunteer the least; and those working over 40 hours report higher levels of volunteering than those working the “standard” week. The size of the cohort coefficient in model 3 is reduced. Young women volunteer less than mature women because they work longer hours. Model 4 adds a dummy variable for marital status to the model. Marriage is positively related to volunteering. Table 2 shows that young women are less likely to be married than mature women. The introduction of this control reduces the size of the cohort coefficient. Mature women volunteer more than young women because they are more likely to be married. Finally, in model 5, parental status is entered into the equation. As expected, infant children have a negative effect on volunteering. Elementary and high school children have a positive effect. We see from the comparison of means that mature women in their middle-age years have more children in the household than do the younger women. The cohort effect disappears in this model, suggesting that mature women volunteer more than young women because they have more school-age children in the household in midlife.

Decomposition of the Tobit estimates shows that most of the change in hours volunteered per week takes the form of changes in the probability of volunteering in the first place. Three-quarters of the effects of our independent variables are associated with changing the probability of volunteering from no hours to some hours per week. The structure of the Tobit decomposition implies that this percentage is the same for all estimated models predicting number of hours volunteered (the actual percentage depends only on the number of censored cases relative to the total sample size, and these values remain constant across our models [see McDonald & Moffitt 1980:319-20; Roncek 1990:505-6]). This result suggests that the prevalence of respondents reporting zero hours volunteered has an important impact on our results. Sociodemographic changes have not made much difference in how *much* volunteering women do. Their impact has chiefly been on whether women volunteer at all. Some of these changes have increased the likelihood of volunteering, whereas others have diminished it.

WEEKS VOLUNTEERED PER YEAR

Table 3 shows the results of the Tobit analysis where the number of weeks volunteered in the previous twelve months is the dependent variable. Recall that the correlation between the two dependent variables is modest. Again, most of the total change in volunteering takes the form of changes in the probability of doing at least some volunteer work; about 75% of the effects of our

TABLE 3: Tobit Model Regressions of Number of Weeks Volunteered during Past Year on Cohort and Selected Controls, National Longitudinal Survey of Mature Women (1974) and Young Women (1991), Ages 37-48

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	5.19 (7.96)	-73.11** (8.53)	-67.53** (8.59)	-75.34** (8.65)	-93.04** (9.26)
Cohort (0 = young, 1 = mature)	-2.02 (1.23)	8.16** (1.27)	6.30** (1.28)	5.04** (1.29)	2.36 (1.32)
Age	-.64** (.19)	-.45** (.18)	-.41** (.18)	-.38** (.18)	-.06 (.09)
Education	—	5.30** (.25)	5.33** (.26)	5.15** (.26)	5.22** (.26)
Weeks worked (past 12 months)	—	—	-.21** (.03)	-.18** (.03)	-.16** (.03)
Occupation					
Professional			2.00 (1.88)	2.84 (1.87)	2.95 (1.86)
Managerial			4.22 (2.46)	4.53 (2.45)	5.36 (2.43)
Marital status (0 = unmarried, 1 = married)	—	—	—	11.66** (1.41)	9.88** (1.41)
Parental status					
Number of children age 4 or younger	—	—	—	—	-6.31** (1.85)
Number of children age 5-12	—	—	—	—	4.50** (.68)
Number of children age 13-17	—	—	—	—	3.41** (.69)
Number of children age 18 or older			—	—	1.20 (.85)
Scale	38.57 (.76)	36.36 (.71)	36.12 (.70)	35.83 (.69)	35.45 (.68)
Likelihood ratio χ^2	543.99	543.99	597.48	668.65	756.37
(N = 6,337)					

Note: The number of censored observations (hours volunteered = 0) is 4,579.

independent variables are associated with changing the probability of volunteering.

Model 1 in Table 3 shows the estimate for cohort effects on weeks volunteered, controlling for age. There is no cohort effect. Recall from Table 1 that there are no mean differences in weeks volunteered between mature and young women. In model 2, education is seen to be positively related to weeks volunteered. However, with this variable in the model the cohort coefficient shows that mature women are more likely to volunteer than young women. The better education of young women is suppressing the effect of cohort on volunteering. In model 3, we introduce controls for paid labor. The occupation variables are not significantly related to volunteering; however, the number of weeks worked for pay is negatively related to volunteering. The cohort coefficient is reduced, suggesting that young women volunteer fewer weeks because they are working more weeks for pay. The control for marital status further attenuates the cohort effect. Mature women volunteer more weeks because they are more likely to be married. The pattern of effects of parental status conforms to that found in Table 2. Once again, the result of introducing this control is to render the cohort coefficient insignificant. Mature women volunteer more than young women of a comparable age because they have more school-age children (there are no cohort differences in number of preschool children).

In summary, education, work hours, weeks worked, occupational status, marital status, and parental status are all linked to volunteering in the expected way. Controlling for these variables eliminates any generation effect. The findings confirm what sociologists have long known: women's social situation provides them with opportunities (or responsibilities) and constraints, as far as volunteering is concerned. Women acquire the resources for volunteer work through higher education and better jobs. However, married women with school-age children in the house take on more volunteer work, regardless of their work status. The higher fertility of the mature women means more volunteer work for them.

TYPES OF VOLUNTEERING

We find no generational differences in how much women volunteer. But this does not rule out the possibility of changes in the type of volunteer work women do. The young women in our sample are members of the baby boom generation. They were raised in the prosperous 1950s and reached early adulthood in the late 1960s, at the height of the civil rights and peace movements of that era. They acquired "an abiding confidence about the future" and were "prime candidates for collective political action" (Goldstone & McAdam 2001:211). They developed a taste for political activism in their youth, and they have remained politically active into middle age, when civic


engagement would normally be expected to decline (Jennings 1989). Perhaps the generations are different, then, not in how much they volunteer, but in where their volunteer work is directed. The younger generation favors political activism and community action, whereas the older generation favors more traditional forms of civic engagement, through churches, service clubs, and ancillaries to hospitals and schools. Of course, these changing priorities — if they exist — might not be due to a change in consciousness at all, but to the changing social circumstances of women. Perhaps they are switching from volunteering to cook meals for the male-dominated service club to volunteering to help organize a neighborhood environmental watch group because they are better educated, have better-paying jobs, and have a mortgage written in their own name.

Survey respondents who reported volunteering in the past twelve months were asked a follow-up question: “What organization did you volunteer for?” This provides us with the opportunity to examine cohort differences in volunteer choices. Unfortunately, respondents were given only one opportunity to answer this question, and it is common for people to volunteer for more than one activity at a time. (In 2002, 68.1% of women volunteers gave time to one organization, 19.8% to two, and the remainder to three or more [U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002].) Because NLS respondents were asked to identify the organization to which they contributed most hours, their responses should thus be treated as a measure of their volunteer *priorities*. The options were (1) hospital or clinic, (2) school, (3) church, (4) political organization, (5) groups such as community chest, United Fund, Heart Fund, (6) Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, Little League, (7) civic or community action, (8) social and welfare, and (9) other. These categories are far from optimal: the descriptions are rather vague, and the list is short. However, the types provide us with an opportunity to see if the two cohorts of women made different choices about where to give their time.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of volunteers from each of the two cohorts selecting each of the options provided. In line with the results of other studies of types of volunteering (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002), church-related work was the most likely to be mentioned, followed by assistance to schools. These are the priorities we would expect of all middle-aged women. Mature women were more likely than young women to select church-related volunteering, whereas more young women selected school-related volunteering. The question is whether these differences are due to the changing sociodemographic composition of the two cohorts, or whether there is a residual generation effect. Undoubtedly, sociodemographic characteristics make a difference to choice of volunteer activity. For example, 22.6% of high school dropouts choose school-related volunteering as their main activity, compared to 28% of college graduates. Conversely, 45.8% of high school dropouts choose

FIGURE 2: Young and Mature Cohort Volunteering, by Organizational Type

Figure 2: Young and Mature Cohort Volunteering, by Organizational Type. Note: Asterisks next to organizational type names indicate significant cohort differences, (** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$).



Note: Asterisks next to organizational type names indicate significant cohort differences.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

church-related volunteering, compared to 31.5% among college graduates (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002). What happens once we control for these factors?

In order to answer this question, we first created a set of dummy variables for each type of activity. We then estimated a series of logistic regression models, one for each of the dummy variables, including cohort as one of the independent variables. For example, in the hospital/clinic model, the cohort coefficient would report the difference in the (log) odds of volunteering for that activity versus all other activities attributable to cohort after controls are imposed.

In reporting the results of these analyses, we do not present nine separate models but indicate which of the cohort differences in type of volunteer activity are significant by placing asterisks by the name of the activity in Figure 2. Five of the differences are significant. Young women are more likely than mature women to volunteer in school-related and civic work. Mature women are more likely than young women to perform church-related, service, and youth-related volunteer work.

When interpreting these differences, it is important to remember that each type represents a wide variety of organizations. Nevertheless, some pattern is visible. Controlling for parental status, women of the younger cohort do more volunteer work in connection with schools than do mature women. Ladd (1999) reports a similar finding: "all the surveys show the proportions of parents saying they have recently attended meetings dealing with local school needs and programs up over the last two or three decades" (36). Unfortunately, Ladd does not report whether this trend is net of rising educational status. The NLS data suggest that the focus on schools is not merely the result of women being better educated. This leaves the door open for a generational interpretation. Possibly the young women, schooled in the late 1960s, acquired a stronger interest in educational issues from the many social movements aimed at educational reform that occurred at the time. However, it is not possible to rule out a period effect either. Perhaps the 1990s saw more demand for school volunteers because of cutbacks in educational budgets. It is difficult to explain why young women are more likely than mature women to choose school-related volunteering but less likely to choose youth-related volunteering. Both sets of activities would appear to be related to having school-age children in the household, for which we have controlled. Possibly the category "youth related" contained more responses indicating activities such as Boy Scouts and other more traditional activities that have declined in recent years.

Young women are more likely than mature women to spend time working on behalf of a civic group or an organization engaged in community action. To some degree, changes such as this could be attributed to the rising occupational status of women, but, since we control for occupational status, a

generational impact of the 1960s cannot be ruled out. As we noted earlier, the young women were 14-24 in 1968 and thus came of age during a time of considerable social and political turmoil. This experience stayed with them into midlife and now informs their volunteer choices. Yet the difference could be due to period effects. The mature women were surveyed in 1974, too early to benefit from the explosion of advocacy groups and grassroots associations that occurred between the 1970s and the 1990s (Skocpol 2003).

Figure 2 shows that, although church-related activities remain the most popular choice across the generations, young women are less likely to choose them than the mature women. It is tempting to attribute this result to secularization. The young women are less religious than the generation preceding it. Putnam (2000) describes a “slump” in church attendance during the mid-1980s. But other authorities question whether church attendance varied much at all in the 1974-91 period (Wuthnow 1999). In an analysis of General Social Survey data on voluntary association memberships covering the same period as our comparison of the two women’s cohorts (1974-94), Rotolo (1999) found that rates of participation in church-related activities were lower in 1994 than they were in 1974 — although not as low as they were in the 1980s. It is unfortunate that the NLS does not gather information on religion.

A final difference shown in Figure 2 concerns the category we have called “service.” Mature women are much more likely to report this activity than young women. Assuming our identification of the category is correct, this trend makes sense in light of the reported decline in membership in service and fraternal associations (many of which are sex-segregated). Women have moved away from traditional clubs and federations toward the other kinds of activity shown in the figure. The explanation given for this trend usually invokes other social changes, such as increased labor force participation, for which we have controlled. This leaves the door open for an interpretation based on the overall decline in voluntary associations that assume the segregation of the sexes.

Discussion

In this article we have argued against the idea that older generations of women are more disposed to volunteer than younger generations. At the same time, however, we have acknowledged that two cohorts of women can vary in their volunteer behavior because of the circumstances of their birth. The solution to this seeming puzzle is that cohort is not the same as generation. The term “cohort” applies to clusters of single-year birth cohorts defined by some social reality, such as draft laws. However, a cohort is not necessarily a social generation. It merely describes quantitative or incremental differences in life chances, whereas “generations describe qualitative differences and also social units capable of relating to each other” (Marshall 1983:53).

Scholars agree that the two groups of women compared in this study “represent two of the most demographically important cohorts of women in recent United States history” (McLaughlin et al. 1988:162; see also Moen, Downey & Bolger 1990). The mature women were forming their families in the 1950s:

During the 1950s and the early 1960s the traditional family was king. Young men and women married early and had rather large families relatively quickly. Divorce was rare and unmarried childbearing unheard of. Young women worked before they were married and some continued working until their first child was born, but almost all mothers of infants left the labor force for an extended period and many did not return. Women earned much less than men because they had less education and training, because they almost all worked in “women’s jobs,” and because they either had just started working or would soon leave. (Waite & Nielson 2001:23)

The young women were forming their families in the late 1960s and 1970s. Their cohort was the first to enter the labor force in the era of modern feminism. Goldin (1997) characterizes these women as having desired “career more than family” because they delayed marriage and children while pursuing a career. The young women married later, divorced more frequently, and had fewer children. They were also more highly educated (Goldin 1997).

Some of these changes increased the likelihood of women volunteering, while others diminished it. The net result, in the short term, is hardly any change at all. When we compare the proportions of middle-aged women volunteering in 1974 and 1991, we see they are virtually the same. Minor differences can be accounted for by changes in the sociodemographic composition of the female population. There is no residual effect that could be attributed to cultural factors. Indeed, it could be argued that mature women ought to have volunteered more than they did, given some of the sociodemographic advantages they had over younger women. They had more free time and more family ties to connect them to the volunteer world. How is it, then, that the younger women maintain the volunteer rates of the older women despite the greater demands on their time? First, they are better educated and have better jobs. To take advantage of these superior resources, they might well have taken time away from other unpaid work, such as household chores. Additionally, women have proven adept at getting around busier work schedules: “while working long hours may make coordinated activities within couples more difficult . . . it does not necessarily reduce individual spouse’s commitments outside the home” (Becker & Hofmeister 1999:24). In addition, the structure of opportunities to volunteer has changed in response to changing social conditions. Nonprofit organizations are being forced to offer people more “episodic” forms of volunteering that do not require fixed commitments of time (Wuthnow 1999).

Although the overall rate of volunteering and, more specifically, the amount of women's volunteering have not changed much, it was almost inevitable that changes would occur in what type of volunteer work people perform. Our analysis of types of volunteering shows this to be the case: the more recent cohort has turned away from church-related volunteering (although it is still the most popular) and turned toward civic and school-related activities. We found these changes difficult to interpret given the broad categories used in the survey. This is certainly an area of potentially fruitful research.

Conclusion

Alwin (1998) has noted the tendency for “‘generational myths’ to become infused into our consciousness and become part of the fabric of social knowledge and beliefs” (54). In this study we have tried to separate the effects of structural changes on the disposition to volunteer from residual effects that might be attributable to historical events that occurred during the early adulthood of successive generations of Americans. In conclusion we first consider whether our argument is generalizable to other forms of civic participation. We then consider some of the limitations of our study and make some suggestions about future research in this area.

Volunteer work is one way of providing help to others and is thus part of the “care work” people do. It is also one way of being engaged in the civic life of one's community. Is there any evidence that care work in general or forms of civic engagement other than volunteering are susceptible to the generational explanation? As far as we are aware, there are no trend data on subjects such as informal helping and caregiving. However, Robison et al. (1995) examine cohort differences in caregiving using a panel data set consisting of two surveys, one conducted in 1956 and the other in 1986. They distinguish two cohorts, one born between 1905 and 1917 and the other born between 1927 and 1934. The first generation reached adulthood during the Great Depression, and the latter reached adulthood in the 1950s. They speculate that the more recent cohort would be more liberated from traditional norms involving caregiving obligations. However, they find that women born in more recent cohorts are *more* likely than those born in earlier cohorts to serve as caregivers. The explanation is found in period effects. Lengthening life spans mean that women in the younger cohort are more likely to have elderly parents to care for, in any given age bracket, than women in the older cohort. If there are any “generational” differences between the cohorts, they are not sufficient to overcome this structural change.

A recent study (Jennings & Stoker 2001) uses data from a three-panel longitudinal survey to examine the impact of “generation” on voluntary association memberships. The first generation was born between 1910 and 1940,

half of them between 1917 and 1924. This generation “easily falls within Putnam’s high praised ‘long civic generation’” (Jennings & Stoker 2001:3). They were the parents of the respondents comprising the second panel, who were high school seniors when they were surveyed in 1965. The high school students were early members of the baby boom generation. The age-standardized voluntary association memberships of the first generation in 1965 can be compared with those of the second generation in 1997. This is a similar technique to the one used in this article. The data show that members of the second generation were *more* civically engaged than their parents in midlife, regardless of current income, education, workforce participation, and home ownership. Much of this was due to an increase in membership in professional or business groups and neighborhood associations.

In summary, there is little reason to think that the results we arrived at are unique to volunteering. Any “generational” differences in behaviors directed at helping others or working for the common good either are more common in recent birth cohorts or are explicable in terms of structural changes.

Finally, we turn to the limitations of our study. First, it could be argued that the mature and young women in the NLS do not correspond to the generations identified by Putnam and Goss. Our “civic generation” is composed of women born between 1923 and 1937, a fourteen-year span. Putnam’s “core” civic generation was born between 1925 and 1930. Goss’s “civic” generation was born between 1910 and 1930. She defines the generation born between 1930 and 1945 as the “silent” generation. Some of our mature women would be members of this inactive generation. In contrast, the young women in the NLS seem to overlap more closely with previous definitions of a recognizable cohort. Putnam targets the baby boomers as being inactive socially, and according to his definition they were born between 1945 and 1955. Goss defines the baby boomers as individuals born between 1945 and 1960. The young women in the NLS were born between 1944 and 1954. When we repeated our analysis confining the mature women to those born between 1925 and 1930, the results were essentially the same.

Second, it could be argued that the age range we were forced to choose because of the structure of the data set and the timing of the questions on volunteering in the NLS biases the test for cohort effects. The mature women were first interviewed in 1967, when the youngest of them was 30. They were not asked about their volunteer work until 1974, when the youngest was 37. We are unable to compare the volunteer behavior of the two cohorts in their twenties or, for that matter, in their fifties. Perhaps generational effects exist in these other age ranges. We cannot simply assume that age effects are the same for each cohort or that cohort effects do not change as a result of aging. Researchers should conduct tests to verify that our results generalize to other women outside the age range we have compared.

Third, it could be argued that we have not eliminated the possibility of period effects. We compare the volunteer behavior of mature women in 1974 with the volunteer behavior of young women in 1991. As we note, some surveys show an increase in the rate of volunteering in the general population between these dates. This would give the young women an advantage over the mature women and help explain why we find no generation effect: it is being suppressed by period. In conducting our pooled time-series analysis, we attempted to exclude this possibility, but period effects, especially if they interact with generational effects, can be difficult to dismiss without comprehensive longitudinal data on individuals with widely varying ages.

Fourth, the data we use pertain to women only. We have no idea whether the same results would occur were men included in our analyses. Perhaps men's volunteering remains less affected by family statuses than women's because of the household division of labor. Perhaps they favor different kinds of activities. If there was a generation difference, controlling for the marriage rate or fertility might leave the cohort coefficient significant. Again, in order to test such ideas, future research would need to consider more comprehensive data sources.

Fifth, we cannot test for interaction effects with our data. Our analysis assumes that the difference between generations is constant across ages and across periods. As Marshall (1983) points out, generational consciousness can be modified by historical events. For example, the object of attention — volunteering — could change in significance or value over time. If volunteer work increases in social value as one generation succeeds another (e.g., as a result of presidential endorsements, or an increase in government funding to nonprofit organizations), the weaker civic education of the younger generation might be masked by increased opportunities. Another reason not to rule out interaction effects is that the age curve of volunteering in the two generations might be a different shape. This is one implication of Goss's argument. In the 1990s, the elderly were volunteering at higher rates than the elderly in the 1970s. Some of this increase was due to the sociodemographic characteristics of the later generation; but some of it was due to the period in which it occurred. The elderly of the 1990s enjoyed a standard of living different from that of the elderly of the 1970s, a period of sharp inflation.

Finally, we have no data on values held by the individuals. The generation theory relies heavily on the idea that birth cohorts think differently about issues such as civic engagement. We have shown that there are no residual effects of cohort once structural changes have been taken into account. No doubt some of these structural changes themselves reflect the influence of values. For example, younger women place less value on having children and more value on paid employment, which in turn affects their propensity to volunteer. Members of the 1960s movements had lower rates of marriage and fertility (Whittier 1997). While these trends reflect the counterculture ideas of the

time, the chances are that they, rather than “civic obligation,” helped sustain political engagement into middle age. In short, the same structural changes we have used to wipe away the generation effects might themselves be an indication of changed social attitudes and values. Without independent data on values we cannot fully adjudicate between the two meanings of cohort, the one referring to generations in the sense of a group consciousness and the other referring to age cohorts whose structural location is different.

In sum, we have recognized a number of limitations faced in our research. Despite these limitations, our findings shed light on the debate over the social participation of two generations in the U.S. — an issue that has received widespread attention in both academic and policy circles. We do not wish to diminish the contributions to volunteerism of those born around the Great Depression and the Second World War (i.e., the long civic generation). However, careful consideration of the structural contingencies that underlie any observed generational differences in social participation allows us to paint a more complete picture of the volunteer activity of the long civic generation as well as of succeeding ones. The gradual passing of the long civic generation will no doubt impact the supply of volunteers; we, nevertheless, urge researchers to explore the conditions that engender future generations to fill adequately any volunteering void.

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
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Volunteerism during the Transition to Adulthood: A Life Course Perspective*

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Abstract

This panel study examines whether educational, work, and family roles promote volunteerism during late adolescence and early adulthood, as they do later in adulthood. The findings reveal substantial continuity in volunteerism from adolescence through the transition to adulthood and highlight the importance of values expressed in adolescence for volunteerism in the years following. Controlling these processes, attending school during this life stage promotes volunteerism. In contrast, full-time work investments in the early life course are found to hinder volunteer participation, as does the presence of young children in the family, especially at earlier parental ages. The results support a life course perspective for understanding civic participation.

America has long been considered a nation of joiners, contributing to the public welfare through their involvements in associations directed to the improvement of quite many facets of public and private life (Tocqueville [1835, 1840] 1959). A presumed decline of civic society is the subject of much recent concern in the U.S. Commentators note growing materialism and individualism

** The Youth Development Study is supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD44138) and the National Institute of Mental Health (MH42843). Part of this research was conducted while Oesterle and Johnson were postdoctoral fellows at the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, funded by a grant from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development/National Institute of Health (P01-HD31921). A previous version of this article was presented at the 1998 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco. The authors would like to thank Scott Stoner-Eby, Kim Shuey, and Andrea Willson for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. Direct correspondence to Sabrina Oesterle at the Social Development Research Group, University of Washington, 9725 3rd Ave. NE, Suite 401, Seattle, WA 98115. E-mail: soe@u.washington.edu.*

during the past 25 years, along with a decline in social capital and erosion of community involvement (Bellah et al. 1985; Easterlin & Crimmins 1991; Etzioni 1996; Paxton 1999; Putnam 2000). Civic engagement is seen as having far-reaching consequences for individuals and for society, lessening crime, drug use, violence, and joblessness and fostering education, economic success, and both physical and mental health (Thoits & Hewitt 2001; Wilson & Musick 1999). Decline in civic orientations and behaviors is consequently viewed as a setback to democracy and to social well-being.

Concern about the maintenance of American democracy and civic society is heightened by a presumed disengagement of the contemporary younger generation from the political process and civic life, as well as its greater individualism and materialism. The empirical evidence for the perceived disengagement of young people is mixed, however. While trust among young people has declined and materialism has grown, rates of volunteering and community participation have remained stable or even increased over the past two decades (Astin et al. 1997; Bachman, Johnston & O'Malley 1980; Independent Sector 1997, 1999; Johnston, Bachman & O'Malley 2001; Rahn & Transue 1998). Despite this evidence, concern about young people's civic involvement and the future of American civic society continues. To be concerned is warranted, since learning a sense of civic-mindedness and being engaged in the community early in life is found to be of utmost importance in developing responsible and civically active adults (Fendrich 1993; McAdam 1988; Youniss & Yates 1997).

We know little, however, about the factors that draw young people into voluntary participation and individual patterns of continuity and discontinuity in participation across adolescence and young adulthood. Our focus in the current study is on participation in volunteer work. Volunteer work is activity performed freely to benefit others and is distinct from participation in voluntary associations (Wilson 2000). Except for research on school-based service learning programs (Andersen 1998; see also Marullo & Edwards 2000), research on volunteerism is primarily based on adult populations and older volunteers.

Life course studies (Elder, Johnson & Crosnoe 2003; Shanahan 2000) indicate that the meaning of roles and activities differs across life stages. Distinct connections between individuals and institutions, or configurations of such attachments, characterize the various phases of life. Some connections are required by law (e.g., school attendance up to a certain age) or by economic need (e.g., work to maintain livelihood in adulthood), while others reflect values and preferences (e.g., maintaining weak or strong ties to families of origin, religious involvement). Young adults have greater discretion than adolescents to make choices about their organizational and institutional connections (Shanahan 2000). How can young adults' civic involvement be understood given the demanding character of their involvements with other roles that are essential to

their livelihoods and family building (e.g., postsecondary education, career establishment, marriage, and parenthood)?

Following this life course perspective, our research examines whether the factors that are thought to promote or hinder adult volunteerism function in the same way during the transition to adulthood. Many of these factors may in fact be age- or life-stage-specific. The character of the transition to adulthood leads us to expect that some factors that draw adults into volunteer work will obstruct young people's participation, others will be of no relevance, and still others will attract young people much as they do adults. To examine the life-stage-specific character of volunteerism, we draw on nine years of panel data to estimate time-series models of volunteering in a contemporary panel of young people from late adolescence (age 18–19) through young adulthood (age 26–27).

Volunteerism during Young Adulthood

Early research on adult volunteers identified a range of factors that promote volunteering, classified broadly as variables indicating dominant social status, social integration, and altruistic values. The more recent literature frames precursors of both volunteering and civic participation in terms of participatory resources that increase the capacity for action (Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; Wilson & Musick 1997a). Contemporary scholars distinguish three sets of resources, paralleling the earlier perspectives, based on human, social, and cultural capital.

HUMAN CAPITAL

The human-capital and prior-dominant-status perspectives (Lemon, Palisi & Jacobson 1972) argue that resources associated with higher social status enable persons to engage in volunteer activities. People of higher social status have greater civic skills; they are thus more attractive to volunteer organizations and more likely to be asked to volunteer. They may also be more motivated to volunteer, as they have a greater stake in the community. Consistent with this theme, educational attainment is a strong predictor of adult volunteerism and other kinds of voluntary participation (Putnam 2000; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995; Wilson 2000). Earnings and occupational status also influence volunteering (Wilson 2000; Wilson & Musick 1997b).

Young adults are at the beginning of their work lives and careers, still learning new roles and establishing themselves in the labor market and in communities. Indicators of adult social status may not yet reflect the differences in qualification, civic skills, prestige, and community interest to the same degree

as they do in later adulthood. Thus, in comparison to adulthood, the same status indicators measured during young adulthood might be expected to have little relation (or even an inverse association) with participation in volunteer work.

Earnings, for example, are likely a poor reflection of skills and social status at this stage, when many people temporarily forgo higher earnings for additional schooling. Earnings, in fact, are somewhat unstable in the years immediately after high school, fluctuating with participation in postsecondary education, periods of unemployment, and job changes, all of which occur more frequently during these years than in adulthood. Occupational status similarly fluctuates. The meaning of a person's earnings and occupational position for others in the community, as well as a person's perception of his or her place in the community, also change with age. It takes some time to build a reputation and to perceive that one has a stake in the community. Thus, unlike in adulthood, when earnings promote volunteerism, we expect no effect of earnings on volunteerism during the transition to young adulthood and expect instead a positive effect that emerges with age. Indicators of labor-force attachment that promote occupational attainment may inhibit volunteering as careers are becoming established. In contrast, educational participation and attainment during these years operate as status indicators and as a source of human capital just as they do later in adulthood.

SOCIAL CAPITAL

The social capital or social integration perspective emphasizes that volunteering opportunities result from connections to others in social institutions. Though these institutions may also foster the development of civic skills and values, of key importance is that they constitute recruitment networks. Connections to others in social institutions make it more likely that one will be invited to engage in civic activities (Brady, Schlozman & Verba 1999); they also increase information and access for those who are interested in or seek volunteering opportunities. Youth and adults alike are about four times as likely to get involved in volunteer work if they are asked to volunteer (Independent Sector 1997, 1999).

Investigators of adult volunteering have conceptualized the family as a central institution promoting social integration and drawing adults into volunteer work. Being married and having children are considered indicators of such integrative processes (Janoski & Wilson 1995; Sundeen 1990). Participation in voluntary associations (as opposed to volunteerism) is most prevalent among families with school-age children and families with children who are beginning to leave the home (Knoke & Thomson 1977). In a study of retrospective reports of voluntary participation, Rotolo (2000) finds that married persons join organizations at a higher rate and retain their memberships longer than single persons. The presence of elementary-school-

age children also promotes participation via differential joining and leaving rates, particularly for youth-related and church-related organizations (Rotolo 2000).

In early adulthood, however, adjusting to new family roles may limit the time and energy available for volunteering. Thus, we expect that marriage and parenthood hinder volunteerism during young adulthood. Knoke and Thomson's (1977) cross-sectional study of voluntary association participation is suggestive of this process. Young married respondents and young parents were involved in fewer organizations than young single respondents without children.

The potential for stress and role conflict during this time is especially great for young women, who remain primarily responsible for housework and childcare while employed (Coltrane 2000; Johnson, Oesterle & Mortimer 2001). As a result, we expect that family roles will influence volunteerism among young women more strongly than among young men. Parenthood is a particularly demanding role in its initial phases, and this may be exacerbated when occurring at an early age. In other words, the parent at 24 may be better equipped to handle the demands of parenting than the parent at 19. Thus, being a parent at later ages during young adulthood should be less limiting than at earlier ages.

With time in family roles we would expect less hindrance, and eventually promotion, of volunteerism. Time in the parent role not only reflects role adjustment but is also necessarily tied to the age of one's children, which should also affect participation in volunteer work. When children are young (preschool age), the demands of the parent role are especially high, and there may be fewer opportunities to establish connections to other people and to institutions outside the family and work. During this life stage, children are often too young to provide the social ties that encourage civic participation. When children grow older and become involved in more community-based and school-based organized activities (e.g., sports and scouts), they serve to socially integrate their parents.

Work is another important adult context that provides social ties and civic skills facilitating volunteerism (Wilson 2000; Wilson & Musick 1997b). Yet, as suggested earlier, because young adults are just beginning to establish their careers and work relationships and are possibly negotiating other new roles at the same time, we expect that greater work involvement restrains rather than fosters participation in volunteer activities during this phase of the life course. Again, with time in the role we expect to see that work serves an integrating function, promoting volunteerism as it does later in adulthood.

Many youth experience continuation of the familiar student role during young adulthood. Educational institutions are a major source of social capital for young adults. Colleges and universities encourage students to contribute

to their communities through volunteer work and often organize service clubs and other activities to benefit the school and the broader community. Thus, educational participation and attainment should not only facilitate volunteerism by providing human capital, it should do so by providing encouragement and opportunities for volunteering as well.

Religious organizations are another significant arena of social integration that draws people into volunteering (Independent Sector 2001; Verba, Schlozman & Brady 1995). People who are part of a religious community have more opportunity to get involved in volunteer activities, since many religious organizations provide social services to the community. The majority of adults and teenagers alike who volunteer become involved through religious organizations (Independent Sector 1997, 2001). Several indicators of religious practice, such as frequency of prayer, church attendance, and religious affiliation, have been found to directly and positively affect volunteering (Becker & Dhingra 2001; Wilson & Janoski 1995; Wilson & Musick 1997a). Religion is likely to be just as facilitating of volunteer work during the transition to adulthood as it is during adulthood.

CULTURAL CAPITAL

Resources deriving from human and social capital make participation possible by providing the necessary skills and opportunities to volunteer, but they are not sufficient to explain why some people get involved and others do not. Altruistic values and moral or ethical orientations provide an important psychological motivation for participation in volunteer work and other forms of civic engagement. We follow Wilson and Musick (1997a) in conceptualizing civic and moral values as “usable resources” or cultural capital. Values are cultural resources on which people draw to enact their social identities (e.g., as an altruistic and benevolent person). Like human and social capital, these cultural resources are acquired through participation in social institutions, particularly the family, education, and religion.

Among the diverse motivations people have for volunteering (Becker & Dhingra 2001; Clary, Snyder & Stukas 1996; Daniels 1988), including self-oriented reasons (e.g., gaining practical experience and résumé enhancement)¹ and a desire to learn and understand, altruistic values are thought to be the most crucial in enhancing the motivation to help others (Clary & Snyder 1991; Omoto & Snyder 1995). In fact, altruistic beliefs act as precursors to volunteer work independent of structural and social factors (Wilson & Musick 1997a, 1997b). Values should also predict volunteerism during young adulthood.

Religious organizations and educational institutions are sources of cultural capital, promoting the development of prosocial and civic orientations. All major religions emphasize service, charity, and caring for others (Wuthnow &

Hodgkinson 1990). Education also teaches the values and norms of the wider community, including a sense of civic duty. We expect that involvement with educational and religious institutions during young adulthood thus provides cultural capital that motivates volunteer work.

Hypotheses

From the resource perspective, connections to social institutions, such as education, religion, work, and the family, provide the key skills, motivations, and opportunities for volunteering. Rather than being directly measured, connections to institutions are proxies for these skills, motivations, and opportunities for volunteering. It is important to add that the same institutional connection can represent the acquisition of several forms of capital (resources). Education is a source of civic skills but also facilitates social integration and fosters civic values. Work is both a source of social integration and of human capital.

Institutional connections change over the life course, as does role performance. Thus, while all three forms of participatory resources should be pertinent to both young and older adults' volunteerism, the social institutions that contribute to volunteer activity may be life-stage-specific.

The special character of the transition to adulthood sets it apart from later adult life. It is a challenging time that requires learning new roles and responsibilities and adjusting to new contexts and situations. The particular stresses experienced during this time may disrupt earlier trajectories of civic participation. While many of the youth who began such trajectories during childhood and adolescence will continue to engage in volunteerism, others may temporarily interrupt their participation in volunteer work and take it up again after settling into adult roles. For others, however, the lack of involvement may be more permanent, including those youth who have not yet established a pattern of civic engagement. The transition to adulthood is, therefore, a crucial time during which lifelong trajectories of civic participation are formed.

While the literature on adult volunteering identifies work and family as significant institutions that provide participatory resources and opportunities, they are the spheres that may be the sources of greatest stress and demand during the transition to adulthood. Thus, we expect that early connections to adult institutions, such as work and family, do not provide participatory resources. They reduce rather than promote the young adult's availability for civic activities such as volunteer work. On the other hand, involvement in schooling during young adulthood entails the familiar student role learned during childhood and adolescence. Moreover, postsecondary education presents a context that promotes the acquisition of all three types of resources:

civic skills, social connections, and civic values. Education should therefore continue to provide important participatory resources, fostering young adults' capacity and opportunity to volunteer. As outlined above, we also expect to see differences in the effects of these institutional connections with time in a role, age, and gender.

More specifically, our hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Participation in postsecondary education and educational attainment promote volunteerism during young adulthood.

Hypothesis 2: Involvement in paid work hinders volunteerism during young adulthood.

Hypothesis 3: Earnings are not associated with volunteerism during young adulthood.

Hypothesis 4: Marriage and parenthood hinder participation in volunteer work during young adulthood, more so for young women than for young men.

Hypothesis 5: Parenthood at earlier ages further hinders volunteerism.

Hypothesis 6: Work, marriage, and parenthood come to facilitate volunteerism with time in the work, marital, and parental roles (and as children age). Similarly, earnings come to promote volunteerism with age (and establishment in the work career).

Hypothesis 7: Participation in religious activities promotes volunteerism during young adulthood.

To evaluate these hypotheses, we examine panel data from a community sample of contemporary youth for the nine-year period between late adolescence (age 18–19) and early adulthood (age 26–27). We include sociodemographic factors, prior volunteer experience, and adolescent civic orientations to control early selection processes and predispositions when predicting volunteering. The use of panel data and the inclusion of prior volunteering and civic orientations in our analyses set this study apart from prior work. Its longitudinal character enables assessment of the stability of volunteering over time, allows for the examination of time-specific effects, and strengthens our inferences about work, family, and educational experiences in producing and maintaining volunteer behavior through the early life course.

Data and Sample

We examined panel data from the Youth Development Study (YDS), a longitudinal study that began in 1988 with a randomly chosen panel ($N = 1,000$) of ninth-grade students enrolled in the St. Paul public school

district in Minnesota. Pertinent to this study of volunteering, the district did not have a service learning requirement for graduation at the time of data collection. Our analysis focuses on the YDS respondents' volunteering activities during late adolescence and young adulthood, covering the nine-year period from age 18–19 (1992) to age 26–27 (2000).

Consent to participate was obtained from 64% of those invited to join the study. Because of concerns that participants in the study may select themselves on the basis of high socioeconomic background and other demographic characteristics (e.g., age, race, gender, and family composition), a probit analysis of the decision to participate was conducted, including information from the 1980 census reported at the tract level to characterize the neighborhoods of all eligible families. Girls and younger students were somewhat more likely to participate. There was no significant selection bias, however, in the sample composition as regards race, family structure, or socioeconomic status of students' neighborhoods (indicated by median household income, receipt of public assistance, and educational and occupational status; Finch et al. 1991). Furthermore, although the YDS is a community sample based in the city of St. Paul, 1990 census data show that it is quite comparable to the nation as a whole with respect to economic and social indicators (Mortimer 2003).

In the first four years of the study (1988–1991), participants completed questionnaires in their high school classrooms. Surveys were mailed to students if they were not present on either of the two administration days scheduled in each school. As a school-based study, students who dropped out of school prior to the ninth grade would not have been included. Still, dropping out before the ninth grade is very rare and occurs only under the most unusual circumstances, since school attendance is required by law until age 16 (only 1.3% of U.S. 14–15-year-olds are not enrolled in school and have not graduated from high school; U.S. Census Bureau 2002). Extensive tracking and follow-up procedures during each wave of data collection ensured that students who dropped out after ninth grade or who moved to another school district were followed.² The data for 1992–2000 were collected by mailed questionnaires. In 1988 and 1991, the respondents' parents were also surveyed by mail.

The retention rate through 2000, when panel members were mostly 26–27 years old, was 76%. This rate is relatively high for a panel study spanning 14 years. The retained sample in 2000 was somewhat more advantaged than the initial sample in terms of socioeconomic background and family structure (two-parent family), and retention was more likely for females than males.

TABLE 1: Volunteer Work during the Past Year

Age Year	18–19 1992	19–20 1993	20–21 1994	21–22 1995	22–23 1996	23–24 1997	24–25 1998	25–26 1999	26–27 2000
Life history calendar									
Percent volunteered	9.6	18.4	13.9	12.5	8.4	9.2	8.9	9.0	8.8
Total N	816	781	799	778	788	785	760	725	741
Direct question									
Percent volunteered	18.4	19.6	20.6	20.6	NA ^a	NA	NA	NA	17.0
Total N	797	774	795	778	NA	NA	NA	NA	751

^a N/A indicates that the question was not asked in that year.

Measures and Analytic Strategy

VOLUNTEERING

Starting in 1992, when most panel members were 18 or 19 years old, the YDS employed a “life history calendar” (Freedman et al. 1988) to gather month-by-month information on respondents’ family and living arrangements, schooling, and work activities, including volunteer work. For each year of the nine-year analysis period, we counted respondents as volunteers (coded 1) if they volunteered in at least one month during the past year (coded 0 otherwise). The distribution of responses shows that fewer than 20% of young adults volunteered in any given year (Table 1). Rates of volunteering declined over the young adult years from a high of 18% at age 19–20 to a stable 9% during the mid and late twenties.

The report of monthly volunteering was noticeably lower in 1992 at age 18–19 (9.6%) than in the immediately following years. It is unclear why fewer youth reported volunteering at this age, yet this possibly results from the new survey instrument. The life history calendar was used in the YDS for the first time that year. Unfamiliarity with and difficulties filling in the life history calendar may have resulted in lower reports of volunteering. One year earlier, when most YDS respondents were in their senior year of high school, 14% indicated that they currently volunteered in response to a direct question about volunteer work (not using the life history calendar method).

Furthermore, compared to the direct question about volunteering used during the high school years (“Do you currently do any volunteer work [without pay]?”), the life history calendar provides little prompting or direction on volunteering. “Volunteer work” (without further definition) is the last of fifteen items on the life history calendar for which respondents are asked

to provide start, end, and continuation months. This could be a further reason why the volunteering rate appears to be lower in 1992.

In some years (1992–95 and 2000), additional direct questions were included in the YDS survey, asking respondents “Have you done any volunteer work during the past year?” Reports of volunteering were much higher than in responses to the life history calendar when respondents were asked in this manner, with about 20% volunteering during the early twenties and 17% at age 26–27 (see Table 1). Therefore, rates of volunteering obtained through the life history calendar method may underrepresent true levels.

Still, even the volunteering rates based on the direct question are noticeably lower than findings from national U.S. samples. The Independent Sector study of giving and volunteering in the U.S. reports a participation rate of 46% in 1998 for 18–24-year-olds (Independent Sector 1999). One reason for the Independent Sector’s findings might be that their study specifically focuses on giving and volunteering, making the topic more salient than in our study, where volunteering is only one among many topics. Recall may be improved under such circumstances. The focus on volunteering may also increase the likelihood of social desirability bias, however, inflating volunteering rates. Social desirability bias may also result from employing telephone interview methods. Bias is less likely to occur when data are collected by self-administered questionnaires (Groves 1990), as was done in the YDS.

Other prominent national studies of adolescents and young adults are not directly comparable to the YDS data in that they focus on subpopulations, such as college freshmen (Astin et al. 1997), or do not restrict questions to volunteering but ask more broadly about civic participation. The Monitoring the Future study, for example, asks high school students in one question whether they volunteered *or* participated in community affairs (Johnston, Bachman & O’Malley 2001). These considerations suggest that the YDS figures are lower than in other studies because they likely reflect a more committed group of young adult volunteers for whom volunteering is relatively salient.

Although the YDS life history calendar data indicate lower rates of volunteering than the direct questions about volunteer work, we decided to use the calendar data in our analysis because the information it provides is consistent in format across years and was collected in every survey year. Volunteering measures based on the life history calendar yield a greater number (nine versus five years) of time points, equally spaced, for time-series analysis, covering the entire nine-year period of interest without breaks. Our substantive conclusions are virtually unchanged when we use the direct question about volunteering in the analysis and model only five time points.³

TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics on Measures of Education, Work, Marriage, and Parenthood

Age Year	18–19 1992	19–20 1993	20–21 1994	21–22 1995	22–23 1996	23–24 1997	24–25 1998	25–26 1999	26–27 2000
<i>School attendance (0–12 months)</i>									
Mean	5.7	4.9	4.6	4.4	3.5	2.6	2.0	1.9	1.7
Std. deviation	4.3	4.6	4.8	4.9	4.6	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.3
N ^b	816	781	799	774	785	788	760	725	724
<i>B.A. degree or higher (1 = B.A. degree)</i>									
Percentage	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.3	4.3 ^a	21.3	26.0	28.5	29.0
N ^b	1010	1010	1010	773	773 ^a	783	764	737	769
<i>Full-time employment (0–12 months)</i>									
Mean	2.9	4.2	5.0	5.3	6.4	7.4	8.5	8.9	9.3
Std. deviation	4.0	4.6	5.0	5.1	5.2	5.1	4.8	4.7	4.5
N ^b	816	781	799	778	787	785	760	725	725
<i>Work status (1 = working, 0 = not working)</i>									
Percentage currently									
working	70.0	61.8	74.5	79.3	80.4	84.0	92.5	86.6	88.9
N ^b	810	781	799	767	785	777	720	722	755
<i>Hourly wage rate (for those working)</i>									
Mean \$	5.92	6.30	7.01	7.52	9.14	9.91	11.61	13.23	14.56
Std. deviation	5.40	2.61	3.03	2.43	3.00	3.38	4.73	6.35	6.96
N ^b	563	522	588	592	623	635	652	614	656
<i>Marital status (1 = married, 0 = not married)</i>									
Percentage	1.7	3.2	5.9	10.6	15.4	19.5	25.6	30.3	35.4
N ^b	912	900	888	853	850	847	827	800	756
<i>Children</i>									
Percentage with									
no children	81.2	75.8	70.0	66.0	62.3	60.1	54.9	51.1	48.8
Percentage with									
preschool children	18.5	23.9	29.7	33.2	35.2	35.2	37.7	39.2	37.2
Percentage with									
school-age children	.5	.6	1.8	3.5	8.1	12.4	18.8	24.3	30.0
N	799	799	799	799	799	799	799	799	799

^a Same as prior year (See note 5.)

^b We permit the sample size to vary for these descriptive statistics because we use all available information in the multivariate analyses to follow, in which the unit of analysis is the person-survey year.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

We measured involvement in four types of roles and institutions: education, work, marriage, and parenthood. Based on the monthly information from the life history calendar, we measured educational involvement as indicated by the number of months (0–12) in which respondents attended school per year during each of the nine years of the study period. This measure captures exposure to educational institutions and the student role. At this age it is difficult to clearly distinguish between students and nonstudents. As would be expected, the mean number of months of school attendance decreased with each year from a high of 5.7 months at age 18–19 to a low of 1.7 months at age 26–27 (Table 2). We measured degree attainment with a binary variable indicating whether respondents had completed a bachelor's (B.A.) or higher degree (coded 1) or not (coded 0). As would be expected, YDS panel members received a B.A. degree at the earliest by age 21–22, four years after most had graduated from high school.⁴ By that time, 4.3% had completed a B.A. degree. Because data were collected in the spring each year, many young people finished degrees shortly thereafter. This proportion increased to 21.3% at age 23–24 and reached 29.0% by age 26–27.⁵

Involvement in work is indicated by the months (0–12 months) of full-time paid employment (35 hours per week or more) each year, as reported on the life history calendar. Reflecting the increasing movement into full-time work during young adulthood, at age 18–19, the respondents spent on average 2.9 months in paid full-time work, which grew to an average of 9.3 months at age 26–27 (Table 2). In addition to months of full-time work each year, which captures annual involvement in work, we accumulated work experience for each year to evaluate the "time in role" hypothesis (hypothesis 6).

We also considered using a parallel measure of involvement in part-time work (less than 35 hours per week). However, we excluded part-time employment from our analysis because it primarily reflects the absence of full-time work. Furthermore, the meaning of part-time work changes during this early stage of the adult life course. Early on, part-time work is positively correlated with investment in postsecondary education, for those who continue in higher education are likely to work part-time and unlikely to be employed full-time. In fact, very few young adults who continue their schooling after high school do not work at least part-time during some part of the year. As many young adults complete their postsecondary education and begin to move into full-time, year-round employment, the connection between part-time work and school attendance becomes weaker. At this stage, part-time work can reflect any of several situations. As before, those who work part-time may still be in school. However, it may also be that some people work part-time because they cannot find full-time employment. Others may have chosen part-time work as a way to manage multiple role demands, such as family and work. This

last strategy becomes increasingly likely, especially for women, as more of them begin to have children. Thus, while early in young adulthood, part-time work often indicates investment in education, later on it represents several alternatives to full-time work.⁶

We measured both involvement and attainment aspects of work. While months of full-time employment reflect involvement in the institution of work, earned wages indicate human capital and social status.⁷ We used the hourly wage rate for the job respondents held at the time of data collection (before taxes and including tips and commission). If respondents did not work, we assigned a value of 0 to their wage rate. To account for work status, we included a dummy variable in the multivariate analyses indicating whether respondents were currently working (coded 1) or not (coded 0). As we would expect, the wage rate increased during the young adulthood years, from an average of \$5.92 to \$14.54 per hour (Table 2).

In addition to work and education, we measured two family roles: marriage and parenthood. Each year, YDS respondents indicated on the life history calendar during which months they were married (1992–94, age 18–19 or 20–21) or lived with their spouse (1995–2000, age 21–22 to 26–27). We counted respondents as married in a given year if they indicated being married or living with a spouse for at least one month during the year. In 1995, at age 21–22, and in 2000, at age 26–27, respondents were also asked whether they had ever been married and if so, when they got married (month and year). We used this information to retrospectively fill in missing information on the marital status variable (1 = married, 0 = not married) for each year. Table 2 shows that the proportion of married young adults steadily increased from 1.7% at age 18–19 to 35.4% at age 26–27. In addition to measuring marital status each year, we accumulated the years respondents were married over time to evaluate the “time in role” hypothesis (hypothesis 6).⁸

We measured parenthood in a way that would capture its hypothesized changing relationship to volunteering with the ages of the children and duration in the role. Each year, YDS respondents indicated the birth date (month and year) of each of their children (by birth or adoption). From this information we calculated the age of each child at each time point of the analysis period. We then coded for each person and year whether they had no children (coded 1, 0 otherwise), whether they had preschool children, age 5 or younger (coded 1, 0 otherwise), and whether they had school-age children, age 6 and older (coded 1, 0 otherwise). Table 2 shows that the proportion of childless young adults steadily decreased between the age of 18–19 and 26–27. By the time the YDS panel reached their late twenties, somewhat fewer than half (48.8%) remained childless. At the same time, the proportion of respondents with preschool children increased and stabilized in the midtwenties at slightly less than 40% as more and more children became of school age.

Several socioeconomic and demographic background variables are controlled in the analyses. Parental socioeconomic status was measured by an additive index of standardized measures of parental education (average of mother's and father's) and family income as reported by parents in 1988, when panel members were in the ninth grade. Parental educational attainment was measured in eight ordinal categories (1 = less than high school; 8 = Ph.D. or professional degree). Family income was measured by the total household income when respondents were in ninth grade, as reported by the father (1 = less than \$5,000; 13 = \$100,000 or more). When this information was not available from the father, information reported by the mother was used. We also included respondents' race (1 = white [74%], 0 = nonwhite [26%]) and gender (1 = male [48%], 0 = female [52%]).

In order to account for a propensity to volunteer that might precede (and covary with) young adult involvement in educational, work, and family roles and render relations between the latter and subsequent volunteering spurious, we controlled both the respondents' expressions of civic orientation and their prior volunteer experience. We measured civic orientation during the senior year of high school (age 17–18) with a single item that indicates the importance attached to future community involvement as adults (1 = not at all important; 4 = extremely important; mean = 2.49, s.d. = .79). We included a time-varying measure of prior volunteering experiences, measured one year earlier. In order not to exclude information about prior volunteering in the analysis of volunteering at age 18–19 (the first time point would necessarily have missing information for prior volunteering if information were restricted to the life history calendar), we measured "prior volunteering" at age 17–18 based on the direct question used during the senior year of high school.

Our ability to consider the institution of religion in our analysis was limited. A question about the frequency of attendance at religious services (1 = never to 5 = more than once a week) was included only twice in the YDS, when panel members were 21–22 (1995) and 26–27 (2000) years old. We estimated a model in which we included worship attendance measured at age 21–22 (mean = 2.07, s.d. = .94) as a time-constant covariate. Doing this assumes that worship attendance is stable during the young adulthood years (i.e., that attendance at age 21–22 is a valid proxy for attendance in the immediately preceding and following years). In both years, at age 21–22 and age 26–27, the large majority of panel members never or rarely attended religious services (79.3% and 73.3%, respectively). The correlation between attendance at age 21–22 and at age 26–27 is moderately strong (Spearman's $r = .56$, $\gamma = .70$), suggesting that the frequency of attendance at religious services is somewhat stable through the young adulthood years, but we have no means of assessing the stability of attendance across the entire age range covered by our analyses. Because this may be somewhat of a problematic assumption, we present the model without

worship attendance but note differences that arise in estimates from the alternative model.

ANALYTIC METHOD

To test the hypotheses, we estimated a time-series logit model, incorporating both time-constant and time-varying covariates, to predict the dichotomous measure of volunteering. This model is a special case of the general linear model in which the distribution of the dependent variable is binomial and the link function is the logit (Stata Corporation 2001). The unit of analysis is the person-year; the analysis is based on a sample size of 5,324 person-years. Each respondent could contribute as few as one and as many as nine observations. The mean number of observations per respondent was 7.3. We report robust standard errors in which the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is utilized, producing valid standard errors even in the presence of a misspecified within-group correlation structure (Stata Corporation 2001). The standard errors are adjusted to reflect clustering resulting from the fact that each respondent can contribute more than one observation to the model.

This approach has several advantages, one of which is its dynamic representation of volunteering, consistent with our life course perspective. In addition, the approach allows assessment of both the overall usefulness of the predictors of volunteerism during this life stage and the extent to which their influence changes with time or age. Finally, the approach utilizes the maximum information possible about respondents and their volunteer work. A case does not have to have complete data available across all survey years in order to be included in the analysis. Because attrition from the study is fairly gradual, this means that more cases can contribute to the model in the early years when retention in the study was at its highest.

Findings

The estimated coefficients from our time-series logit model predicting volunteer work are shown in Table 3.⁹ In model 1, we estimated the main effect of each of the hypothesized predictors of volunteerism. As hypothesized (hypothesis 1), educational investments were significantly related to volunteering during the transition to adulthood. The odds ratio for months of school attendance each year indicates that the odds of volunteering in a given year increased by 5% for each month the respondent was in school that year. Beyond educational attendance, however, attainment of the bachelor's degree had no significant effect on volunteering.

With respect to work, months of full-time work reduced volunteerism, offering support for hypothesis 2. The magnitude of this effect is similar to the

TABLE 3: Time-Series Logit Model Predicting Volunteer Work, Ages 18–19 to 26–27

	Odds Ratio ^a	
	Model 1	Model 2
<i>Education</i>		
Months of school attendance	1.05*** (.01)	1.05*** (.01)
Bachelor's degree (or higher)	1.34 (.21)	1.48* (.25)
<i>Employment</i>		
Months of full-time employment	.96*** (.01)	.96** (.01)
Employed (at the time of the survey)	1.23 (.19)	1.17 (.18)
Wages (current job)	1.01 (.01)	1.01 (.01)
<i>Family</i>		
Married	.92 (.15)	.90 (.15)
Parent of preschool-age child	.59** (.09)	.30*** (.09)
Parent of school-age child	1.22 (.22)	1.95 (1.59)
Survey year	—	.95 (.03)
Survey year × Parent of preschool-age child	—	1.17** (.07)
Survey year × Parent of school-age child	—	.91 (.12)
<i>Propensity to volunteer</i>		
Volunteered one year prior	7.71*** (.97)	7.67*** (.97)
Civic orientation at age 17–18, 1991 (time constant)	1.17* (.10)	1.17 (.10)
<i>Sociodemographic Indicators (time constant)</i>		
Male	.61*** (.08)	.60*** (.08)
White	1.00 (.15)	.96 (.15)
Parents' socioeconomic status	1.02 (.04)	1.01 (.04)
N (person years)	5,324	5,324
N (respondents)	732	732

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

^aOR_b = exp(b) and se(OR_b) = exp(b) * se(b) (See note 9.)

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

positive effects of schooling. For each month spent in full-time work in a given year, the odds of volunteering that year were reduced by 4%. Involvement in work, rather than promoting volunteering by providing social integration, actually hinders volunteer participation in early adulthood. Although we hypothesized that greater time spent in the work role would reduce its impact (hypothesis 6), we found no additional effect of accumulated work experience over time (not shown).

Among those employed at the time of the data collection each year, hourly wages had no significant effect on volunteering. While these findings support hypothesis 3, that status markers like earnings do not promote volunteerism during young adulthood, there is no sign that earnings start to promote volunteerism with age (hypothesis 6). In additional analyses (not shown), we estimated a model in which we added measures of both survey year and an interaction between survey year and hourly wages. There was no indication that earnings become important to volunteerism with age. Perhaps this effect would emerge at later ages not represented yet in this panel.

Family roles at this life stage were related to volunteering in ways that also differ from what is found generally in adulthood. The effects of family roles, where present, did not significantly vary by gender, however. Marriage appeared to neither promote nor hinder volunteering among both young men and women. In additional analyses (not shown), we estimated a model in which we added a measure of the time in the marital role (cumulative years being married). Time in the marital role had no effect on volunteerism, contrary to hypothesis 6. Because our data were collected on a fairly age-homogenous panel, longer marriages also mean early marriages, and perhaps the role adjustment that occurs with time is offset for volunteering behavior by the disadvantages associated with early marriage.

Having preschool-age children clearly limited participation in volunteer work during these years, consistent with hypothesis 4. Parents of preschoolers were about half as likely to volunteer as respondents without children of this age. Because time in the parental role and the ages of children are tightly interwoven, either the newness of the role or the demands of very young children could be the source of this effect. Although the estimated effect of having school-aged children is in the direction expected from prior research on adults, it does not achieve statistical significance.¹⁰ Having school-aged children has been theorized to draw parents into civic participation and volunteer work as a result of their children's needs and activities. Again these patterns were similar for men and women.

We also hypothesized that being a parent at later ages would minimize the extent to which parenting limited volunteerism (hypothesis 5), and we find support for this in model 2 (Table 3). Having preschool-age children reduces volunteerism, as before, but the interaction between survey year and having

preschool-age children is positive and statistically significant. Having preschool-age children hinders volunteerism to a lesser extent in later years (later ages). In our panel, having school-aged children is very uncommon until the later years of the study. Thus, we gain little from the interaction between having school-aged children and survey year. In fact, because of the low incidence of having school-age children in the early years of the study, the standard error estimate on the main effect is quite large in model 2.

One additional change in the findings is apparent in model 2. The estimated effect of having a bachelor's degree on volunteerism is slightly larger and statistically significant. This change results from the inclusion of survey year (main effect) in the model, which was necessary to evaluate the age interaction hypothesis (hypothesis 5). Since degree attainment is positively associated with both survey year and volunteering, and survey year is negatively associated with volunteerism, this effect was somewhat suppressed in model 1.¹¹

One of the most prominent features of our model is its incorporation of prior volunteering behavior, as well as a measure of civic orientation from adolescence. Having volunteered one year earlier had the strongest effect on volunteering in the current year of any covariate considered. Respondents were almost eight times as likely to volunteer in a given year if they had volunteered the year before. Civic orientation measured in the senior year of high school also predicted volunteering in the years thereafter, with those volunteering at higher rates during the transition to adulthood who indicated participation in the community was of more importance to them in adolescence. Together these findings indicate that volunteering is to some extent a stable behavior. Moreover, the findings support a developmental perspective on volunteering (e.g., Youniss & Yates 1997), that is, that acquiring a sense of civic-mindedness early in life is of importance for developing responsible and civically active adults.

Only one of the sociodemographic indicators has a significant effect on volunteering during the transition to adulthood. Males were considerably less likely to volunteer, even controlling the other factors in the model. Race and parental socioeconomic status neither promoted nor hindered volunteer participation, controlling other factors.

As noted earlier, we were unable to satisfactorily incorporate church or synagogue attendance into our model of volunteer work. Based on the (admittedly tenuous) assumption that worship attendance is stable across the transition to adulthood, we estimated an additional model in which worship attendance in 1995 (at age 21–22) was treated as a time-constant covariate. Consistent with prior research on volunteering, and our expectations in hypothesis 7, attendance at religious services was strongly associated with performing volunteer work (O.R. = 1.36; $p < .001$). Inclusion of religious participation in the model had virtually no consequence for the other coefficients, with one exception. In this latter model, the estimated effect of

civic orientation during the senior year of high school was reduced slightly ($O.R. = 1.12$) and was no longer statistically significant. Religious participation and civic orientation may both indicate prosocial values that encourage volunteer work. Religious participation also represents other unmeasured factors, however, including social ties and the ongoing opportunity for informal and formal volunteering. Its more comprehensive nature likely holds greater power to predict volunteerism.

Discussion and Conclusion

The present research contributes to our understanding of civic participation by examining the volunteer work of young people during the transition to adulthood. Most prior research on volunteerism has focused on adults, neglecting to consider life course variation in the factors that promote and constrain volunteer work. Earlier findings, coupled with the patterns revealed by this research, indicate that the determinants of volunteerism are life-stage-specific.

Three types of resources tied to human, social, and cultural capital facilitate volunteerism and other forms of civic participation. Because connections to social institutions, such as education, work, family, and religion, are thought to provide these resources, that is, key capacities, motivations, and opportunities for volunteering, they represent the standard predictors of volunteerism in past research. We have argued from a life course perspective that institutional connections, associated role performances, and their meanings change over the course of individual lives. Consequently, we expected that the consequences of participation in social institutions that contribute to the acquisition of civic resources during adulthood are not the same when young people transition from adolescence into adulthood.

Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that involvement in full-time work and family — parenting young children in particular — reduces rather than promotes volunteerism during young adulthood. In addition, marriage and income, which promote volunteering in adult samples, were unrelated to volunteering during these early adult years. These findings suggest that while work and family are significant institutions that provide participatory resources and opportunities to adults, they do not operate similarly for young adults, who may initially find their new roles especially demanding.

On the other hand, we expected that involvement in postsecondary schooling would foster young adults' participation in volunteer work and our findings support this hypothesis. Attending a postsecondary educational institution promotes volunteering during the young adult years. The significance of education lies in the fact that it promotes the acquisition of all

three forms of resources: civic skills, social connections, and civic values. It is widely understood that educational attainment is positively associated with volunteering and other forms of civic participation long after the young adult years. Thus, the findings of this study serve as a reminder that the benefits of education extend beyond the individual to the community.

The significance of religious institutions for teenage and adult volunteering alike has also been well established. Religious organizations provide direct opportunities for volunteer work and social ties that connect people to these opportunities and make it more likely that one will be asked to volunteer, but they also teach altruistic values and are thus an important location for the acquisition of both social and cultural capital. Although our ability to consider connections to religious institutions in our analysis was limited, our findings are consistent with prior research on volunteering. Like education, the institution of religion is a source of participatory resources that seems to be significant for volunteerism throughout the life course.

Consistent with a life course perspective, we also expected differences in the effect of institutional connections during young adulthood by gender, with time in adult roles, and with age. We hypothesized that young women are affected by family demands more so than men. However, we do not find any significant gender interactions with marriage or parenthood. Both young men and women are less likely to volunteer if they have preschool children, while being married does not influence their participation.

Yet the gender difference in volunteering itself represents an interesting life course dynamic. Whereas rates of volunteering did not differ for boys and girls when this panel was in high school (Johnson et al. 1998), as young adults men were substantially less likely to volunteer than women. Perhaps this results from the changing meaning of roles with age. Helping and caring for others, including volunteering, may be a stronger aspect of the adult woman role. The gender difference in volunteering might also reflect women's possession of other forms of social capital that we did not directly measure, such as informal social relationships (Wilson & Musick 1997a). Women may be more likely to perform specific types of volunteer tasks, such as informal help provided to friends, family, and neighbors (Wilson & Musick 1997a). Further study of gender differences in volunteerism is warranted.

We do not find any evidence that time in the work and marital role reduces the restraining effect of these initially demanding roles. Perhaps if we could extend our analyses into the thirties we would see these effects diminish as well as the expected reversal when these roles foster volunteerism. However, we find that the effects of parenthood vary by the parent's age even within the twenties. While having preschool-age children hinders volunteerism throughout young adulthood, it does so to a lesser extent at later ages. Our findings, therefore, suggest that parenthood, as a demanding role in its initial phases when children are young and the role is new, limits the young adult's avail-

ability for volunteer work. Yet this restraining effect on volunteerism is exacerbated when parenthood occurs at early ages.

The use of panel data and the inclusion of prior volunteering and adolescent civic orientations set our analysis apart from prior research. Our conclusions about the consequences of education, work, and family roles for volunteering during young adulthood are strengthened by controlling such continuity and selection processes. Yet continuity and selection are themselves of interest as an important part of understanding volunteerism across the life course. We find that prior volunteer experience and early motivations to participate, as expressed in civic orientations during the senior year of high school, are key factors in later volunteering. The findings indicate that volunteer participation is a fairly enduring activity during the transition to adulthood. Those who volunteered the year before were almost eight times as likely to participate in volunteer work in the subsequent year during young adulthood.

Past volunteer experience itself may reflect differences among respondents on all three participatory factors. Those who volunteer during adolescence (and maybe even childhood) likely had access to more pertinent resources and acquired the skills to do volunteer work early on. They probably had greater opportunities to do volunteer work because they were connected to others who invited and encouraged them to do so. This connection — for example, through church or youth groups such as the Boy Scouts or Girl Scouts — likely also exposed them to messages about the importance of altruistic actions, providing one psychological motivation to participate. Our earlier study of the precursors of volunteer participation during high school showed that adolescent volunteers were characterized by strong civic values and interest in service to others (Johnson et al. 1998).

These findings, regarding the continuity of volunteering, point to the potential to foster lifelong volunteerism through programs aimed at youth. Service learning programs implemented in the schools may be a key mechanism through which this could be accomplished. Whether such programs should be mandatory or voluntary is still a debated issue. (For an extensive review of research on service learning and policy recommendations at all educational and administrative levels, see Andersen 1998.) One important advantage of required service learning is its inclusiveness, as it exposes all students to civic participation and provides participatory opportunities, especially to those who are least likely to participate because of their lack of connections to other institutionalized programs. It may also provide an experience with great potential for change for those with initially low civic orientations (Power & Khmelkov 1999).

The life course perspective sensitizes us to the importance of age, duration, and timing in considering factors previously found to promote volunteerism. Our focus on the transition to adulthood is unique in the study of volunteerism.

By estimating models of volunteer work in a dynamic fashion across nine years, we have been able to examine not only this life stage but also changes in the effects that several putatively important factors have on volunteerism with age. The importance of studying volunteerism during the early years of the life course rests in the fact that young people are the middle-aged and elderly adults of the future. As they age, they offer us the potential to build an understanding of volunteerism that truly spans the entire life course.

Notes

1. Indeed, volunteering may be conceived, most cynically, as a form of conspicuous leisure, affirming the social status of those who are able, as a result of their own comfortable economic positions, to contribute their time to others' welfare (Veblen 1970). Daniels (1988), for example, found many self-oriented motivations for volunteering among her sample of elite women civic leaders. In addition to enhancing their social reputations, they sought to learn new skills, gain experience, perform interesting work, make social contacts, or even to forestall social reforms. A popular book on career changes also suggests that volunteer work is an effective means of getting one's foot in the door (Bolles 1992).
2. At the time of data collection in wave 3 (11th grade), 6% of retained panel members were not currently attending school, 10% in wave 4 (12th grade), and 16% of the panel had not yet graduated from high school one year later in wave 5.
3. There were only three notable differences between the models. First, the odds ratio for prior volunteering was reduced to 4.01 ($p < .001$). Second, the effect of months of full-time employment was no longer statistically significant. Third, the effect of parents' socioeconomic status became statistically significant (O.R. = 1.08, $p < .05$). Because these differences could result from the form of the question or from having only five time points, we also estimated a model using the life history calendar measure of volunteering for the same five time points. In this model the effect of prior volunteering was also reduced (O.R. = 3.76; $p < .001$), suggesting that this particular difference was due to not having information between 1996 and 1999. Though the coefficients differed little across models, months of full-time work remained statistically significant and parents' socioeconomic status had no significant effect. In these latter cases the slight changes in coefficients appear to be due to differences in question wording between the life history calendar technique and the direct survey question about volunteering.
4. Consequently, this variable has a constant value of 0 for all respondents during the first three years (age 18–19 to 20–21).
5. The jump in the percentage of respondents with a bachelor's degree at age 23–24 is due to the fact that no data were collected in 1996. To avoid missing data for the entire time point (age 22–23), we used the educational attainment information from the prior year assuming that if a certain level of educational attainment is achieved it cannot be lost. (Note, however, that substitution of data was not necessary for measures based on

the life history calendar, because the calendar in 1997 covered two years, referencing age 22–23 and 23–24.)

6. When we replace full-time with part-time employment in our analyses, part-time work has a positive effect on volunteering, reflecting the absence of full-time work. When both measures are included, the effect of full-time employment is not statistically significant (analyses not shown).

7. Because of missing occupational information for many respondents, we do not examine the effects of occupational prestige on volunteering.

8. We considered using cohabitation as another indicator of family status. However, we decided to exclude it from the analysis because the meaning of cohabitation varies widely and cannot be assumed to be equivalent to marriage (Seltzer 2000). Furthermore, we had no hypotheses about the specific effect of cohabitation on volunteering.

9. For ease of interpretation, we report the odds ratio of the logit, which is a univariate transformation of the regression coefficient [$OR_b = \exp(b)$]. The standard error of the odds ratio is based on a similar transformation [$se(OR_b) = \exp(b) * se(b)$] (Scribney & Wiggins 1999; Stata Corporation 2001).

10. In additional analyses, we examined an alternative strategy for measuring parenthood in which respondents were classified into mutually exclusive groups of having preschool-age children only, school-age children only, both preschool-age and school-age children, and no children (reference group). The findings were essentially the same.

11. At the suggestion of a reviewer, we also examined further the effect of survey year (i.e., panel age) on volunteering. In a similar time-series model controlling only prior volunteering, survey year had a negative effect on volunteering ($OR = .94, p < .001$) consistent with the descriptive statistics in Table 1. In subsequent models, we considered blocks of our explanatory variables (education, employment, family, and prior orientations and sociodemographic background) to identify the factors that account for the decline in volunteering during the transition to adulthood. Our findings indicate that participation in volunteer work declines to a large extent from greater involvement in full-time work.

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Gender and Marital Decision Making: Negotiating Religious Ideology and Practice*

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Abstract

This article uses quantitative data from the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence Survey to examine the relationship between religious identity, gender ideology, and marital decision making. The focus is on variation across religious groups in beliefs about the husband as the head of the family and reported patterns of marital decision making. While conservative Protestants espouse a traditional gender-role ideology, their marital decision-making practices are not significantly different from those of other religious groups. On the other hand, theologically liberal Protestants have more egalitarian ideology while reporting decision-making practices that are not significantly more egalitarian than those of conservative Protestants. The findings suggest that ideology should not be equated with practice without taking into consideration the broader context and subcultural meanings of the beliefs in question.

For decades in America, the traditional family has been closely associated with religious influences. At the end of the 1950s, married couples with children made up nearly half the American population. During this time church membership grew rapidly, and churches responded by emphasizing "traditional nuclear families," a response that continues to reinforce the relationship between religion and family life today (Marler 1995). Traditional ideals about family life and gender roles have many of their roots in religion, and there is much literature on the influence of religious beliefs on family values and patterns. Recent decades, however, have seen shifts in family structure, with the

** Funding for this research was provided by the Pew Charitable Trusts. An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion in Montreal, Canada, November 1998. I am grateful for the direction and support of Christian Smith. I also thank Kraig Beyerlein, Mark Regnerus, John Bartkowski, Robert Woodberry, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions. Direct correspondence to Melinda Lundquist Denton, Department of Sociology, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, CB #3210, Hamilton Hall, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3210. E-mail: mlund@email.unc.edu.*

acknowledgment of nontraditional family forms becoming more common. Along with this shift in family demographics have come changing cultural expectations of families. Scholars are increasingly turning their attention to the changing relationship between family life and religion. Many churches continue to cater to the traditional family model and exert an influence over the beliefs and practices in the family life of their members. However, there are also recent moves within religious communities to recognize changes in family structure and the accompanying changes in ideologies and expectations about family life.

The historical link between religious beliefs and family life has played out in several areas. Past research has documented religious influences on family life in marriage and divorce rates, fertility rates, parenting, labor force participation, household labor, and many others (Call & Heaton 1997; Ellison & Sherkat 1993; Heaton & Cornwall 1989; Hertel & Hughes 1987; Mosher & Hendershot 1984; Wilcox 1998). Changes in the relationship between religion and family have been particularly relevant in the area of gender-role expectations and the relationships of men and women within marriages. An increasing number of women in the labor force and a move toward more egalitarian attitudes about gender are at the center of recent debates over the influence of religion on issues of family and gender (Ammerman & Roof 1995). On June 8, 1998, for example, the Southern Baptist Convention amended its statement of beliefs, the *Baptist Faith and Message Statement*, to include a resolution that a woman should "submit herself graciously" to her husband's leadership, and that the husband should "provide for, protect, and lead his family." These statements from the declaration received much media attention. They seemed to confirm the commonly held belief that conservative Protestant religious groups are resistant to changing gender expectations and responsible for encouraging patriarchal marriages and oppressive gender roles for women. Less attention was directed toward the fact that the resolution also included language about men and women being "of equal worth before God," that while the husband is to take the role of servant-leadership, the wife is "in the image of God as is her husband and thus equal to him."

This language highlights an apparent contradiction in the discourse about family among some religious groups. There seems to be a clear mandate for a hierarchical relationship between husbands and wives, yet there is an affirmation of the equality of men and women. Given this paradoxical language, what do such resolutions tell us about what ordinary Southern Baptists, or more broadly, ordinary conservative Protestants, actually think about family and gender issues? In addition, even if the rhetorical ideology found in this Southern Baptist declaration was consistent with what most conservative Protestants think about family and gender, what conclusions do these ideological statements allow us to draw about what actually takes place in the daily routines of marriage relationships? Are conservative Protestants unique in their ideological views regarding gender and marriage? If so, does their

traditional gender ideology translate into more traditional or inegalitarian marital and family practices?

These questions highlight the importance of drawing distinctions between the official rhetoric of religious groups, the beliefs of the members of those religious groups, and the practices of those individuals. Too often, official statements such as that of the Southern Baptist Convention are taken as direct indicators of how individuals actually behave. There are three significant problems with this conclusion. First, movement rhetoric is not always an accurate reflection of individual ideology. The discourse of a movement is an important resource for movement members, but it is often just one of several cognitive and institutional resources used by individuals to negotiate and articulate their own beliefs and ideologies. Recent work by Bartkowski (2001) on evangelical gender negotiation within marriages serves as an example of the various ways that individuals who ascribe to the beliefs of a particular community interpret the discourse of the community leaders in ways that produce diverse individual ideologies. The second problem is that research has found that there is often a discrepancy between stated ideology and actual practice within families (Ammerman 1987; Hochschild 1989; Kaufman 1991; Pevey, Williams & Ellison 1996). Finally, McNamara (1985) has argued the importance of employing Weber's concept of *verstehen*, an attempt to understand the *meanings* that different actors bring to their beliefs and activities. McNamara identifies a lack of *verstehen* as a particular shortcoming of previous studies of conservative Protestantism. For scholars to interpret words such as *headship* and *equality* without seeking this understanding of meanings is to ignore an important part of the story — the one that seems to matter the most to the main characters.

The work of Sewell (1992) provides a helpful starting point for addressing the questions raised above about the apparently paradoxical gender ideology and marital and family practices of conservative Protestants. We understand from Sewell that people's lives are experienced through a variety of intersecting structures. Within these structures, social actors are versatile in their ability to maintain a variety of overlapping and even apparently incompatible schemas, and to transpose and apply these schemas in a range of contexts. In doing so, according to Sewell, actors also draw on a range of polysemous resources — symbols, language, and texts that can hold multiple and contradictory meanings — that reinforce and modify these different schemas. Sewell's concepts of the transposability of schema, and the polysemy of resources have often been used in past research to examine the relationship between religion and other areas of individuals' lives, including family life (Bartkowski & Wilcox 2000; McVeigh & Sikkink 2001; Regnerus & Smith 1998a; Sherkat 1998; Sherkat & Darnell 1999; Sherkat & Ellison 1997; see also Ellison & Sherkat 1995), and will be helpful in this examination of the dynamic between religious ideology and marital relationships and practices.

GENDER IDEOLOGY AND DECISION MAKING

Current research trends reveal that attitudes about gender in the U.S. are becoming more egalitarian (Hall 1995; Thornton 1989; Thornton, Alwin & Camburn 1983). Changing gender ideology has multiple implications in both the public and the private spheres of our society, and these changing expectations have been of particular interest within families. In some ways, these changes have met with the challenge of structural role constraints that serve to highlight what Hochschild (1989) calls the “stalled revolution.” In other cases, we see a notable relationship between changing gender ideology and the relationships of men and women in marriages (e.g., Amato & Booth 1995; Scanzoni & Arnett 1987).

One area where gender ideology plays a significant role in familial relationships is in the process of marital decision making. Much has been written on the role of resources and marital power in exchange relationships as it relates to marital decision making. In addition to the actual exchange of resources, however, couples’ perceptions and ideology have been found to be just as significant a factor in the establishment of marital power. Several researchers have found strong links between gender ideologies of married couples, the negotiation of marital decisions, and marital satisfaction (Scanzoni & Kingsbury 1989; Waldruff 1988; Zvonkovic, Schmiede & Hall 1994). As previously noted, recent decades have witnessed continual changes in gender ideology. Sexton and Perlman (1989) suggest that these changes have significant implications for marital behavior and the negotiation of marital power. Research by Godwin and Scanzoni (1989) and Zvonkovic and colleagues (1996) also supports the link between perceptions about gender ideology and the decision-making processes of married couples.

Since gender ideologies appear to be important in marital decision making, it is important to understand the factors that influence specific gender ideologies, and how these ideologies get worked out in practice. Traditional gender ideology — that which identifies specific and distinct roles for men and women within marriages — has long been associated with religious influences. Specifically, conservative Protestants have been noted for their ideological support of the patriarchal family model and the belief that the husband should be the head of the family (Bartkowski 1997, 2001; Gallagher & Smith 1999; Thornton, Alwin & Camburn 1983). The distinct language of “male headship” and “female submission” is often associated with conservative Protestants when discussing gender-specific marital roles. Conventional wisdom suggests that, because of their use of traditional gender-specific language, we should expect conservative Protestant marriages to be those in which husbands have a more dominant influence in marital decision-making patterns than they have in other religious groups.

GENDER IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION

Changes in the landscape of gender expectations have highlighted the intersection of religion and family in the area of gender negotiations. Scholars with an interest in the structural context of marital relationships have paid close attention to shifts in gender ideology. Following Sewell (1992), these structures consist of schemas regarding the marital relationships and the resources available to the partners in these relationships. Therefore, understanding the forces that structure marital relationships requires an examination of both the schemas and resources affecting marriages.

Judging from the amount of publications they produce on the subject, it appears that conservative religious groups also have a keen interest in family relationships and high investments in the importance of families. Changes in gender expectations have the potential to upset the balance of traditional family structures. Therefore, many religious groups find themselves involved in heated debates over gender ideologies and the ways that these ideologies are sustained, reproduced, and lived out in the families of their adherents. Much of our understanding of gender ideology in conservative Protestant families has been derived from examinations of these debates and the rhetoric of religious leaders (D'Antonio 1983; Hadden 1983; Hargrove 1983; Messner 1997; Scanzoni 1983). This approach poses the potential problem of focusing only on certain positions found among the ranks of religious leaders. McNamara (1985) points out that research focused on such polemic writings reflects the most extreme positions and ignores the more moderate pastoral literature. The danger of analyzing a single strand of writings within a movement is highlighted by John Bartkowski's (1997) review of the evangelical discourse on gender roles, which contests the notion that conservative Protestants are united in their opinions on gender ideology and family structure. His analysis of the rhetoric of evangelical family commentators reveals a real debate within the evangelical movement over these issues. Bartkowski identifies a number of views on gender and family and concludes that we can no longer use sweeping generalizations to describe the complexity of gender ideology within conservative Protestantism. Instead, there is a range of conservative, moderate, and liberal voices expressed on the issue, as well as a range of individual responses to those voices. When only the extreme positions of any issue are analyzed and critiqued, we flatten an otherwise variegated and complex discourse.

These "official" positions of conservative Protestant religious groups and the writings of movement leaders are frequently viewed by researchers as a proxy for how the person in the pew interprets and applies religious ideology to his or her personal life. This introduces yet another potential problem with analyzing movement rhetoric. The rhetoric and writings of conservative Protestant leaders on gender in marriage serve as an important resource for the conservative Protestant laity, but they are part of the many resources at

play in the formulation and instantiation of individuals' schemas of gender ideology. And if there are many voices on these issues, then there also may be many ways in which various ideological positions translate — or do not — into practice. Gay, Ellison, and Powers (1996) found that there is more diversity of opinion about family and gender roles among conservative Protestants than there is in the general population. Woodberry and Smith (1998) also point out that conservative Protestant beliefs and practices on issues of gender and family are in fact more nuanced and complex than they were previously believed to be. In light of these findings, it seems that we cannot rely on a select handful of movement leaders for an accurate reflection of the sentiments of the rank-and-file church members. While recognizing the importance of official rhetoric, we need to move beyond it to an understanding of how the rhetoric is interpreted and how ideology is worked out in the daily lives of ordinary conservative Protestants.

The schema of traditional gender ideology does not stand alone in the subcultural framework of conservative Protestants. As evidenced in the declaration of the Southern Baptists, their discourse also includes notions about marriage as a supportive mutual partnership and mandates for marital equality. Likewise, there are myriad resources to be accounted for, including those from within specific religious traditions and those material resources common to society as a whole. The multiplicity of schemas is used to interpret available resources. But schemas are also products of resources, being validated and then reproduced or reinterpreted through the accumulation of resources.

According to Sewell's framework of schemas and resources, the multiple ideological positions on gender supplied by the leaders within conservative Protestantism can be drawn upon by conservative Protestants and reinterpreted through existing schemas about gender and marital relationships and their interaction with resources. In addition to religious resources such as affiliation with a specific religious group or theological beliefs, schemas on gender are also validated by nonreligious resources such as increasing opportunities for women in the labor force, decreasing feasibility of single-income families, and a changing political climate for gender discrimination. Bartkowski (2001) has also shown how this process differs across the life course, with couples in various life stages interpreting family ideology through the lenses of their own life experiences.

The ideological language of conservative Protestant leaders is not a direct indicator of the ideological beliefs of ordinary conservative Protestants. Rather, it prompts the question of how individual conservative Protestants use this multifaceted cognitive resource and what role this plays in the construction of their individual gender schemas. These tensions within conservative Protestantism, along with evidence that reveals gaps between marriage ideology and behavior, call for a closer examination of the relationship between conservative religious gender ideologies and marital decision making. How do conser-

vative Protestants compare with other religious groups on decision-making behaviors and ideology that regards the husband as the head of the family?

Because of the particularly patriarchal stereotypes attributed to conservative Protestant positions on gender, several qualitative studies have sought to explore the role of women in conservative Protestant contexts and how the women themselves perceive issues of gender. The findings, while varying somewhat across studies, have found that these women construct their views on headship and male spiritual leadership in ways that lend legitimacy to their involvement in their ideological system and point out ways in which they become beneficiaries. Studies like Marie Griffith's (1997) *God's Daughters* and Judith Stacey's (1990) *Brave New Families* looks at the ways women in conservative Protestant religious groups have reconstructed their meanings of headship over time to accommodate the changing realities of their life experiences and to denounce past abuses of male power. Similarly, Pevey, Williams, and Ellison (1996) deal with the personal negotiation of headship meanings in their study of a women's Bible class at a Southern Baptist church. While the majority of the women in the class believed in their church's position on the husband as the head of the family, they were able to espouse this ideology by renegotiating its meaning in a way that was consistent with their own experiences.

Gallagher and Smith (1999) use in-depth interviews with a national sample of evangelical men and women. In their research, they propose a theory of symbolic traditionalism and pragmatic egalitarianism to reconcile evangelical beliefs about gender roles and male headship with behavior. They suggest that traditional gender-role language used by this conservative religious movement is primarily symbolic, that terms such as headship are used to emphasize the spiritual leadership and family responsibility of men. Meanwhile, the behaviors of the respondents demonstrated much more egalitarian practices. Many of their respondents indicated that they actually make decisions jointly, mutually striving for consensus.

Similarly, Smith and Lundquist (2000) found that, although most of the evangelicals interviewed believe in a husband's headship, they were also eager to qualify what that meant to them. There was significant diversity on what was meant by the term *headship*, and for most evangelicals it did not necessarily imply male dominance in the marriage relationship. Rather, husbands as the head of the family more often meant special male accountability, responsibility, servanthood, and self-sacrificing love. For those who say they believe in headship, the language of the husband as the spiritual leader or spiritual role model was much more common than the language of the husband as breadwinner or final authority in the marriage. By defining male headship as spiritual leadership — symbolic traditionalism — the pragmatic egalitarianism of their everyday lives did not appear to them to be in conflict with their ideological belief in the husband as the head of the family. Instead, interpret-

ing headship as a spiritual concept allowed for a range of more egalitarian practices to be compatible with their understanding of male headship. In addition, Smith and Lundquist (2000) show that most of the interview respondents also talked about marriage as a mutual, equal partnership that requires respect and commitment from both partners. Their reports indicated that headship, as these evangelicals interpret the term, is viewed as compatible with rather than conflicting with a partnership view of marriage. Thus, while the language of headship is an important part of evangelical discourse about marriage, it may not automatically imply that evangelical marriages are highly male-dominated in practice.

The qualitative studies discussed above have made strides toward understanding the implications of headship ideology in the pragmatic working out of marriage relationships. They have provided insight into how some individuals understand and interpret the meanings of headship and negotiate its role in their own marriages. However, no single previous study has provided a comprehensive analysis of self-reported religious identity, gender ideology, and decision making. Some prior work related to religious gender ideologies has been limited to analysis of religious literature (e.g., Bartkowski 1997). This explores the positions of certain religious leaders, but it does not tell us much about who reads this literature or how the members of religious groups apply it. In addition, previous studies that do examine respondents' religious gender ideologies or decision-making behaviors have been limited to specific subsets of the population (Gallagher & Smith 1999; Smith & Lundquist 2000) or to nonrepresentative samples (Bartkowski 2001; Grasmick, Wilcox & Bird 1990; Griffith 1997; Stacey 1990; Zvonkovic et al. 1996).

In contrast, this article uses nationally representative data to build upon the findings of previous work. Following the patterns found in the qualitative research, this article explores the dynamics of religious identity, gender ideology, and decision-making behaviors. Comparisons within and across religious categories inform our understanding of how ideology and practice play out in various religious traditions. The findings of Bartkowski (2001), Gallagher and Smith (1999), and Smith and Lundquist (2000), and others suggest that the language of the husband as the head of the family remains a significant part of the conservative Protestant dialogue about gender ideology. Therefore, I expect to find significant differences between religious groups in the support of this ideological language, and I specifically expect that conservative Protestants will report higher levels of support for this traditional ideology than other groups. However, previous studies have also shown that among conservative Protestants there are a variety of interpretations of this concept of the husband as the head that could lead to differences in the way schemas regarding headship affect actual marital practices. Following the theory of symbolic traditionalism and pragmatic egalitarianism proposed by Gallagher and Smith (1999), I expect that, although conservative Protestants are more likely to sup-

port husband-as-the-head ideology, this ideology may not necessarily translate into more traditional family practices.

Methods

DATA

The data for this research come from the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence Survey. This is a cross-sectional, nationally representative telephone survey probing the religious beliefs, identities, and behaviors of adult Americans. The telephone survey was conducted from January to March 1996, using a randomly generated sample designed to represent all telephones in the U.S., excluding Alaska and Hawaii.¹ Random-digit dialing ensured equal representation of listed, unlisted, and not-yet-listed household telephone numbers. In order to randomize responses within households, and so to ensure representativeness by age and gender, interviewers asked to speak with the person in the household who had the next birthday. The research design included at least 10 calls for each number, and three callbacks to convert refusals. All data analysis is weighted by the number of people 18 years old or older in the respondent's household to account for the fact that only one respondent for each telephone number was given an opportunity to participate. The survey was designed with an intentional oversample of religiously committed Protestants.² This oversample was necessary in order to achieve sufficient numbers of respondents from the distinct traditions within the broader category of American Protestantism. (See Smith et al. 1998 Appendix A.) Weighting procedures were used in descriptive statistics to compensate for this oversample, correcting for the true proportion of religiously committed Protestants in the American population.

MEASURES

Independent Variables

There is a variety of religious schemas and resources that influence people's behaviors. The vast majority of past studies have focused on conventional survey measures of religion — denominational affiliations, theological beliefs, frequency of church attendance — and how these direct beliefs and behaviors. These are important factors in predicting people's behaviors. However, recent work has also begun to explore new avenues by which religion acts as a resource in the negotiation of beliefs and behaviors. Smith and colleagues (1998) contend that the broader religious movement or tradition with which individuals identify themselves is a significant cognitive resource that often guides their beliefs and behaviors. Rather than rely on denominational

affiliations to predict religious attitudes and behaviors, recent surveys have begun to use questions that allow respondents to locate themselves on the field of contending religious movements. In 1996, for example, the GSS began to include a question modeled after the Religious Identity and Influence Survey that allows respondents to self-identify with religious movements such as fundamentalist, theologically liberal Protestant, mainline Protestant, and so on.

Religious identities may play a different role than denominational affiliation or biblical beliefs, and it is important to explore the nuances that these identities illuminate. For example, Darnell and Sherkat (1997) have done work that shows the importance of denominational ties and theological beliefs on educational attainment. This work has been an important contribution to our understanding of how religious resources are linked with educational resources. However, Beyerlein (n.d.) used religious identities to investigate the same issue of educational attainment and was able to draw out some finer distinctions and nuances that also contribute to a more complete picture of the relationship between religion and educational attainment. While I recognize the importance of a wide range of religious resources, the focus of this article is to highlight a particular way of conceptualizing religion and religious identity that to this point has not received as much attention in the literature. A series of recent research has used these religious identities and has found them to be significant predictors of a wide range of beliefs and behaviors (e.g., Beatty & Walter 1988; Emerson, Smith & Sikkink 1999; Green et al. 1996; Hamil-Luker & Smith 1998; Regnerus, Sikkink & Smith 1999; Regnerus & Smith 1998a, 1998b; Sikkink 1998; Smith 2000; Smith et al. 1998; see also Woodberry & Smith 1998).

An indicator of religious self-identification was used as the measure of the key independent variable, religious identity, in this study. (See Smith et al. 1998 Appendix B for a detailed explanation of this variable.) The self-identity variable resulted in 11 religious categories that I collapsed into eight categories for use in these models. The categories within the religiously committed Protestant oversample include conservative Protestant, mainline Protestant, theologically liberal Protestant, and other Protestant.³ The remaining four religious categories are nominal Protestants, Catholics, other religions, and nonreligious. These eight categories were used as indicator variables in the models, with theologically liberal Protestants as the reference category. I expect that of the religiously committed Protestants, liberal Protestants will have the most egalitarian attitudes and behaviors, making them a good reference group for the other churchgoing Protestant religious categories. In reference to all of the religious identity categories, liberal Protestants form a theological midpoint of the eleven categories, allowing comparisons on both ends of the religious identity spectrum.

While religious self-identification is the focus of this analysis, it is important to also consider other measures of religion. In particular, theological beliefs have been shown in past research to be important religious resources that predict a variety of outcomes (Bartkowski & Wilcox 2000; Hamil-Luker & Smith 1998; Sherkat 2000; Sherkat & Darnell 1999; Sherkat & Ellison 1997; Sherkat & Wilson 1995; Wilcox 1998). Belief in the literal interpretation of the Bible is one such theological commitment that often correlates with traditional ideology about family and gender. Note that this specific belief overlaps with but is a distinct type of religious resource from a conservative Protestant religious identity. In order to distinguish the effects of this theological resource from the effects of religious identity on marital decision making, a variable for the theological belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible will be included in models below where theoretically warranted, namely, in models where the influence of these two religious resources could be conflated. Literal Bible is a dichotomous variable indicating those respondents who believe that the Bible is both the inspired word of God and true in all ways, and to be read literally, word for word.

In addition to the religious identification variables and the theological belief variable, control variables used in this analysis include indicator variables for sex, residence in the South, the employment status of the female member of married couples, and race (black, white, Hispanic, and other). I also control for age (in years),⁴ education (years completed), the logged population of respondent's county of residence, and income. Income is measured in categories, with respondents being asked to identify the category that best describes total household income before taxes. The categories are in 10,000-dollar increments, with the first category being "less than \$10,000" and the final category being "more than \$100,000."⁵ Each of these control variables is used in all the models, although they do not appear on the tables.

Dependent Variables

The dimension of gender ideology examined in this study is operationalized by a question asked of all respondents, "Do you think that the husband should be the head of the family or not?" The responses resulted in a dichotomous variable indicating whether the respondent believes that the husband should be the head of the family.⁶ Respondents who answered yes to the question about the husband as the head of the family were then asked a series of follow-up questions. They were asked, "What do you think it means to be the head of the family?" and were given a chance to respond separately to each of the following possible meanings of the concept in question:

- "Does it mean that the husband should be responsible to give spiritual direction for the family, or not?"

- “Does it mean that the husband should be the final authority in decision-making, or not?”
- “Does it mean that the husband should be the primary breadwinner, or not?”

The order of these three questions was randomly rotated in the survey. The results were coded into three dichotomous variables indicating more specific meanings attributed to husband-as-head beliefs.

The second group of dependent variables is designed to measure decision-making patterns within marriages. Respondents were asked who has more “say-so” when it comes to making decisions about important financial matters, child rearing, and who should work outside the home. They were then also asked, “When you and your spouse disagree about important decisions that need to be made, who usually gives in and goes along with what the other thinks, you or your spouse?” In addition, they were asked, “Who usually takes the lead on spiritual matters?” For all these questions, respondents are prompted with the “you or your spouse?” option. Saying “both” was also an answer category, but the interviewer did not offer this as a choice — respondents had to volunteer that answer. Requiring respondents to volunteer “both” encouraged consideration of their answers to the questions and prevented “both” as an easy, socially desirable answer. The answers to all these measures have been recoded into three categories: “male more,” “female more,” and “both equal.”

Below I analyze the relationship between religious identity and belief in husband as the head of the family using logistic regression, since the outcome variable is dichotomous. I then analyze the relationship between religious identity and decision-making patterns using multinomial logistic regression, since the outcome variables each have three unordered response categories. All regression results are reported as estimated odds ratios.

Results

EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS

Table 1 provides the weighted percentages for each religious identity, along with the unweighted *N* for each group. As might be expected, conservative Protestants have the highest percentage of respondents who agree that the husband should be the head of the family, while nonreligious respondents report the lowest percentage of agreement with this ideology. The difference in the percentage of conservative Protestants and theologically liberal Protestants who agree with husband headship is more than 27 percentage points; and between conservative Protestants and nonreligious respondents, the difference is more than 60 percentage points.

TABLE 1: Husband as the Head of the Family (Percents)

	Percentage of Sample ^a [Unweighted N]	Agree with Husband As Head	Head of Family As Authority ^b (Married Only)	Head of Family As Bread winner (Married Only)	Head of Family As Spiritual Direction (Married Only)
Religiously committed Protestants					
Conservative	13.1 [809]	86.6	51.1 (54.1)	42.7 (45.2)	78.3 (83.6)
Mainline	9 [571]	70.5	25 (26.4)	34 (35.1)	53 (55.3)
Theologically liberal	6.7 [430]	59	24.5 (27.5)	25.5 (26.1)	41 (41.5)
Other Protestant	4 [254]	80	40.3 (48.1)	39 (41.6)	63.3 (71.3)
Nominal Protestant	21.4 [163]	54.3	18.21 (16.9)	24.4 (26.8)	34 (32.5)
Catholic	24.3 [177]	33.2	9.8 (9.4)	12.5 (11.6)	21.2 (23.6)
Other religions	8.4 [77]	61.3	28 (26.9)	34.4 (40.1)	49.8 (51.5)
Nonreligious	13.3 [109]	26	10 (8.4)	14.8 (11.6)	14.3 (17.9)

Source: Religious Identity and Influence Survey 1996.

Notes: All statistics are weighted for household size unless otherwise noted.

^a Percentages are weighted to correct for household size and the oversample of religiously committed Protestants.

^b Questions regarding meaning were asked only of those who agree with husband as the head of the family. Numbers reported reflect the total percentage of each group who responded positively to the question.

Table 1 also shows the total percentage of each religious group that answered positively to each of the three questions about what it means that the husband is the head of the family. Among conservative Protestants, spiritual leadership appears to have a high level of consensus. Consistent with the responses from personal interviews found by Smith and Lundquist (2000), 78% believe that for the husband to be the head of the family means that he is responsible to provide spiritual leadership for the family. The diversity among conservative Protestants noted earlier can be seen in their responses to decision-making authority or primary breadwinner status as elements of male headship. While the percentages for these interpretations are higher than for

TABLE 2: Decision-Making Percentages by Religious Groups

	Who Usually Gives In?			Who Has More Say-So in Financial Matters?		
	Male	Both	Female	Male	Both	Female
Religiously committed Protestants						
Conservative	24.2	30.8	45.1	49.4	36.8	13.8
Mainline	22.9	36.5	40.6	44.8	40.3	14.9
Theologically liberal	22.7	38.2	39.1	42.1	42.1	15.8
Other	15.2	36.2	48.6	45.4	38.2	16.3
Nominal Protestant	30.8	30.8	38.3	36.2	44.5	19.2
Catholic	27.8	40.1	32.1	36.9	38.7	24.3
Other religions	32.9	39.9	27.2	34.7	55.5	9.8
Nonreligious	34.0	42.2	23.8	32.9	38.3	28.8

those of other groups, they are much lower than that of spiritual leadership. Only slightly more than half of all the conservative Protestants in this survey profess a belief in male headship that grants final authority in decision making to the husband. Less than half (42.7%) equate headship with being the primary breadwinner. This supports the idea that there are multiple views about what it means for the husband to be the head of the family, and that among conservative Protestants the most commonly held understanding of headship is not that of authority, but rather providing spiritual leadership for the family.

However, the numbers of conservative Protestants who hold any of these perspectives regarding male headship are higher than they are for any of the other religious categories. The question equating the husband as head with final authority in decision making is the most closely linked to later questions about decision-making patterns in the home. While 51% of conservative Protestants reported that they believed in male headship that grants the husband final authority in decisions, only 25% each of mainline and liberal Protestants fell in this category.⁷ This might lead us to think that evangelicals would be more patriarchal in their decision-making patterns than their theologically liberal Protestant counterparts.

On the questions about marital practice, however, the differences are not as great. Table 2 shows that among conservative Protestants, the husband “gives in” about 24% of the time, compared with 23% for mainline and liberal Protestants, a difference of less than 2 percentage points. The question of who has more say-so in decisions about financial matters also shows relatively small differences between the religiously committed Protestant groups. Among conservative Protestants, 49% report that the man has more say-so in financial

TABLE 2: Decision-Making Percentages by Religious Groups (Cont'd)

	Who Has More Say-So about Who Works?			Who Has More Say-So about Childrearing?		
	Male	Both	Female	Male	Both	Female
Religiously committed Protestants						
Conservative	29.7	63.2	7.1	12.4	51.0	36.6
Mainline	23.8	65.9	10.3	8.2	45.4	46.5
Theologically liberal	25.2	66.9	8.0	10.1	48.2	41.7
Other	26.4	63.8	9.8	13.5	44.8	41.6
Nominal Protestant	23.8	69.3	6.9	13.7	42.7	43.6
Catholic	13.1	78.0	8.9	5.5	53.3	41.2
Other religions	27.1	70.5	1.0	10.0	48.6	41.4
Nonreligious	19.2	73.3	7.5	7.1	34.7	58.2

Source: Religious Identity and Influence Survey 1996.

Note: All statistics weighted for household size.

decisions. This compares with 45% of mainliners, 42% of the liberals, and 33% of nonreligious respondents who report that the man has more say.⁸ These percentages are noteworthy, since only 25% of both mainline and liberal Protestants reported an ideology that supports male decision-making authority, while their reported decision-making behavior shows significantly higher proportions of respondents for whom male-dominated decision-making is their actual practice. Conservative Protestants were more likely to report an ideology that supported the husband's authority in decision making, but the percentage of respondents for whom the male partner had more decision-making say-so was lower than the percentage reporting that ideology. This appears to be a regression-toward-the-mean effect. The two groups are on opposite ends of the ideology spectrum but seem to converge toward similar patterns of reported behavior.

These bivariate percentages suggest that there is a wider gap between conservative Protestants and other religious groups on questions of ideology than on questions of practice. In order to examine these differences more fully, I employ multivariate analysis.

HUSBAND-AS-HEAD IDEOLOGY

The first analysis examines belief in the husband as the head of the family. I used logistic regression with a dichotomous variable for the question, "Do you think the man should be the head of the family?" In Table 3, model 1 shows

TABLE 3: Belief in Husband as the Head of the Family

Should the Husband Be the Head of the Family?				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	All Respondents	Married Respondents	All Respondents	Married Respondents
Religiously committed Protestants				
Conservative	4.82***	6.14***	4.04***	4.91***
Mainline	1.76***	1.66*	1.75***	1.61*
Other	2.56***	2.76**	2.41***	2.50**
Nominal Protestant	.76	.64	1.03	.85
Catholic	.44***	.41**	.48**	.43**
Other religions	1.37	1.36	1.72	1.68
Nonreligious	.27***	.20***	.37***	.29**
Literal Bible			2.69***	3.00***
Pseudo R ²	.167	.1784	.189	.2024
Log-likelihood	-1279.607	-714.566	-1246.152	-693.658
χ ²	339.5	200.61	362.9	215.44
N	2,480	1,501	2,480	1,501

Source: Religious Identity and Influence Survey 1996.

Notes: Estimated odds ratios. All models weighted for household size and include controls for age, black, Hispanic, other race, female, income, education, logged population, and wife working that are not reported in the table. Omitted reference category for religious groups is theologically liberal Protestants.

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

the results of these regression models for the independent variable of religious identification as measured by indicator variables for the seven religious categories (control variables not shown). Theologically liberal Protestants were used as the reference category to which all other religious groups were compared. As expected, the greatest difference on this question was with conservative Protestants. With control variables held constant, the odds of self-identified conservative Protestants agreeing that the husband should be head was 4.82 times as great as among liberal Protestants. The effect was similar among married conservative Protestants, for whom the odds of agreeing are 6.14 times as great as among married liberal Protestants. While most groups were significantly different from liberal Protestants in one direction or the other, conservative Protestants (especially married conservative Protestants) were at the farthest end of the spectrum, with a large gap between them and the other groups.

Model 2 of Table 3 includes a control for a literal view of the Bible. As expected, this additional measure of conservative religious belief is significantly related to agreement that the husband should be the head of the family. Including literal Bible in the model does slightly reduce the odds ratio for conservative Protestants. However, even when controlling for belief in a literal interpretation of the Bible, conservative Protestants are still much more likely than liberal Protestants to agree that the husband should be the head of the family. This indicates that even beyond measures of theological belief, there is something significant about the conservative Protestant identity that contributes to a stronger likelihood of agreeing with headship ideology.

DECISION MAKING

The second set of variables tested the reported behaviors of married respondents. Five variables were used to measure the patterns of marital behavior among the religious identification categories. Multinomial regression was employed in these analyses. The comparison category in the multinomial models was the response that reflects the most traditional or patriarchal behavior. The remaining two possible responses that indicated female-dominated or egalitarian decision making were then compared directly with the male-dominated response.

Give-in

Multinomial regression allowed an analysis of the question "Who usually gives in and goes along with what the other thinks?" The response indicating that the wife usually gives in more was considered the most typical of a patriarchal response and was used as the comparison category. The models in Table 4 indicate the increased or decreased odds of choosing the answer "husband gives in" over "wife gives in" and also the odds of choosing "both give in equally" over "wife gives in." In model 2, belief in husband as head is significant at the 0.001 level for the odds ratio of husband giving in to the wife giving in. This finding indicates that respondents who agree with husband's headship have 43% lower odds than those who do not agree of saying that the husband usually gives in rather than the wife gives in on important decisions. This supports the notion of headship as bestowing more decision-making responsibility on the man. The odds ratio for both giving in equally is also significant. All other things being equal, those who agree that husband should be head are more likely than those who do not to report that the wife gives in more often than that they both give in equally. Given that belief in husband as head is significant, we might expect that if it were left out of the model, those religious groups that are more likely than liberal Protestants to agree with husband's headship would reflect the indirect effect of headship ideology, resulting in a significant

TABLE 4: Reported Marital Decision Making

	Who Usually Gives In?			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Husband Gives In More	Both Give In Equally	Husband Gives In More	Both Give In Equally
Religiously committed Protestants				
Conservative	1.05	.69	1.29	.84
Mainline	1.18	.79	1.28	.86
Other	.61	.93	.69	1.05
Nominal Protestant	1.50	.77	1.37	.73
Catholic	1.65	.98	1.34	.83
Other religions	2.07	1.08	2.11	1.11
Nonreligious	2.03	1.71	1.54	1.37
Belief in husband as head			.43***	.47***
Pseudo R ²	.043	.052		
Log-likelihood	-1443.494		-1429.175	
χ^2	129.32		158.07	
N	1,404		1,404	
Say-So about Who Works				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Wife Has More Say	Have Equal Say	Wife Has More Say	Have Equal Say
Religiously committed Protestants				
Conservative	.69	.78	.81	.98
Mainline	1.15	.83	1.22	.91
Other	1.40	1.16	1.57	1.36
Nominal Protestant	.95	1.26	.83	1.06
Catholic	1.55	1.85	1.16	1.31
Other religions	.00	1.20	.00	1.24
Nonreligious	1.27	1.72	.87	1.08
Belief in husband as head			.35**	.28***
Pseudo R ²	.093		.111	
Log-likelihood	-879.335		-861.577	
χ^2	180.000		215.520	
N	1,165		1,165	

TABLE 4: Reported Marital Decision Making (Cont'd)

Say-So in Important Financial Matters				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Wife Has More Say	Both Have Equal Say	Wife Has More Say	Both Have Equal Say
Religiously committed Protestants				
Conservative	.74	.75	.95	.99
Mainline	.97	.87	1.07	.97
Other	.99	.92	1.16	1.10
Nominal Protestant	1.75	1.36	1.60	1.27
Catholic	1.73	.94	1.33	.75
Other religions	.68	1.61	.72	1.72
Nonreligious	2.01	1.29	1.41	.91
Belief in husband as head			.35***	.34***
Pseudo R ²	.047		.066	
Log-likelihood	-1446.181		-1419.154	
χ^2	143.18		200.85	
N	1,491		1,491	
Say-So about Child Rearing				
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Wife Has More Say	Both Have Equal Say	Wife Has More Say	Both Have Equal Say
Religiously committed Protestants				
Conservative	.72	.86	.92	1.15
Mainline	1.16	.97	1.29	1.09
Other	.91	.88	1.08	1.08
Nominal Protestant	.91	.74	.81	.65
Catholic	1.58	1.54	1.15	1.09
Other religions	.84	.84	.85	.85
Nonreligious	1.53	2.24	.99	1.37
Belief in husband as head			.23***	.19***
Pseudo R ²	.036		.047	
Log-likelihood	-1217.107		-1203.285	
χ^2	91.330		118.970	
N	1,319		1,319	

Source: Religious Identity and Influence Survey 1996.

Notes: Estimated odds ratios. All models weighted for household size and include controls for age, black, Hispanic, other race, female, income, education, logged population, and wife working that are not reported in the table. Omitted reference category for religious groups is theologically liberal Protestants.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed tests)

relationship between religious identity and the responses to who gives in. However, in model 1 we do not find statistically significant differences between most religious groups and the liberal Protestant reference group. Of specific interest is the fact that the odds of saying that the husband gives in as compared to the wife giving in are not significantly lower for conservative Protestants than for liberal Protestants. Nor do conservative Protestants have increased odds of reporting that the female gives in more than both give in equally.

More Say-So

Responses from the question "Who has more 'say-so' in decisions about financial matters?" are also shown in Table 4. If a belief in the husband as the head of the family increases male dominance in marital behavior, we would expect to see that since conservative Protestants believe in headship, they would be more likely to report that husbands have more say-so in financial decisions. Instead, there are no significant differences between any of the religious groups and the liberal Protestant reference group in the responses to this question. Agreement that the husband should be head significantly decreases the odds of reporting that the wife has more say-so as opposed to the husband having more say, as well as the odds of reporting that both have equal say as compared to the man having more say in financial decisions. However, whether or not belief in headship is controlled for, conservative Protestants do not report significantly different decision-making patterns from liberal Protestants.

The third dependent variable in Table 4 also reports results for a question where we might expect to see that the odds of male dominated decision-making patterns increase with headship ideology: "Who has more say-so in decisions about who works outside the home?" I have controlled for the wife working outside the home, since the work status of the wife proves to be significantly negatively related to the odds of the husband having more say as opposed to the wife having more say or both having equal say. Asking who has more say in decisions about who works outside the home, we find once again that there are no significant differences between liberal Protestants and any of the other categories of religious identity. Holding all other variables constant, conservative Protestants do not report significantly lower odds of the wives having more say or both having equal say than of the husband having the most say on this issue.

The final models of Table 4 show the responses to "Who has more say-so in decisions about childrearing?" regressed on the control and religious identity variables. Child-rearing decisions are often attributed to women in traditional decision-making patterns. However, conservative Protestants may have a tendency to consider these decisions to be a part of the man's responsibility for leadership of the family. If this is true, we should expect an even larger gap here between liberal and conservative Protestants. Following the same pattern

as the previous tables, however, we see that in spite of the strong relationship between conservative Protestants and headship ideology, there is no similar relationship between being conservative Protestants and increased odds of reporting male-dominated decision-making patterns. Note that all models were also run with the literal Bible variable included. The inclusion of this variable did not change any of the results for the religious identity variables, and it was therefore not included in the final models.

I used the general category of conservative Protestants in these regressions. Though a high percentage of conservative Protestants report a belief in the husband as the head of the family, there are those who do not subscribe to this ideology. To press the analysis even further, I ran the models again using dummy variables to differentiate those conservative Protestants who believe that husband should be head from those who do not. This eliminated the possibility that conservative Protestants who do not subscribe to the ideology of headship were creating the nonsignificant results. I found that in most cases, conservative Protestants who stated that they agree that the husband should be the head of the family do not report decision-making patterns that are significantly different from the liberal Protestant reference group. The one exception to this was from those in the case of who usually gives in. Conservative Protestants who believe in the headship of the husband have significantly lower odds of reporting that both give in equally than of the wife giving in. However, they were not significantly different from liberal Protestants in the odds of reporting that the husband gives in from the odds of the wife giving in. Across all other variables, the general pattern of results also holds up even when subjected to a more specific and demanding test limited to conservative Protestants who explicitly profess agreement with husband-as-head ideology.

Spiritual Leadership

Thus far we have discovered that conservative Protestants have significantly higher odds of agreeing with husband-as-head ideology but are no less likely to report egalitarian decision-making patterns than their theologically liberal Protestant counterparts. Since their reported decision-making patterns do not appear to reflect more male dominance than other groups, it is misleading to conclude that a tendency toward belief that the husband should be the head of the family necessarily leads to more traditional decision making among conservative Protestants. We can, however, continue to explore the meanings and contexts of headship among conservative Protestants in an attempt to explain the role of headship ideology in their marriages.

Table 5 reports odds ratios for responses to the question "Who usually takes the lead in spiritual matters?" The response categories are coded in the same manner as the previous variables. This question was asked only of religiously committed Protestants in the sample, so we are only able to compare across

TABLE 5: Spiritual Leadership

Who Usually Takes the Lead in Spiritual Matters?						
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Wife Takes the Lead	Both Take the Lead	Wife Takes the Lead	Both Take the Lead	Wife Takes the Lead	Both Take the Lead
Religiously committed Protestants						
Conservative	.37***	.29***	.39***	.29***	.47**	.38***
Mainline	.87	.65	.88	.65	.93	.70
Other	.72	.46*	.74	.47*	.85	.55
Literal Bible			.80	.88	.94	1.07
Belief in husband as head					.27***	.23***
Pseudo R ²	.093		.093		.112	
Log-likelihood	-1202.050		-1201.058		-1176.392	
χ ²	245		247		296.3	
N	1,222		1,222		1,222	

Source: Religious Identity and Influence Survey 1996.

Notes: Estimated odds ratios. All models weighted for household size and include controls for age, black, Hispanic, other race, female, income, education, logged population, and wife working that are not reported in the table. Omitted reference category for religious groups is theologically liberal Protestants.

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

those categories. Theologically liberal Protestant remains the reference category. In model 1 we see that, compared to reporting that the husband takes the lead in spiritual matters, the odds of saying that the wife usually takes the lead or that both take the lead equally are significantly lower for conservative Protestants than for liberal Protestants. As previously noted, a literal interpretation of the Bible may contribute to more traditional gender ideology and therefore be related to the likelihood of a husband taking leadership in spiritual matters. To separate this from the influence of religious identity, the literal Bible variable is added to model 2. Supporting a literal view of the Bible does not significantly change the odds of reporting that the husband takes the lead in spiritual matters. Neither does the inclusion of this variable reduce the odds ratios of conservative Protestants. Even when accounting for a literal view of the Bible, conservative Protestants are still much more likely than theologically liberal Protestants to report that the husband takes the lead in spiritual matters.

When the belief-in-husband-as-head variable is added to model 3, conservative Protestants remain significantly different from liberals, although

the effect is diminished. The odds ratios change from 0.39 and 0.29 to 0.47 and 0.38, and the significance level for the comparison between the wife taking the lead and the husband taking the lead drops from $p < .001$ to $p < .01$ (indicating that headship may be an intervening variable in the odds ratio for conservative Protestants in models 1 and 2). The results from this question are consistent with the finding that conservative Protestants have the highest percentage of respondents who report spiritual leadership to be a key component of husbands' headship. These findings indicate that spiritual leadership is one area where we *do* see conservative Protestants' reported marital behaviors differing from those of liberal Protestants. That a belief in the husband as the head of the family accounts for some of this difference suggests support for a *spiritually symbolic interpretation* of the meaning and influence of headship ideology in conservative Protestant marriages.

Discussion

Conservative Protestant religion has long been associated with male headship and patriarchal family structures. However, past research on this relationship has been limited in two ways. First, research has often been limited to the analysis of the rhetoric of evangelical leaders that has then been used to make generalizations about the beliefs and behaviors of conservative Protestants. Second, much research that focuses on the conservative Protestant laity has been limited to particular subsets of the conservative Protestant population, particularly women and charismatics. I have attempted to address both these limitations and advance our understanding by analyzing the husband-as-head ideology and reported decision-making behavior of a representative sample of Americans, using innovative measures of religiously committed Protestants.

In spite of conservative Protestants' strong tendency to support the ideology of the husband as the head of the family, they are not significantly different from other religious groups in their practices of marital decision making. If in fact belief in the headship of the husband had the practical consequences of creating male dominance and patriarchal marriage patterns, we should expect the religious groups who adhere to this ideology also to report more male-dominated decision-making patterns. Instead, it appears that they are not significantly more traditional in their decision-making practices than the respondents from other, more liberal, religious categories.

How can we understand these findings? There are multiple factors that contribute to the discrepancies we find between stated ideology and the reported practices of conservative Protestants. Returning to Sewell's (1992) model of interacting schemas and resources, we realize that the process of negotiating cultural values and schemas in the context of pragmatic realities determines to a large extent how various ideological positions work out in

practice. The high percentage of conservative Protestants who profess agreement with husbands' headship suggests that headship is a schema that is not only supported by conservative Protestant leaders but is also highly ingrained in the conservative Protestant identity. However, this schema of gender ideology is interpreted, sustained, and reproduced through its relationship to the resources available to individuals. Conservative Protestants, as a group, have levels of education and income similar to those of the rest of the population (Woodberry & Smith 1998). We also see among their membership single parents, dual-income families, and a range of socioeconomic indicators similar to those of the larger population. It is to be expected that since conservative Protestants are similar to other Americans in marital status, working status, and socioeconomic status, the same structural forces that influence the decisions of groups will also have some influence on conservative Protestants' decisions about these issues. The reality of dual incomes and changes in societal gender expectations makes the conventional wisdom about the husband as breadwinner and authority figure ring hollow for many conservative Protestants. They must then reinterpret the schema of the husband as the head of the family in a manner that is consistent with their social location, resources, and experiences.

This pattern of negotiated ideological schemas has been identified particularly among evangelicals, a large subset of conservative Protestantism. As has been noted by Bartkowski (1997, 2001), Smith (2000), and Smith and colleagues (1998), evangelicals have within their tradition a variety of often-paradoxical cultural tools (Swidler 1986) with which to navigate their engagement with society, including those that support a more egalitarian view of marriage. Smith and Lundquist (2000) argue that as the ideology of evangelicals gets worked out in practice, they emphasize those aspects of their subcultural tradition that resonate most closely with the larger cultural environment. Those aspects of traditional headship that come into conflict with economic and social changes, such as husband as the primary breadwinner, may be challenged and re-negotiated. As they draw more heavily on their egalitarian cultural tools in the pragmatic working out of everyday life, the schema of male headship may take on a different meaning.

It is clear that conservative Protestants are committed to the ideology of the husband as the head of the family. However, among the conservative Protestants in this study, the notion of the husband as the head of the family has a meaning not found as commonly among more liberal religious groups — spiritual leadership. While there are also those who understand head of the family to be defined in terms of decision-making authority and breadwinner status, the overwhelming majority of conservative Protestants agree that being the head of the family means taking spiritual leadership in the family. The area of spiritual leadership is one aspect of husband-as-head ideology that is not directly challenged by social and economic resources. Rather than abandoning

a version of headship that conflicts with their social environment, most conservative Protestants appear to hold to a spiritualized interpretation of headship that allows for practices that are not in direct conflict with the changes in their social context. By emphasizing the concept of spiritual leadership, these conservative Protestants are able to maintain a schema of headship that is unique to their own subculture while being compatible with the cultural shifts that require them to draw on more egalitarian aspects of their tradition in daily practice. If this is the case, then the patriarchal marital patterns so often attributed to conservative Protestants by way of their adherence to headship ideology may not be as prevalent as is often thought.

In fact, if the majority of conservative Protestants believe that for the husband to be the head of the family means that he offers spiritual leadership, then this is the test we should use to determine the relationship between this ideology and the practice of these beliefs. The apparent gap between ideology and practice may be partially explained by shifting the focus of where we expect to see the practical consequences of this particular ideological belief. According to the findings of this article, the area where the husband-as-head ideology of conservative Protestants has the most apparent influence on practice is in fact in the area of spiritual leadership, the only place where we see patterns of gendered decision making among them significantly different from those of the theologically liberal respondents.

The lack of a significant difference between conservative Protestants and theologically liberal Protestants, however, is only partially explained by the characteristics of conservative Protestants. Another factor to consider is that the source of these differences may be found among the liberal Protestants. Looking back again to the percentages in Tables 1 and 2, we see that there is a considerable difference between the number of liberal Protestants who profess an ideology of authoritative male headship (25%) and the number who report that the male has the most say-so in financial decisions (42%). Even though the majority of liberal Protestants reject a view of the husband as the head of the family with decision-making authority, we do not find that this translates into a similarly high proportion of them reporting egalitarian decision making in regard to financial matters. The gap between reported ideology and practice exists among theologically liberal Protestants in the opposite direction from what is found among conservative Protestants. These opposite discrepancies between the ideology and reported behaviors within each religious tradition help to explain why there are no significant differences between the practices of the two groups, in spite of the large differences between their ideological positions.

The findings here regarding gender ideology and decision making in marriages are one facet of a larger process of the negotiation of religion and family life. Religious commitments do play a role in family life. However, this examination of conservative Protestants provides an example of the dynamic

nature of the relationship between religion and family. At the same time that religious ideology influences views about the family, the realities of changing demands on and expectations of family life also influence the ideological constructs within the subculture of conservative Protestantism. To understand the nature of this relationship, it is not sufficient to determine that certain religious groups are more or less likely to hold traditional views on gender roles. If we stop there, we lose the nuance of meanings that lie behind the stated ideologies, as well as the relationship between meanings and behavior. Instead, we should seek to specify meanings and understand consequences of the ideological language employed.

This article has gone beyond determining who affirms ideologically the husband as the head of the family to try to establish a better understanding of what that does and does not mean when it comes to lived practices. The findings of this article confirm and elaborate previous research that has suggested that the ideology of husbands' headship has spiritually symbolic significance for conservative Protestants. Although the data is limited to reports of perceived behavior and not actual behavioral observations, the findings are consistent with the previous qualitative studies of the gender ideologies of conservative Protestants. Conventional wisdom suggests that belief in the husband as the head of the family necessarily implies a host of other male-dominated characteristics about conservative Protestant marriage and family structure. This research has shown, however, that in the area of marital decision making, conservative Protestant adherence to headship ideology does not appear to create marital patterns that are less egalitarian than other, more liberal, religious groups.

Notes

1. As with all telephone surveys, there is a selection bias against those people who live in households without telephones, presumably the very poor and migrant portions of the population.
2. Though church attendance and identifying as "Protestant" (or belonging to a Protestant denomination) primarily defines this oversample, researchers did not want to eliminate from the oversample Protestants whose faith is important in their lives but are unable to attend church. Therefore, the oversample includes those who said they attend church at least 2 or 3 times a month or who said their faith was "extremely important" in their lives.
3. The other Protestant category includes respondents who identified themselves as religiously committed Protestants but who did not select a more specific religious identity within this broader category.

4. Age is divided by 10 to obtain more meaningful estimates of the change in the expected odds. In order to fill in 30 missing values on the age variable, the respondent's age was estimated from the reported age of his or her children.
5. Missing values on income are estimated by first regressing income on age, sex, education, marital status, racial categories, work status of the respondent and spouse, subjective assessment of change in financial health, county population, and occupational categories (adjusted $R^2 = .47$). The resulting coefficient estimates were used to predict the income of respondents who did not report their incomes.
6. The 56 respondents who answered "don't know" and 26 who did not provide an answer were treated as missing cases and excluded from the analysis.
7. A separate regression analysis (not shown) shows a statistically significant difference between the responses of evangelicals and theologically liberal Protestants on this question.
8. The results from this question are similar to those found using another data set with a similar question about financial decisions. The 1992 Economic Values Survey (U.S. Labor Force Sample; see Wuthnow 1994) asked respondents, "Who is the person most responsible for making the decisions about how to handle your family's savings and investments?" Among conservative Protestants, 44% reported that they and their spouse make the decisions equally. This compared with 37% of the nonreligious respondents and 50% of the mainline/liberal Protestant respondents.

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Temporary As Compared to Permanent High School Dropout*

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Abstract

More and more high school dropouts are obtaining GEDs or returning to school to earn diplomas, and several studies point to socioeconomic status, academic standing, parenthood status, and students' expectations as predictors of dropouts' later high school certification. Absent from these studies, however, are measures of students' motivational characteristics and employment patterns prior to dropping out. This article, which takes a life course perspective, draws upon a longitudinal study of first-time dropouts in Baltimore, where the dropout rate is high (over 40%), to compare those who dropped out temporarily with those who dropped out permanently. We find that Baltimore students who later achieved high school degrees resembled their counterparts — those who finished high school — in national studies in terms of demographics and school performance. We also find that before dropping out, the temporary dropouts had more positive motivational qualities and were more often employed than the permanent dropouts. Policy implications of the findings are discussed, including the pivotal role of work and alternative routes to high school certification in the lives of disadvantaged adolescents.

A life course perspective has led to a decided shift in how social scientists now approach issues of schooling and educational attainment. The core assumption of life course theory — developmental processes and outcomes are shaped by the life trajectories that individuals follow — focuses attention on cultural differences and socioeconomic variation in school outcomes. It also redirects

** This research was supported by the William T. Grant Foundation (95-164195, 9819298, 83079682, 82079600), the Spencer Foundation (B1517, 199800106), and the Office of Education and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education (R306F70128). Direct correspondence to Doris R. Entwisle, Department of Sociology, The Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218. E-mail: entwisle@jhu.edu.*

attention to the *process* of schooling. Adolescents, like their adult counterparts, are socially organized in ways that have strong implications for their life experiences, but we know little about the school and work careers of youth in poverty-stricken cities, where high school graduation is least likely and where pressure for students to contribute to family support is common. Detailed research on this kind of social variation in status attainment is rare.

The work trajectories of school dropouts and other disadvantaged groups are variously described as disorderly (Hogan 1981), floundering (Osterman 1989), turbulent (William T. Grant Foundation 1988), or milling about (Klerman & Karoly 1994). Such overall descriptions, however, hide patterns with many understandable elements that are obscured when researchers study life events or outcomes only one at a time. For example, wages in early adulthood are often studied in relation to employment in high school. The life goal is (tacitly) assumed to be income maximization, but for disadvantaged students, later monetary payoff from educational investments is not the only issue. For example, pursuing a GED allows them to work or care for a child and *concurrently* achieve high school certification. Choices about work and school are highly interdependent for disadvantaged youth, and their life needs do not necessarily match those of more advantaged youth.

The large majority (over 90%) of all high school students in the U.S. now work for pay (Bachman & Schulenberg 1992; Hotz et al. 1999; Manning 1990; Steinberg & Cauffman 1995), with probably 70% participating in the labor force at any given point. They tend to move in and out of the labor market, and many start work in their early teens, long before graduation (Entwisle, Alexander & Olson 2000a; Leventhal, Graber & Brooks-Gunn 2001). Financial need, the kinds of work available, and the future value of high school jobs are far different, however, for youth who are well-off compared to the disadvantaged. Teens from poor families are less than half as likely to be employed as those from well-to-do families (Brown 2001), but when they do work they are more likely than other students to be employed 20 or more hours per week (the so-called "high intensity" threshold associated with adverse effects on school performance). The tenth-grader in Baltimore who has a two-year-old child, who attends school full-time, and who works 30-40 hours a week cleaning stalls at a race track is on a different life trajectory from the tenth-grader in that same city who takes a college preparatory program and who works a dozen hours a week running errands for a brokerage house. For the college-bound, work in high school is mainly discretionary. They buy clothes, cars, and other "luxuries" with their earnings, and their high school jobs are not likely to be connected to the full-time jobs they will eventually hold. For students growing up in poverty, work in high school is much less discretionary, many contribute earnings for family support (Entwisle, Alexander & Olson

2000a; Johnson & Lino 2000), and their high school jobs may be related to the full-time jobs they will soon hold.

In national samples, certain kinds of employment and long hours of work predict dropout (see McNeal 1997); however, the ways in which high school employment links to dropout among disadvantaged students are not well understood (see Warren 2000 for an interpretation that implicates selection into work among students who already are academically disengaged). In cities with high rates of poverty, dropout rates approach 50% (see Alexander, Entwisle & Kabbani 2001; Ensminger & Slusarcick 1992). Being “off-time” in school (previously held back) and having a weak academic background dramatically increase the risk of dropout for poor urban students (Alexander, Entwisle & Horsey 1997; Alexander, Entwisle & Kabbani 2001; Ensminger & Slusarcick 1992; Lloyd 1978), but how employment affects status attainment for disadvantaged students is not clear.

A life course perspective helps illuminate these issues of stratification. It leads us to see “starting work” and “leaving school” as processes rather than as “events.” Even though most teenagers in the U.S. start and stop paid work repeatedly, for those who plan to go on to postsecondary education, the student role remains primary, because they tend to stay in school continuously, irrespective of their work status. For others, the student role fades, work assumes increasing importance, and dropout becomes a serious possibility. But currently more than half of those who drop out later resume their educations (Boesel, Alsalam & Smith 1998), some by earning high school diplomas, but the majority by earning a GED. For example, about one-third of dropouts in the 1978 NLSY sample, 40% in the HS&B panel (1982), and 45% in the NELS88 panel earned GEDs or high school diplomas.

Earning a GED requires passing a 290-item test divided into five subject areas (writing, reading, social studies, science, and math). Little or no classroom time may be required — one can sit for the test without taking a “prep” course. This option allows youth to achieve high school certification while working full-time, and it offers flexibility with respect to when they enroll in a GED program and how long they take to finish. Not much systematic research addresses the specific question of whether the GED encourages dropping out, although allowing teenagers to get GEDs without parental permission increases the likelihood that they will do so (Chaplin 1999). The GED option nevertheless seems to attract students who aspire to a high school degree but for whom opportunity costs of returning to school are high. Just as the choice to drop out links to prior life history, however, so must the choice to return to school or seek a GED. Still, why some dropouts later get more schooling while others do not is not altogether clear.

A number of studies provide evidence that temporary dropouts differ from permanent dropouts *before* dropping out. For example, GED recipients finish

more years of high school than permanent dropouts (Cameron & Heckman 1993; Cao, Stromsdorfer & Weeks 1996; Maloney 1992; Murnane, Willett & Boudett 1995, 1997), are more likely to have expected to complete high school (Chuang 1997; Finn & Rock 1997), have higher cognitive scores (Hotz et al. 1999; Murnane, Willett & Boudett 1995), and come from higher SES backgrounds (Cameron & Heckman 1993; Hotz et al. 1999; Kolstad & Kaufman 1989; Murnane, Willett & Boudett 1995, 1997).

Despite evidence of these preexisting differences between students who seek GEDs and those who remain dropouts, no direct evidence is yet known that bears on the motivation or employment histories prior to dropout of students who later get high school degrees as compared to those who do not. Meyer and Wise (1982) conjecture that students who work in high school perhaps are selected to have positive personal characteristics not gained through work. Hotz et al. (1999) likewise mention "motivation" or "innate talents" as likely possibilities for pre-dropout differences. More direct evidence pointing to motivational differences is that higher levels of "being prepared for and participating in classwork," as reported by teachers, distinguished students who later obtained high school degrees from those who did not (Finn & Rock 1997). Altogether, then, it seems likely that motivation or preexisting personality characteristics could distinguish temporary from permanent dropouts.

Employment histories prior to dropout may also distinguish students who later get high school degrees from those who do not. Cao, Stromsdorfer, and Weeks (1996) attribute some of the differences in later earnings between GED recipients and permanent dropouts to "work experience," but their study did not parse that experience into pre-GED and post-GED portions. Even so, work prior to dropout could influence the decision to seek certification, since students might take a job with the intention of juggling school and work but then find that a regular high school program is too difficult to maintain along with a job. They might then drop out and enroll instead in a GED program. Likewise, students' experience in the labor market could make them more aware of the advantage of a high school degree and so lead them to return to school.

Dropouts in Baltimore

In this article we study preexisting differences between dropouts who later resume their schooling and those who do not. We investigate the two main hypotheses outlined above: the extent to which (1) employment before dropout and (2) preexisting motivational or personality factors distinguish between temporary and permanent dropouts. The data come from the Beginning School Study (BSS) in Baltimore, where dropout rates are over 40%.


The BSS has tracked a random sample of approximately 800 Baltimore residents continuously since 1982, when the residents started first grade. About half are African American and half white. Their socioeconomic level was representative of first-graders enrolled in Baltimore City public schools in 1982, and so it is lower than that in the nation at large. About two-thirds of the panel members were in low-income families in 1982, for example, as reflected by participation in the federal school-meal subsidy program. Information on the school performance and motivational status of panel members is available starting nine or ten years before dropout, as is a broad array of other information (see Alexander, Entwisle & Kabbani 2001).

The analyses that follow build on analyses reported by Berktd, Geis, and Kaufman (1998) that used NELS88 data to shed light on later attainment of a high school degree by dropouts.¹ Our analyses focus on first-time dropouts who are classified based on their later school experience as "permanent" (those who have not received a high school diploma or achieved a GED by age 22) or "temporary" (those who have received a high school diploma or achieved a GED by age 22). The sample consists of GED recipients (30.4% of dropouts; $N = 89$), diploma recipients (9.2% of dropouts; $N = 27$), and permanent dropouts (60.4%; $N = 177$).

The multivariate model (Figure 1) proposed to explain temporary as compared to permanent dropout builds directly on a model developed by Berktd, Geis, and Kaufman (1998) to explain high school completion (GED or diploma) by dropouts in the NELS88 sample. In addition to gender and SES, the predictors in their model are race/ethnicity, composite test-score quartiles measured in 1988 (eighth grade), grade point average from high school transcripts, student's educational expectations, grade at first dropout, and timing of own parenthood. Among this list of predictors, only four proved significant in discriminating temporary dropouts (i.e., those who finished high school) from permanent dropouts: (1) low or middle SES as compared to high SES, (2) scoring in the low or middle test quartiles as compared to the highest test quartile, (3) student's expectation of completing high school or less as compared to achieving a bachelor's degree or higher, (4) and no children as compared to having a baby within nine months or longer after dropping out. Our model includes these same four predictors of the Berktd, Geis, and Kaufman model, subject to some minor differences in details (see Appendix).

The present extensions of the Berktd, Geis, and Kaufman (1998) model involve two additional predictors: (1) the teacher's rating of the student's temperament/disposition at age 14, a measure shown in previous research to predict school performance and achievement gains (Entwisle, Alexander & Olson 1997), and (2) whether or not the student was employed in the year before dropout. These variables test the two hypotheses outlined above — namely, whether noncognitive status prior to dropout differentiates between

FIGURE 1: Hierarchical Model Predicting High School Completion by Age 22 among BSS Dropouts



students who later complete degrees and those who do not, and whether employment prior to dropout differentiates between the two groups of dropouts.

Data and Setting

PROCEDURE

Data for this article came from several sources: school records; interviews conducted during the school year at ages 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18; tracking surveys for those out of school at ages 18 and 19; and a Young Adult Survey at age 22/23. Students' age corresponds with "year in school." Forty-four percent of the BSS cohort was at least one year behind in grade, including 73% of eventual dropouts. Also, many retainees remained enrolled for up to three years after year 12, the normal graduation point.

ATTRITION

Data on dropout status are available for 719 students (of whom 293 are dropouts), representing 91% of those originally sampled in first grade. Complete data on students' dropout and employment status during years 10 through 14 (ages 15 through 19) are available for 573 students (213 dropouts). This latter group compares well with the original random sample of 790 students in terms of first-grade characteristics (see Table A.1). However, sample weights that reflect the propensity of each individual to be in the active sample, based on students' initial (1982) demographic and academic achievement profiles, adjust for possible attrition bias in estimates of regression parameters.

Descriptive data in Tables 1 and 2 are for the full 293 dropout case base. Data in Tables 3 and 4 are only for those with data on both dropout and employment. The multivariate model (Table 5) includes 239 dropouts, the subset of students for whom we have data on students' employment status in the period immediately preceding their dropout. It adjusts for possible attrition in the data with sample weights as described above.

DROPOUT

Dropouts are defined as students leaving school for the first time prior to receiving high school certification. They are further classified as "temporary" if by age 22 they had received a high school diploma or GED; otherwise, they are classified as "permanent." Most dropouts (77%) first left school before the end of year 12 (age 18), but another 15% dropped out in year 13 (age 19), another 7% in year 14 (age 20), and another 1% after that. (See Appendix for further information.)

WORK VARIABLES

Work

In the spring of years 10, 11, 12, and 13 (ages 15, 16, 17, and 18), panel members described their work for pay in the current school year, including the nature of the jobs, hours, and earnings.² (See Appendix for questions.) During years 10-12 all BSS participants, whether still in school or a dropout, reported on paid work (summer work is excluded). In year 13, those who had not yet finished high school ($N = 309$) were interviewed, and those not in school responded to a tracking survey concerning current employment. In year 14, all employment data came from a tracking survey.

Employment rates increased from 27% in year 10 (average age 15) to 58% by year 14 (roughly age 19). On average, respondents were employed 2.19 of the 5 years, corresponding to an average employment rate of 44%. There were

no significant differences by gender, but whites were more likely to be employed than African Americans in every year and had a higher consistency of work over the 5-year period. For instance, 30% of whites compared with only 14% of African Americans were employed during at least 4 of the 5 years, and the mean employment rate for whites was 52% compared with 37% for African Americans.

Employment in Year Preceding Dropout

A dichotomous indicator is used to show whether or not the student was employed in the year *before* his or her first dropout. For example, a student who worked in year 10 and dropped out in year 11 is coded "1," while one who worked in year 11 and dropped out in year 11 is coded "0."

TEMPERAMENT/DISPOSITION, AGE 14

Children's temperament or disposition is based on teachers' ratings. This scale measures personal qualities that predict achievement in the early grades (Alexander & Entwisle 1988) and that should predict success in school and the workplace as well. Math teachers and reading/English teachers rated each student on a six-point scale (National Survey of Children 1976) on the following 5 items:

1. Very enthusiastic, interested in a lot of things; likes to express his/her ideas
2. Usually in a happy mood; very cheerful
3. Shows creativity or originality in schoolwork
4. Keeps to himself/herself; tends to withdraw
5. Very timid; afraid of new things or new situations

Coding is in a positive direction. The sums of separate ratings from math and English teachers were averaged. Data were available from assessments made by teachers in year 9 (age 14) for 474 students. For an additional 42 students, we used teacher assessments from year 8, when students were age 13. Alpha reliabilities for this scale range from .77 to .81 for years 8 and 9. (See Alexander, Entwisle & Dauber 1993 for further detail.)

DEMOGRAPHIC AND ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT MEASURES

See Appendix for information on measurement of demographic and academic achievement.

Results

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS: PROFILES OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY DROPOUTS

High school completion rates among the sample of dropouts vary by race and gender (see Table 1). Over 40% of the African Americans of both genders and about 40% of the white females achieved high school credentials by age 22/23, compared to 31% of the white males.³

In agreement with the NELS88 sample results (Berkthold, Geis & Kaufman 1998), compared to temporary dropouts, the permanent dropouts came from more disadvantaged backgrounds (see Table 2). Mother's education, for example, is significantly lower for the permanent dropouts (10.2 vs. 11.4 years), and more permanent than temporary dropouts are themselves parents, although that difference is not significant.

The academic differences between temporary and permanent dropouts also correspond well with those observed in the NELS88 sample. Temporary dropouts outrank permanent dropouts on measures of academic standing such as test scores and likelihood of having been retained (Table 2). Grade level at time of dropout is more than half a year higher for temporary as compared to permanent dropouts. On average, educational expectations at age 14 are also significantly higher for the temporary dropouts: nearly 70% of the temporary dropouts expected at least a high school education, compared with only 57% of the permanent dropouts. Grade retention, not included by Berkthold, Geis, and Kaufman (1998), is a powerful predictor of dropout in the BSS panel (see Alexander, Entwistle & Kabbani 2001).

The inclusion of teachers' ratings of BSS students' temperament/disposition at age 14 tests one major hypothesis, namely whether motivational differences prior to dropout distinguish between those who complete high school and those who do not. The answer from the descriptive analyses is "yes," because this rating is significantly higher ($p < .05$) for temporary dropouts (18.5) than it is for permanent dropouts (16.3).

Employment histories, used to test the second major hypothesis (see Table 3), show that from age 15 to 19, about half of the temporary dropouts (51%) were employed in 3 or more of the 5 years under consideration, and their mean yearly employment rate over the entire 5-year period was 48%. Work patterns for permanent dropouts are far different: only 25% were employed in 3 or more of the 5 years, with a mean employment rate over the 5-year period of just 31%. These same employment patterns hold within racial subgroups, although African Americans overall are less often employed than whites. Among whites, temporary dropouts average 2.85 years of employment versus 2.22 for permanent dropouts ($p < .05$); among African Americans this

TABLE 1: High School Completion Status of BSS Dropouts at Age 22, by Gender and Race

	Temporary Dropout			Permanent Dropout	Total
	Diploma	GED	Total		
Total dropouts	9.2	30.4	39.6	60.4	100
Males	7.5	30.8	38.4	61.6	100
Females	11.2	29.9	41.0	59.0	100
Whites	6.3	28.6	34.9	65.1	100
African Americans	11.4	31.7	43.1	56.9	100
White males	4.4	26.5	30.9	69.1	100
White females	8.6	31.0	39.6	60.3	100
African American males	9.9	34.1	44.0	56.0	100
African American females	13.2	28.9	42.1	57.9	100
N	27	89	116	177	293

Note: Numbers are percentages.

contrast is 2.13 years versus 1.03 ($p < .05$). In sum, temporary dropouts were employed more often throughout their teenage years than were permanent dropouts.

The figures in Table 3 do not screen on the timing of work in relation to dropout, however, and for work to be used as a predictor of dropout, obviously it must precede it. Those comparisons, reported in Table 4, tally the annual work of dropouts before, during, and after the year they dropped out. For example, for those who dropped out in year 11, year 10 work is classified as “work before dropout,” year 11 work is classified as “work in the dropout year,” and work in year 12 or later is classified as “work after dropout.”

Rates of employment before dropout and during the dropout year are uniformly higher for temporary than for permanent dropouts. Of dropouts who later completed high school, 45% were employed in the year before they dropped out, compared to 23% of permanent dropouts ($p \leq .05$) (Table 4, left panel). During their dropout year (middle panel), temporary dropouts were also more often employed than permanent dropouts (44% vs. 28%). The year after dropout shows little difference in employment rates (44% vs. 43%). However, employment after dropout likely means different things for the two groups, because some temporary dropouts have gone on to college or other form of postsecondary training. In terms of time from dropout to completion (GED or diploma), those who finished in two years or less were significantly more likely to be employed before and during the dropout year than those who took longer (data not shown).

TABLE 2: Demographic and Academic Achievement Characteristics, Educational Expectations, and Motivation of BSS Dropouts, by High School Completion Status

	Temporary Dropout				Permanent Dropout	
	Diploma	GED	Total		Dropout	Total
Demographic characteristics						
Mother's years of education	11.8	11.2	11.4	*	10.2	10.7
Proportion receiving meal subsidy	.75	.78	.77		.85	.82
Proportion from 2-parent family	.32	.45	.42		.42	.42
Family SES index	-.18	-.24	-.23	*	-.53	-.41
Proportion parents by age 18	.52	.40	.43		.49	.47
Academic achievement						
Reading CAT score, year 9	511	550	540	*	512	523
Math CAT score, year 9	530	542	539	*	512	522
Proportion retained, years 1-9	.67	.65	.69	*	.87	.78
Grade level at first dropout	10.4	9.8	10.0	*	9.5	9.7
Mean educational expectations, age 14 ^a	3.5	3.8	3.8	*	3.4	3.5
Temperament/disposition, age 14	19.1	18.3	18.5	*	16.3	17.1
N	27	89	116		177	293

Note: Sample sizes represent the maximum for each category. Complete coverage was not always available for all variables. Significance levels are for t-tests comparing temporary and permanent dropouts.

^a Respondents were queried about their educational expectations at the end of what should have been their ninth year of school, when on-time students would have been in ninth grade. Very few of these dropouts would have reached grade 9 by this time, since their rate of grade retention was about 70%.

* $p \leq .05$ (for differences between adjacent columns)

MULTIVARIATE MODEL OF COMPLETION AMONG DROPOUTS

The next step is to test the robustness of differences in the motivational characteristics (temperament/disposition) and work patterns between temporary and permanent dropouts prior to dropout when other relevant variables are controlled. We employ a logistic regression model with variables entered sequentially in three steps. The model includes as independent variables all the significant predictors used in the Berktdol, Geis, and Kaufman (1998) model and also variables used in studies of high school graduates by Cameron and Heckman (1993) and Cao, Stromsdorfer, and Weeks (1996), with one substitution — for this analysis grade retention is included in the set of

TABLE 3: Employment Rates over Years 10-14 (Ages 15-19), by Dropout Status

	Dropout Status	
	Permanent	Temporary
Proportion employed		
Year 10	.23	.32
Year 11	.30	* .48
Year 12	.29	.39
Year 13	.34	* .51
Year 14	.39	* .57
Mean proportion employed (yrs. 10-14)	.31	* .48
Proportion employed every year (yrs. 10-14)	.03	.04
Proportion employed 3 or more years (yrs. 10-14)	.25	* .51
Mean number of years employed (yrs. 10-14)	1.53	* 2.41

	Whites		African Americans	
	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary
Proportion employed				
Year 10	.26	† .44	.21	.25
Year 11	.46	.57	.18	* .41
Year 12	.43	.43	.17	* .36
Year 13	.46	.60	.24	* .45
Year 14	.52	.60	.29	* .55
Mean proportion employed (yrs. 10-14)	.44	* .57	.20	* .43
Proportion employed every year (yrs. 10-14)	.07	.09	.00	.00
Proportion employed 3 or more years (yrs. 10-14)	.39	* .67	.15	* .40
Mean number of years employed (yrs. 10-14)	2.22	* 2.85	1.03	* 2.13

Note: Significance levels are for *t*-tests comparing adjacent groups.

* $p \leq .05$ † $p \leq .10$

TABLE 4: Employment Rates in Year Preceding Dropout, Year of Dropout, and Year after Dropout, by Time of Dropout

Time of Dropout	Employed Year before Dropout		Employed Year of Dropout		Employed Year after Dropout	
	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary	Permanent	Temporary
Before end of year 10	18.8	20.0	21.7	25.0	25.0	33.3
Year 11	23.9	33.3	32.6	40.0	35.6	37.5
Year 12	30.4	*	34.1	40.0	47.6	43.5
Year 13	15.0	*	19.0	*	55.6	61.1
Year 14 or later	16.7	*	15.4	*	56.5	42.9
Total (dropouts in all years)	23.4	*	28.0	*	42.5	43.5
N	141	98	150	98	146	92

Note: Numbers are percentages. Significance levels are for t-tests comparing adjacent groups.

* $p \leq .05$

controls, whereas Berkthold, Geis, and Kaufman employed a measure of grade at first dropout (see Figure 1).

Step 1 controls on demographic characteristics (race, gender, family socioeconomic status) and academic achievement (reading and math CAT scores at age 14, plus grade retention). Among BSS students, 69% of temporary dropouts and 87% of permanent dropouts were retained at least once. In conformity with Berkthold, Geis, and Kaufman (1998), students' educational expectations at age 14 and whether the student had a child by age 18 are also included.

Step 2 adds the variable measuring temperament/disposition, because this variable predicts both employment and school completion. Students who seek GEDs not only may have higher academic ability than permanent dropouts, as several prior studies have shown, but also may be more motivated to succeed or may possess other positive personality characteristics before they drop out. The motivational variable here measures students' enthusiasm, interest in doing things, and general outgoing, happy nature — the kinds of personal characteristics that probably benefit students and employees alike. Such qualities of temperament, rare in research on high school dropouts, have been invoked as a possible source of unobserved heterogeneity in studies that assess, for example, the earnings returns to GED holders (e.g., Cameron & Heckman 1993).

Step 3 adds a dichotomous indicator of employment in the year before dropout. Students who are employed differ in many ways from those who are not employed (see, e.g., Steinberg, Fegley & Dornbusch 1993), and among BSS students pressure to work is generated by family needs (see Entwisle, Alexander & Olson 2000a). The full model thus determines whether the significant differences in motivational status and pre-dropout employment identified in the descriptive analysis remain robust with other variables controlled. The model estimates are weighted to adjust for attrition, and dummy variables are included to account for missing values on some predictors.

The logistic regression that estimates the full model (Table 5, column 3) shows African American dropouts to be just as likely as their white counterparts to be temporary rather than permanent dropouts. Being of higher SES (odds of 1.54) predicts being a temporary rather than a permanent dropout, in line with findings for the NELS88 sample. Contrary to this and other prior research, however, students' scores on two standardized tests (CAT reading comprehension and math reasoning) do not discriminate between the groups, but having been retained does. This discrepancy probably stems from the fact that earlier studies did not include grade retention, which correlates with both academic standing *and* off-time status (see Alexander, Entwisle & Kabbani 2001 for a review).

TABLE 5: Logistic Regression Model Predicting High School Completion by Age 22 (Diploma/GED) among Dropouts

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Gender	1.19	1.44	1.50	2.21 [†]
Race	1.36	1.24	1.28	1.24
Family SES index	1.50*	1.56*	1.54*	1.55*
Retention, years 1–9	.37*	.37*	.37*	.38*
Reading CAT score, age 14	1.05	1.00	.99	.96
Math CAT score, age 14	1.36	1.32	1.24	1.27
Educational expectations, age 14	1.10	1.08	1.07	1.08
Parenthood by age 18	.72	.68	.72	1.20
Temperament/disposition, age 14		1.55*	1.54*	1.54*
Employed in year before dropout			2.20*	2.16*
Parenthood × gender				.39 [†]
Pseudo R ²	.10	.14	.16	.16
(N = 239)				

Note: Coefficients are odds ratios. High school completion status is coded 1 for dropouts who later received their high school diploma or GED and 0 for permanent dropouts, so regression coefficients represent the effect of a unit change in other independent variables on the odds of a dropout later completing high school compared with being a permanent dropout. To allow for possible attrition bias, weighted regression coefficients are reported. Dummy variable indicators (not shown) adjust for cases with missing values.

[†] $p \leq .10$ * $p \leq .05$ (one-sided)

Confirming the first hypothesis, temporary dropouts have significantly more positive ratings on temperament/disposition than permanent dropouts. A one-standard-deviation increase above the mean increases the odds of being a temporary rather than a permanent dropout by 55% (Table 5, column 2). Furthermore, adding this variable leads to a 4% jump in explained variance (R^2 increases from .10 to .14).

When employment in the year before dropout is added to the model to test the second hypothesis, temporary dropouts are shown to be more than twice as likely (odds of 2.20) as permanent dropouts to be employed in the year before dropout. In addition to demographic, academic, and personality/motivational differences between temporary and permanent dropouts, then, prior work history is a significant determinant of whether a dropout will return to complete a high school degree.

The effects of parenthood remain to be discussed. A large literature suggests that parenting reduces the likelihood that teenage women will work. Following Berkthold, Geis, and Kaufman (1998), a variable to indicate parenthood status was included here as a control in all three models. In the pooled sample,

parenthood is not a significant predictor, but because teen parenting is likely to have a greater effect on women's lives than on men's, we added an interaction term involving parenthood and gender (see Table 5, last column), which turned out to be marginally significant ($p = .08$). When the full model is estimated separately for the two genders, being a parent roughly doubles the odds (.46) that women will be permanent rather than a temporary dropouts. For men this effect is insignificant and in the opposite direction.

Discussion

A sizeable literature focuses on status attainment for GED recipients as compared to high school graduates, but studies of differences between dropout groups are much less common. This study identifies events and activities early in the adolescent-to-adult transition that distinguish between dropout groups. For the BSS panel the probability of dropout is far above the national norm (over 40%) but, as in national samples, the probability of achieving high school certification after dropping out is also substantial (over 40%). Moreover, the correlates of the dropout-return pattern in Baltimore match the correlates in national samples (higher educational expectations, higher achievement levels, and others). Even though the Baltimore population is economically disadvantaged, dropouts who are relatively better-off have higher high school completion rates.

The retention rate in Baltimore (upward of 50%) by any standard is extremely high, and retention is known to be a powerful predictor of dropout (see Cairns, Cairns & Neckerman 1989; Ensminger & Slusarcick 1992; Leventhal, Graber & Brooks-Gunn 2001). Further, the effects of retention far outweigh those of low test scores or marks (see Alexander, Entwisle & Dauber 2002), but to our knowledge retention is not usually included in other studies of GED reciprocity. Grade at first dropout, used in Berkthold, Geis, and Kaufman's (1998) model, no doubt captures part of any retention effect, because students who have been held back will be in a lower grade when they drop out than will students of their age who have never been retained. Also, and not previously reported, a key finding here is that retention boosts the odds of becoming a permanent rather than a temporary dropout.

Retention could be seen as an indicator of less-than-adequate school performance, but its power to predict dropout, we think, must stem from other sources, because test scores and grades, which are also measures of academic performance, lack predictive power. The explanation may lie in the fact that retention puts students off time in the severely age-graded organization of the school. It labels students as "behind," "dumb," or "failures" and adds to the time they must spend in school before graduation. By dropping out, retained

students can shed a punishing role and instead, by work or other means, acquire some of the status accorded to adults. In other words, retention can accelerate the adult transition (see Entwisle, Alexander & Olson 2001).

A key finding of our research is the positive effect of prior employment on some dropouts' likelihood of completing high school. Further research might help distinguish between the kinds of jobs that are most likely to help boost these odds, but work adds to specific human capital, so that in itself could boost the odds of school completion. The positive effect of temperament suggests that dropouts who return possess a resiliency that enables them to overcome their earlier academic failures and eventually achieve high school certification. These findings support speculations such as those of Cameron and Heckman (1993), who question labor market returns of the GED on grounds of unobserved heterogeneity; they suggest that any later advantage in wage returns for GED recipients could be explained by preexisting motivational or personality differences like those uncovered here. Although these authors did not mention employment prior to dropout, that could also be a source of unobserved heterogeneity. The effect of temperament/disposition shown in the full model in Table 5 (odds of 1.54) is independent of students' employment status, so the two sources of heterogeneity appear to be distinct, at least here.

Our measure of temperament captures "soft skills," which has important implications. Workers who are generally happy, ready to try new things, and outgoing in personality have an advantage in school *and* on the job (Entwisle, Alexander & Olson n.d.). Such noncognitive skills improve the odds of disadvantaged workers being hired (Moss & Tilly 2000), and with over 50% of the U.S. economy presently devoted to service-sector jobs, the value of soft skills in the labor market will only increase.

Implications

The growing popularity of GED programs is a symptom of the traditional high school's failure to meet the needs of students who find high school alienating or incompatible with their emerging adult responsibilities. Economic pressures can force low-income students to take jobs that interfere with school. Early parenthood can also interfere with school. Many students view the GED as an attractive alternative to a high school experience that is alienating or irrelevant to their future. In the BSS, 45% of dropouts said that one reason they dropped out was that getting a GED was faster than earning the diploma. The power of personal motivational qualities and employment to predict dropouts' likelihood of later achieving a high school degree suggests that many dropouts possess the needed drive to complete high school but choose to do so via GED certification.

Failing competency tests, lack of vocational programs, seduction by the sports culture, and even teachers' negative attitudes toward students who work (Bills, Helms & Ozcan 1995) may all contribute to dropout (Weis, Farrar & Petrie 1989). Retention prior to high school, however, poses far more critical risks to students in the BSS panel than academic weaknesses such as poor test scores (Alexander, Entwisle & Horsey 1997; Reynolds 1992). This retention risk traces back to problems at the time of the first grade transition (Alexander, Entwisle & Kabbani 2001) or even earlier (see Entwisle, Alexander & Olson 2000b). In fact, the "retention problem" is probably the most serious challenge facing policymakers and educators today, because retention is so much more prevalent in schools that enroll disadvantaged students (see Alexander, Entwisle & Kabbani 2001). It predicts dropout at every age and in many kinds of school settings (Alexander, Entwisle & Dauber 2002). Retention being a predictor of permanent rather than temporary dropout is another serious consequence of the practice.

A wider view of the dropout-return pattern suggests that stopping out (dropping out temporarily) and returning to school is not as nonnormative a sequence as it may seem. African Americans are less likely than whites to enroll in college immediately after high school graduation (U.S. Department of Education 1999). Stopping out of college is also prevalent. The median age of college students is now above 22 (U.S. Department of Education 2001), which implies that many have dropped out somewhere along the line, either before or during college. Put another way, juggling the worker and student roles is now normative for almost all students in college *and* high school — it is part of the adult transition. Economically disadvantaged students who leave high school and later achieve a GED are actually stretching out the school-to-work transition, in parallel with patterns seen for their middle-class counterparts who stretch out the transition by working part-time while they attend college. But for the economically disadvantaged, work during the teen years can also serve as a way to accumulate specific human capital. For middle-class students, high school jobs seldom relate directly to employment after college. For disadvantaged students, the long-term careers of many involve jobs not very different from those they can secure as teens.

Knowledge about the life patterns of middle-class students cannot guide educational policy for disadvantaged students. "Employment" and "dropout" denote a multiplicity of experiences, and not only the experiences themselves but also the valences placed on these experiences differ across social groups. The jury is still out as far as comparative long-term economic benefits of high school employment are concerned, but the payoffs from high school work are probably quite different for middle-class as compared to disadvantaged youth. Contrary to the general pattern, for students in the lowest-income families, high work intensity goes along with better schoolwork, not worse (Lerman 2000). Also, certain labor market advantages for disadvantaged youth who work during

high school are irrelevant for better-off youth. Baltimore youth who work in craft or clerical jobs at ages 13-14, for example, are more likely to work in these same, relatively good kinds of jobs later in their teens than are their counterparts who earlier worked at unskilled jobs (Entwisle, Alexander & Olson 2000a). Thus students leaving school for good at age 18 or 19 who have recent job experience have a distinct advantage that is mostly irrelevant for their classmates who continue on in school. In other words, the process of status attainment differs.

As far as the scope of our findings is concerned, disadvantaged high school students in a high-poverty city like Baltimore, where the poverty rates of school-age children approached 37% in 2002, make up a marginalized population on the periphery of most adolescent research. It bears pointing out, however, that these students may nevertheless be typical of as many as 2 million adolescents who, like them, live in families perched on the edge of poverty in the 30 U.S. cities with poverty rates at or above 25% (in the year 2000). High schools need to recognize that although almost all students now work, that work is not discretionary for those with limited family resources. Also, forgoing employment does not keep disadvantaged students in school. Nonworkers are just as likely to drop out as workers. The time may have come to back off from research demonstrating the human capital deficits of GED recipients and instead turn toward research on ways to develop flexibility in secondary school programs so that students who are poor can more easily combine work and school. Likewise, there is a need to expand opportunities for dropouts who later come to regret their decision and wish to avail themselves of "second chance" opportunities that later will pay off. Clearly, many have the motivation and tools to do so. At present, however, the GED remains the main option for most dropouts.

Notes

1. National data show that in 1999, 43% of GED recipients were under age 20 and another 36% received GEDs before reaching 30 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001).
2. The Department of Labor defines an "employed" person as a civilian, 16 years or older, who "during the reference week did any work for pay or profit, a minimum of one hour's work, or who worked 15 hours or more as an unpaid worker in a family enterprise." The BSS defines "work" in almost the same way except for age. Here we are considering employment to be "regular" jobs, i.e., on-going formal work arrangements, and excluding more casual "odd jobs" which are not done on an on-going regular basis. By age 15 teenagers are legally eligible for these more formal work arrangements, and it is this type of regular employment which would be expected to interfere with schooling.
3. In the NELS88 sample, 44.6% of male dropouts and 43.3% of female dropouts completed high school by 1994, with whites (46.5%) more likely to complete school than African Americans (41.5%) (see Berkthold, Geis & Kaufman 1998).

APPENDIX

Definition of Dropout

"Dropout" was self-defined by panel members in interviews from age 14 through age 20 and in a field survey at age 22. A typical dropout question (age 17) was, "Are you currently attending high school?" Response options were as follows (caps in original):

1. Yes, I was in school for the whole year.
2. No, I attended some of this year, but dropped out DURING the 1993–94 school year.
3. No, I received a high school diploma early (NOT A GED) DURING the 1993–94 school year.
4. No, I dropped out BEFORE the start of the 1993–94 school year.
5. No, I received a high school diploma (NOT A GED) BEFORE the start of the 1993–94 school year.

Other questions covered the exact timing (i.e., age) and grade when the first dropout occurred. When records of school enrollment were unclear, a judgment about dropout was made on the basis of the entire record. Of the 719 youth with dropout information through age 22, 293 (41%) dropped out at least once. Careful records were also compiled on each dropout's later educational history — whether the student later returned to school, earned a diploma, or received alternative high school certification through the GED.

Definition of Work

During the spring of years 10 through 13, BSS students were asked the following questions about their work for pay in the current school year:

1. Since school began in the fall, have you had a regular-paying part-time job?
2. What kind of job is this?

In years 13 and 14, when most students had left high school, the questions were as follows:

1. Are you working?
2. What kind of job?
3. Full-time or part-time?

Demographic and Academic Achievement Measures

RACE

Race was coded 0 for white, 1 for African American.

GENDER

Gender was coded 0 for male, 1 for female.

APPENDIX (Continued)

FAMILY ECONOMIC LEVEL: MEAL SUBSIDY STATUS

School records provided information about students' participation in the federal meal subsidy program. Eligibility is based on family income and size.

PARENTS' EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

According to pooled data over the first eight years of the study, the number of mean years of education completed by mothers (for 95% of students) is 11.7, and by fathers (for 67% of students) it is 12.2.

PARENT OCCUPATION

Beginning in the ninth year, parental occupation was determined for parents who had any regular contact with the student. Responses were classified by the updated Featherman-Stevens TSEI2 (Featherman & Stevens 1982). Over the first nine years, information is available on mother's occupation for 77% of students and on father's occupation for 66% of students.

FAMILY SES INDEX

A composite SES scale combines meal subsidy status and the educational and occupational status of both parents. Each variable was standardized, and the mean of available z-scores computed (99.5% sample coverage). At least two items were available for 95% of the sample.

CALIFORNIA ACHIEVEMENT TESTS, AGE 14

Students' Reading Comprehension and Mathematics Concepts and Applications scores from the California Achievement Test (CAT) Form C were collected from school records. "Scale scores" measure growth over students' 12-year school careers (California Achievement Test 1979).

GRADE RETENTION, YEARS 1-9

Grade retention from 1982 through 1991 indicates whether the student was ever retained. The cumulative retention rate through year 9 was 51.3%.

PARENTHOOD THROUGH AGE 18

A dichotomous indicator is used to determine parenthood through age 18. Each year beginning at age 14 (year 9), students were asked whether they had "become a parent" in the last 12 months, and beginning at age 16 (year 11), they were asked, "Do you have children of your own?" Combining available data over years 9 through 13, we determined parenthood status through age 18. Overall, 28% of the sample reported becoming parents by age 18, 47% of the dropouts and 14% of the students who never dropped out.

(Continued on next page)

APPENDIX (Continued)

EDUCATIONAL EXPECTATIONS, AGE 14

Students were asked, "Considering your situation, how far do you think you *actually will* go in school?" Students responded on an 8-point scale, from "1" (leave school as soon as possible) to "8" (more than college — M.D., etc.). The scale was later condensed as follows: 1 = less than high school; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = business/trade school; 4 = fewer than 4 years of college; 5 = college degree; 6 = advanced degree. Data at age 14 were available for 659 cases. For those with missing data at age 14, educational expectations from age 13 provided 15 additional cases.

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TABLE A1: Attrition Analysis: Characteristics of Original BSS Sample and Sample with Complete Employment Data for Years 10-14 (Ages 15-19)

	Original BSS Sample (1982)			Age 19 Sample (1996)		
	Mean	S.D.	N	Mean	S.D.	N
Proportion African American	.55	.50	790	.55	.50	573
Proportion female	.51	.50	790	.55	.50	573
Family SES index ^a	-.04	.80	787	.01	.81	573
Mother's years of education	11.7	2.55	750	11.9	2.55	548
Proportion receiving meal subsidy	.67	.47	701	.63	.48	522
CAT Reading Comprehension, fall 1982	281	40.8	691	283	42.8	508
CAT Mathematics Concepts and Applications, fall 1982	292	31.9	708	295	32.5	521

^a The composite measure of family SES combines information on meal subsidy status and mother's and father's education and occupational status. See Appendix A for details.

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
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Book Reviews

Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public.

By Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 294 pp.

Reviewer: DOUGLAS EICHAR, *University of Hartford*

In his 1960 classic, *The Semisovereign People*, E.E. Schattschneider provided a trenchant critique of pluralist theory. He famously observes, the “flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.” In contrast to the pressure system lionized by pluralists, the system of party competition is more likely to address the interests of the many, especially those who occupy the lower rungs of society’s ladder. This is because electoral competition gives parties incentives to convert nonvoters into voters, thus triggering a “socialization of conflict.”

If Schattschneider indicts interest-group politics as elitist, Matthew Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg in *Downsizing Democracy* indict both interest-group and electoral politics as increasingly elite affairs. This follows from their main thesis that ours has become a “personal democracy.” Where popular democracy required elites to mobilize nonelites in order to prevail in political conflict, our current personal democracy does not. Instead, due to the proliferation of opportunities for individual access to government, elites have few incentives to mobilize nonelites at all.

The first half of the book deals with changes in party politics. It discusses how state building has historically depended upon an expansion of citizenship. What government elites found was that in order to expand their powers, they required not only the consent of the governed, but also their active cooperation. In particular, elites needed soldiers to wage war, tax revenues to fund state activities, and a loyal corps of administrators who could secure public compliance. What developed was a tacit exchange of service for benefits: for voluntary compliance with respect to paying taxes, serving in the military, and following government policy generally, government elites expanded suffrage, proffered benefits, and distributed patronage.

The problem is that elites now have less need of the active cooperation of citizens. Taxation has become automatic through payroll deduction, citizen

soldiers have become professionalized, and civil service has eliminated most patronage jobs and benefits. As a result, party elites make little effort to mobilize the 50% of the American electorate that doesn't vote in presidential elections. Furthermore, both parties suffer "elite apprehensions" about expanding the electorate. While Republicans fear an influx of the poor, who would likely side with the opposition, Democratic officeholders fear that these new voters would support alternative party leadership. Instead of voter mobilization, we have parties concentrated on activating their loyal voters.

Building upon the work of Ginsberg and Martin Shefter in their important book *Politics by Other Means*, Crenson and Ginsberg argue that political parties have developed an alternative approach to political conflict that relies less on electoral struggle. This they label "institutional mobilization," which, instead of directly involving the electorate, engages each party's network of "interest groups, think tanks, news media, public agencies, nonprofits, and other private institutions" — the sites of each party's "new patronage." Federal social welfare and regulatory agencies, along with nonprofits, serve as centers of influence for the Democratic party. The Pentagon, defense contractors, and private contractors generally serve in the same capacity for the Republican party. Institutional combat may include defunding the left when Republicans are in power and cutting defense budgets when Democrats are in power. It also involves efforts to criminalize policy disputes with the tactics of "revelation, investigation, and prosecution (RIP)."

The second half of the book shows how interest-group politics, with its built-in elite bias, has evolved in ways that are even less likely to benefit nonelites, and much less likely to require their mobilization. Much of the advocacy explosion of the past 25 years has involved a proliferation of groups dealing with postmaterial issues, like consumer safety and environmental protection. Combined with a decline in unions, little of this new advocacy involves issues of economic security. Furthermore, not only do many of these groups have nothing more than mailing list memberships, some have private foundation or corporate patrons and thus have no need for members at all.

While these groups may enter the electoral fray, two other trends have further reduced the need to do so. One is the growth in the number of regulatory agencies, which has multiplied both the points of access and targets for agency capture. The other is the expanding role of courts. Between court-sanctioned class-action lawsuits and federal laws (e.g., environmental protection) that recognize "private attorneys general," who can file suit to enforce federal regulations, interest-group activists and entrepreneurs can achieve their goals without ever having to bother with the broader public.

The authors conclude that efforts to reinvent government along the lines of business, together with either the privatization of government services or the use of vouchers to purchase them, have combined to shrink citizens down

to the size of customers. If, as Schattschneider argued, the needs of the many depend upon the socialization of conflict, this book suggests that our capacity to satisfy these needs has been greatly diminished.

This is an insightful book. But as is true of any book with a provocative thesis, its arguments are at times overdrawn. While the authors are unrelenting in their criticism of interest-group politics, they overlook its strengths (e.g., providing a venue for the articulation of interests ignored within a two-party system), as well as those accomplishments that have benefited the broader public (e.g., clean air).

Their analysis of electoral politics is also limited. While they make a strong case for viewing nonvoting as a result of the loss of elite incentives to socialize conflict, surely dilemmas at the grass roots are also responsible for declining participation. Not only have a multitude of social forces produced a citizenry that increasingly “bowls alone” and votes less, but the decline of unions and political machines has made it particularly difficult to mobilize the poor.

Last, it might be more apt to substitute “middle class and above” for “elite” in their analysis. Most of the trends discussed by the authors point to a political system geared toward the needs of both business and the middle class. To draw upon Schattschneider one last time, it may be that our political system has become the “most broadly based, ruling oligarchy in the world.”

Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action.

By Nan Lin. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 278 pp.

Reviewer: MICHAEL WOOLCOCK, *World Bank and Harvard University*

This book attempts, not always successfully, to synthesize a coherent whole from new chapters (for this book) and revised versions of earlier stand-alone publications on the concept of social capital; it is Nan Lin's attempt to ground social capital in its social theoretical roots, thereby providing it with the solid intellectual foundation it has (implicitly) heretofore been without. Opening with a discussion of capital theories in general, Lin moves on to spell out his version of a specifically social capital theory, using it to then address more substantive issues, for example the emergence of social structures, the processes of societal change, inequality in labor markets, and the appeal of on-line communities.

I really wanted this book to be good, but in the end I struggled to share the enthusiasm of the numerous luminaries who endorsed it. The most interesting and innovative aspects are Lin's attempt to integrate a Marxist ontology of capital (following Pierre Bourdieu) — one in which capital in any form is regarded as inherently social — with a rationalist epistemology of choice (à la

James Coleman), in which individuals seek to attain both instrumental goals and social status. The extension of this approach to wrestling with the fundamental question of the micro-macro link was capably done, and it's always encouraging to see theoretical assertions boldly expressed as testable hypotheses.

The letdown has less to do with actual substance — most of which is reasonable enough, if hardly earth-shatteringly original or sophisticated — and a lot to do with style (which is to say, the amount of space and energy it takes to convey what are, in the end, relatively simple points). Most bothersome was its persistent disconnect from social problems and the actual debates in the wider social capital literature. That might sound like a cheap shot for a book on theory, but even a cursory reading of social capital's intellectual biography since the 1920s — from Jyda Hanifan on school reform and Jane Jacobs on urban vitality to Glen Loury on black marginalization, James Coleman on education performance and Robert Putnam on governance experiments — shows that the term has derived its influence from its capacity to forge an iterative dialogue between accessibly general story, sensibly coherent theory, rigorously documented evidence, and concretely specified policies and projects. All four are necessary, but at best only the theoretical pillar is on display here, and even then in such dense form as to be essentially unusable.

The insularity of Lin's approach is evident most clearly when it comes to addressing debates in the social capital literature, a literature he views as one bordered almost entirely by the contributions of network sociologists. This matters, because it is not: network sociologists occupy an important but relatively modest place in sociology, and the serious overlap only partially with those Lin identifies. Consider just the definition of social capital: for network scholars, social capital refers to the resources that inhere exclusively in networks, such as trust, favors, and information; for others, it the structure of the networks themselves — the strength and diversity of one's "portfolio" of social connections — that constitutes one's social capital. They are not the same thing, despite Lin's implication that any such differences are ones of degree rather than kind.

Followers of Francis Fukuyama (and they are many in eastern Europe and Latin America, yet Lin does not even cite him), moreover, regard social capital as the property of entire countries or cultures, while others urge a more parsimonious micro approach centered on individuals and households. Networks themselves are more central to some definitions of social capital than others, while Putnam himself — almost singlehandedly responsible for putting social capital into the public domain — has shifted from an early tripartite approach (social capital as the norms, networks, and trust facilitating collective action) in his work on Italian regional government to a much stronger focus in his recent investigations (on the decline of civic engagement in the U.S.) on the centrality of networks as the core component of social capital. Even within scholarship singularly concerned with social networks, the manner in

which it is conceived, measured, and analyzed differs considerably among economists, quantitative sociologists, and anthropologists.

Reasonable people can and do differ on the merits of casting their lot with one approach rather than other. The point is that Lin is seemingly oblivious to all these debates (some of them seriously acrimonious and vented in high places), content to delve deeply into his own version of matters without making the initial case for why social capital has become the intellectual and policy phenomenon it has, and why we should take his account more seriously than those of others. To then be told of the many and varied virtues associated with spanning organizational and disciplinary boundaries seems strangely contradictory, even hypocritical. It is one of the great ironies of scholarship on social networks that its key empirical claim — that significant returns accrue to those with diverse ties — is too often belied by the practices of its chief academic protagonists, who are seemingly members of a self-contained research community.

The upside of *Social Capital* is that it at least attempts to integrate and reconcile insights from a century or more of social theory; the lengthy downside, unfortunately, is that it all does not really add up to a persuasive, engaging, and constructive contribution that scratches where social capital's supporters and critics are itching. For these reasons, I fear this book will occupy an unhappy niche as one of the most-bought but least-read books on social capital.

Marching on Washington: The Forging of an American Political Tradition.

By Lucy G. Barber. University of California Press, 2002. 323 pp. \$34.95.

Reviewer: ROBERT KLEIDMAN, *Cleveland State University*

Protest movements routinely organize mass marches and rallies in the nation's capital, confident in their right to do so and hopeful that a large turnout will help them build momentum and achieve their goals. This cleverly conceived, well-researched, well-written book shows how these assumptions are the product of past movements and marches. In *Marching on Washington*, Lucy G. Barber looks at a number of marches from Coxey's Army for jobs and public works in 1894 to the Spring Offensive antiwar marches of 1971, examining the complex interactions of protesters, political leaders, the mass media, and bystander publics.

Barber expressly emphasizes the changing spatial politics of the capital and the strategic uses of American citizenship. She develops these themes well. Barber shows how the use of public space in Washington has been a negotiated process, based on the changing physical layout and population of the city and on evolving strategies and tactics of protesters and the responses of authorities.

There is a mutual interaction between this process and the symbolic expression of citizenship and group identity.

In addition to Coxey's Army and the protests against the Vietnam War, Barber devotes chapters to the Woman Suffrage Procession and Pageant of 1913, war veterans' Bonus Army of 1932, the planning for the Negro March on Washington and its cancelation in 1941, and, of course, the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom of August 28, 1963, whose recent 40th anniversary drew much national attention and commemoration.

These marches are interesting and important as events that have been more or less effective in changing policy, culture, and movements. They are also useful as windows into specific movements, the social movement sector, and American political culture. It is fascinating to compare and contrast the collective identities, self-presentation, goals, and issue framing of the various marches and the movements that gave rise to them.

In these chapters, Barber looks at the growing legitimization of mass protest, the routinization of the relationship between protesters, media, and authorities, changes in the goals of protesters and policy change to movement building, the development of a historical memory and the deliberate use of historical references among protesters, and the outcomes of these marches. She is cautious about developing broad conclusions about these themes, but she provides sufficient depth and detail in the individual chapters to enrich her brief discussion in a concluding chapter.

Barber, a historian, does not attempt to engage the sociological literature, although judging from her bibliographic essay at the end of the book, she has used some key works in the social movement field and other fields to help develop her major themes. Given the strength of the analytically informed narratives of each march, I think she could have ventured into some theory building with good results.

I also would have liked a fuller discussion of how Barber selected these specific marches. The impression she leaves is that these marches clearly fit some criteria of size and historical importance, but it would be useful to make these or other criteria explicit. Despite this concern, the cases she chooses are interesting and important, and Barber writes about them with intelligence and sensitivity. Therefore, I think that sociologists will be able to use this book to enrich theory as well as our understanding of these important historical episodes.

The Internet in Everyday Life.

Edited by Barry Wellman and Caroline Haythornthwaite. Blackwell, 2002. 588 pp. Cloth, \$66.95; paper, \$29.95.

Reviewer: ROBERT E. WOOD, *Rutgers University, Camden*

While the popular media continues to focus disproportionately on wired weirdness — the offbeat and the faddish — social scientists have been chipping away at the early myths and misconceptions about the so-called virtual world. Indeed, a central finding has been that most online activities are highly integrated into other daily activities, not an escape into some different world.

The nineteen studies in *The Internet in Everyday Life*, along with an excellent introduction by editors Barry Wellman and Caroline Haythornthwaite, serve to make a powerful collective statement both about the domestication of the Internet in everyday life and about the need for new kinds of questions and methodologies in the next generation of Internet studies.

In a foreword, Howard Rheingold notes that we no longer need to rely on “data-free philosophizing” and that the early questions that researchers posed “were themselves the first problem to solve.” Such questions looked for universal answers to dichotomous questions about empowerment, addiction, alienation, and the like. Series editor Manuel Castells extends this point to note that “rather than analyzing the impact of the Internet on society, the key issue is to understand the effect of society on the Internet.”

While on the cusp of this transition to a more contextualized study of Internet usage, the chapters vary in the degree to which they cross this threshold. The pull of dichotomous questions and broad generalizations about people in general remains strong. The studies make important statements at this level — based mainly on large-scale surveys and quantitative analyses — but collectively also point toward the need for more fine-grained and context-specific studies. It seems likely that the next generation of Internet scholarship will make more use of the qualitative and ethnographic approaches found in the more contextualized chapters on lifestyle changes and Internet use; e-mail and gender; ethnicity and Internet usage; distance learning; home-based work; and scientific communication in Kerala.

The volume’s central contribution is to document the fact that for several hundred million people around the globe, the Internet has become an integral part of everyday life. Furthermore, early fears and research findings about isolation, loneliness, and retreat from real-life interaction and community have not been supported by the accumulated body of Internet research. The chapters collectively make a strong case that for most people, the Internet has increased social contact, community, and social capital, and that the overall results have been beneficial for individuals and societies. Going a step further theoretically,

the editors suggest a societal shift toward “networked individualism.” The individual, as Wellman likes to state, has become the portal.

The findings in dozen or so chapters that take up the question of how online activity relates to broader patterns of communication and community are strikingly uniform in their positive conclusions, with the exception of a time diary study by Nie, Hillygus, and Erbring. These researchers report finding a “strong negative impact on time spent with friends and family,” a reduction of physical time together approaching one hour a week. They depict time spent online, including doing e-mail, as time spent “in isolation” and argue that the internet has a greater isolating potential than television. This dissenting chapter makes clear the degree to which much of the debate is about conceptualization and operationalization. Certainly the thrust of the volume as a whole is to challenge this radical separation of online and physical communication.

While most of the contributors do not shy away from words like *beneficial* and *positive*, there is one potentially worrisome finding that emerges. Internet usage tends both to reflect and to reinforce preexisting competencies and activities. Several of the longitudinal studies show growing differences between Internet users and nonusers over time. Especially in light of the widespread recognition that the digital divide involves much more than access, this finding raises questions about new sources of inequality in a networked society.

The volume includes a chapter about the NSF-supported WebUse portal at the University of Maryland, as well as a final chapter on experience and trust in online shopping. The authors have deliberately omitted the study of the Internet in workplaces, as well as the less mainstream home uses that often catch the media’s eye. For a look at how much the Internet is part of everyday life for a growing number of people, and at how social science scholarship is evolving to meet the challenge of analyzing this, *The Internet in Everyday Life* is unsurpassed.

People of Faith: Religious Conviction in American Journalism and Higher Education.

By John Schmalzbauer. Cornell University Press, 2003. 267 pp. Cloth, \$32.50.

Reviewer: WILLIAM MARTIN, *Rice University*

As a sociologist educated at Wheaton and Princeton and now teaching at Holy Cross, John Schmalzbauer understands the secularizing power of his and related disciplines but also recognizes and honors the efforts of believers who have not bowed the knee to the Baal of unbelief. In *People of Faith*, he draws on interviews and major writings of forty well-known Catholics and evangelicals in journalism and social sciences, which he characterizes as “the quintessential Enlightenment

professions,” and examines the strategies they use in their efforts to accommodate the demands of their competing commitments.

Some potential respondents declined to be interviewed, fearing that being identified as practicing Christians might undermine their standing among colleagues and their ability to address secular audiences. Schmalzbauer does not dismiss their apprehension, noting that even such well-established figures as Fred Barnes, Cal Thomas, and E.J. Dionne acknowledge the risk of being upfront about one’s faith, particularly in Washington. Similarly, Christian social scientists — John DiIulio, Andrew Greeley, John Green, George Marsden, Nathan Hatch, Mark Noll, and others — observe that, having demonstrated their ability to play by “the rules of the academic game,” they might use their academic credentials to confer legitimacy on religious approaches to public policy but would scarcely consider offering a religiously based opinion or social criticism in their professional writing without having first established a strong record of credible empirical research.

In the heart of the book, Schmalzbauer delineates significant differences between the ways Catholics and evangelicals bring their faith to bear in their professional life. He notes that Catholic journalists such as E.J. Dionne, Peter Steinfels, and Kenneth Woodward give greater attention to cultural consensus and communitarian themes, argue against false polarization and inflammatory language in the public square, and call for nuanced perspectives on the complexities of modern society. Catholic journalists, he found, are also likely to echo their church’s teachings on social justice, concern for the poor, and peace (as seen in frequent appeals to just-war theory, a largely Catholic product, prior to the invasion of Iraq). In contrast, evangelicals such as Fred Barnes and Cal Thomas give greater attention to the Culture Wars, emphasizing the boundaries between Christ and culture, placing more stress on personal morality and individual responsibility than on the influence of supraindividual structures and collective processes and expending considerable energy in defining the enemy-liberals, the mass media, secular humanists. Other evangelicals, with Jeffery Sheler of *U.S. News and World Report* as a prime example, find opportunity to draw attention to the scriptures, reporting on contemporary biblical scholarship and including the views of conservative scholars. Among historians, evangelicals such as Marsden, Hatch, and Noll tend to take an ironic, Niebuhrian view, finding good and evil intermixed in society and debunking the notion that America was ever a Christian nation. Catholic social scientists, Schmalzbauer observes, are apt to take a more “comedic” line, celebrating the increasing affinities between American Catholicism and American democratic culture.

Both the Catholic and the evangelical respondents resist efforts by their secular colleagues to reduce religion to economic, social, or political factors, insisting that religion and religious beliefs are themselves integral aspects of human culture and must be taken seriously, whether or not one believes they

are ontologically valid. In addition, practicing a bit of intellectual jiu-jitsu, some borrow the claims and rhetoric of postmodernism, postpositivism, and multiculturalism to argue that perspectives of believing Christians deserve a place at the table as much as any other system of beliefs or values.

Despite evidence that Catholic and evangelical scholars can fit religious conviction into their professional roles, Schmalzbauer acknowledges that their faith-related influence has been modest and their scholarship not significantly different from that of their secular colleagues. They have, for the most part, he concedes, “confined explicitly religious discourse to the prefaces, notes, epilogues, and afterwords of their works.” Schmalzbauer obviously sympathizes with those who find it difficult to reconcile “the wisdom of Athens and the faith of Jerusalem” and, using that same figure, closes the book with the hope that, “With God’s help and a lot of practice, they may yet learn to sing the songs of Zion in a foreign land.”

Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950–1994.

By Elizabeth A. Armstrong. University of Chicago Press, 2002. 272 pp. Paper, \$22.50.

Reviewer: STEVEN EPSTEIN, *University of California, San Diego*

This is one of those rare books that builds bridges across divides. It connects distinct sociological sub-specialties, unites narrative history with structural analysis, melds quantitative and qualitative data, and weaves together institutional and cultural approaches to the study of social reality — all while telling a compelling story.

In *Forging Gay Identities*, Elizabeth Armstrong successfully provides a novel reinterpretation of the development of gay and lesbian movements, communities, and identities in the U.S. Her focus is on the self-proclaimed “gay Mecca” of San Francisco — by no means the modal case, but crucial for an understanding of the broader tendencies of gay life in this country. Armstrong traces the trajectory of mainstream lesbian and gay politics over half a century, but the cornerstone of her argument concerns what she calls the “gay identity movement” that took shape in the 1970s. Overshadowed by the preceding phase of radical gay liberation in many historical accounts, the gay identity movement was pivotal, Armstrong argues, for the consolidation of a distinctive organizational field. Using a carefully constructed database of San Francisco-based gay organizations, Armstrong charts the phenomenal explosion of gay and lesbian groups from the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s. As Armstrong notes, group formation followed the principle of “gay plus one”: organizations found their *raison d’être* in the union of gayness with any other specific social interest, be it softball or suicide prevention, Catholicism or sadomasochism.

Armstrong's point is that all this "banal functional diversification" is really quite interesting in at least two respects. First, in contrast to the monotone portrait of social movements suggested by at least some scholars, the gay identity movement was "simultaneously cultural, political, and organizational" (p. 13). Second, if a typical version of identity politics involves a group's projection of a totalizing sameness, then the gay identity movement's organizing logic of "unity through diversity" accomplished something rather different — the promotion of a loose confederation that papered over real differences in the interest of community building and the advancement of civil rights.

In sketching this portrait, Armstrong draws heavily on conceptions of "fields" developed by organizational sociologists, deliberately uniting that scholarship with the work of social movement analysts to describe the creation of a field of identity-based organizations as a political and cultural project. And by identifying the inner workings of the field, Armstrong is also able to make sense of its characteristic exclusions. In a chapter focusing on gender, race, and class divisions, Armstrong observes that lesbian feminists and lesbians and gay men of color often found themselves on the outside of the gay identity movement precisely because they repudiated the "gay plus one" logic. In place of the assumption that gayness was the master identity and the unifying term, these groups refused to subordinate their other identities: Being an African American gay man was just not the same as being a gay hiker. Thus, in the end, the "celebration of diversity" that characterized the gay identity movement was, too often, a celebration of "ideological and sexual diversity among white, middle-class men."

Armstrong observes that the gay identity movement in the 1970s and 1980s combined two "logics": an "interest group" logic of pursuing rights and reforms, and an "identity" logic that sought authenticity through visibility. (She makes the interesting observation that most scholarship on the lesbian and gay movement has taken for granted that these distinct logics would coexist, thereby failing to track the kinds of political and ideological work that made their alignment seem sensible.) She also describes a third, "redistributive" logic that, along with the identity logic, characterized the preceding phase of radical gay liberation. Although Armstrong uses these concepts in a helpful way to characterize different expressions of lesbian and gay politics over a long span of time, I had some quibbles with her deployment of them. First, it seems to me that "redistribution" was a goal of gay liberationists only insofar as they aligned themselves with other New Left movements that sought to remedy structural inequalities in U.S. society. But in their own sexual politics, liberationists did not seek what "redistribution" would imply — a transfer of social resources from the straight *have's* to the gay *have not's*. It would be more accurate to describe their goal as an overthrow of the sex/gender system through challenge to the notion that categories such as "gay" and "straight," or "masculine" and "feminine," were appropriate descriptors of identity in the

first place. Second, Armstrong periodically introduces a consequential forth “logic” — the defense of sexual pleasure-seeking — but does not integrate this concept into her abstract model in a systematic way.

What I did like, however, is that Armstrong’s “logics” are not the stuff of arid structural analysis. Instead, the conceptual framework provides a backbone for a nuanced historical account that is sensitive to contingency as well as to unintended consequences. And rather than hinge her narrative of change on free-floating “political opportunity structures,” Armstrong emphasizes the sense-making practices of actors on the ground who must engage in cultural work to perceive those opportunities as such. For these virtues alone, *Forging Gay Identities* is well worth the cover price — and a great book to assign in undergraduate or graduate classes on social movements, organizations, sexuality, or U.S. society.

Too Much to Ask: Black Women in the Era of Integration.

By *Elizabeth Higginbotham*. University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 288 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$19.95.

Reviewer: SARAH SUSANNAH WILLIE, *Swarthmore College*

Although the African American women about whom Elizabeth Higginbotham writes in *Too Much to Ask* are not even a full generation older than I, their presence — on predominantly white college campuses in particular and in the work world in general — allowed me a better experience in college and made the experience of work far less trying than it would have been without their sacrifices. That said, there are structural reasons in addition to timing for the interrelatedness of our experiences. One of the most salient is class.

Using in-depth interviews and surveys, Higginbotham contacted 56 women who described school experiences at the same time as the U.S. was pushed through the tunnel of resistance to integration by the civil rights movement into an atmosphere of ambivalent desegregation. Leaving high school and entering college in the 1960s, her respondents “were an optimistic group ready to accept the challenges of integration. Their struggles were critical ones, and we can point to individual successes. However, we have not seen the institutional change that many of the women thought their actions would bring about.”

Thus, Higginbotham sets the stage for a sociological essay that outlines the often demanding and difficult choices the families of these particular women made to pursue a solid education for their daughters. She does so against a meticulously researched and often elegantly written history of the state of black American families and their work and residential options during the 1950s and

1960s. At the same time, she introduces her reader to the complex interplay of race, class, and family composition for the implications of her respondents' trajectories. True to the postmodern moment, Higginbotham refuses to let the racial identity of her subjects be reduced to an archetypal experience where they can be nostalgically remembered as sacrificing heroines and then forgotten. By asking black women who were both working-class (55 percent) and middle-class (45 percent), who went to public and private high schools that were both diverse and homogeneous, she followed their routes to colleges that were both selective and nonselective, public and private. While some of her respondents had not yet completed college at the time of her study and others had earned advanced degrees several years earlier, their experiences reveal a level of family strategizing, solidarity, and goal orientation that will probably seem quite different from the families of most middle-class white women who went to college during the same era.

Despite the brevity of space for this review, two of Elizabeth Higginbotham's findings deserve repeating. One is that the parents' financial well-being put middle-class students on different footings in high school, oriented them toward different kinds of colleges, and differently prepared Higginbotham's respondents for navigating the experiences of college — from academic confidence to dating to negotiating sometimes hostile racial atmospheres. While the parents of the women that Higginbotham interviewed all wanted their daughters to achieve their full potential, their job statuses and incomes positioned them differently when it came to knowledge, resources, and even confidence in supporting their daughters' educational pursuits. The struggles of Higginbotham's respondents are similar to those of contemporary students who are working-class, African American, and female. Indeed, while black girls are likely to have different experiences from black boys in school (see Ann Arnett Ferguson's *Black Boys: Public Schools in the Making of Black Masculinity*, University of Michigan Press, 2000), working-class black girls especially are regularly schooled to enter jobs that replicate those of nineteenth-century domestics — nurse's aides, food-service workers, janitors, and child-care providers.

A second finding that bears mentioning is that the plans that Higginbotham's respondents had for their lives were not traditional, especially considering that they were exposed to the dominant-group ideals of women primarily as wives, homemakers, and child-care providers. While there was less explicit discussion of alternative lifestyles than I might have hoped for — including life in group houses or lesbian life partnerships — only percent of her interviewees stated a life plan preference that did not include work outside the home. Thirteen percent said they preferred to have only a career; and 18 percent envisioned a career and marriage without children. Forty-one percent said they preferred to have all three, and — while four percent had no expec-

tations — 23 percent envisioned marriage, children, and periodic or steady part-time work.

This book is broader in information and implications than its title suggests. Higginbotham provides a thoughtful context within which to understand her respondents' educational lives, and for that reason her study is an important contribution to the discipline and excellent choice for courses in public policy, the psychology or sociology of the family, human development, introduction to sociology, African American studies, race and ethnicity, women's studies, and education.

The New Race Question: How the Census Counts Multiracial Individuals.

Edited by Joel Perlmann and Mary C. Waters. Russell Sage Foundation, 2002. 398 pp. Cloth, \$39.95.

Reviewer: KIMBERLY McCLAIN DaCOSTA, *Harvard University*

The 2000 census marked the first time in its history that the Census Bureau allowed respondents the option of choosing more than one racial category. Strictly speaking, individuals have long been able to choose more than one racial category — their responses, however, were not counted as such. So the center of current concerns over the new race question, and what this volume is most concerned to address, are the implications of both *counting and using* multiple race counts in policy areas where race counts matter. How can 2000 race data be compared with that collected in previous censuses? Are multiple-race respondents treated as separate groups for the purposes of civil rights enforcement? What impact will this change have on political alignments? Will it undermine the legitimacy of the state's collection of racial data?

Joel Perlmann and Mary Waters have put together an important, timely, and readable volume that examines these issues from a variety of disciplinary perspectives (most are sociologists, political scientists, or demographers).

Of most immediate importance to readers will be the various articles that detail the technical aspects of how the census counts multiracial individuals. The possible permutations of the race data are daunting: 63 racial categories (126 when reported by Hispanic/non-Hispanic ethnicity). An appendix detailing the results of various techniques for bridging old and new race data is essential for understanding how racial statistics are arrived at (Tucker, et. al.). Other articles make clear the interpretive problems hidden within such data. David Harris provides empirical support for something qualitative analyses of multiracial populations have long contended, namely that how people identify themselves racially varies with the form of the question asked, the context in which it is asked, and who is doing the asking.

While the book is subtitled “how the census counts multiracial individuals,” it is broader than this wording implies. Discussions of the census question, bridging techniques, and the effects on population counts constitute only one-third of the book. Another third is dedicated to the politics of counting multiracial individuals and another third to more speculative matters such as its likely effect on racialized political alignments.

It should be no surprise that this is the most varied and contentious part of the book. The authors all seem to believe in the necessity of counting by race (with the possible exception of Werner Sollors), but they disagree on the wisdom of counting multiple race responses. Rod Harrison is the most pessimistic about this policy, arguing that the racial counts upon which civil rights enforcement depends are now determined by allocation procedures — procedures that are vulnerable to legal challenge. Josh Goldstein and Ann Morning are more accepting of this change and provide a helpful overview of Office of Management and the Budget (OMB) tabulation guidelines and their likely (and variable) impact on civil- versus voting-rights cases.

Taken as a whole, the book begins at the moment when changes to OMB Directive 15 (issued in 1997) are first implemented in 2000 and proceeds into the future. What we don’t learn about is how this change came about in the first place. Perlmann and Waters choose to “leave to others” an examination of the political machinations that led to the race-question change. They raise the possibility that multiracial advocates and Republicans in Congress shared an interest in diluting the strength of black interest groups (albeit for different reasons) as an explanation for why multiracial actors were successful in getting their agenda acted upon. This is a provocative speculation and deserves more sustained attention. Luckily for those interested, an analysis of the major players in the classification debates and their agenda based on interviews and fieldwork has been done (see Kim M. Williams, “The Next Step in Civil Rights: The American Multiracial Movement,” paper presented at the Colorlines Conference, Harvard University, August 31, 2003), and this volume could have benefited from such an analysis.

The main weakness of the volume is that it analyzes the population under consideration from a distance. The multiracial population is treated mostly as a statistical artifact of the change in classification procedure. Contributors (wisely) warn against treating multiple race counts as if they refer to socially meaningful populations. A collection of individuals does not an ethnic group make, they seem to be saying (see Harrison, Harris, and Farley). Certainly. But given that much of the volume is about the future implications of collecting multiple-race data (Perlmann offers a great analysis of the distortions that result from current racial forecasting procedures that assume no intermarriage), it is surprising that there is no examination of whether or in what ways multiracial collective identities are forming. The assumption of some contributors is that, since key multiracial advocates for classification change

have faded from public view, “multiracial movement” was all about classification. Actually, for most people joining multiracial organizations in the 1990s, classification was a minor concern. Moreover, such an interpretation misses the cultural conditions (e.g., social stigma attached to interracial families and identities) and institutional practices (beyond the always important recognition of the group-making capacities of statistical agencies) that have helped to create the desire for social recognition in the first place. The continuing creation of multiracial organizations and their growing media visibility suggest that this “population” is attempting to strengthen its sense of groupness. The future size and political visibility of one (or several) multiracial population(s) will hinge in part on whether this community of interests strengthens what are now very weak institutions and further elaborates a cultural identity. What is certain, however, is that the “counting of multiracial individuals” will play a role in that process.

The New Electoral Politics of Race.

By Matthew J. Streb. University of Alabama Press, 2002. 259 pp. Cloth, \$39.95.

Reviewer: DAVID WEAKLIEM, *University of Connecticut*

This book explores the conflict between race and class divisions in politics by examining recent gubernatorial elections in seven states. The argument rests on the principle that the salience of race to white voters depends on the size of the black population. Consequently, appeals to racial themes will be more effective in states with large black populations. Working-class voters are particularly susceptible to such appeals, and so the presence of a large black population provides conservative politicians with an opportunity to split the traditional Democratic coalition. Although explicit appeals to race are generally not acceptable in contemporary American politics, it is possible to achieve the same affect by discussion of issues such as welfare or crime.

This is a familiar argument and has already been explored in a number of studies. Streb’s contribution is to focus on the behavior of politicians rather than voters. Although there is some analysis of exit poll data, the heart of the book is a series of narratives of recent gubernatorial election campaigns. Streb has extensive analyses of Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas, and Virginia and brief discussions of three northern states. His results confirm that Republican candidates made more effort to play on white interests and fears in states with larger black populations. Democrats tried to defuse racial appeals by focusing on issues such as a proposed state lottery. Streb also seeks to consider the effect of class composition on party strategy. Alabama, for example, combines a large black population with a large number of working-class whites, while Georgia has a large black population but a smaller number of working-class whites. His

definition of class, however, will not satisfy most sociologists, since it is based entirely on income. Moreover, no clear difference along this dimension emerges from his analysis. Hence, the book does not make much contribution to the analysis of the relationship between race and class in electoral politics.

Streb presents his study as an attempt to solve a “puzzle”: why race continues to have an important impact on voting choices even though explicit racial rhetoric has largely disappeared. However, this question is a puzzle only if one assumes that votes are determined by positions on the issues of the day. When one considers evidence on the general staying power of group cleavages, it does not seem surprising that blacks should continue to vote Democratic in overwhelming numbers.

Overall, the book is likely to have more appeal to political scientists than to sociologists. Streb makes little or no reference to the sociological literature on class or race, and his basic conclusions are not surprising. However, the accounts of the election campaigns are interesting, particularly in showing the extent to which state politics reflect idiosyncratic local concerns. In Virginia, for example, a Republican candidate won largely on the basis of a promise to repeal a car tax, even though polls showed that most voters did not believe that he would carry out this promise. The narratives also illustrate that divisions between left and right are often very muted at the state level. Democrats tend to emphasize improving education, while Republicans emphasize cutting taxes, but issues such as abortion and gun control seem to play little role. Since all the elections studied occurred in the late 1990s, it is not possible to say how widely the evidence can be generalized. Nevertheless, they indicate that state politics should not be regarded as national politics in miniature. The case studies also show that party strategy can have a substantial effect on voting patterns. In Arkansas, Republican Mike Huckabee was able to win almost 48 percent of the black vote, not far short of his performance among whites. At the other extreme, the Republican candidate won only 5 percent of the black vote in Alabama. It would be interesting to see if such distinctive state patterns persist over time.

Although its theoretical contribution is modest, *The New Electoral Politics of Race* is well written and contains a good deal of interesting material. If nothing else, it can remind political sociologists that there is a lot going on below the national level.

Screen Saviors: Hollywood Fictions of Whiteness.

By *Hernán Vera and Andrew M. Gordon*. Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 203 pp. \$22.95.

Reviewer: PAMELA PERRY, *University of California, Santa Cruz*

Movies appeal to and help construct our imagination, including the ways we imagine ourselves and others. And where people have few or no face-to-face encounters with people who occupy radically different social locations than themselves, the media stand in for that encounter. Because movies are profit-making enterprises, directors and producers will seek to create films with wide appeal that, thus, present viewers with stories and images they will identify with, enjoy, learn from, and find solace in. We “love” the movies in which we see our values, aesthetics, and selves reflected.

So imagine what we might learn about “white” racial desires, values, and concepts of themselves and others through examining nearly all the most highly acclaimed and popular films of the twentieth century that were directed by whites, intended for a large (white) audience, and featured white protagonists who interact with people from different racial and ethnic groups. That examination is what Hernán Vera and Andrew M. Gordon do in *Screen Saviors*. Vera and Gordon’s analytical foci are (1) representations of white people in film, seeking to deconstruct the “sincere fictions” of white self-concepts, and (2) representations of whites’ relations with people of “another color,” seeking insights into how race relations, inequalities, and solutions to such are culturally presented, produced, and reproduced. They argue that films teach whites how to be “white” while also providing “social-therapeutic devices” for coping with racial inequality without changing the status quo.

The result of collaboration between a sociologist (Vera) and a film critic (Gordon), the book combines the best of media criticism with sociological inquiry. I can often feel a little uncomfortable with research that too confidently asserts the influence of popular culture on people’s mindsets, as though perception were unmediated by the experiences, insights, mental formations, and interpretive contexts of individuals. However, once I got into the substantive argument of this work, I put aside my concerns. The authors’ well-designed and comprehensive methodology makes this book quite persuasive and sets it apart from other film studies of whiteness.

Vera and Gordon discuss upwards of forty-six popular films, organized by genre, including *Glory*, *To Kill a Mockingbird*, *One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest*, *Mutiny on the Bounty*, *Amistad*, *Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner*, *Gentleman’s Agreement*, *Bulworth*, *Blazing Saddles*, *Men in Black*, and *Matrix*. Each film is examined in its social-historical context, and movies based on real events are compared to the historical record. Vera and Gordon find that white people are always primary characters in these films and people of color secondary,

present to love and serve whites. This is true even in films, such as *Amistad*, that are principally about an oppressed group and attempt to represent its members as complicated (i.e., human) characters. Furthermore, white people are consistently represented as more principled, enterprising, brave, kind, cultured, and good-looking than other peoples — in other words, racially superior. Showing us that notions of white racial superiority, if unconscious, are alive and well in U.S. culture is, in my opinion, one of the most important aspects of this text. Within sociology the tendency to emphasize white privilege as if it were material privilege alone overlooks what Cornel West calls the “existential capital” that whites gain from an inherently elevated self-concept.

Through their examinations of white fictionalizations of whiteness and race relations in popular films, the authors illustrate mainstream movies as part of the “project of racism” to shape racial consciousness and imaginaries in ways that will make a “non-racist world impossible in the future.” Even as representations of blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and other people of color “improve” in films, they still serve the propped-up ways whites are represented and bolster imaginary solutions to inequalities that do not challenge the racial (or gender/sexual) status quo and fail to present color-blindness or cross-racial homosocial bonding between heterosexual males.

Overall, *Screen Savors* is a highly accessible, engaging, and informative text, suitable for undergraduate and graduate courses on race, whiteness, and cultural or media studies. The authors conclude the book by pointing out the need for teaching media literacy to young people and using that skill to help deconstruct whiteness. This book would well serve as a text for such a course.

Resilience and Courage: Women, Men, and the Holocaust.

By Nechama Tec. Yale University Press, 2003. 438 pp. Cloth, \$35.00.

Reviewer: LYNN RAPAPORT, *Pomona College*

Some Holocaust scholars have argued that focusing on gender differences trivializes the Holocaust experience by making invidious comparisons among victims and detracting from the notion that Jews were persecuted because they were Jews. Drawing on wartime diaries, postwar memoirs, archival materials, and interviews with survivors, Nechama Tec shows exactly how gender affected the initial stage of German occupation in Eastern Europe, life in the ghettos, concentration camps, the Aryan world, the underground movements, and the forests. Tec shows how gender mattered at every stage — identification, expropriation, removal from gainful employment, isolation, and annihilation. Because Jewish men were viewed as a greater threat to the Nazis than Jewish women, men were targeted first to quash political opposition. Jewish women

were considered less threatening. Thus, their coping mechanisms and responses to persecution were different.

During the initial stages of German occupation, for example, Nazi measures prevented men from fulfilling the traditional masculine role of provider and protector. When Jewish men lost all prospects of gainful employment, their wives and children took over these roles. Upper-class Jewish men were particularly distressed by wartime deprivation, as they had more to begin with and thus more to lose. Disempowered fathers and husbands often fell into deep depressions. The Nazis attacked Jewish women through their children. Children within the ghetto were deported or starved, and women arriving at concentration camps pregnant or with small children were gassed immediately.

Men and women also reacted differently in concentration camps. Men had a harder time coping than women, partly because their physical sufferings were greater. Moreover, since women traditionally were involved in food selection and preparation, they were more knowledgeable about food in general and better equipped to deal with chronic hunger and starvation. Women also have more body fat than men and were better able than men to ration their meager food portions to last longer.

The concentration camp created new social distinctions among prisoners. Men were affected more than women by their prewar standing. Most divisions were determined by access to food and, indirectly, by the kinds of jobs prisoners performed. Most of the prewar male elites, equipped with irrelevant skills and habits that the Nazis targeted for destruction, moved to the bottom of the social structure. The skilled laborers, craftsmen, and manual laborers had better jobs than the prewar male elite.

In the concentration camps, Jews who established collective support systems by bonding together were better able to cope with the slavelike environment. A few of these associations were based on familial ties: mothers and daughters, fathers and sons, and same-sexed siblings. While prisoners were powerless against the authorities, a group could protect its members from other prisoner's hostile acts like stealing food and could offer aid at desperate moments. These informal bonding groups improved the quality of their lives, and gave them a reason to live. Tec argues that regardless of country of origin, or which camp they were transferred to, women invariably formed cooperative groups and thus increased their chances for survival.

In a fascinating chapter on hiding and passing on the Aryan side, Tec shows how patriarchal predilections that led men to be seen as more intelligent, rational, and aggressive than women resulted in legislature requiring all adult males to work in jobs that benefited the German economy. Thus, authorities would likely check the documents of men on the streets before checking those of women, making it easier for women to hide and pass. Moreover, Jewish men were circumcised; a casual examination could easily reveal their Jewishness.

In order to hide or pass, Jews also needed Christian protectors and fluency in the native language of the area. In Eastern Europe Jewish women were traditionally confined to the domestic sphere and barred from Jewish religious, political, and cultural leadership. Because of this, they had more freedom to become involved in secular education and were often more familiar with the common language and culture of the non-Jewish secular society and thus more advantaged in their ability to pass.

More men escaped into the woods than women, often joining partisans in the forest. Most men among the partisans considered women unfit for combat and therefore burdensome. Women who joined the partisans were more likely relegated to traditional feminine spheres like food preparation. In some Russian detachments women were accepted largely as sexual partners, becoming the virtual property of the officers. Jewish women in the forest were often forced into sexual relationships because their protection and survival depended on forming a sexual liaison with a man who had a gun. Women were also the victims of rape.

All told, Tec provides a fascinating and profound analysis of how gender affected persecution and survival during the Holocaust. She convincingly shows how a gendered analysis can provide a more nuanced understanding of the Jewish experience without leading to trivialization or distortion. By showing how gender relates to class and power in matters of cooperation, bonding, survival, and resilience, Tec's book will be invaluable for Holocaust scholars, those interested in gender, and anyone trying to understand the ability of humans to survive inhuman conditions.

Handbook on the Sociology of the Military.

By Giuseppe Caforio. Kluwer Academic, 2003. 498 pp. Cloth, \$130.00.

Reviewer: BRADLEY BULLOCK, *Randolph-Macon Woman's College*

This ambitious compilation is a much-needed general, but thorough, overview of military sociology from the time it emerges as a specific subdiscipline in the 1940s. For this, the volume deserves immediate praise. The handbook's excellent summary of social thought frames major classical and contemporary debates by careful selection of recent scholarship. The contributors, from several countries, study issues from various national and international contexts, and their works are commendably interdisciplinary.

The editor's own work dominates the introductory selections. His chapter on the emergence of military sociology is a truly remarkable synopsis. For example, he effectively traces dominant themes emerging from the American School — such as the Huntington and Janowitz divergence/convergence debate — to the seminal influences of classical theorists before bringing the readers

up to date on recent research under this heading. From his own cross-national survey of researchers in the field, Caforio reports a general crisis in theory relative to “practical” empirical studies favored by research groups outside academia (and sometimes sponsored by governments or their militaries). Perhaps in response, the works in this volume are thoroughly grounded in theory, and a large section of the book is devoted to theoretical models. Most notable among these is James Burk’s “Military Mobilization in Modern Western Societies,” which uses a synthesis of several change theories to explain the likely consequences of the international trend away from mass armies and toward volunteer ones.

Another large section devoted to civil-military relations features two articles about how evolving military structures affect military families and includes Hans Born’s suggestions for new, post-Cold War frameworks to study ongoing concerns about democratic control of armed forces. Noteworthy here is Bernard Boëne’s criticism of the popular notion that rapid technological innovations largely explain structural changes. He claims that today’s organizational trends — networks of smaller units with flatter hierarchies, decentralized decision making, an increasing capacity to tolerate ambiguities, and permeable boundaries — follow from postmodern, ideological shifts that dismantle an overarching, universally valid, and socially meaningful vision of the military.

Concerning military culture, the increasing participation of women among armed forces is a subject of wide interest. Marina Nuciari notes, in one of the better articles, that this trend is necessarily consistent with others: that is, the transition to volunteer forces and force downsizing, the need for technological expertise, and new “nonconventional” or “humanitarian” missions. Other works concentrate on the conversion or restructuring of the military. Significant trends include a need for “constabulary forces” that respond quickly to flash conflicts (Manigart), finding new functions for “downsized” military forces as civilian employees occupy a larger role in military operations (Jelušić), factors encouraging more flexible and collaborative multinational missions (Dandecker), and the global evolution of the perceptions and identities of soldiers themselves as “humanitarian peacekeepers” (Kümmel). Caforio appropriately concludes the volume with concise summaries of these trends and suggests some larger implications from the whole to guide the next round of scholarship. One important structural change not adequately covered in this volume is represented by P.W. Singer’s *Corporate Warriors*, which documents the dramatic increase in the “outsourcing” of traditional military functions to private, capitalist enterprises.

A few comments on the reference value of this handbook may be useful. Readers are thoughtfully directed to earlier bibliographies to complement an extensive list of references (although I found it less convenient that all these were piled into one section at the end rather than at the conclusion of each

piece). Some sociologists might note that more often than not references come from outside their field. Caforio makes a strong case for sociology as “the most sound and complete scientific approach to the study of the military” but argues that the field is rightfully interdisciplinary, preparing readers for research dominated by approaches from related fields (particularly political science, cultural anthropology, and social psychology). He justifies this tack using a quote from Kümmel’s chapter: “The reason for trans-/interdisciplinarity lies in the simple truth that the military is a highly complex social phenomenon . . . that cuts through various levels, touches several different contexts, and is thus subject to multiple processes of interpretation.” Most sociologists will likely appreciate the interdisciplinary nature of this volume; others should not expect, despite its title, that the majority of the selections are the product of interdisciplinary sociologists sitting in departments of sociology. Many of the authors are affiliated with military institutes (four contributors from the Royal Netherlands Military Academy alone) and disciplinary affiliations are left unclear. Scholars tired of international compilations dominated by U.S. studies will find this volume refreshing, as most contributors are European and tend to use the U.S. as a comparative case. Also, perhaps to counter the “theoretical crisis” suggested by the editor, the selections decidedly favor qualitative over quantitative models.

This volume is a valuable addition, long needed by those interested in the military as a sociocultural phenomenon. It should prove useful to neophytes and seasoned practitioners alike. The selections are of high quality, well represent the primary lines of research within the field, and offer implications that could not be more timely. Consistent with the argument that sociologists should draw widely from numerous fields, we may anticipate that future research will be “meta-disciplinary” as well — that is, will incorporate the systematic observations of war correspondents, journalists, refugees, and others outside academia and established think tanks. Sometimes these observers on the ground offer the freshest hypotheses and insights.

The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment.

By Franklin Zimring. Oxford University Press, 2003. 258 pp. Cloth, \$30.00.

Reviewer: HERBERT H. HAINES, *State University of New York at Cortland*

Considering its modest length, Franklin Zimring’s *Contradictions of American Capital Punishment* is a complex book. First and foremost, it attempts to explain why the U.S. finds itself increasingly isolated among Western democracies in continuing to embrace the death penalty. But in doing so, the book also explores the cultural roots of the sanction in this country, the large regional differences in execution patterns within the U.S., the intensification of the American

capital punishment debate during the 1990s — by which time the matter had been largely settled elsewhere in the world — and the future of state-imposed death as a political issue. Zimring may have taken on too much here, raising more important questions than he can answer conclusively. But the questions are so significant and his answers so intriguing that the book merits the attention of death penalty scholars in a number of disciplines.

Space limits prevent me from even summarizing all the arguments in Zimring's book, much less discussing them in the detail they deserve. In essence, he suggests that the death penalty in the U.S. must be understood in terms of the interplay between two contradictory cultural traditions. One of these emphasizes due process and the mistrust of centralized government, while the other is based upon vigilante values and direct social control by local communities. In Europe, where vigilante values are weak, the death penalty has been reframed in recent years as a human rights question, and the consensus among European elites is that no nation that continues to execute its citizens can be considered fully civilized. Even though European opinion surveys reveal popular approval of the death penalty comparable to that in the U.S., no serious reinstatement effort has emerged in any Western democracy or is likely to. In the U.S., in contrast, the death penalty continues to be discussed almost entirely as a domestic crime policy matter. The notion that an execution could be compared to torture, political imprisonment, or slavery strikes most Americans as bizarre. Moreover, executions are increasingly justified here as a "service" to victims' families to help them achieve emotional "closure." Execution is rarely criticized as an illegitimate application of state power, thus depriving abolitionists of a potentially fruitful angle of attack.

The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment also brings the due process–vigilantism dichotomy to bear on the marked state and regional variations in the death penalty's application. While both these cultural strands are identifiable throughout the U.S., Zimring shows that states with weaker traditions of vigilante violence are less likely to have reinstated capital punishment after the 1976 Supreme Court ruling in *Gregg v. Georgia*. If they did reinstate, they are less likely to have actually executed significant portions of those inmates sentenced to die. States with long histories of vigilante justice — most notably in the South — are the states with the highest execution rates. This hypothesis is plausible, of course, and the author supports it with historical data on lynching. The more difficult task is finding direct evidence of the continuing impact of vigilante values in more recent times when the extraordinary divergence in executions between and within states has emerged. To make his case, Zimring relies on scattered survey data, concealed firearms laws, and rates of self-defense killings as proxies, and he acknowledges that such evidence is merely indirect and suggestive. Hopefully survey researchers will follow his lead in crafting new instruments that will allow for more adequate tests of his hypotheses.

The final chapters of *The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment*, in which Zimring turns to the death penalty “end game” in America, are perhaps the only weak parts in an otherwise excellent book. Recent judicial struggles with the appeals process and heightened concerns about miscarriages of justice, he writes, suggest that the abolition process has already begun. The ongoing value conflict, however, ensures that capital punishment will not go away without a protracted and divisive struggle. Much depends upon the way in which abolition campaigns are conducted, and Zimring outlines what he sees as the most effective strategy for anti-death penalty activists to follow. He concludes that capital punishment will end sooner and with greater finality if abolitionists subordinate pragmatic issues such as cost, racial discrimination in capital sentencing, the danger of miscarriages of justice, and the like in favor of a direct attack on the vigilante values that underlie the appeal of execution: “In addition to the pragmatic and incremental campaigns of recent years, morally centered objections to execution and morally committed activism will be needed to create an atmosphere where change can be facilitated. The campaign to abolish the death penalty in the U.S. will not succeed by stealth” (180). Although the words “in addition to” provide wiggle room, Zimring’s vision runs directly counter to this reviewer’s argument (*Against Capital Punishment: The Anti-Death Penalty Movement in America, 1972–1994*, Oxford University Press, 1996) that a more pragmatic form of abolitionism has the advantage of providing those who fall between the extremes of opinion with a culturally resonant vocabulary for thinking critically about capital punishment. Reasonable observers can disagree on such matters, of course. But Zimring strongly implies that abolitionists have simply failed to consider a frontal assault on capital punishment as an immoral public policy. In fact, anti-death penalty forces relied almost exclusively upon such an approach for nearly two centuries, and without much success. The short-lived victories of the late 1960s and early 1970s were based on the claim that executions were *unconstitutional* rather than immoral, but not until the late 1980s did “pragmatic and incremental” claims begin to gain a foothold in the movement. The pragmatic turn in movement strategy seems to be faring rather well, judging from the generally favorable receptions given to moratorium proposals at the state and local levels, as well as recent evidence of public and judicial misgivings about capital punishment. In any case, the lack of detailed attention in *The Contradictions of American Capital Punishment* to the strategic evolution of the anti-death penalty movement as a whole, and of specific anti-death penalty organizations, is surprising and disappointing. Zimring does refer to Amnesty International from time to time, but the reader does not come away with a very nuanced understanding even of AI’s abolition work over the years, much less that of the other groups that have tried to close the door to the death chamber. Some incorporation of the (admittedly limited) literature on the anti-death penalty

movement would have provided much-needed context for the book's concluding chapter and perhaps even affected its conclusions.

Demographic Change and the Family in Japan's Aging Society.

Edited by John W. Traphagan and John Knight. State University of New York Press, 2003. 248 pp. Cloth, \$71.50; paper, \$23.95.

Reviewer: CHIKAKO USUI, *University of Missouri—St. Louis*

Traphagan and Knight have edited a timely and interesting book about Japan's aging population and its impact on the family and rural depopulation. It attempts to synthesize demographic and anthropological approaches and documents changes in the *ie* (Japanese stem family) and small-town struggles for survival. Two chapters by demographers identify trends and variables associated with coresidence and functional limitations of older persons using a 1987 national survey. Eight chapters of field studies conducted in the 1990s complement the statistical analyses and reveal how, where, and why problems arise and how people and towns cope. In chapter 1, Traphagan and Knight review the issues (family, population, and aging) addressed in the book. In chapter 11, Long and Littleton evaluate the accomplishments of the book for three themes (depopulation, caregiving, and family relations).

A key theme is the decline in traditional living arrangements and the weakening of obligatory family caregiving. Chapter 2 by Raymo and Kaneda shows that coresidence (multigenerational living arrangements) is more likely when older persons are widowed/divorced/separated, own businesses, have three or more children, own their own homes, and are nonurban. In contrast, in chapter 10 Traphagan points out that coresidence as a variable does not necessarily mean two (or three) generations living under one roof. Increasingly it represents two households on the same family compound (they are not recognized as coresident in the census). Whether residents perceive their arrangements as coresidence or separate units, and how they interact, is more complex than their numerical representation. For example, he describes resistance by daughters-in-law to traditional coresidence and suggests that this is why eldest sons are handicapped on today's marriage market.

As the family system changes, traditional obligations and expectations are often reinvented or revived by people, industries, and government policies, albeit with different outcomes. Brown's study of *nisetai jutaku* (new prefabricated two-family households under one roof) in chapter 3 shows how reality deviates from the ideal as a result of different expectations by the two generations. Thang, in chapter 4, examines an unsuccessful attempt at reviving contact between older persons and children at an age-integrated facility (a nursing home combined with a nursery). Problems result from the lack of

commitment from government officials, lack of training among facility managers, and opposition from middle-aged parents who question the hygiene of the elderly. Chapter 7 by Kawano describes alternative locations of burial for those outside the traditional *ie* system and for those who reject traditional family grave sites. While these chapters demonstrate conflicts and strains between generations over the succession of the *ie* and caregiving issues, chapter 9 by Jenike shows how families adapt to professional care as Japan shifts to a new model of welfare with the introduction of National Long-Term Care Insurance (*kaigohoken*) in 2000. Chapters 5 and 6 on depopulation, by Thompson and Knight, illustrate how towns struggle with revitalization projects and their politics.

The book sometimes falls short of its goal of strengthening complementarities of demographic and anthropological studies. The issue of when and how two generations coreside centers on the daughter-in-law's point of view, even though family succession by daughters (rather than sons) is increasing. Similarly, the question of who provides care is largely presented from a daughter-in-law's point of view despite the fact that elderly wives are the largest group of caregivers to bedridden elderly. In other words, the authors do not sample other participants in these conflicts. A more balanced picture would be provided by including older persons living alone, older couples helping each other, and daughters as caregivers.

As Traphagan and Knight acknowledge, these two disciplines differ in methodology, and the fit between them is not perfect. Statistical analyses by demographers do not offer substantive interpretation of why certain variables are associated with coresidence. Ethnographic studies by anthropologists do not provide fuller answers because they rely on small convenience samples that do not represent the models provided by demographers. Rich in detail, these cases show the variance rather than the means.

Despite these problems, the book offers a rich understanding about family changes and how people cope. It generates interesting questions and serves as a good reader for discussion in undergraduate and graduate courses on comparative cultures, on Japan or East Asia. For those teaching family and gerontology courses, the book offers a wonderful cross-cultural perspective. I highly recommend it.

This Land Is Our Land: Immigrants and Power in Miami.

By Alex Stepick, Guillermo Grenier, Max Castro, and Marvin Dunn. University of California Press, 2003. 192 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$19.95.

Reviewer: GEORGE WILSON, *University of Miami*

This is a useful book for both advanced undergraduate and graduate seminars on race and ethnic relations. It is a highly readable and perceptive account of relations between Latin American and Caribbean immigrants, who, in one generation, have transformed Miami from a sleepy southern town to a cosmopolitan “gateway” city, and longer-established groups, specifically whites and African Americans. Overall, it represents an important piece of a growing body of sociological research over the last decade demonstrating that in the era of the “new racial and ethnic diversity” Miami extends the analysis of intergroup relations into uncharted territory.

The authors skillfully use participant observation to assess how the unique characteristics of Miami, for example, the numerical preponderance of racial/ethnic minorities and the unprecedented socioeconomic success of some in the first generation — including, most conspicuously, Cubans — advance our understanding of the dynamics of assimilation. Indeed, in Miami, these characteristics have turned the assimilation process upside down. For example, first-generation immigrants, rather than on a trajectory that will eventuate in becoming “mainstream” Americans, have gained control of many of Miami’s key institutions. As a result, Latin Americans have made the greatest inroads with other recent arrivals, such as Colombians, Dominicans, and Haitians, now making advances, though in a more limited way. Meanwhile, whites struggle to maintain influence in some key institutions and African Americans continue largely as disenfranchised and second-class citizens.

Significantly, while often reading like a lively journalistic account, this volume contains much sound and innovative sociological analysis. The authors analyze assimilation as an interactive process across three institutional domains — civic and business power, education, and the workplace. This, of course, stands in contrast to the imagery of assimilation as a one-way street in which immigrants progressively adopt that which is native as a precursor to socioeconomic success. Overall, the key explanatory variable driving the analyses of interaction, and the path along which assimilation proceeds across each of the three domains, is power, a key sociological concept that has remained insufficiently integrated into sociological analyses of assimilation. In fact, the authors’ explicit use of power as the key variable allows them to identify the range of paths along which assimilation may proceed.

The authors document that intergroup relations inevitably produce “transculturation,” in which immigrants and Americans adapt to each other. However, the degree of transculturation among both immigrants and natives

is a function of power relations that vary across institutional domains. In this vein, most interesting to me was the authors' analyses of elite governance in Miami. Specifically, white leaders have engaged (albeit reluctantly after waiting for Latinos to adopt "mainstream" values and culture) in a process of "reverse acculturation," heralding Miami as the capital of Latin America and learning Spanish and adopting Latino culture in response to the growing numbers and power of Latino elites. Similarly, African Americans continue to have influence over Haitian children in the sphere of education. Specifically, Haitian adolescents have undergone "segmentary" assimilation, that is, assimilation to a particular segment of American culture — namely, that of inner-city poor African American youth — by virtue of being a numerical minority and exerting little influence in the same schools attended in poor areas of the city. Finally, across a range of industries, the racial/ethnic composition of managers and supervisors by workplace structures socioeconomic rewards, in part, on the basis of language usage and cultural propinquity.

In sum, as the authors point out, Miami is a harbinger of interethnic relations in other parts of the U.S. Accordingly, the dynamics of assimilation should be increasingly complex in a growing number of geographic areas. This book is important in helping to identify the formula for the increasingly complex patterns of assimilation and, hopefully, spurring research to test its adequacy in various geographic locales.

The Origins of Indigenism: Human Rights and the Politics of Identity.

By Ronald Niezen. University of California Press, 2003. 272 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$18.95.

Reviewer: KERI IYALL SMITH, *Stonehill College*

Twenty years of study and thinking culminate in this work by Niezen. Using community-based research from Canada and Africa, this work introduces and explores the emergence of indigenism, the international movement of indigenous peoples.

With chapter 1, indigenous forms of resistance are distinguished from ethnic groups on the basis of their unique political status. The reader is also introduced to the concept of indigenism, which is defined as "the international movement that aspires to promote and protect the rights of the world's 'first peoples.'" Niezen's anthropological roots guide him in this process, but he breaks the mold by studying the world as a microcosm. Here, the discussion of *indigenous* fleshes out the idea of *indigenous* and the empirical expression of *indigenous* as a global phenomenon.

The next chapter explores the international response to indigenous peoples' assertions of sovereignty at two time points: the beginning and end of the

twentieth century. This includes three cases: an appeal to the League of Nations from 1922 to 1924 for a hearing investigating a dispute with Canada over tribal self-government; initiatives by the International Labour Organization from 1921 to 1989; and the role of indigenous peoples in the United Nations since its inception. This overview of the indigenous experience in international governing organizations over time allows the reader to better understand the emergence of indigenism.

Chapter 3 examines diversity and commonalities across indigenous peoples. Niezen identifies two axes of difference: a North–South line and in the African/Asian controversy. Indigenous peoples of the North are advantaged by the liberal democratic states and their assimilation-oriented educations that allow them to understand international governing systems while the indigenous peoples from the South struggle to survive in oppressive political systems. Indigenous peoples in Africa and Asia face challenges to politicizing their status as indigenous because the state is liberated from its colonizer. Using the cases of the Crees in Canada and the Tuareg of North Africa, chapter 3 illustrates the shared experiences of marginalization, oppression, and the special rights that indigenous peoples claim. Niezen identifies assimilative education, the loss of subsistence, and state abrogation of treaties as foundations for the formation of a common global indigenous identity.

The goal of chapter 4 is to explore the overlap between the issue of cultural relativism versus ethical universalism and the issue of collective versus universal rights. The author seeks to explain how this overlap presents a challenge to cultural preservation and self-determination for indigenous peoples. This chapter tackles a complex overlap that might be easier to comprehend if it were presented in two separate chapters. There is so much going on that it was difficult to follow the flow of ideas. Although Niezen's statement that there is a "pervasiveness of sovereignty as a point of contestation between indigenous peoples and the states" is believable, it is difficult to judge or verify that his work reveals this to be the case.

Chapter 5 explores how assertions of self-determination influence indigenous–state and indigenous–international governing organization relations. The indigenous expression of self-determination is in opposition to the homogenizing tendency of states. Here Niezen presents empirical examples of the Grand Council of the Crees at the United Nations and disputes within international governing community over the application of the term *peoples* to indigenous groups. While the goal of self-determination unites indigenous peoples' lobbying efforts in international forums such as human rights meetings and processes, self-determination can take on multiple forms, varying from organization to organization.

With the next chapter, Niezen investigates the political implications of indigenous peoples' assertions of self-determination. The state cannot be the

source of justice for self-determination claims on behalf of indigenous peoples because of its interest in the outcome. Even international governing organizations are biased toward the state, as they generally represent the interests of a population of states. Discussions of secession and civil society among indigenous peoples examine the use of symbols of statehood.

The book ends with a brief chapter that names the key projects of indigenism: affirming local claims of difference, using the language and symbols of states in claims of self-determination, and embracing the universal concept of human rights to protect and develop identity.

With *The Origins of Indigenism* Niezen considers the ways that indigenous peoples are fitting themselves into existing structures at the state and international levels. In the process, he reveals the paradoxes between indigenous goals and the structure of the state system. Further empirical study will benefit from the ideas in this theoretical work. World systems theorists and researchers would be interested in Niezen's study of the world microcosm and indigenism. This book would make an excellent contribution to graduate seminars on culture, postcolonial studies, globalization, or social movements.

Contemporary Asian American Communities: Intersections and Divergences. Edited by Linda Trinh Vo and Rick Bonus. Temple University Press, 2002. 254 pp. Cloth, \$69.50; paper, \$22.95.

Reviewer: JIMY SANDERS, *University of South Carolina*

The collection edited by Linda Trinh Vo and Rick Bonus is a multidisciplinary account of various ways in which Asian American communities have evolved over the past few decades. Both spatial and behavioral dimensions of "the community" are considered. Relationships involving the fluid nature of ethnic identity and the intergenerational dynamics of community development receive attention. How intragroup variation in social class impinges on these relationships also receives attention. A number of chapters consider how diverse special interests on the one hand, and common interests on the other hand, influence the emergence and institutionalization of political activism within the Asian American community. A few chapters consider nontraditional means through which culture is expressed.

The multidisciplinary character of this volume results in a stimulating variety of inquiries into the ethnic community. Some of these inquiries are more successful than others, but the strength of the collection rests on its diversity of approaches and foci. Shortcomings are that the chapters often suffer from data limitations and few if any original ideas are examined. In that way, the limitations of this volume are similar to the limitations of most edited

volumes. Although few, if any, of the chapters could stand up to the rigors of a scholarly peer-reviewed journal, taken together they constitute a useful addition to the literature.

The collection includes 15 chapters. The two most imaginative ones are by Fung and Chow. The former considers how filmmakers use their art to wrestle with social and political ambiguities in Taiwanese national identity and cultural authenticity. Fung shows how these issues can become entangled in the traditional importance of preserving masculine lineage. This entanglement can lead to a clash of values and necessitate flexibility in negotiating group identity so as to effect familial and cultural continuance. Chow's chapter, which uses fictional writing to explore the issue of Asian American panethnicity, may also be viewed by many readers as too much about too little. But at the least Chow shows how issues studied by sociologists, such as relationships involving the intergenerational cultural gap, marginality, and panethnicity, can receive insightful treatment in fictional literature.

The remaining contributions are more mainstream for an audience of sociologists. Various chapters concentrate on (1) the spatial, social, and economic positioning of immigrant communities in the broader urban (and international) environment; (2) the marginality of gay Asian Americans in the larger gay community; (3) how variation in social class and intergenerational differences in socialization influence ethnic identity in a plural society; (4) the use of the Internet as a forum for members of an ethnic group to grope through the meanings of ethnic identity; (5) how Pacific Islander groups are distinct from Asian American groups; and (6) political activism in Asian American communities.

I wish to draw attention to three of the stronger chapters. King shows how ethnic communities may preserve certain aspects of their identity by resorting to a "transracial ethnic strategy." As the group intermixes with outsiders, the definition of who is a group member is expanded to include those of mixed backgrounds. Panethnic identity is discouraged by expanding the definition of what constitutes in-group membership. The chapter by L. Park describes the crucial role American-raised children often play in businesses operated by their first-generation parents and emphasizes the issue of intergenerational role reversal. Because they have superior knowledge of the language and customs of the host society, children become more competent than their parents in some aspects of operating the business. Park considers how the children deal with this role reversal. Ho's chapter shows how panethnic identity can be encouraged by social class privilege. Although this identity is largely based on a culture of professionalism, consideration is given to how intergroup connections among professionals may facilitate efforts to address the needs of the less fortunate members of Asian American communities.

This collection makes for an interesting read and can be useful for undergraduate instruction.

Mothers and Children: Feminist Analyses and Personal Narratives.

By Susan E. Chase and Mary F. Rogers. Rutgers University Press, 2001. 343 pp. Cloth, \$60.00; paper, \$55.00.

Reviewer: KINKO ITO, *University of Arkansas, Little Rock*

Mothers and Children is a page-turner. The book, which reads very well as a textbook and also as general reading, is based on the materials that were covered in Susan Chase's seminar "Motherhood and Feminism" at her university. As the subtitle states, the book is written from the perspective of feminism and entails feminist observations, analyses, theories, and concepts. It debunks the myths and cultural construction of motherhood that is prevalent in the U.S. It is refreshing, informative, and educational to see the American situation of motherhood and children from the feminist perspective, and I found the book an eye-opener. *Mothers and Children* also includes the professional experiences of the authors in the classrooms as well as their more private and personal accounts, which make for powerful statements. Many comments made by the students in Chase's seminar are also included in the book. They are interesting and insightful, adding much color, context, and texture to the reading material and the issues at hand.

Mothers and Children has three parts. Part 1 is about the social constructions of motherhood and has four chapters: "Motherhood and Feminism," "'Good' Mothers and 'Bad' Mothers," "The Institution and Experience of Motherhood," and "Fatherlessness, Men, and Mothering." Part 2, Maternal Bodies, has three chapters: "Mothers, Sexuality, and Eros," "Pregnancy and Childbirth," and "Family Making and Reproductive Technologies." Part 3, Mothering in Everyday Life, also has three chapters: "Mothers and Children over the Life Course," "Othermothering," and "Mothering As Political Action."

Each chapter has a few personal narratives that are definitely informative and very effective tools of teaching. The students can learn the concepts, and theories from the narratives' concrete examples, which are intimate, personal, direct, and hard to forget. The students are exposed to the powerful testimony of the women's experiences and situations as well as the social issues encountered by them. They also learn the abstract concepts such as motherhood, poverty, childbirth, and environmentalism through the readings. These narratives are very potent because the writing of the experiences, feelings, and opinions comes from the hearts of the women who experienced them.

Motherhood is a multifaceted life stage that entails aspects that are biological (health, pregnancy, abortion, childbirth, aging, death and dying), cultural (norms, values, customs and manners, symbols), political (laws, policies, adoption, politicians, social movement), and social (religion, social

stratification, gender roles, race and ethnic relations, domestic violence). The history of motherhood along with the history of American women and feminism are introduced at the beginning of the book, and this provides the foundation for understanding motherhood and children in the U.S.

Mothering is uniquely a female experience. *Mothers and Children* approaches all issues from the feminist perspective, and it also covers some cross-cultural materials. Overall, the book reads very well and is easy to follow. It can be read from any chapter as the instructor sees fit.

Mothers and Children debunks many myths and the view that the mass media portray of motherhood and children. It has pragmatic implications for social policy and lawmakers, doctors and nurses, child welfare professionals, social workers, school and daycare teachers, attorneys, university professors, and students. The book has much pragmatic implication for the larger society in terms of policymaking, too. The narratives can be read somewhat like testimonies that show what is actually going on in the mothers' and their children's lives today. The narratives written on poverty, adoption, infertility, teenage sexuality, taking care of the elderly, and environmental issues should make the reader — whether a lawmaker, a schoolteacher, or any other professional who deals with mothers and children in an occupational role — think about the issue of motherhood and children from a different perspective. These narratives may be able to help change the course of motherhood and children in the U.S.

The Many Costs of Racism.

By Joe R. Feagin and Karyn D. McKinney. Rowman & Littlefield. \$24.95.

Reviewer: EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, *Texas A&M University*

There is very little I like about the sociology we produce in the U.S. In our frenzy to become “objective” social scientists, we have sacrificed our sociological imagination at the altar of methodological correctness. Thus, not surprisingly, American-made sociology tends to be boring (how many of you wait anxiously for your *American Sociological Review*, *American Journal of Sociology*, and *Social Forces* issues or — and be honest — read a good portion of the articles in these flagship journals?), uninspiring, apolitical, badly written, and hardly relevant.

To these trends in American sociology, there have always been exceptions. And arguably no exception in the last twenty years has been more significant than that of Joe R. Feagin. Almost everything he has written is interesting, inspiring, political, and relevant even if not always necessarily methodologically correct. Following on his longstanding scholarly tradition (he has published 45 books!), Feagin's new book with Karyn D. McKinney, *The Many Costs of Racism*, is a passionate, well-written, scholarly treatment of a terribly important

subject that has not received yet the attention it deserves: the psychological and health impact of racism on its targets. (I would be remiss if I did not mention the pioneering work in this area, generously cited throughout this book, of my former colleagues at Michigan David R. Williams, James A. Jackson, and Robert J. Taylor.)

Feagin and McKinney's book begins with a quote from a black entrepreneur in response to the question "What is it like to be a black person in white Americas today?" Her answer is shocking: "One step from suicide! What I am saying is — the psychological warfare games that we have to play every day just to survive." But as we read this book, we realize that her answer is not irrational or sensational but *representative* of how the respondents in this study feel about being black in white America.

Blacks interviewed for this study, all middle-class and presumably successful, complain about how blatant, covert, and subtle discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere affects all facets of their lives: their physical and mental health, their family life, and their involvement in community affairs. In the essential chapter 1, the authors frame the discrimination experienced by their respondents as not peculiar but part of systematic racism. More significantly, the authors describe whites' denial of racial inequality and of the reality of discrimination and provide a very lucid argument about why such denials occur.

In chapters 2 and 3, the authors address the psychological and physical health consequences of contemporary racism on blacks. On the psychological front, respondents expressed how angry they feel about how they are treated in the workplace by their white peers (e.g., from being called names such as "buckwheat," "Aunt Jemima," or "nigger" to being passed over for promotions that are usually given to white coworkers with significantly less experience). A retired professor described his level of rage toward discrimination on a scale from one to ten as "Ten!" and added "I think that now I would strike out to the point of killing, and not thinking anything about it. I really wouldn't care." This respondent's answer exemplifies an idea the authors convey throughout the book: the cumulative impact of discrimination. Incident after incident, small and big, pile up in blacks' bodies and souls, creating a negative multiplier effect. Besides anger, respondents related symptoms or ailments such as depression, fatigue, sleeplessness, stress, headaches, hypertension, and stomach problems to their experiences of discrimination.

Chapter 4 documents the many ways in which discrimination affects blacks' family life. Parents complained that stress produced by discrimination experienced at work negatively affects their family relations. As a black mother vividly put it, "the anger sometimes builds up, and you're not even aware that it's there — so the moment your spouse, or your child, if there is anything that may seem like it was belittling or demeaning, you're responding to them with a level of anger, even, that is really inappropriate for the situation." Other respondents complained that the pressure at work drains them mentally to

the point that when they go home they are unable to deal with their children or partners in an effective and loving way. (Note to minority readers: chapters 2, 3, and 4 are upsetting. They made me relive many of my own bouts with discrimination and affected me physically — I had a knot in my stomach for a day!)

Chapters 5 and 6 are central, as they discuss the repertoire of coping strategies blacks use to handle discrimination. The authors conclude this book with a review of the multiple ways in which racism plays out in the health-care system.

Although this book has limitations — the sample on which it is based is small albeit large by qualitative standards, we learn little about the impact of discrimination on poor and working-class blacks, there is no discussion on the “many costs of racism” to other minority groups — it deserves to be widely read. Feagin and McKinney have produced a classic that can be confidently assigned in both graduate and undergraduate courses. And because I think that more should be done in this area, I hope that a smart program officer in a foundation contacts these authors and asks them to direct a large, systematic, national study on the many costs of racism in America with the goal of producing a Myrdalian tome on the subject.

A Troubled Dream: The Promise and Failure of School Desegregation in Louisiana.

By Carl L. Bankston and Stephen J. Caldas. Vanderbilt University Press, 2002. 268 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$24.95.

Reviewer: MARK J. SCHAFER. *Louisiana State University*

I have had the opportunity to talk with other parents in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, about desegregation. Most are quite familiar with the various problems outlined by Bankston and Caldas. Some hold on to the ideals of desegregation: equal opportunity, making amends for past injustices, fairness, and so forth. Others decry desegregation as another example of the federal government wresting from families and communities more control over children. Very few are aware of the role sociological theory has played in desegregation discourse (James Coleman’s work in particular). *A Troubled Dream* uses the lens of Coleman’s social capital theory to gain insight into family-level response to desegregation in Louisiana. The authors do a pretty good job explaining both why *de facto* segregation persists and why racial disparities in educational outcomes have actually increased. Families, it turns out, use social capital for *rational self-interest*, maximizing benefits to family, not community. The case studies of New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Lafayette demonstrate how

savvy parents (white and black) resisted perceived and actual disadvantage resulting from forced desegregation by abandoning public schools, relocated to neighboring school districts, and negotiating magnet and gifted programs.

I applaud *A Troubled Dream* for establishing a fair rendering of the historical context of unequal educational opportunity in segregated Louisiana. They nicely set up their theoretical straw man, the “harm and benefit” thesis attributed to Coleman’s version of social capital, holding that integrated schools can benefit blacks but need not harm whites. Then they lay out their rational self-interest counter. The three primary case studies of desegregation in New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Lafayette provide strong evidence in favor of rational self-interest. These case studies of desegregation are highly detailed. The authors combine more qualitative discussions and interviews with descriptive statistics on desegregation, demographic movements, enrollment patterns, and test scores. Chapter 6 presents further supporting evidence from other Louisiana school districts demonstrating that the proportion of minority students in a school negatively effects performance of *both* black and white students, contrary to the harm and benefit thesis.

This detailed study still left me feeling that some key dimensions of the argument were missed. First, the authors could have embedded their discussion on desegregation within the broader context of public schooling in Louisiana. This way, the reader might be able to discern whether issues such as funding, school quality, and teacher training are pertinent to the failure of desegregation. Second, I feel uneasy about the authors’ emphasis on single-parent households. I commend the authors for pointing out the strong correlation between race, class, and family structure. In Louisiana, desegregation means combining whites with blacks, middle class with poor, and children from intact families with children from single-parent families. While it is interesting that the sophisticated regression analysis isolates single-parent families as the culprit, bringing down overall achievement levels, this path of inquiry serves to deflect blame from “racist, middle-class whites” to “immoral, poor blacks.” Most likely, a combination of family-level factors have contributed to the trends. More important, the search for the “root cause” focuses too much attention on families, distracting from school and community complicity in the failure of desegregation. Did schools genuinely prepare for desegregation? Were teachers and administrators adequately trained in emerging pedagogical techniques for multicultural classroom settings? Did schools promote parental involvement? Did communities urge schools to capitalize on the value created by diversity? While I fundamentally agree with the authors’ rational self-interest perspective, parents’ decision-making calculations can be shaped by what schools and communities do. Third, and related to my second point, I hoped for a more elaborate discussion on institutional arrangements and incentives in the recommendation section. The recommendations themselves seem jus-

tified by the findings, but the larger unasked question remains “what institutional arrangements might make more parents see both school improvement and desegregation as being in their rational self-interest?”

My questions notwithstanding, I highly recommend *A Troubled Dream* for its rich descriptive and analytical detail to anyone concerned with the idea, implementation, and outcomes of legal efforts to force school districts to desegregate.

Latino Homicide: Immigration, Violence, and Community.

By Ramiro Martinez Jr. Routledge, 2002. 204 pp. Cloth, \$85.00; paper, \$22.95.

Reviewer: GEORGE E. TITA, *University of California, Irvine*

As part of a “problem-solving” effort aimed at reducing gun violence in the nearly homogeneous Latino (Mexican-American) neighborhood of Boyle Heights in the City of Los Angeles, I would often laud the “Boston Gun Project” in my presentations as a shining example of an intervention that worked in reducing youth gun violence. My audience consisted of the residents of this neighborhood, some of whom were bilingual, others who spoke only Spanish. But in English or in Spanish, the collective voice of the community was clear: “This isn’t Boston.” In essence the community was questioning why one would be so naïve as to think that a program designed in a northeastern city composed primarily of blacks and whites, for a problem that was confined almost exclusively to the young black males of that city, would have any legitimacy in their neighborhood. As he set off to examine Latino rates of homicide in contemporary urban America, armed with the traditional theories of urban violence, community, and crime, one has to wonder how many times during the production of this research Ramiro Martinez needed to remind himself, “This isn’t Chicago.”

Martinez confronts the media (and politicized) creation of the “Latino as violent” stereotype in a carefully crafted and thoughtful manner. He provides the reader with historical overviews of the creation of the Latino identity, focusing on the origins of their presumed association with violence by indicting the popular media and policymakers alike, especially those lawmakers involved with immigration legislation. Using a rich set of data culled from police homicide files in the five cities he studied (Chicago, El Paso, Houston, Miami, and San Diego), Martinez deftly debunks this stereotype as he demonstrates that Latino homicide rates over the study period (1980–94) are not only much lower than expected, but much more in line with homicide rates of non-Latino whites than with African Americans. This finding is inconsistent with the expectations predicated on theories formulated by the Chicago School. One

would expect Latino rates to be more similar to black rates, since Latinos have much more in common with blacks than with non-Latino whites in terms of labor market success, spatial and social isolation, and patterns of discrimination. Martinez is careful, however, to add the caveat that important differences exist between the experience of African Americans and that of Latinos, and that these differences should not be underestimated. While the book also includes important analyses of such phenomena as violence among Mariel Cubans in Miami and border killings in California and differentiates the role of drugs and gangs in motivating violence among white, black, and Latino populations, the book's lasting contribution will be its ambitious effort to explain the discrepancy between Latino and black rates of homicide.

Martinez takes turns focusing on issues of community, urban poverty, and immigration, comparing and contrasting these features across the five cities in an attempt to distinguish the experience of Latinos from that of African Americans. At first blush, the similarities appear to outweigh the differences because both groups experience high levels of unemployment and poverty. Telling differences emerge, however, with respect to rates of female-headed households and labor force attachment, the latter of which provides the foundation for Martinez's explanation of the Latino-black difference in homicide rates. Acknowledging that poverty makes life more difficult in the barrio as well as in black neighborhoods, Martinez argues that it is the "*relative deprivation* and *structural conditions* [that] provide a compelling explanation of Latino homicide." Both subcultures of violence and the type of strain purported to operate within the black community are muted in the barrio because of a difference in one's reference point: African Americans are more likely to compare their collective position within society to the positions achieved by European immigrants over the last one hundred years, while Latinos need only "look across the border" (quite literal in El Paso and San Diego) to find comparative economic conditions far worse than those in even the toughest of U.S. urban neighborhoods. Therefore, Martinez argues that there is a much greater willingness to work for subsistence wages among Latino immigrants that leads to greater attachment to the labor force. Labor force attachment serves to promote community integration and stability, leading to less-disorganized communities. Finding that immigrant Latinos are actually less violent than native Latinos, Martinez pushes his argument further by suggesting that it is precisely because Latinos continue to enter the U.S. and replenish the barrios and enclaves with immigrants who identify their environs as an improvement that homicide rates remain lower than in similarly situated African American communities.

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Errata

In John Hagan and Holly Foster’s article, “S/He’s a Rebel: Toward a Sequential Stress Theory of Delinquency and Gendered Pathways to Disadvantage in Emerging Adulthood,” published in *Social Forces* 72(1), pp. 53-86, a few errors appeared in the first few lines of Tables 3B, 4A, and 4B. The correct versions of the tables are printed here.

TABLE 3B: Unstandardized Structural and Reduced Form OLS Equations for Depression Scale at Time 2 for Males

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anger (t1)	.717**	.626**	.531*	.583*	.544*	.587*	.645**
Depression (t1)	.594***	.570***	.559***	.567***	.559***	.563***	.570***
Drinking problems (t1)	.165*	.143*	.079	.122†	.078	.113	.130†
Parent education (t1)		-.467***	-.491***	-.462***	-.507***	-.464***	-.509***
Age (t1)		.159*	.163*	.165*	.158*	.152*	.152*
African American		.433	.440	.401	.479	.380	.493
Hispanic American		.982**	.956**	.964**	.967**	.915**	1.000**
Asian American		1.192*	1.223*	1.214*	1.210*	1.200*	1.201*
Other		-.312	-.333	-.319	-.333	-.343	-.279
Blended family: two parents (t1)		.223	.191	.210	.193	.193	.224
Single-parent family		.470†	.416	.447	.421	.411	.512†
Other family structure		.146	.109	.120	.125	.098	.173
Full delinquency (t1)			.065***				
Violent delinquency (t1)				.079			
Nonviolent delinquency (t1)					.090**		
Exposure to street violence (t1)						.209*	
Alcohol availability in home (t1)							.768**
Constant	3.506***	2.243†	2.115†	2.100†	2.228†	2.331*	2.214†
R ²	.353	.365	.368	.366	.368	.367	.368
Model-adjusted Wald statistic	F _(3,126) 387.66	F _(12,117) 137.48	F _(13,116) 127.54	F _(13,116) 127.19	F _(13,116) 128.37	F _(13,116) 126.78	F _(13,116) 136.20

(N = 5,615)

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

TABLE 4A: Unstandardized Structural and Reduced Form OLS Equations for Drinking Problems at Time 2 for Females

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anger (t1)	.031	.055	.020	.039	.025	.050	.055
Depression (t1)	.013**	.016***	.009*	.013**	.009*	.014***	.015***
Drinking problems (t1)	.490***	.479***	.433***	.468***	.431***	.471***	.478***
Parent education (t1)		.032	.028	.037	.022	.036	.026
Age (t1)		.022	.034*	.030*	.030*	.025†	.022
African American		-.354***	-.376***	-.380***	-.358***	-.379***	-.348***
Hispanic American		-.176*	-.214*	-.195*	-.206*	-.201*	-.174*
Asian American		-.313*	-.358**	-.316*	-.367**	-.310*	-.315*
Other		-.165	-.163	-.175	-.154	-.179	-.173
Blended family: two parents (t1)		-.079	-.090	-.090	-.082	-.086	-.081
Single-parent family		.011	.001	.002	.007	-.001	.026
Other family structure		-.019	-.059	-.039	-.051	-.034	-.013
Full delinquency (t1)			.045***				
Violent delinquency (t1)				.061*			
Nonviolent delinquency (t1)					.057***		
Exposure to street violence (t1)						.101*	
Alcohol availability in home (t1)							.137*
Constant	.184**	-.154	-.353	-.280	-.288	-.194	-.174
R ²	.217	.224	.234	.226	.235	.226	.225
Model-adjusted Wald statistic	F _(3,126) 60.17	F _(12,117) 22.36	F _(13,116) 21.01	F _(13,116) 20.58	F _(13,116) 21.36	F _(13,116) 21.15	F _(13,116) 21.83

(N=5,891)

TABLE 4B: Unstandardized Structural and Reduced Form OLS Equations for Drinking Problems at Time 2 for Males

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Anger (t1)	.201*	.206**	.150†	.176*	.159*	.193*	.206**
Depression (t1)	.016*	.015*	.009	.013†	.009	.013†	.015*
Drinking problems (t1)	.326***	.304***	.267***	.290***	.268***	.295***	.304***
Parent education (t1)		.009	-.005	.012	-.014	.010	.007
Age (t1)		.136***	.138***	.140***	.135***	.134***	.136***
African American		-.284***	-.280***	-.306***	-.259***	-.301***	-.282***
Hispanic American		-.062	-.077	-.074	-.070	-.083	-.061
Asian American		-.321***	-.303***	-.306***	-.311***	-.319***	-.321***
Other		-.060	-.073	-.065	-.073	-.070	-.059
Blended family: two parents (t1)		.017	-.002	.008	-.000	.008	.017
Single-parent family		-.014	-.045	-.029	-.041	-.032	-.012
Other family structure		-.168	-.189†	-.186†	-.180	-.183	-.167
Full delinquency (t1)			.038***				
Violent delinquency (t1)				.053*			
Nonviolent delinquency (t1)					.051***		
Exposure to street violence (t1)						.066*	
Alcohol availability in home (t1)							.033
Constant	.166**	-1.812***	-1.886***	-1.908***	-1.820***	-1.784***	-1.813***
R ²	.130	.149	.161	.152	.162	.151	.149
Model-adjusted Wald statistic	F _(3,126) 26.74	F _(12,117) 12.43	F _(13,116) 15.04	F _(13,116) 12.57	F _(13,116) 15.71	F _(13,116) 11.69	F _(13,116) 11.94

(N=5,615)

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests)

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JUNE 2004,
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ISSN 0037-7732 Library of Congress Catalog Number 24-31023

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Periodicals postage paid at Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514 and additional mailing offices.

Postmaster: Send 3579 to *Social Forces*, UNC Press, P.O. Box 2288, Chapel Hill, NC 27515

Claims for undelivered copies must be made within the month following the regular month of publication.

The publisher will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

Social Forces is issued quarterly: September, December, March, June.

Social Forces is published by the University of North Carolina Press for the Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

Rev. 2/04

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Editorial and business communications should be addressed to: Social Forces, 168 Hamilton Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599-3210.

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Introductory Remarks

RICHARD L. SIMPSON

With this issue of *Social Forces* I retire from my position as co-editor. Judith Blau will become editor on July 1, 2004. Working with her this year has been a pleasure. I am grateful to the authors and manuscript reviewers who have contributed to the journal since I became editor in 1983.

Editors are privileged to be close up to an academic field of research and study. That is, to be close enough to hear the many voices of scholars/researchers, close enough to watch the birth and maturation of new projects and approaches, and even close enough to take the pulse of the field from time to time. We describe the social sciences as being organic, which is how an editor experiences it, while we recognize that the journal can only provide its readers with static snapshots.

This was a year of many changes at *Social Forces*. Judith and I are extremely sad to lose Paul Mihas as the Managing Editor at the end of June, when the Journal moves completely to the Department of Sociology. With Paul's and Jennifer Ashlock's assistance we are well on our way to implementing electronic management of manuscripts and reviews, anticipating the full transition to online-submission capability sometime this summer.

The first article in this issue is Patricia Yancey Martin's presidential address that she delivered at the 2003 meetings of the Southern Sociological Society: "Gender as Social Institution." Following the peer-reviewed articles is a section that includes a paper by Michael Burawoy, "Public Sociologies: Contradictions, Dilemmas and Possibilities," along with rejoinders by François Nielsen, David Brady, and Charles Tittle. Catherine Zimmer, President of the North Carolina Sociological Association, introduces these four papers that are based on a session at the NCSA. Judith will continue to devote a short, bracketed section of each issue of *Social Forces* devoted to Commentary and Debate.

Gender As Social Institution^{*}

PATRICIA YANCEY MARTIN, *Florida State University*

Abstract

This article encourages sociologists to study gender as a social institution. Noting that scholars apply the institution concept to highly disparate phenomena, it reviews the history of the concept in twentieth-century sociology. The defining characteristic most commonly attributed to social institution is endurance (or persistence over time) while contemporary uses highlight practices, conflict, identity, power, and change. I identify twelve criteria for deciding whether any phenomenon is a social institution. I conclude that treating gender as an institution will improve gender scholarship and social theory generally, increase awareness of gender's profound sociality, offer a means of linking diverse theoretical and empirical work, and make gender's invisible dynamics and complex intersections with other institutions more apparent and subject to critical analysis and change.

While rarely giving reasons for doing so, social scientists apply the term *social institution* to an amazing array of phenomena, including, for example, taxation and handshakes (Bellah et al. 1991), schools (Due et al. 2003), socialism (Parboteeah & Cullen 2003), mental hospitals (Goffman 1962), courtship (Clark 1997), community and property (Nisbet 1953), healing (Johnson 2000), sports (Andersen & Taylor 2000; Messner 1992), appellate courts (March & Olsen 1989), religion and marriage (Waite & Lehrer 2003), universities (Benschop & Brouns 2003), heterosexuality (Rogers & Garrett 2002), and "proliferating going concerns" (Gubrium & Holstein 2000, after Hughes [1942])

** This article is based on my presidential address delivered at the Southern Sociological Society meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana, in March 2003. Portions of it were delivered also at Keele University, Alma College, the College of William and Mary, the University of Mississippi, the College of Charleston, the University of South Alabama, the University of California at Davis, the University of Minnesota, and Trento University. For helping me improve the article, I thank Charles Camic, Judith Lorber, Myra Marx Ferree, Sharon Bird, Vinnie Roscigno, Don Tomaskovic-Devey, and John Reynolds, and for assisting with my talk, I thank John Reynolds and Chardie Baird. Direct correspondence to Patricia Yancey Martin, Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2270. E-mail: pmartin@coss.fsu.edu.*

1984). Such inclusiveness prompts questions about what these phenomena have in common.¹ What makes anything a social institution? Without explicit conceptualization or criteria, it is difficult to tell. "The only idea common to all usages of the term institution is that of some sort of establishment of relative permanence of a distinctly social sort," according to Hughes ([1936] 1971:5; see also Hughes [1942] 1971). This comment, which Hughes made at the 1935 American Sociological Society meetings, is as apt today as it was then.² Hughes was acknowledging the failure of sociologists — and psychologists and economists and so on — to specify the meaning(s) of the social institution concept.

This article offers a conceptualization of institution that includes gender as well as other social realms that are typically included under this umbrella. To advance the thesis that gender is a social institution, I begin with an overview of the history of the concept. Conceptual definitions are not imbued with radical, reactionary, or other inherent meanings but they do have implications for the foci we choose and the types of analyses we undertake. I argue for framing gender as a social institution because doing so will foster critical analysis and insights, particularly about gender's profound sociality, help us avoid reductionist thinking, and make gender more visible and susceptible to intentional change, including dismantling (Lorber 1994). Clarifying the parameters of the concept institution also contributes to social theory generally.

The Term *Social Institution* in Twentieth-Century Sociology

Although this feature is only sometimes explicitly noted, the most universal theme in sociologists' definition of *social institution* is endurance: An institution persists, it is not ephemeral. Other typical features that are implied or asserted are institutions' external, macro, and constraining qualities and their equation with "major" societal realms such as family, religion, education, polity, and economy. Some authors say a particular set of institutions, those that meet "basic" societal "goals" or "needs," is required for a society to exist; Berger and Luckmann (1966:55) describe society as "an agglomeration of institutions."³ Many imply that institutions are harmonious and benevolent (e.g., Searle 1969, 1995) although Balzer (2003) and Nisbet (1953), among others, disagree. Bellah and colleagues (1991) claim that institutions have a moral or ethical quality.⁴ Some scholars apply the term *institutions* to formal organizations, for example, schools, nursing homes, universities. Some focus on what institutions *are*, others on what they *do*. Many represent institutions as internally consistent, conflict-free, fixed, and unchanging, yet a growing number focus on conflicts, internal

inconsistencies, and change as well as power, inequalities, privilege, and disadvantage as institutional features.⁵

Nearly all conceptions depict institutions as controlling, obligating, or inhibiting, although some also note their facilitating and empowering effects (see Berger & Luckmann 1966, Giddens 1984, and March & Olsen 1989 on this point). In the mid-twentieth century, many sociologists equated social institutions with ideas, norms, values, or beliefs with no attention to processes or practices. This narrow and static definition has been under challenge for some time by scholars who assert the centrality of practices in constituting social institutions (Giddens 1984; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina & Von Savigny 2001). Gender scholars, I am happy to say, were in the vanguard of this development (for example Acker 1992; Connell 1987; Lorber 1994; Reskin 1988; Ridgeway 1997; Risman 1998). Gender scholars have also advanced the notion that institutions are embodied; the “material body” is key. That is, the practices and interactions of “real” people with bodies that talk and act constitute social institutions, gender included (Acker 1990; Connell 1987; Lorber 1996, 1999; Rogers & Garrett 2002).

Relative to practices that constitute institutions, many contemporary scholars focus on rules, procedures, customs, and routines. March and Olsen (1989), for instance, define institutions as sets of rules and routines that are “constructed around clusters of appropriate activities” and “appropriate procedures” (24). Giddens (1984) acknowledges rules, procedures, and “enactment” in saying “Let us regard the rules of social life . . . as *techniques or generalizable procedures* [emphasis mine] applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices. . . . The most important aspects of structure are rules and resources recursively involved in institutions” (21–23). Similarly, Connell (1987) says *social institution* “classically signifies custom, routine, and repetition” (140). Relative to gender, Acker (1992) focuses on the concrete practices and processes that mobilize gender in multiple settings, and Ridgeway (2001) explicates links between gendered beliefs and practices (“legitimacy reactions”) that penalize women leaders. These scholars focus on practices and related interactional dynamics (see Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina & Von Savigny 2001; Schwalbe et al. 2000).

Many sociology encyclopedias, dictionaries, and introductory textbooks define institutions globally, with a vague sentence or two followed by a list of examples. Two sources reflect both this pattern and the older, idea-focused definition. The 2000 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Sociology* (Borgatta & Montgomery 2000) lacks an entry for institutions. Instead, readers who search for the term are told to “see American Society.” The American Society entry (Williams 2000) defines institutions in one sentence (142): “Institution here means a definite set of interrelated norms, beliefs, and values centered on important and recurrent social needs and activities.” *The Blackwell Dictionary of Sociology* (Johnson 2000), an e-dictionary, defines institutions similarly:

Institutions are “an enduring set of ideas about how to accomplish goals generally recognized as important in a society” (157). Johnson’s invocation of “ideas,” like Williams’s of “norms, beliefs, and values,” implies that institutions are *subjective* (see below) rather than material or behavioral in content. Johnson’s use of the term *enduring* implies a time element, as does Williams’s use of the term *recurrent*, although neither discusses time explicitly. Neither says where goals or “recurrent social needs” come from nor how their importance is determined. Both fail to mention practices or acknowledge that institutions are conflicted, dynamic, and changing. Finally, both fail to address the relationship of individuals to institutions.

The examples listed by these sources, also typical, include “family and kinship, social stratification, economic system, the polity, education, and religion” (Williams 2000:142) and “family, religious, economic, educational, healing, and political institutions” (Johnson 2000:157). Giddens (1984) objects to equating institutions with such “substantive” lists because doing so implies that the phenomena are universal, necessary, and unchanging and, equally troublesome, that they stand “outside human agency.” As I explain later, I share Giddens’s concern.

EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONCEPTIONS

In a commentary on a newly discovered and unpublished manuscript by Parsons (written in the 1930s but not published until 1990), Charles Camic (1990) addresses Parsons’s influence in shifting the concept of social institutions away from behavior and practices toward a “subjective only” definition. According to Camic, *social institution* was a key concept for “anthropologists, political theorists, economists, sociologists and even psychologists” in the early twentieth century (1990:315). However, simultaneous with Parsons’s rising influence on U.S. sociology, the meanings scholars attached to the institution concept became less consistent than they had been earlier.

Among the early twentieth century scholars who touted the concept’s utility for understanding society were economist Walton Hamilton (1932) and sociologists Charles Horton Cooley ([1909] 1962), L.T. Hobhouse ([1924] 1966), and William Graham Sumner ([1906] 1979). Hamilton, one of Parsons’s teachers at Amherst College, defined an institution as a complex phenomenon with multiple facets: “a cluster of social usages, possessing some ‘prevalence and permanence,’ ‘embedded in the habits of a group of people or the customs of a people’ and accompanied by formal and informal ‘sanctions’ that ‘function’ to ‘fix the confines of and impose form upon the activities of human beings’” (Hamilton 1932:84 as cited in Camic 1990:316). According to Camic, this formulation was “not idiosyncratic” but was widely embraced, by for example Cooley, Hobhouse, and Sumner who viewed institutions as central to sociology’s

domain. These scholars focused on the practices (or usages) aspect of institutions, their endurance over time, and their constraining influence on societal members. That is, institutions were “recognized and established usages governing [social] relations (in conjunction with the ‘principles’ and ‘organization’ of those usages)” (cited in Camic 1990:316 from Hobhouse [1924] 1966:49); “usages that are crystallize[d and] enduring” (cited in Camic 1990:316 from Cooley [1909] 1962:313); and usages that are “endowed with a coercive and inhibitive force” (cited in Camic 1990:316 from Sumner [1906] 1979:67). Institutions were framed as organized, persisting, and “behavioral,” not only ideational or normative.

According to Camic (1990:317), MacIver “codified” these themes when he argued that social institutions are one of two “great classes [of] social fact,” the other being social relations. For MacIver, institutions were “forms of social activity” or “the established forms or conditions [e.g., rules] of procedure characteristic of group activity” (cited in Camic 1990:317 from MacIver 1928:7, 1936:16–17). MacIver said institutions entail activities, or practices, that inform and enable members about how to get things done. They also maintain order by encouraging or requiring some activities and discouraging or forbidding others. He noted also that institutions persist over time, and thus he made their time element explicit. These principles were “virtually axiomatic among sociologists” by the 1930s, Camic (1990:317) says.

Talcott Parsons, whose influence on U.S. sociology in the twentieth century was extensive, rejected MacIver’s inclusion of the “forms of social activity/procedures” so as to “preserve” the concept for sociology. Parsons was responding to claims by psychologists and behaviorists that “the habitual behavior of individuals should be viewed as units of biology, chemistry and other natural sciences,” not sociology (Camic 1990:316–17).⁶ Parsons responded by differentiating the notion of institutions into “uniform modes of behavior and forms of relationship” and “the idea of sanction” and, then, relinquishing the former to the behaviorists and retaining the latter for sociology. The former became equated with an “objective” approach to institutions (e.g., MacIver’s and his predecessors) and the latter with the “subjective” approach favored by Parsons. This step equated an institution with “the normative rules that underlie it,” setting “aside modes of behavior and forms of relationship” and “leaving behind much of what otherwise might have been regarded as these thinkers’ institutional analysis” (Camic 1990:317–18).⁷

[When Parsons] tries to counteract behaviorist reductionism by grounding institutions in common ultimate values, much of what sociologists and institutionalists of his time were pointing to with the term institution — diverse forms of social activity, specific prescribed usages, historically-changing economic, political, religious, familial and other practices, and their variable sources simply disappears. (Camic 1990:318)

Parsons's actions fostered confusion that is evident today in publications as well as Ph.D. preliminary exams where students labor (and fail) to equate institutions with "norms, beliefs, and ideas" and organizations with "practices and structure," as if institutions lack practices and structure and organizations lack norms, beliefs, and ideas. While his conception allowed societal members to have agency in shaping the norms, beliefs, and values that constrain them, Parsons's rejection of behavior and practices removed the dynamics by which change is produced. As a result, social institutions suggested a society where conformity and stasis are usual and conflict and change are unusual.

LATER TWENTIETH-CENTURY CONCEPTIONS

Not everyone agreed with Parsons. Nisbet (1953) critiqued sociologists' definition of institutions that ignored people; represented each institution as separate from all others; suggested an ahistorical picture; depicted institutions as free of conflict, inconsistencies, and change; and failed to address their origins (88–90). Nisbet called for more attention to human agency in creating and changing social institutions and for scholars to frame institutions as rife with conflict, incoherence, and change. Conflict *within* as well as *between* institutions is pervasive, he argued (87–88), and these dynamics should be explored. (See Roscigno 2000 on interinstitutional dynamics.)

Berger and Luckmann (1966) challenged prevailing definitions by reinstating the "objective" aspects of institutional phenomena and linking their "subjective" and "objective" qualities. Rejecting the implications of a functionalist view of institutions as "positive" or necessary, they made the issues of power and domination key to institutional dynamics. Focusing on institutions' coercive powers, Berger and Luckmann highlighted *legitimation* dynamics wherein powerful elites claim and justify to a broader social audience the rightness and necessity of institutional arrangements that work to their benefit. Here institutions are actively constructed, as human products, claiming that a repeated action "frequently becomes cast into a pattern, which can then be reproduced with an economy of effort and which, *ipso facto*, is apprehended by its performer as that pattern. Habitualization [the repetition of a pattern] . . . implies that the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effect" (1966:52–53). Although not inevitably, processes of habitualization often develop into institutions.

Berger and Luckmann emphasized both *historicity* and *control*. "Institutions always have a history, of which they are the products" (1966:54); they do not develop spontaneously in response to "societal needs or goals." Institutions have a "controlling characteristic." "To say that a segment of human activity has been institutionalized is . . . to say that this segment of human activity has been subsumed under social control" (55). Their emphasis on the controlling

effect(s) of institutions resonates with work from decades earlier by Cooley, Hamilton, and MacIver. Berger and Luckmann also insisted that institutions span an extensive amount of time, a point with which contemporary theorists agree.

Giddens (1984) extends this prior work by making recursive human practices key to the constitution of institutions. Social institutions are recursive human practices with the greatest time and space distancing. Recursive human practices are not repeated identically each time; through recursive human practices, group members constitute and reconstitute social institutions. In Giddens's view, "Institutions are . . . the more enduring features of social life . . . , the human practices that last longest and extend farthest in geographic space — the most "temporally long-established and spatially widespread" (23, 301). Only recursive practices that last a long time and extend far in space should be deemed institutions.

Time's importance to a conception of institutions is reflected in Giddens's (1984) distinction between individuals' repetitive daily routines and life span experiences and the long "duree" (endurance) of institutional time.

The events and routines of daily life do not have a one-way flow to them; they are recursive or repetitive. . . . [T]he routines . . . are formed in terms of the interaction of passing (but continually returning) days and seasons. Daily life has a duration, a flow, but it does not lead anywhere; the very adjective "day-to-day" and its synonyms indicate that time here is constituted only in repetition. The life of the individual, by contrast, is not only finite but irreversible, 'being towards death.' Time in this case is the time of the body . . . and the life cycle is really a concept that belongs to the succession of generations and thus to a third dimension of temporality. . . . This [third dimension] is the 'supra-individual' duree of the long-term existence of institutions, the long duree of institutional time. (35)

As already noted, Giddens objects to defining social institutions *substantively* (1984:34), that is, as family, education, religion, and so on — and he opposes a strict micro–macro distinction between individuals and institutions, saying it suggests that institutions are detached from or only external to people. Rather, institutions are "internalized" by the human actors who constitute them. While institutions are simultaneously constraining and enabling, Giddens places more emphasis than do many others on internalization and enablement.

Unique among authors reviewed so far, Giddens instates the body and embodiment in institutional dynamics, affirming the significance of bodies that materially exist and consequentially do things, a theme developed further by Connell (1987) in relation to gender and sexuality (see also Acker 1990; Lorber 1999). People have bodies that do things via physical and communicative action and, in acting, constitute themselves and society, with *structuration* referring to the simultaneous constitution of "agents" and "structures" (Giddens 1984:25–

26). Giddens acknowledges people as situated actors who actively constitute and reconstitute social institutions and, in so doing, suggests where institutions “come from” and how they are maintained, resisted, and changed.

Toward (Re)Defining Social Institution

Building on the above review and other works to be noted shortly, I identify criteria for defining social institutions and, after reviewing them, present the case for gender as a social institution. The features of social institutions are as follows.

1. *Institutions are profoundly social; they are characteristic of groups.* Institutions are constituted by collectivities of people who associate with each other extensively and, through interaction, develop recursive practices and associated meanings.

2. *Institutions endure/persist across extensive time and geographic space.* Social institutions have a history that can be studied (e.g., changes in gender from the 1700s to 1990s in the U.S.). In accord with Giddens (1984), only phenomena with *extensive* time and space *distanciation* are usefully viewed as social institutions.⁸

3. *Institutions entail distinct social practices that recur* (Giddens 1984), *recycle* (Connell 1987), *or are repeated (over time) by group members.* Through acting or doing, individually and collectively, group members constitute institutions. Distinctive practices differentiate institutions from each other. Barnes (2001) equates social institutions with practices, and Tuomela (2003:123) views social institutions as “norm-governed social *practices*” (also Searle 1969, 1995). Even Bellah and colleagues (1991:40), who generally favor a “subjective”/Parsonian view, acknowledge that institutions are “*patterns of social activity* that give shape to collective and individual experience” [emphasis in this and the preceding quote is mine]. Practices that recur over extensive spans of time and geography are defining features of social institutions and the means by which they are constituted (Connell 1987; Giddens 1984). Relative to gender, people “do gender” in the street, on the subway, in their homes and workplaces, individually and collectively (Acker 1990, 1992; Britton 2003; Martin 2003; Pierce 1995; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999; West & Zimmerman 1987). In many contexts and in varied ways, their practices constitute and reconstitute the gender institution.

4. *Institutions both constrain and facilitate behavior/actions by societal/group members.* Institutions constrain group members by forbidding some alternatives and choices of actions and empower them by making some

alternatives and choices of action possible and preferable (March & Olsen 1989).

5. *Institutions have social positions and relations that are characterized by particular expectations, rules/norms, and procedures.* An institution entails a set of social positions that are interrelated, “make sense,” and are enacted relative to each other. For instance, gender has boy, girl, woman, and man. Religion has lay member, pastor/priest/rabbi/ayatollah, acolyte, elder, deacon, worshiper, and so on. The behavior of incumbents to these positions is shaped by widely shared cultural rules or norms.

6. *Institutions are constituted and reconstituted by embodied agents.* Institutions exist because embodied agents, societal members with material bodies, enact practices to constitute them. Institutions persist because embodied agents continually constitute them, although in varying ways (see points 9 and 10). The *material body* is a critical element in the social relations and dynamics of institutions and, according to Connell (1987), its influence must be studied without invoking biological reductionism or other essentialist interpretations (also Giddens 1984; Lorber 1994).

7. *Institutions are internalized by group members as identities and selves and they are displayed as personalities.* Institutions are not only external to individuals. Members’ experiences within — with *and* in — institutions become incorporated into their identities and selves as members identify with their positions, the practices they enact, and the positions they occupy. Through this dynamic, institutional phenomena acquire personal meaning and significance (Connell 1987).

8. *Institutions have a legitimating ideology* that proclaims the rightness and necessity of their arrangements, practices, and social relations. Legitimizing ideology that justifies institutional practices and social relations is created by elites who benefit from the arrangements and practices they valorize (Berger & Luckmann 1966). Gender ideology is widely known and generally believed.

9. *Institutions are inconsistent, contradictory, and rife with conflict.* Despite their persistence, institutions are not highly coherent or integrated. They entail many diverse practices, some of which conflict with others. Due to inconsistencies and internal conflicts, struggles among group members over particular practices are common, not rare.

10. *Institutions continuously change.* Related to the prior criterion, and paradoxically contrary to the second criterion about endurance, institutional relations and practices are in flux. One reason is that present practices modify past practices (Connell 1987) and produce slightly, sometimes vastly, altered practices. Also, the interdependence of institutions means that changes in one institution “unsettle” conditions and practices in other institutions, causing

disruption (Nisbet 1953; Roscigno 2000). Finally, over time, old institutions die out and new ones are constituted. For example, slavery is mostly relegated to the past, whereas the mass media institution is a recent creation. Attention to dynamics not only within but between institutions, for example, between gender and the media, is required by this criterion (see Grindstaff 2002).

11. *Institutions are organized in accord with and permeated by power.* Institutional positions and practices allocate privilege and advantages to incumbents of some social positions and subordination and disadvantages to others. Power differentials are manifest in the recursive practices that orient, constrain, and facilitate members' behavior. Social positions that are highly valorized provide incumbents with power over incumbents of less valorized positions. I agree with Stephen Lukes (1974) that organization *per se* creates power (cf. Balzer 2003). Wherever social practices and relations are "organized," as they are in institutions, power differences and dynamics are at play.

12. *Institutions and individuals mutually constitute each other; they are not separable into macro and micro phenomena.* Giddens (1984; also Nisbet 1953) rejects the claim that institutions are macro and individuals are micro, arguing that this distinction distorts their mutual constitution and implies that institutions are only external rather than also internalized (criterion 7). It also implies that they are not susceptible to human agency (criterion 3). This criterion rejects the premises that institutions are big and individuals are small and that institutions are separate from individuals.

I note two other points about social institutions. One is their interdependence. The other is the role of the state. No institution is totally separate from others; each links to others, often extensively (Roscigno 2000). For example, gender and sexuality are intertwined — as are gender and family, gender and work/the economy, gender and religion — but so are family and the polity/state, family and the economy, economy and the polity/state, and education and the polity/state, and so forth (Acker 1992). Assuming that any institution is separate from others will produce flawed understanding (Nisbet 1953). Interinstitutional influences are not only pervasive, they change over time. Thus, changes in gender in accord with second-wave feminism have "unsettled" the family institution, the military, and religion, among other institutions, by challenging the legitimacy of girls' and women's subordination (Connell 1987; Gerson 2002; Katzenstein 1998). In other historical eras, these institutions more extensively "unsettled" gender.

Second, institutions are often entwined with the state. In western societies, for instance, all other institutions are linked to the state — as government, polity, legislation/regulations — which itself is an institution (March & Olsen 1989). States have power over other institutions when they codify particular practices into law and enforce them through the police, the military, the courts, and — more informally, although by no means less importantly — rhetoric

and framing of national concerns and ideology. The state has, for example, codified many aspects of gender into laws or regulations. For instance, it requires a birth certificate and driver's license to list a person's gender. It prohibited women's right to vote in national elections until the 19th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It gave employers the right to pay women less, offering unequal pay for equal work, until the national Equal Pay Act was passed into law in 1963. Laws both reflect and create gender inequality when they lend state authority to gender institution practices by assigning women to an inferior status as citizens and workers. In recent years, at the prompting of women's movement mobilization, the state has acted to enhance women's rights and opportunities (Ferree & Hess 2000). Attempts to understand gender without taking into account the state/polity and other institutions will produce flawed results, as will any attempt to understand other institutions without taking gender into account (Acker 1992; Lorber 1994).

Gender As Social Institution

Connell and Lorber, in the vanguard of asserting gender's institutional character (also Acker 1992), want to stop the widespread reduction of gender to individual, psychological, biological, or other micro phenomena in scholarship and popular culture. Toward this end, Connell (1987) affirms gender's variegated qualities and emphasizes its profound sociality, the centrality of the material body, and the centrality of practice/practicing. (Connell's *gender order* concept is compatible with if not equivalent to my conception of gender institution.) Framing gender in terms of its collective, institutional, and historical properties depicts it more accurately and renders it more accessible to sociological analysis:

In common-sense understanding gender is a property of individual people. When biological determinism is abandoned, gender is still seen in terms of socially produced individual character. It is a considerable leap to think of *gender as being also a property of collectivities, institutions, and historical processes* [emphasis mine]. This view is . . . required by evidence and experience. . . . There are gender phenomena of major importance which simply cannot be grasped as properties of individuals, however much properties of individuals are implicated in them. (Connell 1987:139)

Like Giddens, Connell views people as inside rather than outside institutionalization processes, and institutions as facilitating as well as constraining human practice. Connell valorizes practices and practicing even more than Giddens does, however. In a section titled "towards a practice-based theory," Connell (1987) explains how the *practices of gender* relate to the *structures of gender*. The gender order is constantly transformed through practice, with practice and structure "cyclically" related over time. To Connell,

cyclical practices form the core of institutions, with institutionalization representing the conditions that make cyclical practice possible:

Practice responds to a situation and transforms that situation. To describe structure is to specify what it is in the situation that constrains . . . practice. Since the consequence of practice is a transformed situation which is the object of new practice, “structure” specifies the way practice (over time) constrains practice. (95)

The [gender] process . . . is strictly social and gender is a phenomenon within sociality. . . . [C]yclical practice . . . is what is meant by an institution. The process of “institutionalization” . . . is the creation of conditions that make cyclical practice probable. (140)

Connell also emphasizes historicity, agency, and power — foci that are reflected in the criteria I outlined above. Historicity means that gender varies over time and is susceptible to human agency; gender is *not* a *transhistorical structure* that remains the same across time because of the “sexual dichotomy of bodies” (Connell 1987:64). “The idea of historicity is about change produced by human practice, about people being inside the process” (143–44). People make the social world; they do not only react to it. “To interpret social relations as natural is, fundamentally, to suppress their historicity. Naturalization (claims that something is natural) is a political act” (Connell 1987:246).

Like Giddens, Connell affirms the body’s place and significance in social relations, acknowledging it as the material basis for individual being(s). The body is there, the body acts and interacts, the body transforms and is transformed. Gender “does things” with and to bodies but gender is not explainable by or reducible to the body. Connell decries reducing gender to bodily imperatives but, at the same time, views efforts to understand gender — or any institution — without taking the material body into account as flawed (see also Acker 1990).⁹

As to power, Connell claims that recent changes in the gender order are causing “a crisis of institutionalization” that has weakened the ability of the state to sustain the legitimacy of men’s power over women in the form of domestic patriarchy (159–60). Women’s push for equality has undermined the state’s ability to enforce a family form that gives men authority over women and assures them of women’s domestic services.¹⁰ Gerson’s (2002) research affirms this view, reporting that many more women than men want an equal division of labor at home and work (90% of women, 40% of men). Gerson’s data indicate to her a disjuncture between the institutions of family and work; to Connell they indicate a disjuncture between the institutions of family, gender, and state; and to me they indicate a disjuncture between the institutions of family, state, work/economy, and gender. Differentiating among these distinctive, although intertwined, institutions improves scholars’ ability to identify gender’s influences on other institutions and their influences on it. It

also avoids assuming that gender is “at play” only in face-to-face or primary group contexts, a common practice among scholars, including sociologists (see Acker 1992 and Risman 1998 on this point).

Lorber (1994) underscores gender’s fundamental sociality, origins in human society, and persistence through human agency and interaction.¹¹ In claiming gender is an institution “in its own right” (1), Lorber says gender affects individual lives and social interaction, has a history that can be traced, is a structure that can be examined, has changed in ways that can be researched, establishes expectations for individuals, orders social processes, is willingly incorporated into identities or selves, and is built into the major social organizations of society. In making this case, she calls gender’s “naturalness and . . . inevitability into question” (5).

Conceptualizing gender as a social institution is necessary to make *the origins and perpetuation of gender* explicit. Doing so increases awareness of gender’s sociality and susceptibility to human agency and has the effect of undermining popular presumptions that gender is somehow “natural,” biological, and essential (Lorber 1994). “The prime paradox of gender is that in order to dismantle the institution you must first make it . . . visible” (Lorber 1994:10). Lorber’s “believing is seeing” paradox refers to the power of gender ideology to shape perceptions and expectations, even in the face of contrary evidence. For instance, “believing” that women and men are fundamentally different leads people to “see” them as different even when “the facts” show their commonalities. For gender to be constituted differently, and potentially “dismantled,” its complex and multifaceted character must be made visible. Framing gender as a social institution is a step toward this end.¹²

Gender As Social Institution? The Utility

In my judgment, gender qualifies as an institution on all 12 criteria, showing itself as institutional as any other social phenomenon. I invite scholars to contest this recommendation, furthermore, because even efforts that produce a negative outcome — gender fails to *qualify* — will instruct us about institutions generally and gender in particular. Rather than going criterion by criterion to make this case, I review some key benefits of framing gender as an institution. Doing so underscores gender’s sociality; directs attention to practices, practicing, and interaction; requires attention to power; re-instates the material body; acknowledges disjunctures, conflicts, and change; and challenges micro–macro dualisms.

AFFIRMS GENDER'S SOCIALITY

While “traditional” institutions like the family, economy, and polity are accepted as “distinctly social” in character (Hughes [1936] 1971), gender is not. Gender is reduced by many scholars and by popular culture to biology — genes, hormones, morphology — and psychology in ways that deny its sociality and susceptibility to social construction. Thus, insistence on gender’s collectivity, sociality, and fluidity are required to make the case for its institutional status. Attention to its collective character and historical and geographical variations will, I believe, affirm its susceptibility to human agency and its changes and variations over time. Hansen’s (1994) study of gender in nineteenth-century New England shows that historical analysis of gender often produces astereotypical results (cf. Simon & Nath 2004). Using letters, diaries, and other archival documents, Hansen found that men as well as women made quilts, wrote passionate letters to each other without implicating sexuality, and developed friendships across races and classes as well as genders. Evidence of such “concrete relations and practices” (Acker 1992) often fails to show a dualistic “separate worlds” view of gender that popular cultural beliefs — Lorber’s “believing is seeing” — and some sociological theories embrace.¹³

DIRECTS ATTENTION TO PRACTICES

Sociologists have gone far in transcending the static concepts of “ascribed status” and sex roles (and its variant, gender roles), with gender scholars in the forefront of this development. Their analysis of doing, displaying, strategically asserting, performing, mobilizing, and maneuvering relative to gender has produced important insights into the practices that constitute the gender institution (Bird & Sokolofski 2004; Kondo 1990; Leidner 1991; Pierce 1995; Schippers 2002; Thorne 1993; West & Fenstermaker 1995; West & Zimmerman 1987). Social theorists generally are reinstating practice at the heart of social theory and gender scholars are pathbreakers in this development. Focusing on practices counters the tendency to reify gender as fixed or as accomplished primarily through socialization of the young. Seeing gender as continuously constituted encourages sociologists and societal members alike to view gender as the product of active human agents who can change gender as well as other social institutions.

Gender institution practices need to be explored in both their unreflexive and reflexive forms, furthermore (Ahearn 2000; Giddens 1984; Martin 2003). According to Giddens (1984), people act with purpose, but the effects of their actions are often unintended. He uses an example of language. When one uses English to ask for a bottle of wine in Italy, the intention is to obtain a bottle of wine. But in speaking English instead of Italian, speakers — in practice — contribute to the hegemony of English worldwide, irrespective of their

intentions. Similarly, people who practice gender at work without intending to can and do produce harm. I have seen many instances of this dynamic in my fieldwork, when for example men unreflexively behave in ways that women perceive, and experience, as about masculinity/ies (Martin 1996, 2001, 2003).¹⁴

HIGHLIGHTS POWER

Social organization entails power because it produces differences that allocate resources, privilege, and opportunities differentially (Balzer 2003; Lukes 1974). The structuring of behavior through recursive practices privileges some practices over others, some practitioners over others. A conception of gender as an institution requires attention to power (Acker 1992). To ignore power is to fail to understand the hows and whys of “structures of inequality and exploitation” (Collins 1998:150). Competing interests exist. Acknowledging the “complexities within historically constructed groups as well as those characterizing relations among such groups” (Collins 1998:152–54) helps us discover how gender, race/ethnicity, class, sexuality, and other “axes of difference” reflect power, singly and in combination.

REINSTATES THE MATERIAL BODY

All institutions are embodied. Someone works/is working; someone votes; someone leads armies. Events do not happen on their own. People with bodies do things, physically and narratively; they shoot guns, allocate funds, offer praise or criticism, use sexist language, hug and hit people. Practices are embodied. We even “do personality” by displaying ourselves and identities through particular forms of speech and behavior (Connell 1987). This criterion requires scholars to take the body into account. Biology exists; its effects and contours are relevant to gender, at least in some regards. Yet our obligation as sociologists is to understand gender as a *social phenomenon*, meaning on its own terms, while avoiding reductionist and reified assumptions.

ACKNOWLEDGES DISJUNCTURES, CONFLICTS, AND CHANGE.

Gender is not integrated or coherent in ways that “serve an important function” or “fulfill a societal need,” but then, in my view, neither is any other social institution. Like all institutions, gender is a product of people who occupy different positions and have conflicting identities and interests. Conflicts, inconsistency, and change are thus endemic to the gender institution as to others. Second-wave feminism — a gender institution dynamic since the late 1960s — has challenged or “unsettled” how gender is practiced in other institutions — the legal system, the educational system, marriage/home/family, the workplace, social class, heterosexuality, the military. Gender has “bumped

against” these institutions, causing conflict and pressuring them to change (Nisbet 1953). Framing gender as a social institution shows how change is both resisted and accomplished over time.

CHALLENGES MACRO—MICRO SEPARATION

Although large social entities such as corporations or the state should not be reduced to the actions of individuals, individuals’ agency is involved in their production. Framing gender as an institution encourages analysis of how institutions and individuals mutually constitute each other, discouraging division of them into macro and micro realms (Giddens 1984; Risman 1998). When Tom, a corporate vice president, asks his colleague Betsy, also a vice president, to answer a telephone that is ringing in a nearby office, he performs a micro act informed by the gender institution (see Martin 2003 for more on this event). His behavior makes no sense relative to rational-technical bureaucracy where relations based on office (or official position) tell Tom it is inappropriate to instruct a co-vice president to answer a telephone. However, his behavior makes perfect sense in light of the kind of masculinity that tells men and boys they have a right to assistance from women (on masculinities, see Collinson & Hearn 1994; Messerschmidt 2000; Messner 1992). Tom “knows” about this right because of his experiences within gender, as does Betsy who, to her chagrin, answered the phone. In treating Betsy as a woman rather than as a vice president, Tom’s action both reflected and constituted gender. Analysis of how micro individual/interactional acts and the “long duree of institution” mutually constitute each other needs attention from gender scholars and institutional scholars generally.

Discussion and Conclusions

I favor framing gender as a social institution because I believe it qualifies and because sociological analysis will be enhanced by it. Sociology needs a dynamic and profoundly social conception of gender and it needs a clearer conception of social institution. This article is a starting point for both.

Framing gender as an institution is beneficial in drawing attention to its multiple features — ideology, practices, constraints, conflicts, power — and affirming its complexities and multifacetedness. Recognition of this condition assures scholars that they need not “study it all” and, relatedly, gives those who work only on particular institutional features a framework for connecting their efforts to the bigger picture. I hope it will also diminish debates about what gender “really” is and encourage scholars to resist equating gender with only some of its features or dynamics (cf. Hawkesworth 1997, who does both). Scholars who accuse each other of studying the “wrong” aspect or using the

“wrong” theoretical or methodological approach — for example, discourse analysis, poststructuralism, positivism — will be prompted, I hope, to accept that diverse perspectives are needed to comprehend diverse phenomena.

Parsons’s influence requires comment. Although Parsons was attempting to “save” the institution concept for sociology, hindsight suggests that he erred. In relinquishing its behavioral aspects and restricting institution to “subjective” values, beliefs, and norms, Parsons placed sociology in a box relative to dynamics and change, muddled the definition for future generations, and limited the concept’s utility for sociological analysis. Sociologists are and have been struggling for years to transcend his sex roles and other static notions (Acker 1992). As one reviewer of my article noted, Parsons’s conception of social institutions was simply wrong, and we need to bury that ghost.

Will sociologists embrace the claim that gender is a social institution? Those who accept a “subjective” or “substantive” definition of institution are unlikely to. Likewise, gender scholars who view “real” institutions as universal, fixed, consistent, or unchanging will resist because it would require them to deny research affirming gender’s current fluidity and historical variations (Leidner 1991; Thorne 1993). Although some definitions of institutions depict them as fixed or harmonious, current conceptions, including the one I favor, focus on change and highlight inconsistencies, disjunctures, and conflicts of power. Another possible objection is that gender fails to qualify as an institution because it is done *only in accord with other institutions*. Scholars who make this claim disqualify gender because it “cannot stand alone,” separately from the family, polity, economy/workplace, religion/church, and so on. This concern is unjustified in two respects. First, no institution “stands alone” and, second, gender is done everywhere, “inside” other institutions but “outside” them also. Extensive research evidence shows that “gender is done” nearly everywhere, most of the time, including on the streets, in elevators, on subways, on cruise ships — not “only” in families, churches, politics, and workplaces (Acker 1992; Collinson & Hearn 1994; Lorber 1994; Maier & Messerschmidt 1998; West & Zimmerman 1987).¹⁵

How is it possible for institutions to both endure and change? Individuals resist pressures associated with institutional rules, customs, and procedures but doing so generally fails to change the institution in a major way. Connell (1987) and Lorber (1994) say, with others, that institutional change is produced by focused collective action, rarely by individual resistance. Successes of the past 40 years in women’s rights and opportunities surely show the accuracy of that claim. Changes can be undone, however, and nothing suggests that they are permanent. Still, they were effected through collective agency that can and may be mobilized again. Indeed, changes in one institution are so intertwined with changes in others that resistance to going backward may be more widespread and diverse than the efforts to make the changes were initially.

Societal members regularly “use gender” to construct the social relations and dynamics of other institutions. Doing so does not diminish gender’s institutional status. On the contrary, the borrowing of gendered expectations to create and legitimate social relations in all or most other institutions is a clear indicator of its institutional power. Martin and Knopoff (1997) show how justifiers of modern bureaucracies used gender ideology about women, femininity, and (ir)rationality to exclude women’s participation and to valorize attributes and practices associated with men and masculinities. Others show how gender ideology and practices in eighteenth-century England made offspring the property of fathers and gave wives’ wealth to their husbands, fathers, or brothers. Families are constituted in large measure with gender, but so too are religion, politics/law, education, the economy/labor markets/workplaces, and welfare (Fobes 2004; Kenney 1996; Martin, Reynolds & Keith 2002; McGinley 2004; Pierce 1995; Quadagno & Fobes 1995; Rosenfeld 2002; Tomaskovic-Devey & Skaggs 2002). Without question, other institutional spheres “use gender” to construct (some) practices, social relations, rules, and procedures. Acker (1992:566) asks us how the major institutions of society would look if women’s subordination and exclusion had not been “built into ordinary institutional functioning.” The problem is, according to Acker, that except for the family, sociological conceptions of other institutions have represented them as gender-free in ways that have obscured their gendered qualities and dynamics (568). Gender is handy for such uses primarily because of its extensive pervasiveness and intertwining with other social realms (Kruger & Levy 2001; Mennino & Brayfield 2002; Reskin 2003; Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1999; Rosenfeld 2002).

Gender is no more foundational than any other institution, but neither are other institutions more foundational than gender. Framing gender as a social institution is an approach to understanding, not a declaration of truth (Wagner 1992 as cited in Collins 1998). Taking this step directs the study of gender; it does not tell us what to find. Framing gender as an institution will make it more commensurable for linking to other institutions including the traditional “substantive” ones but also race/ethnicity, social class, heterosexuality/sexuality, and age, among others (Ferree & Hall 1996). Social theory can be used to stifle dissent or for positive change (Burawoy 1998; Collins 1998). Framing gender as an institution promises positive change within and beyond the academy in making gender’s social character and dynamics more visible.¹⁶

Notes

1. The terms *institution*, *institutionalized*, and *institutionalism* are defined differently in different disciplines and subfields. I lack the space to address the issue here. See Katzenstein (1998) on social movements, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) on organizations,

- and Hall and Taylor (1996) and March and Olsen (1989) on institutions and institutionalism in political science.
2. American Sociological Society was the name of the American Sociological Association at the time. Hughes's comment was published in the first issue of the *American Sociological Review* in 1936.
 3. Gender scholars differ about whether society "needs" gender. Lorber (2000), for instance, says decidedly not, and Oyewumi (1997) points out that it is not a feature of all societies, whereas Gherardi (1995) says society does need gender. Exploration of this point, while important, exceeds the purview of this article.
 4. Bellah and colleagues (1991:292) assert that because America's social institutions are "damaged," new and better ones must be developed to regain the nation's "institutional health."
 5. Balzer (2003) cautions against framing social institutions as harmonious, positive, or beneficial by reminding scholars that some institutions inflict harm, as slavery did, for example. Furthermore, even if institutions are necessary for a group of people to function, they do not equally benefit all who participate in them.
 6. This point is similar to one made recently by sociobiologist Wilson (1999), which says that social science will eventually wither away because it is not needed. Natural science will explain everything about human behavior that is worth explaining, and thus only "real science" and the arts are required to fully understand the human experience.
 7. Since Parsons saw social sanctions as emanating from norms, rooted in values, the subjective aspect of institutions in essence becomes normative rules. From this point of view, one might link the subjective with what is sometimes called the ideational, provided one takes the ideational in the sense of shared cultural norms, rather than as something that varies idiosyncratically from individual to individual. In contrast, the objective is more like observable patterns of social action, although Parsons does not stress that, because, once he brings norms into focus, he tends to sideline real action patterns. Put most simply, breaking apart the elements woven together in previous conceptions of social institutions, Parsons equates the objective side of institutions with uniform modes of behavior and the subjective side with the culturally anchored normative sanctions that he sees as underpinning these modes of behavior.
 8. Using this criterion, I would suggest that organized sports is a social institution whereas baseball is not (Bellah et al. 1991). Organized sports have existed for centuries in varying forms in many cultures, in most known societies — thus meeting the time and space distancing criterion. Baseball as a particular kind of sport is relatively recent in time and is limited geographically, mostly to the U.S. Baseball is institutionalized according to several criteria we have noted, but its failure to meet them all undermines its status as a social institution properly so called.
 9. Connell's theory of links between gender, sexuality, and the body has prompted a corpus of promising scholarship by sociologists (Rogers & Garrett 2002; Schrock, Reid & Boyd 2004), anthropologists (Kondo 1990), and management scholars (Calas & Smircich 1997; Collinson & Collinson 1996) that explores their interconnections, thereby enriching understanding of how material bodies are culturally and socially deployed, molded,

displayed, evaluated, and altered in various contexts. They also show how these dynamics reflect the gender institution. Connell's exploration of connections between sexuality and gender notes that although homosexual behavior has always been present in human societies, the category homosexual, like the categories prostitute, child, adolescent, and housewife, is a recent historical creation.

10. Shifts in gender patterns have also occurred in workplaces that are moving away from "all male" and "all female" jobs (Bielby & Baron 1986). Today's U.S. labor markets, while still segregated, have many gender-integrated jobs, an increasing number of which are gender-balanced (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993).

11. Although Lorber's claim is widely adopted by scholars worldwide, I have seen little discussion of its specific meanings or the consequences of adopting it. I suspect one feature contributing to its adoption is its superiority to the concept of "gender as structure." Institution's multifacetedness incorporates practices/behavior, social relations, interaction, cultural beliefs, norms, expectations, ideology, social policies, legal statuses and constraints, hierarchical power, and so on. Structure, in contrast, is narrower in scope and has problems with the dynamics of change.

12. With Acker (1992), Lorber says gender is embedded in all other institutions; yet unlike Acker, she says gender is an institution *per se*.

13. Historical-comparative work like Oyewumi's (1997) further shows the astereotypical results that come from an institutional perspective. Precolonial Yoruba society used age, not gender, to structure relationships and hierarchies.

14. To understand gendered practices and practicing, issues of agency, intention, and reflexivity must be unraveled (Ahearn 2000; Martin 2003).

15. Martin (2001) reports for work organizations that individuals "do gender" almost continuously whereas groups "mobilize gender" somewhat less continuously, a pattern documented by Thorne (1993) about children in school.

16. Framing gender as an institution also undermines dualisms (Giddens 1984; Lorber 1996, 1999, 2000), where one category of a pair is alleged to be "different" and of lesser value (Collins 1998; Epstein 1988). All distinctions are socially constructed, not "given" by biology, nature, inevitability, or divine decree, and awareness of this condition is useful.

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Volume 83: Number 1 September 2004

Institutional Environments and Scholarly Work: American Criminology, 1951–1993*

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Abstract

Neoinstitutional theses are examined for the constitution of criminological knowledge during the transformation of penal regimes and the accompanying emergence of a specialized field of criminology. Effects of this reorganization, historical period, and research funding on scholarly journal publications are examined. Results are based on a content analysis of 1,612 articles published in leading journals between 1951 and 1993. Multivariate analyses support neoinstitutional ideas, as topical and theoretical foci are associated with themes suggested by the policy sector. The replication of the policy sector in academic organization tightens this association. Further, articles based on political funding are more likely to engage new preoccupations of the political sector. Theoretical conclusions drawn in the articles under study, however, are independent of institutional factors.

Several studies in the neoinstitutional tradition have shown how organizations inhabiting the same organizational field, with policymakers as influential members, become increasingly similar to each other (e.g., Dobbin & Sutton 1998;

** Research for this article was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (NSF/SBR-9223969) and a supporting grant from the Life Course Center, Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota. Thanks to Piers Beirne, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, Craig Calhoun, Jo Dixon, Pamela Feldman-Savelsberg, David Garland, David Greenberg, John Hagan, Doug Hartmann, Wolf Heydebrand, Sally Hillsman, John Laub, Ross Macmillan, Joan McCord, Jeylan Mortimer, James F. Short Jr., and Chris Uggen for comments and discussions on various occasions. Special thanks to Evan Schofer for crucial suggestions, to Cindy L.S. Crimmins, David P. Nelson, and Sherri P. Overall for contributions to data collection and management, and to Karl Krohn for computer advice. Comments may be directed to Joachim J. Savelsberg, Department of Sociology, 909 Social Sciences, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455. E-mail: savelsbg@atlas.socsci.umn.edu.*

Edelman 1990, 1992; Edelman, Erlanger & Lande 1993; Kelly & Dobbin 1999; Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Sutton et al. 1994). Other research documents similar patterns as nation-states come to resemble each other under the guidance of international regimes (Boli & Thomas 1997; Boyle & Preves 2000; Meyer, Boli et al. 1997). Less attention, however, has been dedicated to the question of how organizational isomorphism (inspired by organizational fields) and nation-level change (inspired by international regimes) affect the behavior of individual members of organizations or nation-states respectively (save Boyle, McMorris & Gomez 2002; Schofer & Hironaka 2004). Furthermore, while these neoinstitutional themes have been explored for a variety of areas such as employee rights (Dobbin & Sutton 1998; Edelman 1990), maternity leave policies (Kelly & Dobbin 1999), environmental policies (Buttel 2000; Frank, Hironaka & Schofer 2000; Meyer, Frank et al. 1997), and human rights (Boyle & Preves 2000), changes in the field of science in response to policy incentives have been underresearched.¹

We seek to fill these empirical and theoretical gaps. We begin by theorizing and describing the impact of science policy on the organization of criminology in the U.S. between 1951 and 1993. We empirically examine effects of the organization of science on topics and theories represented in contributions to prominent scholarly journals. In addition, we examine the impact of one direct link between the state and scholarly output: political research funding. The empirical examination is based on a data set resulting from content analysis of 1,612 articles. The relevance of our study reaches beyond criminology because of the growing politicization of government research funding (Powell & Owen-Smith 1998) and intense demands for science policy advisers to display more policy orientation in their research (Gibbons et al. 1994; Stokes 1997) and by the public generally (Miller 1983).²

Three Causal Paths: The Theoretical Argument and the Case of Criminology

FROM POLICY TO ORGANIZATION

Several mechanisms may change the shape of organizations, often causing increasing similarity between them. A line of Weberian scholarship has argued that organizations seek to adapt to a changing and competitive environment, thus leaning toward those most effective and efficient organizational forms that are likely to secure survival. DiMaggio and Powell (1983), in their influential article, call this competitive isomorphism. They argue that organizations in the late 20th century became increasingly subject to institutional isomorphism as they began to focus more on legitimacy than on effectiveness and efficiency. Organizations did so partly in response to a strong and interventionist state, a

critical civil society, and growing uncertainty about the optimal ways to adapt to a changing environment.

DiMaggio and Powell distinguish among three types of institutional isomorphism. Coercive isomorphism occurs as organizations respond to incentives or seek to avoid sanctions with which the state may respond to their actions. Normative isomorphism often results from professionalization, when professionals import new norms into their employment organizations. Finally, mimetic isomorphism results from organizations adapting to supposedly successful models when they are uncertain about how to organize.

Each type of isomorphism applies to academia, with which we are concerned here. While academic organizations do compete for scarce resources such as personnel and funds, they are also uncertain about the best ways to achieve their ends. In addition, they respond to a normative environment in which the state plays a major role.

Consider the case of criminology. Major shifts in the academic field were associated with a massive reorientation in criminal justice policy. The latter had responded to new societal challenges during the last third of the 20th century, characterized by higher crime rates, greater feelings of ontological uncertainty, and new punitive demands by the public, especially in the U.S. (Garland 2001; Savelsberg 1994; Sutton 2000; Tyler & Boeckmann 1997). The penal welfare state with its reformist and rehabilitative concerns was undermined, while a new model emerged, involving punitive sanctions, commercialization of crime control, and intense concern with the management of risk (also Feeley & Simon 1992). Garland (2001) diagnoses a parallel transformation of scholarly thought, away from a "correctionalist criminology" (41), with its focus on the criminal and the causes of crime, toward the "new criminologies of everyday life" (127), with their interest in situations and routine activities and, simultaneously, toward a "criminology of essentialized difference" (135), focusing on genetic explanations and dangerous offenders or "super-predators." While such sensitive observations have greatly enriched the literature, they have yet to be empirically tested and institutional mechanisms need to be identified.

Several mechanisms in the changing policy agenda may have induced the mutations in criminological thought that Garland observes, much in line with DiMaggio and Powell's ideas about normative and coercive isomorphism. First, political funding for criminological research, concentrated in federal agencies that address social conditions of crime — such as urban development, housing, and health from the 1950s through the late 1960s (Cole 1975; Feeley & Sarat 1980) — was shifted to the U.S. Department of Justice and its Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA). The LEAA, after 1969, became the major agency for criminological and criminal justice research support, later to be followed by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and the Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) (Feeley & Sarat 1980). Second, funding by

the LEAA, NIJ, and OJJDP over time shifted from block grants with broad research agendas through the funding of researcher-defined topics to strategic funding of agency-defined research projects. The agencies' definitions typically affect topics of research and, at times, methods and data (Petersilia 1991). Third, policymakers at various levels, including the U.S. attorney general, regularly address the scholarly community with requests to provide "relevant" research findings (e.g., Reno 1994). Fourth, the state, through attempts to professionalize the criminal justice sector, created new demands (and provided support) for education, thus inducing the creation of criminology and criminal justice programs.

The effectiveness of these mechanisms has been identified for academia generally (Heydebrand 1990) and for the academic organization of criminological work specifically (Akers 1995). After earlier and more moderate precedents — such as the creation of a police school at the University of California at Berkeley (1916) and subsequently at Indiana University, Michigan State University, San Jose State University, and the University of Washington in response to first professionalization drives of the 1910s and 1920s (Ward & Webb 1984) — the late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed a dramatic change in the academic organization of crime-related academic work. Akers analyzes the process and summarizes:

In 1966 the first non-sociological doctoral degree program (a doctor of criminology) was established at the University of California at Berkeley. Then the field exploded. A decade later, there were 729 associate of arts criminal justice programs. Upper division and graduate programs experienced a tenfold increase, to 367 bachelors' programs, 121 master's programs, and six non-sociology degree programs in criminology and criminal justice . . . The fastest growth in these programs came after 1968 when the Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) provided for federal funds to enable enforcement agencies to upgrade educational requirements and to pay tuition and other expenses to law enforcement personnel to pursue postsecondary education degrees. The growth at the undergraduate level continued, albeit at a much-reduced rate, even after LEAA was ended in 1982. (Akers 1992:7)

The growth in student enrollment, programs, and faculty positions was followed by a massive increase in the size of academic associations dedicated to crime issues (American Society of Criminology [ASC] and Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences [ACJS]) and in the number of specialized journals and other outlets for criminological work. The American Society of Criminology, for example, increased its membership from around 300 in 1970 (Morris 1975) to 3,485 by the year 2000.³

While government funding patterns and resulting market forces appear to have been the primary force driving the institutionalization of criminology, the process was likely supported by another factor. We suggest that the ascent of a

specialized criminology was aided by the structural weakness of the sociological discipline (Halliday 1992), the previous institutional home of most crime-related research (Akers 1995). Structural weakness means low interdependence between scholars in a field, which gives evidence of itself first in citation patterns. Crane and Small (1992), for example, analyzing co-citations to map the configuration of specialties within sociology, find that sociology "lacked a sizable core that incorporated a number of major subfields. Instead, sociology shared its subject matter with several other disciplines, as indicated by the number of clusters entirely identified with the other disciplines and applied fields" (222). In addition, and specifically for scholars working in the sociology of crime and deviance, cluster analyses of members of the American Sociological Association (ASA), using data on section memberships and thematic self-identification of ASA members, identify distinct structural positions of researchers in the area of crime and social control (Cappell & Guterbock 1992) and, in some crime-related subspecialties, even marginal positions at the fringe of the sociological community (Ennis 1992). These studies show that scholars working in the areas of crime and social control are relatively unlikely to share section memberships or research interests with other sociologists.

Structural weakness or, in other words, low mutual interdependence as indicated by citation patterns, section memberships, and substantive research interests, is especially consequential if combined with relatively high task uncertainty of academic fields in which information is incomplete and in which the interpretation of results is controversial and ambiguous (Fuchs 1993). The likely result is fragmentation: those areas are particularly prone to break off that are already at the structural margins of the original field. The relative structural marginality of criminology within sociology should ease the institutionalization of criminology as its own field.

In short, politicians and policymakers responded to a changing social environment with dramatically reformed policy initiatives, decoupling crime policies from rehabilitative and reform agendas. In doing so, they sought support from the academic sphere through moral appeals, shifting the allocation of research funding to the Justice Department, increasingly narrow strategic funding, and professionalization drives that resulted in growing demand for criminology and criminal justice training. In line with neoinstitutional theory, these steps induced massive change in the organization of academic work, especially a shift from a structurally weak field of sociology to a rapidly growing field of specialized criminology and criminal justice with its programs, associations, and journals, the new institutional home of most crime- and crime-control-related teaching and research. While we only describe this process here, we now move to formulate (and later test) hypotheses about the *consequences* of the process for the nature of criminological work.

FROM ORGANIZATIONS TO INDIVIDUAL ACTION

While policies effect changes in organizational forms, not just in the business world and in government bureaucracies but in academia as well, the question has been raised whether these changes actually affect the behavior of and within organizations or nation-states (Buttel 2000). Conformity to norms of the environment, after all, may be purely ceremonial (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Nation-states may sign environmental or human-rights treaties but their environmental and human-rights record may not necessarily improve as a consequence (Boyle, McMorris & Gomez 2002; Hironaka & Schofer 2004). Employment organizations may introduce maternity leave policies or grievance procedures for legitimatizing reasons while creating internal roadblocks to prevent their employees from using these institutions (Kelly & Dobbin 1999). Such decoupling of norms and policies from actual outcomes should be especially strong in the world of academia since scholars are more autonomous from their employment organizations than other groups of employees.

Schofer and Hironaka (2004) have recently specified the conditions under which the degree of coupling of outcomes with policies and institutional norms varies. Coupling increases, for example, with highly structured institutional environments (i.e., environments with clear and coherent normative patterns and scripts for expected behavior); the persistence of institutional environments (March 1988); and the penetration of institutional environments directly to subunits of organizations or nation-states, as confirmed in recent research on the direct exposure of individuals to international regimes (Boyle, McMorris & Gomez 2002).

The argument relates directly to the relationship between the state, academic organization generally, and criminology and criminal justice studies in particular. The state is, in Schofer and Hironaka's (2004) terms, highly structured and persistent. This matters particularly in a field like criminology in which the state, by determining through legislation, judicial decision making, and enforcement what constitutes criminal behavior, defines the subject matter, serves as a major supplier of data sets for criminological research (e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics), publishes research reports on a massive scale, and provides funds (e.g., NIJ, OJJDP, U.S. Sentencing Commission) and research sites (government agencies of social control) to scholars.

Additional arguments further strengthen the assumption that policy incentives, having affected the academic organization of criminology, should also directly (through organization) and indirectly affect scholarly output. Consider the indirect path. Departments have considerable control over the incentive structure of scholars. Specialized criminology and criminal justice departments are likely, for example, to reward scholars who publish in multidisciplinary journals that specialize in issues of crime and crime control

while sociology departments are more likely to reward publications in leading sociology outlets.

As scholars in these two settings seek to publish articles, they face various gatekeeper challenges, with consequences for their chances of getting published and thus for the content of their writings. Sociologists, on the one hand, primarily face sociologists who control access to sociology journals. Despite the diversity of sociological perspectives, they may assume a common understanding of basic concepts and theoretical traditions. We argue that this common conceptual and theoretical background secures a relatively high degree of autonomy from the policy environment and its pressures. Criminologists, submitting to specialty journals, on the other hand, face reviewers of diverse academic fields. Not necessarily sharing a conceptual language with their reviewers, the focus of evaluation is likely to shift to data, methods, and policy relevance (see Cole 1975 for the grant selection process; Savelsberg & Sampson 2002 for criminology). Autonomy from the policy environment is likely to diminish as a consequence. We thus propose

Hypothesis 1: Scholarly output in an organizational context that is specialized in issues of crime and crime control is more likely to focus on those general themes, specific topics, implicit theories, and intervention levels that are considered relevant by state actors than output in the organizational context of broader, unspecialized fields such as sociology.

FROM POLITICAL FUNDING TO INDIVIDUAL ACTION

In addition to links between policy incentives and scholarly work that are mediated through the organization of scholarship, we also expect direct links. Our expectation is in line with Schofer and Hironaka's (2004) thesis and Boyle, McMorris, and Gomez's (2002) findings that the decoupling of outcomes from policies and institutional norms is diminished when institutional environments directly penetrate to subunits of organizations or nation-states. Scholars seek research grants, and they may therefore adapt their agendas to available funding programs. This argument is in line with neoinstitutional and with rational choice ideas. In rational choice terms, research grants advance reputations, a major concern of scholars (Bourdieu 1975, 1988; Camic 1995; Collins 1998), and scholars' value on the academic labor market. Both academic departments and universities are interested in scholars who successfully apply for large research grants. Second, the organization of grant agencies and the definition of grant programs also provide scripts by signifying the topics that are deemed important and relevant. We discussed above how funding for crime-related research has shifted from agencies like urban planning, housing, and health to justice agencies and how the latter have moved toward narrowly

defined strategic funding during the 1970s and 1980s (Petersilia 1991). We thus propose

Hypothesis 2: Publications based on funding by political agencies are more likely to focus on those general themes, specific topics, implicit theories, and intervention levels that are considered relevant by state actors than publications that are not based on funded research or that are based on funding by universities or nonpolitical agencies.

This hypothesis as applied to criminology is inspired by numerous inside observers (Cressey 1978; Sarat & Silbey 1988; Wheeler 1975; Wolfgang, Figlio & Thornberry 1978), but has not been empirically examined.

HISTORICAL PERIOD

Finally, scholars are not just members of academic units or grant seekers. They are also citizens and directly exposed to changing concerns and ideas about crime. Garland (2001) argues that shifts in the scripts of criminal justice policy largely resulted from the fact that the uncertainties of life and the risks of criminal victimization no longer just affected the lower classes but increasingly also professionals and the middle classes generally. Scholars, thus equally affected by the changing structural and cultural conditions of life in late modern society, may well have shifted their research agenda independently of the organizational and funding incentives discussed above. It is thus prudent to examine the effect of historical period, and we propose

Hypothesis 3: Scholarly publications tend to reflect the concerns of the period in which they are written, net of funding source and organizational affiliations of scholars.

Data and Methods

DATA COLLECTION

Our empirical examination is based on content analysis of 1,612 articles in general sociology and specialized criminology and criminal justice journals from 1951 to 1993. We identified (1) their substantive, theoretical, and methodological orientation and (2) their social context, including historical period, types of authors, funding sources, and places of publication.

We selected U.S. journals in general sociology and specialized criminology and criminal justice journals that ranked high either in terms of impact, as measured by frequency of citation (for sociology journals see Allen 1990), or in terms of reputation, measured through expert opinion (for crime-related specialty journals, see Shichor, O'Brien & Decker 1981). Within these journals

we selected all contributions that fulfilled a simple set of inclusion criteria: (1) research articles or presidential addresses that (2) deal with crime or delinquency or social (formal [including legal] and informal) control, directed at crime or delinquency, and that (3) are concerned with the contemporary U.S.

Nine academic journals and 1,612 articles fulfilled our inclusion criteria, the *American Sociological Review* ($N = 132$), the *American Journal of Sociology* ($N = 78$), *Social Forces* ($N = 85$), *Social Problems* ($N = 75$), *Criminology* ($N = 579$), *Journal of Criminal Justice* ($N = 116$), *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* ($N = 55$), *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* ($N = 336$), and *Law and Society Review* ($N = 156$). Seven of these nine journals, selected on the basis of influence and reputation, are or were also associated with or supported by major professional associations throughout or, in one case, at some point during the study period. We thus analyzed the entire population of thematically relevant articles in the nine journals ($N = 1,612$). The content of the articles was analyzed by two graduate research assistants specializing in the sociology of crime and social control.⁴

OPERATIONALIZATION

Throughout, data were coded for analysis as 1 = presence and 0 = absence. We first turn to the independent variables (see Table 1). We have hypothesized that the historically specific ideological climate and government practices are associated with the nature of scientific knowledge. We divided the period of investigation into four relatively homogeneous time periods to go beyond a simplistic dichotomous distinction between a modern and a late modern era (Garland 2001). In our descriptive analyses we break up the modern era (1951–68) into two subperiods, one dominated by Republican administrations (1951–60), the other by Democratic administrations, culminating in the Great Society programs of the Johnson presidency. We generally distinguish, within the late modern era, between a formative stage (1969–80) in which deterrence policies dominated and a mature stage (1981–93) in which managerial strategies gained prominence (Feeley & Simon 1992). The percentage of articles increases with each period. This result should not be surprising, since several of our specialty journals were founded and grew during the period under study.

The low N in the first period suggests that it be merged with the second time period for our multivariate analyses (below). This procedure seems justified because criminal justice ideology did not radically change between 1951 and 1968, and a three-period model generally fits the data as well as a four-period model does. Analyses using linear time models indicate that our period model is superior to a linear time model.

TABLE 1: Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics for Journal Articles on Crime and Crime Control

Independent Variable		Description	Percentage
Time	Year article was published by ideological period		
1951-60	Years 1951-60 = 1; 1961-93 = 0		4
1961-68	Years 1961-68 = 1; 1951-60 and 1969-93 = 0		9
1969-80	Years 1969-80 = 1; 1951-68 and 1981-93 = 0		41
1981-93	Years 1981-93 = 1; 1951-80 = 0		46
Political funding	Primary or secondary funding from political source: LEAA, NIJ, OJJDP, NIMH, other policymaking institute = 1; NSF, private foundation, university sources, other national institute, no funding = 0		26
Justice funding	Primary or secondary funding from justice policy source:LEAA, NIJ, OJJDP, other policymaking institute = 1; NIMH, NSF, private foundation, university sources, other national institute, no funding = 0		14
Specialty journal	Crim., JRCd, JCLC, LSR, JCJ = 1; ASR, AJS, SP, SF = 0		77
Dependent Variable			
<i>Topical focus</i>			
Behavior vs. control	Criminal behavior = 2;		39
	Formal control, informal control and agency relations = 1;		43
	Victimization, academic behavior, methods, public opinion, fear of crime, other = 0		18
Formal control vs. informal control	Formal Control, and agency relations = 3;		40
	Informal control = 2;		3
	Criminal behavior = 1;		39
	Victimization, academic behavior, methods, public opinion, fear of crime, other = 0		18
<i>Political issues</i>			
Drug	Drug issue focus = 1; other = 0		12
Incapacitation	Multiple offenders or recidivism focus = 1; other = 0		11
White-collar crime	White-collar-crime focus = 1; other = 0		9
<i>Theoretical focus</i>		Theoretical explanation of crime employed or tested by the criminal behavior article	
Anomie/strain	Anomie, strain, illegitimate opportunity, status frustration = 1; others = 0		14
Social constructivist	Labeling, historical/constructivist = 1; others = 0		7
Learning	Learning, subculture = 1; others = 0		9
Control	Control, power control, social disorganization = 1; others = 0		10
Micro-level (N = 1397)	Individual, interaction (small group) level of analysis = 1; social role, crowd, community/neighborhood, census tract, court district, formal organization, city, state, society, method, other = 0		65
<i>Theory confirmation</i>			
Anomie/strain (N = 223)	Anomie/Strain school confirmed by article = 1; neutral or rejected = 0		60
Control (N = 178)	Control school confirmed by article = 1; neutral or rejected = 0		74
(N = 1,612 except where noted)			

Second, we are interested in the impact of strategic funding. We thus distinguished between articles based on research that received primary or secondary funding from a political source from those that did not. We included all funding agencies as political if their head or director is a political appointee, if the agency is associated with specific departments of the political administration, or if research funding is overwhelmingly strategic, conditions that applied to LEAA, NIH, NIJ, and OJJDP. In total, 26% of articles were based on such funding (14% specifically on funding by criminal-justice-related agencies).

Third, hypothesis 1 states a relationship between research output in specialized criminology as opposed to sociology contexts. Our analysis thus distinguishes articles published in specialty criminology and criminal justice from general sociology journals. Table 1 shows that 77% of our articles were published in specialty journals.⁵

Among our dependent variables, we are first interested in topical focus, distinguishing articles that describe or explain criminal behavior from articles concerned with control behavior (i.e., behavior aimed at the control of criminal behavior). We further coded whether articles focused on formal or informal social control, as we expect the focus of government interest to be on formal control mechanisms.

Second, to explore whether structural conditions affect the likelihood of concern with particular substantive issues of a given era, we coded for focus on incapacitation issues (multiple offending or recidivism, a central theme in political debates during the 1980s), white-collar crimes (advanced after Watergate, during the Carter administration), or drug crimes (central during the "war on drugs," especially during the Reagan and first Bush administrations).

Third, different criminological theories are associated with different policy responses to crime, some having clear affinities with the modern penal welfare state, others with late modern forms of government control, while yet others are opposed to both. We aggregated related theories into broader categories or families. We do so because we are interested in groups of theories that make similar assumptions about the causes of crime. In addition, forming theory families results in larger *N*s permitting more sophisticated multivariate analyses.⁶ We called the first family *anomie/strain*, including Durkheim's ([1933] 1984) and Merton's (1938) approaches, the *illegitimate opportunity* theory of R. Cloward and L. Ohlin (1960), and A.K. Cohen's (1955) *status frustration* approach. Clearly, these approaches show affinity with social reform responses to crime. We called the second family *social constructivist* because it considers crime more an ascribed than an achieved trait, either on the microsociological (e.g., labeling) or on the macrosociological level. Clearly, these approaches are critical toward state intervention and control. The third family, called *learning* and associated with *resocialization* responses to crime, is

primarily composed of the Sutherland (1939) tradition but also includes subculture theories (Miller 1958). We call the fourth family control theories and include control and disorganization theories. We did so despite their different historical origins and some noteworthy differences because both assume criminal motivation that translates into criminal behavior once social worlds are disrupted.⁷ Both suggest policy responses that focus in some way on the control of criminal impulses.

Most of the articles invoke the anomie/strain tradition (14%), followed by the control school (10%), the learning school (9%), and the constructivist school (7%) (59% do not invoke any theory of crime). In addition, 65% of articles dealt with micro-level units of analysis (i.e., individual, small group, interaction). We were interested in this variable because previous research has suggested that government-funded research is oriented toward micro-level interventions (Schacht & Eitzen 1990). Finally, we coded whether the theory was confirmed or disconfirmed by the article (with a neutral alternative).

Findings

PATTERNS BY PERIOD AND SPECIALIZATION

As our historical account suggests, the proportion of articles based on research supported by political funding increases from a very low level of 3% to 31% in the 1980s (see Table 2). Also consistent with our historical account, criminal justice funding increases, especially after 1968. By the 1980s almost two-thirds of political funding was provided by criminal-justice-related agencies. Also consistent with our historical account, the percentage of articles in specialized criminology outlets increases from a rather low (14%) to a very high level (82%).

Dependent variables also change in the expected direction. Confirming early impressions by Cressey (1978) and Wheeler (1975), we initially see a move away from criminal behavior toward control research, but a moderate reversal of this trend in the 1980s. Given the declining focus on criminal behavior research, it is not surprising to see the percentage of articles that invoke one of our four theory families shrink. The decline is especially dramatic for the family of learning theories. Theories of the anomie/strain family also decline consistently except for a small upturn in the 1980s. Theories from the control family (which includes disorganization theory) decline after the 1950s but double their share again during the 1980s. Cutting across theory types, micro-level work predominates in all time periods but loses some ground over time (Table 2).

With regard to specific topics, focus on incapacitation/multiple offenders grows, as expected and in line with the crime management focus of late modern

TABLE 2: Descriptive Statistics for 1,612 Crime and Crime Control Articles by Time Period

	1951–60	1961–68	1969–80	1981–93	Total
Political funding					
No funding	10 (16)	56 (37)	247 (38)	370 (50)	683 (42)
Political funding	2 (3)	31 (21)	151 (23)	232 (31)	416 (26)
University/private/ NSF funding	51 (81)	63 (42)	256 (39)	143 (19)	513 (32)
Criminal justice funding	0 (0)	3 (2)	71 (11)	148 (20)	222 (14)
Specialty journal	9 (14)	93 (62)	530 (81)	610 (82)	1242 (77)
Topical focus					
Criminal behavior	39 (62)	90 (60)	206 (32)	293 (39)	628 (39)
Formal control	13 (21)	32 (21)	311 (48)	287 (38)	643 (40)
Informal control	3 (5)	8 (5)	12 (2)	25 (3)	48 (3)
Other	8 (13)	20 (13)	125 (19)	140 (19)	293 (18)
Article on drug crime	3 (5)	9 (6)	65 (10)	113 (15)	190 (12)
Explicit statement concerning multiple offenders or recidivism	3 (5)	9 (6)	72 (11)	98 (13)	182 (11)
Article on white-collar crime	11 (18)	17 (11)	52 (8)	68 (9)	148 (9)
Anomie/strain theories	15 (24)	34 (23)	67 (10)	107 (14)	223 (14)
Social constructivist theories	5 (8)	9 (6)	52 (8)	50 (7)	116 (7)
Learning theories	21 (33)	26 (17)	41 (6)	52 (7)	140 (9)
Control theories	15 (24)	11 (7)	34 (5)	97 (13)	157 (10)
Article on rational choice/ free will (N = 1604)	2 (3)	6 (4)	44 (7)	55 (7)	107 (7)
Micro-level analysis (N = 1397)	35 (78)	96 (77)	355 (65)	422 (62)	908 (65)
N	63	150	654	745	1,612

Note: Percentages within each time period in parentheses.

control forms — albeit at a modest level. The proportion of articles on crimes of the powerful decreases (despite Watergate and against our expectations), while the drug theme gains ground during the Reagan administration's war on drugs, as expected.

Descriptive patterns vary also by sociological versus specialized criminological context, as expected. While research published in sociology versus specialty journals does not differ much in terms of funding (49% vs. 58%), differences are considerable in terms of thematic and theoretical foci. Articles in sociology journals focus more on criminal behavior than on control institutions (54% vs. 35%). Accordingly, all crime theory families are more often registered in general journals than in the specialty journals, but overrepresentation varies by theory type: learning theory family (16% vs. 6%), anomie/strain theory family (23% vs. 11%), constructivist theories (11% vs. 6%), and control family

(14% vs. 9%). Articles in sociology journals are thus more in line with the critical or reform agendas of the welfare state era. Further, articles in sociology journals are less likely than those in specialty journals to focus on micro-level conditions (60% vs. 67%), study drug crimes (8% vs. 13%), or show an incapacitation focus by studying multiple/career offenders (5% vs. 13%). Sociology journals, on the other hand, are more likely to study white-collar crime than interdisciplinary specialty journals (13% vs. 8%). Their emphasis, in all cases but one (offenses of the powerful), is thus less on themes suggested by the political sector in the late modern era.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Multivariate analysis allows us to examine the effects of period, specialized criminology, and political funding sources independently. We use binary and polytomous logistic regression for our dichotomous and categorical dependent variables, respectively. Coefficients from both techniques can be readily interpreted as effects on odds indicating the change in the likelihood of the dependent variable per unit change in the independent variable.

As we examine the effect of historical period, specialized criminology, and funding sources, we use the time periodization as described above. Separate analyses, using a linear time variable, showed that all coefficients for our explanatory variables retain their direction and significance. The period model had greater explanatory power, since it captures the nonlinear effect of time on our dependent variables.

General Topical Focus

The temporal change in topical focus is statistically verified in model 1 of Table 3. Compared to the 1950s and 1960s, the odds of focusing on formal/informal control relative to criminal behavior were 261% ($e^{1.284}$) higher in 1969–80 and 145% ($e^{0.897}$) higher in 1981–93. Furthermore, articles on informal social control decrease in relation to those on formal social control.⁸ The results support hypothesis 3, specifying that criminology has moved away from the study of causes of crime toward a concern with control agencies and controlling behavior. While it is true that some critical perspectives, especially constructivist approaches, contributed to this trend, articles based on these approaches in no time period made up more than 8% of the entire population. In addition, much constructivism is still primarily concerned with the constitution of crime rather than with the operation of institutions per se. Changing institutional frames, scripts, and relevance systems have thus affected the work of criminologists.

Along with period, we also investigated the effect of criminal justice funding on topical focus. A bivariate analysis (not shown) suggests that criminal justice

TABLE 3: Polytomous Logistic Regression Estimates — Effects of Time and Institutional Variables on Topical Focus of Journal Articles

	Formal/Informal Control vs. Criminal Behavior			Other vs. Criminal Behavior		
	1	2	3	1	2	3
1969–80	1.284** (.183)	1.259** (.184)	1.070** (.189)	1.028** (.237)	1.040** (.238)	.846** (.244)
1981–93	.897** (.180)	.847** (.182)	.647** (.188)	.789** (.232)	.812** (.235)	.606** (.242)
CJ funding		.263 (.164)	.271 (.165)		-.145 (.223)	-.137 (.224)
Specialty journal			.628** (.138)			.649** (.182)
Intercept	-.834** (.160)	-.838** (.160)	-1.149** (.177)	-1.528** (.208)	-1.529** (.209)	-1.849** (.232)
df	4	6	8	4	6	8
χ^2	57.78	62.62	87.97	57.78	62.62	87.97

(N = 1,612)

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Model chi-square and degrees of freedom reported under both categories.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

funding increases the odds of focusing on control as opposed to criminal behavior by 41% ($e^{0.340}$, $p < .05$). Yet, net of period, criminal justice funding does not affect topical focus (see model 2 in Table 3).

Model 3 of Table 3 introduces the organizational specialization of criminology. The model suggests that specialization, net of period and funding type, increases the odds of an article focusing on control by 87% ($e^{0.628}$), thus supporting hypothesis 1.

Political Issues in Research

In line with our hypotheses, period, specialization, and political funding should not just advance a shift of criminological publications toward control research at the cost of criminal behavior research, but also a shift to “new” themes that attracted political attention in the later phases of our time frame. Such issues are the new punitive orientation toward drug offenses, the concept of multiple/repeat offending much in line with the incapacitation and managerial ideas associated with late modernity, and the white-collar-crime theme that attracted

intense scrutiny after the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s. We find strong support for the political funding argument and moderate to weak support for period and specialization (net of political funding). For instance, models 1, 2, and 4 of Table 4 suggest that political funding increases the odds of studying all three issues. Specifically, political funding increases the odds of an article focusing on drugs by 104% ($e^{0.713}$), multiple offending/recidivism by 50% ($e^{0.407}$), and white-collar crime by 45% ($e^{0.37}$).

The effect of criminological specialization is also significant for all three issues, though the effect is more ambiguous. Models 1 and 2 of Table 4 indicate that specialization significantly increases the odds of an article focusing on drugs and multiple offending/recidivism. Model 3 indicates that specialization not only increases the odds of focusing on multiple offending/recidivism, but also conditions the effect of political funding. While the effect of political funding in sociology articles is nonsignificant and negative, politically funded research in specialty journals *increases* the odds of focusing on incapacitation by 74% ($e^{-1.1968 + 1.7505}$).⁹ This significant interaction is consistent with our thesis and suggests articles published in specialty journals are more likely to follow themes suggested by the political sector, and this relationship is particularly strong when research is funded by a political source. Yet in contrast to the effect of specialization on drugs and multiple offending/recidivism, specialty journals are less likely to publish articles on white-collar crime. Model 4 in Table 4 shows a decrease of 40% ($e^{-0.516}$) in the odds that an article in a specialty journal examines white-collar crime. Taken together, these results lend some support to hypothesis 1. Specialization increases the odds of an article focusing on drugs or multiple offending/recidivism as expected; however, and contrary to our prediction, specialization decreases the odds of focusing on white-collar crime.

We found little support for hypothesis 3, which posits that political issues of late modernity should be especially prominent after 1981.¹⁰ Model 1 of Table 4 supports the hypothesis, indicating that the odds of studying drugs increased 65% ($e^{0.499}$) between 1981 and 1993. However, the effect of period was not significant for multiple offending/recidivism or white-collar crime.

Theoretical Focus and Level of Analysis

Table 5 contains the best-fitting models predicting the use of more specific categories of criminological theories.¹¹ In this analysis we examine only articles that focus on criminal behavior ($N = 627$). The influence of the independent variables differs widely across the four theory schools. Model 1 indicates that criminological specialization is the only significant predictor of the use of anomie/strain theories, decreasing the odds of focus on anomie/strain theories by 43% ($e^{-0.570}$) relative to the set of nonanomie/strain theories, net of the period and political funding. Both period and specialization negatively influ-

TABLE 4: Logistic Regression Estimates — Effects of Time and Institutional Variables on Study of Hot-Button Issues

	Drugs	Multiple Offenders/ Recidivism		White-Collar Crime
	1	2	3	4
1981–93	.499** (.160)	.228 (.161)	.228 (.161)	.001 (.176)
Political funding	.713** (.163)	.407* (.172)	–1.199 (.761)	.370* (.187)
Specialty journal	.454* (.209)	1.152** (.263)	.727* (.286)	–.516** (.189)
Specialty journal × political funding			1.752* (.782)	
Constant	–2.861** (.213)	–3.257** (.264)	–2.881** (.273)	–2.022** (.178)
df	3	3	4	3
χ^2	37.62	33.84	40.85	11.55
(N = 1,612)				

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

ence the use of learning theories relative to nonlearning theories, as shown in model 2. Likewise, specialization substantially decreases the odds of employing social constructivist theories (model 3), again supporting hypothesis 1.

Finally, models 4 and 5 illustrate the effect of our independent variables on the use of theories emphasizing social control relative to noncontrol theories. Model 4 shows a positive effect of political funding on use of control theories. However, and consistent with our argument, the interaction between period and political funding in model 5 suggests political funding had no substantial influence on the selection of control theories during the political climate prior to 1980, but the effect of political funding is particularly strong and positive during the 1981–93 time period. The set of control theories is the only group for which political funding has a positive effect.

Overall, our findings among families of theories offer moderate support for hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. Specialization tends to decrease the odds that criminological research will use or test theories that emphasize social conditions of criminal motivation rather than other theories. Specialization, however, has no significant effect on use or testing of theories that focus on control of

TABLE 5: Logistic Regression Estimates — Effects of Time and Institutional Variables on Use of Theory Types in Journal Articles on Criminal Behavior

	Anomie/ Strain	Learning	Social Constructivist	Control/ Disorganization	
	1	2	3	4	5
1969–80	-.327 (.261)	-.987** (.309)	.733 (.447)	-.118 (.332)	-.263 (.360)
1981–93	-.105 (.246)	-.695* (.277)	.688 (.437)	.664* (.296)	.226 (.328)
Political funding	.000 (.210)	.348 (.247)	-.627 (.370)	.532* (.219)	-1.454 (1.056)
Specialty journal	-.570** (.197)	-.517* (.234)	-.772** (.300)	-.299 (.225)	-.341 (.228)
Political funding × 1969–80					1.558 (1.170)
Political funding × 1981–93					2.390* (1.092)
Constant	-.550** (.212)	-.866** (.228)	-2.335** (.381)	-1.730** (.271)	-1.449** (.275)
df	4	4	4	4	6
χ^2	11.80	21.12	10.61	22.75	31.53
(N = 627)					

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

criminals. Period and political funding are nonsignificant or negatively influence the odds that an article will examine or test theories that stress social conditions of criminal motivation; yet, in line with our argument, these two variables combine to exert a large positive influence on the likelihood that articles will utilize theories that focus on control during the most recent time period, 1981–93.

Theories are only partly linked with levels of analysis, which we analyzed separately. Model 3 in Table 6 illustrates that all three independent variables significantly influence whether an article uses micro-level or macro-level

TABLE 6: Logistic Regression Estimates — Effects of Time and Institutional Variables on Level of Analysis in Journal Articles

	Micro-Level Focus		
	1	2	3
1969–80	–.628** (.209)	–.646** (.205)	–.818** (.213)
1981–93	–.746** (.201)	–.785** (.202)	–.969** (.211)
Political funding		.261* (.128)	.297* (.129)
Specialty journal			.474** (.138)
Constant	1.238** (.184)	1.193** (.186)	.982** (.195)
df	2	3	4
χ^2	15.07	19.28	31.06
(N = 1,397)			

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$

analysis. Contrary to hypothesis 3, period has a negative effect on the use of micro-level analysis. The addition of political funding and specialization variables slightly increases the magnitude of the effect of period on level of analysis. The odds of micro-level analysis decrease during 1969–80 and during 1981–93 relative to the 1951–68 reference category. On the other hand, consistent with hypotheses 1 and 2, both political funding and specialization have significant and positive effects on micro-level analysis. Political funding increases the odds of micro-level analysis by 35% ($e^{0.297}$), and specialization increases the odds of micro-level analysis by 61% ($e^{0.474}$).¹²

Theory Confirmation

Clearly, our independent variables influence theoretical foci, indicating a significant influence of changing policies, directly and through the organization of academic work. However, the same independent variables do not affect whether a theory is confirmed. We estimated models within subsets of the theoretical schools anomie/strain, control, and free will/rational offender, predicting confirmation of each of these theoretical perspectives (results not

shown but available upon request). Only one variable, specialization, exerted a mild negative influence on one dependent theory category, the confirmation versus rejection of anomie/strain approaches. None of the other independent variables, either independently or in combination, exerted a significant effect on the other theory confirmation variables. While we are aware of the small population in this analysis, the lack of significant associations suggests cautious support for ideational theories of science, indicating relative autonomy of the methodology of the scientific process proper. That is, while the questions asked are influenced by funding and organization, empirical conclusions are independent.

Discussion and Conclusions

This article took as a starting point the recent massive shift in the culture of control, accompanying the transition from modernity to late modernity (Garland 2001). The state is a central player in this process in that it provides new scripts, models, and practices of social control. Most noteworthy are shifts from the penal welfare state's concern with the causes of criminal behavior to a focus on the effectiveness of control models, and from reformist and rehabilitative to punitive and managerial models of control (Feeley & Simon 1992; Garland 2001). These policy shifts were accompanied by others that directly aimed at the academic organization of criminological work. A shift of funding programs away from agencies concerned with health, human services, or housing and urban development to justice agencies, an increasing focus on strategic research funding within justice agencies, moral appeals directed at criminologists, and the creation of demand for criminological and criminal justice training through professionalization drives resulted in an organizational adaptation of academia to the new realities of state control. This account is much in line with a rich body of neoinstitutional work that has examined the effect of policy initiatives on organizational behavior (Dobbin 1998; Edelman 1990, 1992; Kelly & Dobbin 1999) or of international regimes on national policies (Boyle & Preves 2000; Frank, Hironaka & Schofer 2002; Meyer, Boli et al. 1997).

Our empirical analysis set out to examine recent themes in neoinstitutional work that examine whether such organizational changes affect the level of everyday practice or are limited to symbolic steps at the level of organization. Applied to our case, we inquire into the effects of institutional changes on the nature and outcome of criminological work. We hypothesized such effects in light of Schofer and Hironaka's (2004) argument that highly structured and persistent environments are likely to result not just in symbolic but in actual adaptations within organizations or nation-states. We further hypothesized, following arguments by Boyle, McMorris, and Gomez (2002) that the effects

should be particularly strong when institutional actors and members of target groups are directly linked. In our case, this link is established by research funding from policy agencies to criminological scholars. In addition, scholars are directly affected by new scripts and models because they are also members of American society and participants in public life. We thus finally hypothesized that we should also find a direct effect of historical period on scholarly agendas.

Our analysis of 1,612 scholarly journal articles generally supported these hypotheses. Reorganization of the academic field was associated with remarkable shifts in knowledge produced by criminological researchers. Specifically, we find that changes in criminological work are associated with shifts of implicit political ideologies and penal strategies, away from a concern with the sociological conditions of crime toward a concern with control, and, within control institutions, away from informal toward formal social control. The new organizational specialization of criminology (strongly) and criminal justice agency funding (somewhat) engender a politically favored focus on formal control institutions. We also saw that criminological research turns increasingly toward politically relevant issues of the 1970s and 1980s, including drugs, white-collar crime, and multiple offending. And again, the institutional mechanisms through which this adaptation was achieved are crucial. In fact, pure historical period effects disappear for white-collar crime research and multiple offender research in models that include measures of specialization and political funding. The latter factors, not general ideological climate, moved researchers to new agendas. Findings on theoretical foci were more mixed. Criminological research certainly turns away from learning and strain theories after the 1960s, in line with the abandonment of rehabilitative and reform penal practices and rhetoric. Constructivist themes remain stable at a relatively low level, while theories that focus on the structural conditions of criminal motivation lose ground. Again, organizational specialization of criminology and political funding of underlying research explain this loss. They increase the prominence of theories instead that focus on the control of *assumed* criminal motivation as well as a focus on microanalytic approaches.

In short, organizational specialization of criminology affected criminological output, in line with Schofer and Hironaka's (2004) arguments. Also, direct links between the state and individual researchers through research grants also have a considerable effect, in line with theoretical arguments and findings from a different context (Boyle, McMorris & Gomez 2002). While hypotheses 1 and 2 thus find considerable support, effects of historical period are mostly explained through academic organization and funding, leaving us with relatively little support for hypothesis 3, while suggesting that period largely matters because of increases in political funding and the growth in specialization among journals.

It is interesting nevertheless that, while the criminological agenda was strongly affected by the state, theoretical conclusions drawn in the articles

under study are not related to the institutional factor examined here. We will treat this finding cautiously, since the population is too small to confirm specific theory families. The null results are consistent, however, indicating considerable autonomy of the methodology of the scientific process proper from the state. Both the state's effect on the criminological agenda and the independence of theoretical conclusions are in line with ideas in the sociology of science that regard scholars as driven by interest, albeit interests tied to the academic sphere in which they seek to draw attention to their work and accumulate reputation (Bourdieu 1975; Camic 1995; Collins 1998). At the same time, scholars will seek to appeal to nonscientific spheres such as the state to draw resources such as data sets or research funds that can be converted into scientific capital (Bourdieu 1988). Earlier and much-cited observations by Foucault (1977) about the association of scientific knowledge with power, especially in the area of crime and punishment, thus find some support in our findings. Still, our results reconfirm, *pace* Foucault, the relative autonomy of the scientific process proper while contributing insights into the institutional mechanisms through which the organization and agendas of scholarship are affected by the state.

This article cannot discuss the question of what impact criminological research, itself affected by its political and policy environment, has on the policymaking process. Future work might want to examine the hypothesis that scholarly work, developed in an organizational field that is dominated by policy agencies, will tend to contribute to the technical sophistication of policies without challenging their basic orientations.¹³

We end with two notes on the internal and external validity of our findings. First, our findings are based on a rather conservative measure to identify effects of the state on academic agendas, publications in highly ranked scholarly journals with strict peer-review mechanisms. Future research may want to examine journals with lesser reputation, products of the massive textbook industry that has been built around the growing criminological field, or the myriad series published by agencies like the National Institute of Justice (e.g., *Research in Briefs*, *Criminal Justice Information Policy Reports*, and *Research Reports*). Some of these are written by agents of the institute, others are commissioned by the institute and sent free of charge to a large number of academics and practitioners. Furthermore, think tanks and their products should be considered, like the Manhattan Institute (one of the main proponents of the "broken windows" strategy of policing) and its *City Journal*, whose circulation of 10,000 far exceeds that of most scholarly journals. In short, focusing on top-ranked academic journals represents a rather conservative approach to testing our hypotheses. Knowledge in other outlets should covary more strongly with or be affected more directly by external conditions.

Second, the relevance of our case is likely to extend beyond criminology, since similar reorganization of academic fields is occurring in other substantive

areas (Gibbons et al. 1994; Stokes 1997), and similar effects on the constitution of knowledge have been observed (e.g., Pfeffer 1997 on the move of organization studies into business schools; see also Perrow 2000). Finally, observations in other countries suggest that the findings for American criminology apply in other national contexts as well (see Christie 1997 for Scandinavia).

In short, we have confirmed and specified the effects of institutional environments on the scholarly agenda of American criminology, despite our use of conservative measures. Further, the literature indicates that similar processes may be at work in other areas of scholarship and in criminology in other national contexts. Finally, we found indications for the relative autonomy of the methodology of the scientific process proper. Much more hypothesis testing empirical research on other scientific specializations and other countries is needed.

Notes

1. We reference international work even though our case does not examine the international level (and its impact through national policies on individual or community-level behavior). Yet research at the international level raises theoretical issues parallel to those we addressed with our focus on the organization level (organizations as mediators between national policies and the agendas of individual researchers).

2. An examination of the impact of institutional environments on scholarly work for the case of criminology also adds to a prominent body of literature on the emergence of academic disciplines and specialties (e.g., Ben-David & Collins 1966; Camic 1995; Camic & Xie 1994; Collins 1998; Edge & Mulkay 1976; Hagstrom 1965). Yet such examination is distinct from that literature in three ways. First, it examines the rise of a field close to and advanced by the policy sector. Second, while much of the literature focuses primarily on the conditions for the emergence of new fields, our analysis is primarily concerned with consequences for the content of scholarship. Third, while most studies in this field of research are qualitative case studies, this research provides a quantitative examination of a set of hypotheses. Empirically examining the rise of a field related to the policy sector suggests reference to a line of recent neoinstitutional work.

3. We thank Sarah Hall at the American Society of Criminology for providing us with 2000 membership information.

4. Coder training extended over several weeks and sessions until disagreements between coders were resolved. As rates of coder agreement were not recorded at that point, we recently tested inter-coder reliability with students who had not undergone coder training (and for whom we should thus expect higher levels of disagreement) for a random sample of articles from our data. This test yielded the following levels of agreement: political funding, 96%; topical focus, 81%; theories, 97%; level of analysis, 70%; recidivism, 85%; drug issues, 87%; white-collar crime, 98%.

5. We also found that 54% of articles appeared in journals whose editor was affiliated with a criminology, criminal justice, or public policy program. On the other hand, this

information is available for only 89% of all cases. Analyses incorporating this indicator into an index of specialization showed little difference from analyses based on journal character alone but the missing values reduced the sample size. Further, we analyzed a subset of our sample ($N = 689$) for which information about the author's departmental affiliation is available (sociology/specialty department). While the statistical power of these analyses is weaker because of the lower N , results almost always point in the same direction as the results reported below (Savelsberg, King & Cleveland 2002).

6. We grouped our theories into theory families on the perception that the theories entailed similar ideological and policy implications. In separate statistical analyses, we also disaggregated our theory families and analyzed each theory separately. This is somewhat problematic, since the N for some of the respective theories is rather small. However, if the results for each theory are approximately the same as for the theory family, then this would lend further support for our use of theory families. And indeed, the results of this analysis were in line with the findings presented for theory families. The effects of the independent variables were almost entirely in the same direction and most retained statistical significance despite the small numbers (tables available upon request). This lends statistical support to our argument for grouping individual theories into theory families.

7. Again, this categorization is supported by our statistical analyses. Our explanatory factors always affect the use of control and disorganization theories, when analyzed separately, in the same direction (tables available upon request).

8. Analyses show that, compared to the 1950s and 1960s, the odds of articles focusing on informal control decrease by 84% ($e^{-1.846}$) (1969 and 1980), and by 64% ($e^{-1.032}$) (1981 and 1993).

9. The interaction between specialization and political funding was not significant for drugs or white-collar crime.

10. Here we contrasted the 1981–93 period with all previous periods, since drugs, white-collar crime, and recidivism became political issues especially during the mid- to late 1970s.

11. Authors often employ combinations of theoretical traditions for a variety of reasons. For example, authors may test one theory against another, or they may integrate multiple theories to explain observed behavior. Thus, theory categories are not mutually exclusive. We therefore employ binary logistic regression, assessing use of a given theory family relative to articles not discussing that theory family.

12. Level of analysis is the only dependent variable for which the replacement of journal by author affiliation showed different results (all nonsignificant).

13. Such research can draw inspiration from previous work on the conditions under which technocratic and scientific expertise will be incorporated into the policy making process (e.g., Habermas 1975; Skocpol 1985; Stryker 1989).

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Institutional Dynamics and Dangerous Classes: Reading, Writing, and Arrest in Nineteenth-Century France*

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Abstract

This research shows that the rise of public education in nineteenth-century France was associated with a declining rate of serious crime in the general population. The study finds that although a moral curriculum and the discipline of the classroom were intended to produce conformity, it was actually literacy that was consistently associated with declining rates of both serious crime crimes of violence and property offenses. In the case of violence, the impact seems to have been direct, consistent with civilization and control theories. However, in the case of major property offenses, occupation is an intervening variable, consistent with Merton's (1938) "Social Structure and Anomie."

At a lower level of analysis, as literacy grew in the general population, the rate of crime simultaneously increased in the subpopulation that remained largely illiterate. In this respect, the rise of public education and literacy may have inadvertently given substance to the idea of a "dangerous class" in nineteenth-century France, which foreshadowed Wilson's (1987) "truly disadvantaged" class in the inner cities of contemporary America.

The analysis focuses on primary and secondary education, literacy, and crime in France, 1852–1913, using time-series analyses (ARIMA).

* *Je voudrais remercier Anne-Marie Laurent, Martin Galipot, et le Ministère de la Justice, Paris, pour leur assistance. Thanks also to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for supporting this study, and the International Law Library of Harvard University, and to Lucia Benaquisto, Raymond Breton, Augustine Brannigan, Gwynne Nettler, John Hagan, Malcolm MacKinnon, Kevin McQuillan, Detelina Radoeva, Jeff Reitz, Jack Veuglers, and Cheryl Webster and the anonymous reviewers for Social Forces for their helpful suggestions. Special thanks to my teachers, Ian Brown, who breathed life into history, and Charles Tilly, who merged it with sociology. Direct correspondence A.R. Gillis, Department of Sociology, University of Toronto, 725 Spadina Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, M5S 2J4. E-mail: gillis@chass.utoronto.ca.*

Everybody knows that literacy is a great social benefit and that public education prevents crime. Victor Hugo stated it more than a century ago, when he said “When we open a school, we close a prison” (Yamerellos & Kellens 1970:239; Wright 1983:112). The public school system trains pupils to obey authority and to interact correctly with others, as well as teach them to read, write, and count, which are skills with considerable market value. Either or both of these educational objectives could repress criminal behavior. On the other side, as populations become literate, conditions are likely to worsen for those who remain uneducated, and like Wilson’s (1987) “truly disadvantaged,” illiterate persons, suffering from a dearth of human, cultural, social, and economic capital may out of frustration or necessity turn to crime. Thus, in any population, literacy may lower crime among those who acquire the skill while at the same time increasing illegality among those who do not.

The following research examines these possibilities while focussing on Victor Hugo’s France (1802–85). During this period the public education system was established, the overall rate of serious crime dropped, and the rate of illiteracy declined from 40% to 2.25% of the total population of almost 40 million. This is consistent with the idea that literacy may have reduced crime in the general population. However, even by the end of the epoch, even by conservative estimates, almost a million French men and women were still illiterate, and trying to survive in a largely literate world.

Public Schools and Moral Education

The most obvious way in which public education could have increased conformity and reduced criminality is through the moral training of pupils. Public schools provide the state with an irresistible opportunity to extend authority in an inconspicuous but potentially effective way (see Bernstein 1971; Wilson & Herrnstein 1985). In addition to enabling the interception of children who may have escaped training at home, the school incorporates important advances over the family as a structure for socialization. The state school, with its highly centralized content, not only links a large number of individuals horizontally to each other, but vertically, to the state (see Coleman 1988a and also Meyer 1978). Both the organization and the operation of state schools enable the widespread and consistent definition, identification, and repression of disruptive behavior, including crime. Schools supply both the constraints and the incentives for children to develop self-control and accumulate the human and social capital that facilitate their own vocations and the goals of the organizations in which they will eventually participate. Many scholars have observed that beyond the manifest curriculum, a “hidden curriculum” involving regimented classes and a pedagogy emphasizing acquiescence prepares pupils for self-restraint, adult conformity, and work in the outside

world (e.g., Bowles & Gintis 1976; Illich 1972). Further, classrooms provide the opportunity for constant monitoring to achieve this end (see Gottfredson & Hirschi 1990; Gurr 1979).

This control theory vision of schooling is widely shared by twentieth-century general social theorists, most of whom see conformity and civility as the outcome of successful socialization, including formal education. Functionalists view state schooling as a structure that produces civility, social integration, and obedience to the laws of the land (see, e.g., Parsons 1959). This evaluation of public education is also congruent with the idea of elite theory, according to which control eventually shifts from the rule of lions to the rule of foxes, and power is maintained more through fraud than through force (e.g., Pareto 1935). Marxists and anarchists concur, arguing that both the intent and the effect of state schooling in western states is compliance with authority and conformity with state law (e.g., Bowles & Gintis 1976; Illich 1972; and, for a general discussion, Davies 1995).

In the middle of the nineteenth century, French practice was consistent with this viewpoint. There was an explicit intention to extend civility throughout the nation, and the moral curriculum was far from hidden. Both the form and the content of instruction in state schools were explicitly designed to produce political conformity and reduce crime (Markoff 1986). Public schooling emphasized compliance more than independent thought, especially in the Third Republic (Bourdieu 1984, cf Boli 1989), and this was deliberate. "The school was supposed to improve manners and customs, and to soothe the savage breast" (Weber 1976:329). Teachers maintained great distance from their students, and classes were "quasi-military" in organization, highly structured, with an emphasis on self-restraint (Anderson 1975; Mayeur 1981). Thus, in accord with the observations that were to come a century later from Parsons, Bowles and Gintis, and Illich, both the form and the moral content of state education in nineteenth-century France were designed to teach students civility and self-control.

Literacy and Civil Social Interaction

The classroom experience and its hidden curriculum are not the only products of the public school. Apart from being marketable, the manifest curriculum may also enhance self control, civilizing students, turning them into "gentle" men and women as well as scholars while also promoting trust. This is especially the case with reading and writing, which among other things provided a symbolic alternative for direct, concrete action.

The substitution of debate for more direct physical mechanisms of dispute settlement is the essence of the "civilizing process," and the growth of literacy in France closely follows the pattern of European pacification described by

Elias ([1939] 1978, [1939] 1982, 1969). Rates of serious crime declined during the Renaissance, and continued to do so in Western Europe as well as America until the middle of the twentieth century, when they leveled off and began to increase (see LaFree 1998 for an explanation of this reversal). The long decline was associated with the suppression of passionate displays, violent attacks, and criminality in general, but it did not necessarily require the repression of conflict itself. Instead, courts, parliaments (from *parler*, to speak), and civil society can be seen as alternate arenas for the battlefield, and discussion, debate, and diplomacy for armed combat. Accordingly, literacy equipped students to engage in civil discord by giving them the symbols for nonviolent conflict and training them in the rules for so doing. Sanders (1995) is even more definitive in his argument that reading not only “forced the reflective self into existence” but encouraged consistency and integrity as well. This fits with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) vision of self-control theory.

In an abstract, “informing” way literacy “civilizes” — makes individuals into consenting members of the body politic. Rules of grammar hold sentences together the way physical laws hold the natural world together, and the constitutional laws hold society together. (Sanders 1994:182)

An extensive vocabulary may not only facilitate symbolic contention, but provide a wider range of conceptual tools for greater tact and the circumvention of direct disagreement as well. For example, the concepts of peasants were limited to “simple, concise ideas full of images, specific and based on local experience. That was the nature of rural speech, poor in abstract terms, rich in concrete ones, and in pejoratives” (Weber 1976:92). In low-literacy populations, even humor is more likely to be expressed directly and physically, as a practical joke, and these are “vigorous, expressive, [and] sometimes cruel” (Willis 1977:55). (See also Lévi-Strauss 1966, on the “concrete logic” of “*la pensée sauvage*,” and Goody 1977, 1983.) By infusing vocabularies with more impersonal and emotionally neutral ideas, then, formal education and literacy may act as a social lubricant, enabling and perhaps encouraging more detached and dispassionate discussion. This would have helped to avoid personal confrontation as well as prevent disagreement, when it occurred, from escalating to violent confrontation.¹

Thus, facility with language enables symbolic rather than physical confrontation, euphemizes personal dominance, and establishes social position (see Bourdieu 1977). As the pen displaced the sword, lawyers superseded armed champions, and words became the only legitimate means of attack or defense in civilized altercations. Literacy would have been an important indicator of this expertise in communication, representing human capital (explicit technical skills, such as communication proficiency — see Becker 1964), social capital (social connections/certification, predictability, trustworthiness — see

Coleman 1990), and cultural capital (more erudite symbolic assets, including vocabulary, grammar, taste, sophistication — see Davies 1990).

Illiteracy and Anomie

As noted earlier, modern social theorists and the educators of nineteenth-century France concur that public school systems provide states with a welcome opportunity to generate obedience. On the other hand, the actual impact of education on misconduct is unclear, even in Victor Hugo's France. As noted earlier, the state made every effort to secure future civility through its formal education system, and Ferri (1905) and more recently Gillis (1994) report that literacy was indeed associated with declining rates of serious crimes of violence. This is consistent with the preceding argument.

However, relying heavily on French studies, Lombroso (1968) observed that although crimes of passion and crude offenses such as arson (more often an expression of revenge than insurance fraud) may have been decreasing in conjunction with education during this period, more sophisticated property offenses, such as white-collar crime, were increasing, and the trade was not even. "For each ten new schools opened, there were five more arrests and this was true in all the different branches of crime" (50). Garofalo (1905) and Tarde (1910) concurred, concluding that the main contribution of education was an increase in the sophistication of crime rather than a reduction in its volume (see O'Brien 1982). In line with this, "prison inspector Moreau-Christophe . . . complained that although ignorance was a cause of crime, statistics showed that the incidence of crime was actually highest in those parts of France where education was most general" (Wright 1983:112-13).

Although compelling, this evidence also supports another explanation. Apart from morality and control, formal systems of education can be viewed as institutions designed to transmit human, cultural, and social capital (see Bourdieu 1977, 1984; Coleman 1988b, 1990; Dimaggio & Mohr 1985 on social and cultural capital, and Becker 1964, on human capital). This capital provides both the skills and the certification for graduates to succeed in modern contexts, and its absence is linked to rising rates of crime (see Hagan 1994:66-77, for a lucid discussion). Consequently, economic deprivation and criminal behavior may be inhibited independently through the capital transmitted by the manifest curriculum, but only among the educated.

If literacy embodies human, cultural, and social capital, and indeed reduced crime among those who can read and write, all things being equal, the volume and rate of crime would decline for the population as a whole. However, all things are not likely to remain equal. In his classic elaboration of anomie theory, Merton (1938) observed that restricted access to legitimate opportunity

structures can place pressure on those who are economically disadvantaged to turn to crime (see Messner & Rosenfeld 1994 for an important recent extension of this thesis).

Although Merton's paradigm is static, the processes it describes can be adapted to a dynamic situation. Progressive change at the macro level can improve conditions for one segment of a population while at the same time making life more difficult for those who are left behind. The proliferation of occupations in the service sector late in the twentieth century created opportunities and at least the realization of the American dream of employment for some people. However, the simultaneous decline in manufacturing jobs was an unemployment nightmare for others, and this may have been reflected in diverging rates of crime. In *The Truly Disadvantaged*, Wilson (1987) notes that the shift of so much of the American population to the suburbs over the last half of the twentieth century depleted and impoverished many inner cities, leaving them deprived of social and cultural capital and plagued with high rates of crime.

Since literacy is capital, remaining illiterate in a population that was becoming literate would produce the same strain. According to a study of 12 western industrial countries, illiterate subpopulations currently endure twice the unemployment rate of their more literate counterparts (Little 1997). Historically, the demand for these skills and certification increased to the point where diplomas certifying that individuals had successfully completed school became increasingly necessary for employment (Weber 1976). This was especially the case as national states became literate, "credential societies" (see Collins 1979). Thus, the crime rate in the low-literacy population should have escalated as literacy increased in the rest of the population and gradually became a necessary condition of employment.

Although most western systems of public education offer universal accessibility, not everyone can become literate. Some youngsters may not be physically, intellectually, or emotionally able to cope with even the minimal demands of formal education. Further, as in the case of children with attention deficit disorder, they may also be disinclined to conform, generating an association between lack of training, and delinquency and crime. On another level, sociologists observe that individual aptitude for education is also structured along sociocultural and class lines. Cohen (1955), Polk and Schafer (1972) Stinchcombe (1964), Sugarman (1967) and others point out that the school experience is often humiliating, especially for pupils from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, who lack the human, cultural, and social capital to measure up to the values of the manifest or hidden curricula. These pupils are unable to compete with other students for the approval of teachers. This can spark defiance, malice, and collective as well as individual criminal reactions from pupils who see little future for themselves in the public

education system (see Tanner 1995, for a recent review of these studies). In line with this, alienation from school is one of the best predictors of delinquency (e.g., the re-analysis of the Glueck's data by Sampson & Laub 1993, and also Andrew 1979; Liska & Reed 1985).

Animosity toward formal education may represent counter-cultural capital, which guards the local prestige hierarchy by rejecting the more cosmopolitan rejecters and their system of prestige allocation. This negation of cultural capital can precede any actual contact with the state school system and in the end be very costly in human capital, the skills that can be sold on the wider market. Willis (1977) observes that in England, resistance to schooling by working-class youth extends to skepticism about the value of learning symbolic systems, such as reading, writing, and arithmetic, in view of the inevitability of their future as laborers (see also Hoggart 1958). Although this viewpoint may have been realistic at one point in time, its accuracy and utility in a period when jobs as physical laborers are in decline is tragically misplaced. Further, the sanctification of working-class culture not only exacerbates poor school performance among working-class youth but justifies more direct and concrete styles of dispute settlement as defiance of inequality. In this way, working-class culture may inhibit both attendance at public schools and literacy while perpetuating itself, ignorance, and criminality (Tanner 1996).

In European populations, literacy became increasingly necessary for social mobility and for membership in elites (Kaplan 1997). Further, in nineteenth-century France literacy was associated with employment (see Cipolla 1969). Thus, being able to read and write increased occupational attainment, which in turn may have reduced frustration and economic pressure to engage in crime. As literacy expanded throughout the nineteenth century, the competitive advantage of the literate classes should have gradually declined (see Kuznets 2002). On the other side, illiteracy and the absence of formal education would have limited not only individuals' capacity to interact with others, especially in organized contexts but their level of employability as well. The disadvantages of illiteracy would have become both concentrated and intensified in this subpopulation.

With this in mind, the following research not only examines whether the expansion of public schooling and increasing literacy reduced rates of serious crime in the general population. The analysis also investigates whether literacy had a direct impact on violent crime and an indirect effect on property crime through occupation. Finally, the investigation examines whether the low-literacy subpopulation became more likely to be charged with criminal offenses over time and could have substantiated what was known early in nineteenth-century France as "the dangerous class" (see Chevalier 1973; Donovan 1981; Frégier 1840; Tombs 1980).

The Context of the Research

The last half of the nineteenth century in France is germane for research on literacy, education, and crime for several reasons. In addition to providing the information for most of Durkheim's work, this location and period provided the data for Lombroso's and others' cross-sectional analyses of the relationship between public education and crime. The quality of the population data is high (Van de Walle 1974), as is the quality of official crime statistics (Wright 1983), particularly for serious offenses (see Quetelet [1842]/1969, and more generally, Nettler 1984). (For example, since the French judicial bureaucracy required evidence to be submitted in written form, it is possible that this linked literacy to charges, especially in regions low in literacy. However, if this was indeed the case, it would be more likely to affect minor than major offenses, where action would have been demanded by both plaintiffs and the public.)

Although some of the data are available for several years before and after the period chosen for analysis, 1856–1914 was selected because it is defined by pivotal historical events in the history of France. The revolution of 1848, the coup of 1852, and their aftermath were associated with wide fluctuations in crime rates. Thus, 1856 frames one end and the beginning of World War I (1914), with more extreme fluctuations in crime, frames the other. Therefore, the historical eras on which the analysis focuses coincide with the Second Empire and the Third Republic.

Some lingering normative patterns that were in discord with the law may have affected the reliability of some official records of violent crime. For example, dueling was a form of violence that maintained a certain popularity in nineteenth-century France (Kiernan 1988), and behavior associated with dueling would bring charges and prosecution but often no conviction for offenders (Weber 1986). Consequently, charges are likely to be a more reliable measure than convictions, particularly for violent offenses.

Rates of both major property offenses and crimes against persons dropped over the nineteenth century in France (Gillis 1989, 1996a, 1996b), and serious crimes of violence declined in conjunction with increasing rates of literacy (Gillis 1994). Less serious forms of contention grew substantially over the same period, with escalating rates of minor property offenses, violent misdemeanors, and strikes (Gillis 1989; see also Davidovitch 1961; Lohdi & Tilly 1973).

One change in the law may also have been important. The French penal code was revised in 1863 for the last time in the century, increasing restrictions on the discretionary power of judges and reducing some serious crimes to délits, the equivalent of misdemeanors (Wright 1983). In view of this, an analysis of rates of major crime during this period ought to control for the possibility that the decline in rates of serious crime occurred through a progressive tendency to assign cases to the tribunaux correctionnels (the courts that heard

minor offenses) instead of the *cours d'assises* (where serious crimes were adjudicated).

In France, the public school system was largely built between 1836 and 1886, a period during which the urban population almost doubled. In 1821, just over 6 million people lived in urban areas (localities with 2,000 or more in population), representing about 20% of the total population (see Moody 1978; Prost 1968; Smith 1982). By 1901 urbanization had increased to almost 16 million, representing more than 40% of the population of France. By the beginning of World War I, this figure reached 45%. Except for a dip during the Franco-Prussian War, the increase in urbanization approximated linearity over this period (for more detailed descriptions, see Gillis 1989; McQuillan 1984; Tilly 1986).

The increase in the number of children in elementary school paralleled urbanization, the number rising steadily throughout the nineteenth century. Although varying widely by region, 73.6% of France's children age 6 to 13 were in school by 1876. Child labor and the perception of schooling as useless gradually faded as personal experience with the benefits of literacy increased and it dawned on people that school certificates brought employment (see Weber 1976).

Literacy in Nineteenth-Century France

Although public schools made every effort to teach pupils to read, for much of the nineteenth century, primary education was one thing and literacy another. Many people learned to read and write independent of the school system, relying instead on friends and family for instruction (e.g., Corbin 1990; Martin-Fugier 1990). Literacy was a valued skill. It expanded economic opportunities and made possible personal and social benefits such as being able to keep diaries and communicate with distant relatives through the postal system. Keeping up with the scandals and other news reported in the new tabloid newspapers, such as *Le Petit Journal*, also provided a less practical but perhaps even more enticing motivation for people to become literate in nineteenth-century France (see Weber 1976). Thus, formal education was not necessary to become literate if one had the social capital in the form of literate friends or family.

Compared with the European leader, Scotland (Herman 2001), literacy in France grew slowly until the nineteenth century, when the state took charge of the education system and established uniformity in curriculum and the language of instruction (Furet & Ozouf 1982). The relatively slow progress in the earlier period reflects the lack of integration of the Republic; by 1861 more than one-quarter (8,381) of France's 29,129 communes were non-French-

speaking, and by 1893 the ratio had not changed (Weber 1991). Resistance to French, and literacy, was strongest in peripheral, rural regions such as Brittany and the Basses-Pyrénées, where opposition to French culture and the state still persists (Weber 1976; see also Braudel 1986 on the regional sociocultural diversity of France).

The spread of French throughout France not only extended and established the language of the state, it represented the substitution of one set of “cultural equipment” for another, giving a new mentality to the population. French was “urban, modern, ‘civilized’” (Weber 1991:97). It is noteworthy that as with Elias’s general account of the expansion of civility, French literacy extended from urban to rural areas, and from the top of the social structure to the bottom.

The literacy process is quite simply the story of how an elitist cultural model penetrated throughout society. From the top downward, from the upper to the lower classes, so much so that very early on in our history instruction came to be taken as social superiority, whereas in fact it was merely its corollary (Furet & Ozouf 1982).

As indicated by the proportion of brides and grooms who were able to sign their names to their marriage registrations,² rates of illiteracy decreased from over 40% in the middle of the nineteenth century to just under 3% at the beginning of World War I. Males displayed higher rates of literacy throughout this period, but the gender gap was all but eliminated by 1914.

Data and Time-Series Analyses

The first question to be addressed is whether public education and literacy are associated with declining rates of serious crime. The unit of analysis for the first section of the analysis is continental France for the period between 1856 and 1914. Charges for violent crime and property offenses are taken from the records of the assize courts, which heard more offenses carrying more severe punishments. Less severe punishments were meted out for *délits* (minor offenses) by the *tribunaux correctionnels*. All information pertaining to crime is taken from the *Compte général de l’administration de la justice criminelle*, and other data are taken from the *Annuaire statistique . . .*, which were published for continental France annually. These sources of data are available in the *Ministère de la Justice* and the *Bibliothèque Nationale* in Paris for the years covered. They are also available in some North American locations. For example, most volumes of the *Compte générale . . .* are in the Center for International Law library at Harvard University, and volumes of the *Annuaire statistique . . .* from 1878 are in the Robarts Graduate Library of the University of Toronto.

In the initial analysis, number of children in public school and crime are expressed as absolute numbers rather than rates in the absence of precise parameters to use as denominators for the primary and school-age

subpopulations. Except for literacy (expressed as a percentage), variables in the second part of the analysis are expressed as rates with relevant population parameters as denominators.

Estimates from analyses of temporally ordered data can be influenced by autoregressive processes, present when a variable or its error term is correlated with its own lag, i.e., itself over time. Autoregression violates an assumption of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, where the mean of a series rather than the adjacent case is supposed to be the best predictor of randomly selected cases. (This can also occur in cross-sectional analyses, when the spatially adjacent case is a better predictor than the mean.) When autoregression occurs, it affects the integrity of OLS estimates of correlation coefficients. To protect against this, the following analyses use an ARIMA (1, 0, 1) model to estimate and control for first-order autoregressive processes. ARIMA has three components, the first being the autoregressive processes for the correlation of a variable with itself (see Johnston 1984, Kmenta 1986, Ostrom 1990). Autoregressive processes rarely extend beyond a first-order effect (one-year, with series containing annual data), and so the term in our equations will be AR1 (see McCleary and Hay 1980). Similarly, moving average estimates, MA1, are also included to establish that error terms are indeed "white noise" and, if not, estimate and control for the correlation of the disturbance terms with a linear combination of past and present random errors.

Analytically, ARIMA asks whether the year-to-year changes in an independent variable, minus the mean year-to-year proportional change in that variable for the period being examined, are related to the year-to-year changes minus the average year-to-year proportional change in a dependent variable. Substantively, controlling for autoregressive effects tries to discover whether two trends are related to each other, or whether each is "on a roll," independently propelled by something like bureaucratic inertia, imitation (or with the MA1 term, the same thing in an error term). Thus, one factor, such as literacy, may be increasing over a long period of time while another, such as major crimes of violence, may declining over the same period. However, unless fluctuations are in harmony from year to year, these variables will not be considered correlated in an ARIMA sense.³

Results: Public Education or Literacy?

The absolute number of pupils in public primary school is associated with literacy ($\beta = .004, p = .05$), as is the number of students in high school ($\beta = .009, p = .04$). However, "education is an expenditure for which the benefits come at some distance in the future" (Coleman 1990:62). With this in mind, it is important to realize that any impact of public schooling on crime may also be delayed. Consequently, I examined the distributed lags of both primary and

TABLE 1: ARIMA (1,0,1) Analyses of Charges for Serious Crimes of Violence and Major Property Offenses

Serious Crimes of Violence						
	β	S.E.	p	β	S.E.	p
AR1	.84	.14	.000	.62	.29	.038
MA1	.28	.24	.248	.18	.36	.615
Primary (9)	-.04	.12	.731	.04	.13	.767
Secondary (4)	-1.01	.59	.100	-.35	.67	.603
Literacy				-1.6	.70	.028
Constant	2,772.3	566.3	.000	1,512.5	783.3	.062

Major Property Offenses						
	β	S.E.	p	β	S.E.	p
AR1	.70	.16	.000	.46	.21	.037
MA1	-.37	.21	.078	-.49	.20	.020
Primary (9)	.25	.17	.150	.34	.17	.049
Secondary (4)	-2.52	1.1	.030	-1.41	1.2	.244
Literacy				-3.68	1.39	.012
Constant	3,304.1	1,036.8	.003	1,174.5	1,335.3	.385

Notes: Per 100,000 population on number of pupils in primary(1,000s) and in secondary schools (100's), lead 9 and 4 years, respectively, and literacy, for Continental France, 1852–1913

secondary education on major and minor crimes of violence and on both types of property offenses (see Dhrymes 1971 on distributed lags). In the case of serious crimes of violence, the strongest predictors were a nine-year lead for primary education and a four-year lead for number of children in lycées. This suggests that the most substantial impact of formal education on crime occurs later, on individuals in their early 20s.

Table 1 shows that including both in an equation as predictors of serious crimes of violence results in the number of students in high school as a negative predictor of both the number of violent crimes ($\beta = -1.01$, S.E. = .59, $p = .100$) and property offenses ($\beta = -2.52$, S.E. = 1.1, $p = .030$), with number of pupils in primary school unrelated to either of the dependent variables. The ARIMA (1, 0, 1) model shows that the AR1 term is statistically significant in both equations. The MA1 term is an insignificant predictor of the rate of violent crime, but it is a stronger correlate of major property offenses of ($\beta = -.37$, $p = .078$), suggesting that there may be a negative association between this dependent variable and its preceding error term.

The second ARIMA (1, 0, 1) equations include a measure of literacy (indicated by the annual percentage of husbands and wives who were able to

TABLE 2: ARIMA (1,0,1) Analysis of Charges per 100,000 for Serious Crimes of Violence and for Major Property Offenses

	Serious Crimes of Violence			Major Property Offenses		
	β	S.E.	p	β	S.E.	p
AR1	.88	.10	.000	.32	.33	.345
MA1	.29	.22	.193	-.19	.34	.576
Literacy	-2.85	1.40	.049	-4.46	1.40	.003
Change in law (1863)	-.05	.05	.281	.02	.08	.806
Minor offenses ($\times 10^5$)	17.87	4.95	.001	15.30	4.06	.001
Franco-Prussian War (1870-71)	-420.94	172.32	.020	-316.74	312.3	.318
Prewar/Postwar period	-120.56	170.19	.484	515.94	243.29	.041
Population under 21	-12.23	24.87	.626	-14.26	38.99	.717
Industrialization (fossil fuel)	-1.51	1.52	.327	-3.05	2.3	.194
Infant mortality	1.27	1.51	.408	-4.58	2.46	.071
Economic fluctuation						
Bankruptcies	-217.32	77.70	.008	-231.05	107.88	.039
Strikes ($\times 10^4$)	-22.68	43.71	.607	80.28	72.38	.275
Miners' wages	8.63	5.35	.116	-2.37	8.44	.780
Constant	4646.9	8867.1	.524	7073.5	14190.1	.621

Notes: Controlling for a change in the law in 1863 and minor offenses against persons and property, respectively; the Franco-Prussian War (1870) and its aftermath; proportion of the population under age 21; industrialization (annual consumption of fossil fuel); infant mortality; and economic fluctuation (bankruptcies, miner's wages, strikes), for Continental France, 1852-1913

sign their names to the marriage register). The inclusion of this variable substantially reduces the strength of the association between high school students and violent crime to $\beta = -.35$, S.E. = .67, and $p = .603$. Literacy is a strong negative predictor of the rates of both types of crime, with $\beta = -1.6$, S.E. = .70, and $p = .028$ for violent offenses, and $\beta = -3.68$, S.E. = 1.39, and $p = .012$ for property crime.

These equations fail to support the idea that state schools had much of a negative impact on rates of serious crimes of violence or major property offenses. (In fact, after controlling for literacy, primary school is a significant positive predictor of major property offenses, $\beta = .34$, $p = .049$, supporting the contention of the nineteenth-century researchers.) The power of secondary school as a predictor of both types of crime is substantially reduced by including literacy in the equations. This suggests that the aspect of high school that reduces crime is through literacy rather than the hidden curriculum or some other component of formal education.

Controlling for Selected Possible Contaminating Factors

Table 2 shows that literacy is persistent as a significant negative predictor of both types of major crime. However, other factors extraneous to the arguments presented earlier may have contributed to these relationships. As previously noted, the penal code of France was altered in 1863, reducing some major crimes to less serious offenses. Since this has the potential to produce a decline in crimes classified as major while simultaneously inflating those defined as minor, thereby affecting the relationship between literacy and major crimes, I included the period before the law was changed as well as after it was changed in 1863 as an interruption in the time series and also included rates of minor assault and theft as controls. However, controlling for this change and including these minor versions of major crimes (which are significant positive, rather than negative, correlates of serious crimes) has no attenuating effect on the predictive power of literacy. In view of this, it is difficult to argue that the association of literacy and major rates of crime is simply a consequence of expanding liberalism, manifest in growing literacy and an increasing tendency to charge offenders with minor instead of major crimes.⁴

War either affects rates of criminal behavior (Archer & Gartner 1984) or appears to affect them by depressing reports, processing, or recording of charges during hostilities and then making up for the bureaucratic backlog once the conflict is over (see Gillis 2001, for a discussion). In any case, bursts of wide variation in official data can affect the outcome of time series analyses, and France and Prussia went to war in 1870, producing considerable disruption beyond actual conflict. The aftermath of this war included the rise and fall of the Paris Commune in 1871, the annexation by Prussia of territory on the northeast border with France, and the introduction of considerable turbulence into the middle of the array of data being analyzed in this study. To examine whether this upheaval affects the relationship between literacy and rates of serious crime, I included 1870–71 as a control and also treated the war as a point in an interrupted time series. During 1870–71, rates of serious crime rose significantly, but just as with the introduction of controls shown in the previous table, the inclusion of the Franco-Prussian War and its aftermath in these equations has no impact on the initial ARIMA associations between the independent and dependent variables.

Many factors associated with both crime and literacy could also account for their relationship. Changes in population composition, industrialization, the economy, and general quality of life could reasonably be expected to be correlated with both literacy and crime and contribute to their association. This issue is no less problematic in nonexperimental research at the macro than at the micro level. However, it is often difficult at the macro level to get direct indicators of potential confounding factors, and when the research is historical the problem is compounded. In any case, the following variables were included

in the equation as controls: changes in population composition (proportion of the population aged 21 or under), industrialization (the consumption of coal and petroleum products per metric ton), general quality of life (infant mortality), and economic fluctuation (bankruptcies, strikes, and wages).

This also presents an opportunity to include a potentially important control variable. The measure of literacy for the general population is based on signatures on the marriage register, and the age of marriage is probably lower than that of the population in general. Further, age is often associated with crime (see Hirschi & Gottfredson 1983, 1990; cf. Greenberg 1985). Moreover, literacy grew in nineteenth-century France with the expansion of public schooling. This means that over the period of the analysis literacy would have been negatively associated with age, so that age rather than literacy may have produced the patterns observed above. Consequently, in an effort to control for the possibility of age bias, I examined the relationship between literacy and the crime rates of both categories while controlling for the proportion of crimes committed by young offenders (age 21 and under).

Although the proportion of people 21 or under is indeed a significant negative predictor of the rate of serious crimes of violence ($\beta = -.08$, S.E. = .01, $p = .000$), and a positive correlate of major property offenses ($\beta = .07$, S.E. = .03, $p = .019$), including minors as a control in the equations has no more effect on literacy's association with the former ($\beta = -2.85$, S.E. = 1.4, $p = .049$) than the latter ($\beta = -4.46$, S.E. = 1.4, $p = .003$).

In the end, then, the negative relationships between literacy and rates of serious violence and major property offenses actually intensify while remaining statistically significant when the ten control variables are included in the equations.

Occupation As an Intervening Variable

Between 1856 and 1907 the French recorded the occupations of those who were charged with committing serious crimes of violence and reported this information in the *Compte général de l'administration de la justice criminelle*. (The occupations of property offenders were also recorded, but for a much shorter time.) Eleven occupational categories were presented, some of which I collapsed, producing five categories. These are (1) no occupation (unrecorded as well as unemployed), (2) unskilled labor (e.g., rural farmworkers, factory workers, and domestics), (3) skilled labor (e.g., barge operators, butchers, bakers), (4) owners and managers, and (5) professionals. The raw numbers for these categories were included in equations as controls to see whether the negative associations between literacy and crime rates would be attenuated. In this way it is possible to test whether the impact of literacy is direct, as suggested

TABLE 3: ARIMA (1, 0, 1) Analysis of Charges for Major Property Offenses and Serious Crimes of Violence per 10,000

	Major Property Offenses					
	β	S.E.	p	β	S.E.	p
AR1	.70	.11	.000	-.64	.23	.008
MA1	-.38	.15	.012	-.99	3.7	.790
Literacy	-3.73	1.15	.003	-.03	.28	.790
No occupation				1.31	1.47	.15
Unskilled				1.66	.06	.000
Skilled				.40	.23	.092
Owners, managers				-2.14	.83	.014 Pro-
fessionals				-1.16	.70	.105
Constant	1792.7	284	.000	557.1	99.3	.000
	Serious Crimes of Violence					
	β	S.E.	p	β	S.E.	p
AR1	-.31	.16	.053	.51	.23	.061
MA1	-.94	.08	.000	.96	.88	.282
Literacy	.50	.002	-1.96	.84	.025	
No occupation				-4.15	4.06	.314
Unskilled				-.36	.19	.062
Skilled				.30	1.05	.774
Owners, managers				4.4	2.98	.148
Professional				2.36	3.43	.494
Constant	1398.7	116.8	.219	1394	353.3	.000

Notes: Controlling for occupational category of offenders, for continental France, 1856–1907

by the civility argument, or whether the effect is indirect, through occupations denied or conferred on the basis of literacy.

As expected, the link between literacy and major property offenses occurs through occupation. The initial negative slope for literacy of $\beta = -3.73$, $p = .003$, is obliterated by controlling for occupation ($\beta = -.03$, $p = .790$). Moreover, no occupation, skilled, and unskilled workers are all positive correlates of property crime (the last significant, with $\beta = 1.66$ and $p = .000$), while owners-managers and professionals are negative predictors (the former significant, with $\beta = -.2,14$ and $p = .014$).

This supports the anomie-disadvantaged argument that literacy reduces crime by providing a legitimate opportunity to accumulate resources. The illiterate, without this means to success, are more likely to turn to crime. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that there is no class link suggested by the coefficients for occupational categories and violence. This indicates that it is

FIGURE 1: Major Property Offenses per 10,000 — Low and High Literacy Subpopulations




FIGURE 2: Serious Crimes of Violence per 100,000 — Low- and High- Literacy Subpopulations




TABLE 4: ARIMA (1, 0, 1) Analysis of Charges for Property and for Violent Crimes Per 10,000

	Low-Literacy Subpopulation Property Offenses					
	β	S.E.	p	β	S.E.	p
AR 1	.93	.06	.000	.93	.07	.000
MA 1	.56	.15	.001	.63	.16	.000
Literacy	.14	.05	.003	.20	.05	.000
Young offenders				-.11	.07	.141
Constant	-8.7	3.8	.027	-9.7	3.7	.011
Violent Crimes						
AR 1	.98	.03	.000	.97	.03	.000
MA 1	-.35	.16	.028	-.47	.21	.003
Literacy	.22	.08	.009	.33	.10	.002
Young offenders				-.08	.10	.075
Constant	-9.5	7.7	.219	-16.1	8.2	.056
Low-Literacy Subpopulation Property Offenses						
AR 1	.67	.26	.014	.68	.18	.000
MA 1	.39	.33	.240	.19	.25	.460
Literacy	-.01	.002	.000	-.01	.003	.004
Young offenders				.01	.01	.409
Constant	.87	.18	.000	.80	.21	.000
Violent Crimes						
AR 1	.78	.14	.000	.83	.12	.000
MA 1	.30	.21	.162	.34	.21	.103
Literacy	-.003	.001	.000	-.004	.001	.000
Young offenders				.002	.002	.152
Constant	.312	.048	.000	.34	.060	.000

Note: Controlling for proportion of young offenders, for low- and high-literacy subpopulations, France, 1856–1913

not occupational status that inclines people to engage in violent crime or to be able to resist being charged with the offense. What matters is literacy, and controlling for occupation has no effect on the strong negative association between it and violent crime. This supports the view of literacy as a civilizing force, enabling people to avoid disputes and to reconcile controversies without resorting to violence.

Crime Rates in the Low-Literacy Subpopulation

Literacy can be viewed as both a personal attribute at the individual level of analysis and a contextual variable at the aggregate level. At the aggregate level, literacy is defined as the proportion of the French population who were able to sign their names to the marriage register. Thus, the aggregate can be more or less literate, but individuals in the population are one or the other. (See Hannan 1971; Robinson 1950 and, recently, Zajonc & Mullally 1997 for general discussions of aggregation-disaggregation effects and Messner & Rosenfeld 1994 and Sampson & Lauritsen 1994 on differences between aggregate and individual level explanations of crime.) As argued earlier, in a population becoming increasingly literate, individuals remaining illiterate would find their competitive disadvantage worsening with the passage of time. Like those suffering from anomie in Merton's (1938) paradigm, and Wilson's (1984) truly disadvantaged, *les misérables* would face increasing frustration as well as economic pressure to engage in crime. If this argument holds, then, just as literacy lowers rates of crime in the expanding literate subpopulation, the rate of crime should increase in the shrinking subpopulation of illiterate individuals.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, the French recorded the literacy level of individuals who were charged with major crimes. Offenders were categorized as illiterate (neither able to read nor write), semiliterate (able to read, but not write), literate (able to read and write), and superior (able to read and write at an advanced level). To simplify the situation and to see whether offenses committed by illiterate individuals increase or decrease over time, and whether changes are associated with the level of literacy in the wider population, I combined illiterate and semiliterate as low literacy and merged literate and superior as high literacy.

To examine further the impact of general level of literacy on the low- and high-literacy subpopulations, it is important to use rates instead of absolute numbers. Since literacy in late-nineteenth-century France was increasing, so too, by definition, was the literate population. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, *ceteris paribus*, the number of literate people charged with crime would be increasing as well. From the other side, all things being equal, the size of the illiterate population, and, correspondingly, the number of low-literacy criminals, should be in decline. In view of this, continuing the analysis of crime with rates rather than absolute numbers would give a sharper picture of the situation. To get a suitable denominator for calculating the rates of crime among low- and high-literacy populations, I again used literacy, defined by the percentage of those able to sign the marriage register, as the basis for estimating the size of the low- and high-literacy subpopulations (although with this measure the percentage illiterate falls to just over 2% by the end of the period, this still results in a denominator of about 900,000).

The patterns of different rates of crime for these two categories appear in the following figures. The rate of major property offenses was higher in the low-literacy subpopulation than among their more literate counterparts (Figure 1). Moreover, there is a general increase over the period of the analysis. In contrast, the rate of major property crime in the high-literacy category is low and stable over the same period of time.

Patterns of violent crime follow a similar course (Figure 2). Again, rates for the low-literacy subpopulation can be seen to gradually increase throughout the period.

These figures show that rates of different types of crime decreased and remained low in the high-literacy subpopulation while increasing in the low-literacy subpopulation over the same span of time. Literacy increased over the same period. However, as discussed earlier, coincident trends do not necessarily mean that two variables are actually associated from year to year. To find out whether such an association actually exists requires another time-series analysis.

This also presents an opportunity to further examine age as a potentially important control variable. The measure of literacy for the total population is based on signatures on the marriage register, and the age of marriage is probably lower than that of the general population, which was aging. Further, as noted earlier, age is often associated with crime. Moreover, literacy grew in nineteenth-century France with the expansion of public schooling. This means that over the period of the analysis literacy should have been negatively associated with age, so that it, rather than literacy, may have distorted the patterns observed above. To investigate this possibility, I examined the relationship between literacy and the crime rates of both categories while controlling for the proportion of crimes committed by young offenders (age 21 and under). (Note that this is different from controlling for the proportion of the population that is age 21 or under, shown in Table 2.)

However, literacy and crimes by minors are positive rather than negative ARIMA correlates ($b = .35$, S.E. = .08, $p = .000$), and involvement in crime by minors intensifies rather than attenuates the associations between literacy and the crime rate in all but property offenses in the high-literacy category.

These associations demonstrate that the crime rates in the low-literacy category shown in the foregoing figures are indeed directly related to literacy from year to year in the population as a whole and that the association is not based on differences in the age structure of the low-literacy population. Thus, as expected, as the total population became more literate, the low-literacy subpopulation turned increasingly to crime. In contrast, increasing literacy in the general population is a negative correlate of major property offenses and unrelated to crimes of violence in the high-literacy category.

Discussion and Conclusions

At the macro level, the data indicate that public education at the secondary level may have indirectly reduced rates of serious crime. The analysis also suggests that it was not the discipline or moral training received in the classroom's hidden curriculum that seems to have been the salient factor.⁵ Instead, it was literacy, a product of the explicit curriculum, that intervened between public schooling and declining rates of serious crime.

In the case of violent crime, the impact of literacy is powerful, persistent, and probably direct. As noted earlier, literacy implies much more than simply being able to read and write. It involves verbal facility with the language and ability to deal appropriately with others (Wilson 1996). Literacy involves complying the regulations of a linguistic system, as well as human and social capital, and the absence of these is linked with violent crime (see Sanders 1995). On the other side, the deficit of human capital embodied in illiteracy would poorly equip individuals for civil interaction with their literate counterparts, particularly in dispute settlement. Further, in a highly literate population, the deficiency of cultural capital associated with illiteracy would stigmatize those who could not read or write.

Consistent with this, the data show that if literacy prevented crime, rather than uniformly reducing it across the whole population, the decrease was confined to the literate subpopulation. Correspondingly, the increase in the number and proportion of literate people in the population seems to have elevated the propensity for those in the low-literacy subpopulation to engage in crime. (Because the low-literacy population represented a steadily decreasing proportion of the total, the overall effect was a decline in rates of charges for most types of crime in the total population.)

It is possible that the increasing rate of crime among the illiterate subpopulation reflects their decreasing power to resist being charged rather than an actual change in inclination to commit crimes. However, as noted earlier, the fact that this pattern is found in serious offenses, and that violent crime is unrelated to occupational status, suggests that the basis for these charges was more likely the criminality of those who were charged, rather than the vulnerability of illiterate people to aggressive policing. In any case, if these associations are indeed causal, this unintended consequence of public education and literacy gives substance to the idea of a "dangerous" class. This is ironic inasmuch as the state efforts to reduce crime by building schools to extend literacy may have diminished the number of Victor Hugo's "misérables" but made those who were left out even more miserable, as well more likely to be charged with serious crimes.

A class dimension is far more visible in the case of property offenses. Including five occupational categories in the equations involving violent crime had no effect on its initial association with literacy. In contrast, including the

categories in the equation with property offenses completely obliterated its substantial and significant association with literacy. Further, the correlation of the five categories themselves with property crime is generally hierarchical, with no occupation, unskilled, and skilled labor positive predictors of rates of major property offenses, and owners, managers, and professionals negative predictors of this dependent variable. If literacy actually influenced the declining rate of property offenses, then it did so entirely through occupation, in a way that is consistent with the idea of disadvantage put forth by Merton (1938) and Wilson (1987). On the other hand, the relationship between literacy and serious crimes of violence is more consistent with the civilization argument, or the increasing distinction and exclusion associated with a poverty of cultural and social capital. In any case, the consequences of being illiterate in a social environment that values literacy is clearly greater than exclusion from employment opportunities.

An assortment of characteristics affects an individual's capacity to become literate. However, collective factors are as pertinent. Traditionally, occupational classes and other collectivities, including religious and ethnic groups, vary in the extent to which they appreciate literacy and encourage and assist their members in learning to read. Literacy was valuable as a key to information, prestige, power, and property, and so accessibility was often restricted in an organized way in an effort to preserve hierarchy or as "opportunity hoarding" (see, generally, Tilly 1998). Sometimes this simply amounted to the failure to provide access to specific social categories within the congregation. For example, in France, as in most of Catholic Europe, secondary education in public schools was restricted to males until late in the nineteenth century, and as a consequence women lagged behind men in literacy throughout the period (cf. Somers 2000 for a discussion of contemporary conditions). In other instances, literacy in specific subpopulations was more actively repressed from the outside. For example, under slavery, American states "feared the idea of a 'literate black population' who might find dangerous revolutionary ideas in books," and "throughout the South it was common for plantation owners to hang any slave who tried to teach the others how to spell" (Manguel 1996:279, 280; see also Boli 1989). Thus, access to formal education and literacy was available to some social categories but denied to others. Apart from the inequality this involved at the time, these historical patterns may have had important implications for the future.

An inner-city banker claimed that many blacks in the ghetto "simply cannot read. When you're talking our type of business, that disqualifies them immediately; we don't have a job here that doesn't require that somebody have minimum reading and writing skills" (Wilson 1996:117).

Generalizing from one historical period to another is as risky as extrapolating beyond the parameters of any population. However, keeping in mind Santayana's warning that "those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it," both risks may be worth taking. One policy

implication of this work on nineteenth-century France is that populations embracing literacy should make every effort to achieve universality and to do so quickly. Those without literacy are socially as well as economically disadvantaged, and if their crime rate rises while others become literate, illiterates are doubly disadvantaged. It is unlikely that the costs of this situation will be borne only by the low-literacy subpopulation, if for no other reason than that, policing, processing, and punishing are expensive for the state.

Finally, there are obvious differences between nineteenth-century France and twenty-first-century America and their class structures. Wilson's truly disadvantaged are residentially concentrated urbanites. In contrast, the low-literacy population in nineteenth-century France may have been more peripheral and dispersed, residentially, as well as racially indistinguishable from the surrounding population. Nevertheless, there are important parallels with respect to the relationship between literacy, illiteracy, and crime. Illiterates in nineteenth-century France may have been distinguishable on the basis of a rustic dress and demeanor, and like Eliza Doolittle in George Bernard Shaw's *Pygmalion*, would have been likely to set themselves apart when they spoke. As Bourdieu (1984) has observed, these distinctions matter in France. On the other side, for a modern industrial nation, both levels of illiteracy and rates of crime are relatively high in the U.S., and this is heavily determined by extreme values of these variables among the truly disadvantaged (Wilson 1996). In view of this, the link between schooling, literacy, and crime may well extend beyond the parameters of nineteenth-century France all the way to contemporary North America. Since interest in illiteracy is increasing (e.g., Lemann 1997), research may soon show whether the connection between these variables is coincidental, or a real association in the ARIMA sense, as it was in nineteenth-century France. On the other hand, the "digital divide," where some segments of the population have the advantage of becoming computer-literate while others do not, may be already extending the basis, as well as the composition, of the newly disadvantaged in the twenty-first century (see Warschauer 2003).

Notes

1. Giddens (1990) also notes that shifts from a concrete, personal system to a more abstract one can transform the positive as well as the negative aspects of intimacy. This can alter the nature of community, patterns of friendship, and trust: "personal life becomes attenuated and bereft of firm reference points: there is a turning inward toward human subjectivity, and meaning and stability are sought in the inner self" (115). For example, as literacy rose in the nineteenth century, people began spending a great deal of time keeping diaries "without the least shadow of literary ambition" (Corbin 1990: 499). In fact, "literacy is probably a necessary pre-condition for the growth of introspection" (Stone 1969:226). (This link between self-consciousness and literacy may have been first made explicit by Shakespeare, who is credited with "inventing the human" in literature,

providing vivid examples of soul searching embodied in Falstaff, Lear, and especially Hamlet, whose character epitomizes introspection as an antidote to direct intervention. See Bloom 1998.) Introspection may facilitate self-control by turning people inward and avoiding conflict altogether. However, when taken too far, the result may be self-repression, which may either incapacitate actors or deflect their aggression and violence from others toward themselves, resulting in a suicide rate that far exceeds the rate of homicide (see Gillis 1994). Thus, while discouraging criminal homicide, literacy may have promoted lethal violence in the form of suicide.

On the other side, literacy may have enabled the call to action of political protesters against established hierarchies (Goody 1977, 1983; Markoff 1986), which on occasion became what Tilly (1968) refers to as “contentious gatherings.” These sometimes resulted in violence between protesters and police, with charges occasionally being laid for rioting or even rebellion. However, most of these charges would not have been classified as public order offenses rather than serious crimes of violence or property offenses. (In fact, these crimes are negative correlates of strikes. See Lohdi & Tilly 1973.)

2. This measure almost certainly overstates the actual level of literacy in the population, since some people could sign their names without being able to do much more — see Weber 1976. On the other side, those who were unable to sign their own names would clearly have been unable to write anything else, and the ability of brides and grooms to sign their names is so highly correlated with literacy, as indicated by detailed tests of conscripts’ ability to read and write in French over the period 1872–1912, as to be a virtually identical measure, with $r = .985$, $p < .001$, Durbin Watson $d = 1.94$. Thus, signatures on marriage registers enjoy a high level of criterion validity.

3. The I component of ARIMA is not included here, hence the (1, 0, 1) designation of the ARIMA model. (When the I, standing for integration, is set at 0, equations are sometimes called “ARMA” models, see, for example, Harvey 1981.) I involves first differencing the dependent variable, where its value is subtracted from the temporally prior value. In the past, this was used by itself as a crude method of eliminating positive autoregression, but by overdoing the correction, this procedure risks building in negative autoregression. First differencing is now typically used in ARIMA models to handle intense short-term “drift” or “random walks” when lagged versions of dependent variables are included in equations. Since none of the following structural equations contains lagged dependent variables, this procedure is unnecessary.

ARIMA models can be viewed as a variant of OLS regression equations that are based on a maximum likelihood technique instead of a least-squares criterion for judging the fit between observed and predicted values. ML regression uses repeated runs, or iterations, to produce the estimates of intercepts, slopes, or partial slopes that are the most likely to be true, based on the information in a specific sample. The maximum likelihood approach is more efficient than OLS regression, resulting in a smaller error term. More access to high-speed computers enables more widespread use of this approach, with its lengthy iterative procedure for zeroing in on the most probable estimates. (See Harvey 1981, 1993, for particularly lucid discussions).

In ARIMA, predictor variables are also called regressors and are designated as b . They are treated the same as an unstandardized partial slope in OLS regression, because ARIMA

“treats these predictors much like predictors in regression analysis: it estimates the coefficients for them that best fit the data” (SPSS 1988:B84).

4. The seriousness of major crimes also suggests that their over-representation among the illiterate is not likely to be simply a reflection of a tendency by the police to charge illiterate suspects while at the same time ignoring the misdeeds of those who were literate (see Quetelet [1842] 1969; and more recently Cicourel 1968; Nettler 1984).

5. The failure of schooling to predict directly significant variation in crime when literacy is a control suggests that notwithstanding the intentions and practices embodied in the moral curriculum, public education in nineteenth-century France had no direct effect on crime. Messner and Rosenfeld (1994) suggest that the school as an institution may be too weak to transcend the moral individualism and acquisitiveness of populations with capitalist economies. They argue that especially in the U.S., where capitalism emerged in the absence of traditional regulations such as “noblesse oblige,” an “anything goes” mentality emerged in mass culture, making anomie a collective virtue. Although the U.S. may be extreme in this regard, it is uncertain whether public school and the morality of its hidden curriculum can ever have a lasting effect in any context where the principle of *caveat emptor* prevails.

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Crimes of Opportunity or Crimes of Emotion? Testing Two Explanations of Seasonal Change in Crime^{*}

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Abstract

While past research has suggested possible seasonal trends in crime rates, this study employs a novel methodology that directly models these changes and predicts them with explanatory variables. Using a nonlinear latent curve model, seasonal fluctuations in crime rates are modeled for a large number of communities in the U.S. over a three-year period with a focus on testing the theoretical predictions of two key explanations for seasonal changes in crime rates: the temperature/aggression and routine activities theories. Using data from 8,460 police units in the U.S. over the 1990 to 1992 period, we found that property crime rates are primarily driven by pleasant weather, consistent with the routine activities theory. Violent crime exhibited evidence in support of both theories.

Sociologists have long had an interest in how seasonal climatic changes may interact with social structures to influence the behavior patterns of individuals. Early work in this area includes Durkheim's classic studies of seasonal differences in suicide rates (Durkheim 1952:107-18), a topic that has seen renewed attention in recent decades (Bollen 1983; Warren 1983). Seasonality in birth and death rates has also been investigated (Land & Cantor 1983), as has the linkage between seasonal changes in testosterone production and sexual activity, with mixed success (Smolensky et al. 1981; Udry & Morris 1967). This

** We thank the members of the Carolina Structural Equation Modeling (CSEM) group for their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article. The research on which this article is based was supported in part by a grant from NIDA (DA13148) and also a fellowship (F32 DA06062) awarded to the second author. Direct correspondence to John R. Hipp, UNC at Chapel Hill, Department of Sociology, Hamilton Hall, CB #3210, Chapel Hill, NC 27599.*

article focuses on one of the most robust and socially problematic seasonal trends in behavior, namely seasonal changes in crime rates. The notion that seasonal weather patterns affect crime rates was suggested at least as early as the nineteenth century, when Adolph Quetelet observed such a relationship with data from France (Quetelet [1842] 1969). More recent descriptive evidence from the U.S. also suggests that there are seasonal differences for at least some types of crime (Dodge 1980, 1988). This article addresses the question of *why* such a relationship should exist. While various explanations for seasonal changes in crime have been offered, rarely have these theories been empirically contrasted using methodological tools that directly and dynamically model seasonal changes in crime.

Two dominant theories for explaining seasonal oscillations in crime rates are the temperature/aggression theory and the routine activities theory. While both theories suggest that temperature is related to crime rates, they propose different causal mechanisms for bringing about this relationship. In the more psychologically based temperature/aggression theory first proposed by Quetelet, uncomfortably hot temperatures increase the frustration of individuals, leading to aggressive behavior (Quetelet [1842] 1969). Thus one would expect *violent* crime to reach its highest levels during the hot days of summer, while the more calculating nature of *property* crime should be unaffected by heat and thus show no seasonal oscillations. In fact, in his own analyses, Quetelet noted that property crime in France in the late 1820s actually peaked during the *winter*, which he explained as a response by individuals to a shortage of basic needs. The more recent routine activities theory employs a social explanation, focusing explicitly on the changing activity patterns of individuals to explain seasonal oscillations in *all* types of crime (Cohen & Felson 1979). In this theory, pleasant temperatures encourage individuals to spend more time outside the home, increasing opportunities for criminal victimization.

While much empirical work has looked at each of these theories separately, rarely have studies been conducted with the express purpose of comparing the two. As a result, advocates of both approaches often simply demonstrate a linear relationship between temperature and crime. Such a relationship is consistent with both theories and thus does not provide a basis for comparison. Our approach to comparing these two theories is both theoretical and methodological. By exploring the mechanisms proposed by each theory, we determine how they make subtly different seasonal crime predictions. This allows us to form hypotheses from each of the theories that differ in their implications. While we do not suggest that these theories are necessarily mutually exclusive — and indeed it is possible that both are at work in some instances — our approach allows us to evaluate the predictions of each theory with empirically observed seasonal crime patterns.

Testing these hypotheses requires a methodological approach that will allow us to directly model seasonal fluctuations in crime rates, something that is

notably lacking in previous research on this topic. The model we propose is a variant of the latent curve model (LCM) of Meredith and Tisak (1990) (see also McArdle 1988; McArdle & Epstein 1987; Muthen 1991). The LCM involves the estimation of trajectories of change that may vary over the units of study. While these trajectories are typically modeled with linear, quadratic, or higher-order polynomial functions, recent extensions of the LCM permit the estimation of trajectories that are nonlinear functions of time (Browne 1993; Browne & du Toit 1991; Cudeck 1996; du Toit & Cudeck 2001). While these extensions to the LCM allow the possibility of modeling oscillating functions over time, this strategy has rarely been exploited in applied research. Using the LCM framework allows us to explicitly model the nonlinear cycle in crime that takes place over the seasons. One important result is that we can also predict variation in these seasonal changes over communities, allowing us to test the predictions of these two theories. Further, while many past studies have focused on only one or two communities, our approach facilitates comparisons over many communities — in our case a sample of 8,460 police units in the U.S.

Thus, our article makes four contributions. First, while past work has only viewed seasonal crime patterns in a descriptive manner, using structural equation modeling allows us to statistically test for the presence of seasonal crime patterns. Second, we construct a unique data set that combines crime rates in cities with nearby climate data. Third, we explicitly compare the two theories, and by specifying the implications of the causal mechanisms for each are able to derive testable hypotheses. Finally, we meld these theoretical derivations with a methodology uniquely suited to testing the hypotheses, allowing us to compare crime rates *between* cities at the same time that we model seasonal crime patterns *within* cities.

The article takes the following course. We first provide an overview of the two theories and then deduce a set of hypotheses on seasonal crime trends that differ between the two theories. Following that, we discuss the limitations of the methodological strategies used in past research on this topic and show how our approach addresses these limitations. We also note that, over any evaluation period, seasonal fluctuations in crime may be overlaid on both stable intercommunity differences and longer-term increases or decreases in crime rates, and we use the social disorganization perspective to help explain these differences. After describing our data and measures, we present our analytical model for capturing seasonal oscillations in crime rates and show how it allows us to evaluate the role of key predictors. In addition to the statistically powerful results obtained by analyzing a nationally representative sample of police units, we also explore specific case studies of crime rates for communities in particular states. We conclude with a summary of the results and their implications for future research.

Temperature Aggression Theory

The earliest explanation for the observed regularity of seasonal crime oscillations was the temperature/aggression (T/A) theory. As initially formulated by Quetelet ([1842] 1969), this theory suggests that hot temperatures lead to greater discomfort, which in turn gives rise to more aggressive behavior. Because the focus is on the psychological level of discomfort, some investigators have suggested that both hot *and* cold temperatures should lead to greater discomfort and hence aggression (for a nice review, see Anderson 1989). This has been generalized to other forms of discomfort, such as crowding (Calhoun 1962), and laboratory studies have even looked at the relationship between noxious smells and aggressive behavior (Berkowitz 2000).

However, incontrovertible empirical evidence for the T/A theory has been hard to come by. For instance, laboratory experiments have not fared particularly well. Scholars have attributed these null results to the possibility that entering a laboratory with an inordinately warm temperature might alert participants to the focus of the study and lead them to alter their behavior (Anderson 1989; Anderson & Bushman 1997). These subjects might then attribute provocative behavior by a confederate “to the heat” and therefore show an even more restrained response than would otherwise be the case.

As a result, much of the evidence for the temperature/aggression theory consists simply of studies showing correlations between temperature and crime rates (Anderson 1989, 2001). For instance, in support of the T/A theory, studies using daily data from Chicago and Houston (Anderson & Anderson 1984) and Des Moines and Indianapolis (Cotton 1986) found evidence of a linear trend between temperature and violent crime but no relationship between temperature and property crime. However, focusing on particular cities limits the generalizability of the results of such studies; in addition, Cohn (1990a) points to other studies that have found contradictory evidence regarding the relationship between temperature and homicide rates. Fewer studies have looked at a large number of communities at a given time, also showing inconsistent findings. DeFronzo (1984) looked at 142 standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) in the U.S. with populations greater than 200,000 in 1970. Most notable about this study was that it found that after adding demographic controls, the number of hot days (temperature greater than 90 degrees Fahrenheit) experienced by an SMSA had a positive effect only on homicide and burglary rates. While the finding for homicide is consistent with the T/A theory, the lack of findings for other types of violent crime, along with the finding for burglary, are at odds with the theory’s predictions. Proponents of the T/A approach have countered that the large number of control variables employed by Cohn’s study may have introduced collinearity problems, making the estimates unstable. Additionally, the focus on only large SMSAs limits the generalizability of the study and raises possible selection issues (Berk 1983;

Heckman 1979). A second study looking at 260 SMSAs in the U.S. in 1980 also found that the number of hot days had a positive effect on homicide, even with other controls in the model (Rotton 1993). In sum, while the results of these studies are sometimes consistent with T/A theory, they are too often based on simple tests of a linear relationship between violent crime and temperature.

Routine Activities Theory

In contrast to T/A theory, routine activities (RA) theory suggests that seasonal oscillations in crime rates are not due to increased aggression on the part of individuals, but rather to altered behavioral patterns (Cohen & Felson 1979). For a crime to occur in this model, there must be a concurrence in space and time of three elements: (1) an offender, (2) a suitable target, and (3) the absence of guardians (Cohen & Felson 1979). Temperature can play an important role in determining whether these conditions are met. For instance, when it is very cold, individuals are more likely to stay at home, reducing the number of suitable targets, and as a result burglary becomes much more difficult (since people are in the home) as do such crimes as assault and robbery (as individuals are not out and about providing potential targets). However, it is important to note that RA theory does not focus exclusively on temperature, viewing it as only one of many factors that change the normal behavior patterns of individuals in a community.

In part for this reason, studies attempting to evaluate RA theory often do not explicitly address temperature effects. In their initial test of the theory, Cohen and Felson (1979) noted how structural changes in female labor force participation affected opportunities for crime, asserting that more women entering the labor force moved them outside the home and increased the risk of criminal victimization. Their model then used changes in the percentage of women in the labor force to explain changes in crime rates in the entire U.S. (Cohen, Felson & Land 1980).

Nonetheless, RA theory has strong implications for the seasonal oscillations observed in crime rates due to the hypothesized change in social patterns. For instance, Cohn (1990a) points out that vacations occur more often during warmer weather, leaving homes exposed to burglary and putting individuals out and about in environments and hence at risk of criminal victimization. In general, a greater amount of time spent outside the home during nicer weather should lead to more opportunities for criminal activity. This implies the opposite effect for cold weather, and evidence of this comes from a study of SMSAs finding that the number of cold days in a month has a significant negative effect on various crime types (DeFronzo 1984).

Contrasting the Theories


It is notable that while some studies attribute seasonal changes in crime to increased aggression (e.g., Anderson & Anderson 1984), a study of monthly crime data for England and Wales attributed a similar finding to more time spent outside the home during nicer weather (Field 1992). These different conclusions suggest that the climatic patterns in a community may be important for distinguishing which of these two theories is at work: the fact that a seasonal effect is found in Britain where the summers are fairly mild lends support to RA theory, while the presence of a seasonal effect in an area with hot summers might suggest the T/A theory. This difference points out a possible way to compare these two theories, especially when evaluated using a large sample of communities with considerable variation in climate patterns.

While each of these theories suggests a positive relationship between seasonal temperature changes and oscillations in crime rates, a close inspection of the two approaches reveals that they have subtle, but key, differences in their predictions. First, while the T/A approach suggests that hotter temperatures in the summer will lead to greater aggression and hence an increase in violent crime rates, this aggression is *not* hypothesized to affect rates of property crime. To the extent that property crime involves calculating behavior and not aggression, it should not be affected by seasonal temperature fluctuations. In contrast, routine activities theory suggests that altered behavior patterns will result in seasonal relationships for both property and violent crime. In particular, favorable weather makes individuals more likely to leave home. This may provide additional tempting targets that will particularly affect property crime rates. This yields a key distinction between these two theories:

Hypothesis 1: The routine activities theory predicts that there will be a positive seasonal effect for the property crime rate, while the temperature/aggression theory predicts that there will not be a seasonal effect for *property* crime rates.

And while each of these theories predicts a seasonal effect for *violent* crime rates, the mechanisms they propose for the effect of temperature on violent crime suggest subtle distinctions in this relationship. We illustrate these hypothesized relationships in Figure 1. Because the T/A theory focuses on higher temperature bringing about the psychological causal mechanism of greater frustration/aggression, there is little reason to expect that increases at the low end — or even the midrange — of the temperature scale will increase violent crime rates. That is, a community that experiences temperatures around 40 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter and 75 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer should see no seasonal change in crime since there is little reason to expect that this temperature range leads to greater discomfort, and this is represented by line 4 in Figure 1. Arguably, the level of discomfort *decreases* for increasing middle-range temperatures and only starts becoming uncomfortable at higher temperatures. The precise point at which temperature becomes uncomfortable

FIGURE 1: Theoretical Model: Comparing Seasonal Violent Crime Predictions for Temperature/Aggression and Routine Activities Theories



is not clear: while some studies have used 90 degrees Fahrenheit (Anderson, Bushman & Groom 1997; DeFronzo 1984; Rotton 1993), this has been criticized as arbitrary (Cohn 1990a). We sidestep this issue by focusing on the climatic patterns of communities and suggest that looking at the typical range of temperatures within a community can yield a clue to which of these theoretical mechanisms is at work. The crucial point is that the T/A theory predicts areas with hotter climates will experience the greatest seasonal crime oscillations, as shown by line 1 in Figure 1.

On the other hand, the routine activities theory suggests that the relationship between temperature and crime rates will be most pronounced in the midrange of temperatures. That is, fewer crimes will be committed during colder temperatures as individuals spend more time inside their homes to avoid the inclement weather, thus reducing the risk of victimization. But as the temperature begins to warm, people venture outside their homes, increasing the possibility of criminal acts, as shown by line 3 in Figure 1. At some point increasing temperature ceases to become more pleasant and no longer induces increasing numbers outdoors (Rotton & Cohn 2000), and thus line 2 in Figure 1 shows that variations in already hot temperatures will have little effect on crime rates. Thus, this model implies that seasonal fluctuations in crime will be

greatest for communities with midrange temperatures. Specifically, an area with cold winters and mild summers will see greater seasonal oscillations in violent crime rates than will an area with moderate winters but hotter summers.

Note that this suggests distinguishing temperature differences *within* a community from temperature differences *between* communities. The amount the temperature varies *within* a city over the course of the year is important for seasonal oscillations in crime rates. A city experiencing little variation in temperature from month to month would see little seasonal change in crime rates, according to both theories, while increasing the variation in monthly temperatures may increase seasonal oscillations in crime rates, depending on the particular temperature range. On the other hand, differences in temperature *between* cities can show the effect of heat but say little about seasonal oscillations in crime rates. Thus, examining the interaction between the average temperature in an area and the amount of variation in monthly temperatures may help in distinguishing between these two theories. These observations lead to our second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: The effect of seasonal variability in temperature on crime rates will depend on the average climate of the community. The temperature/aggression theory predicts that temperature variability will induce the greatest seasonal changes in violent crime rates in areas with hotter climate, while the routine activities theory predicts that temperature variability will induce the greatest seasonal variability in both property- and violent-crime rates in areas with moderate climates.

We also attempt to directly model some of the causal mechanisms proposed in the two theories. Unfortunately, this is quite difficult for the T/A theory, as it ideally requires collecting survey data on the psychological state of individuals to determine both whether frustration increases in the hotter summer months and whether this leads to aggression and violent criminal acts. However, we might posit that close proximity of individuals, when combined with hotter temperatures, would lead to increased aggression. That is, since a key feature of the T/A approach suggests that unpleasant conditions can evoke *either* fight or flight tendencies based on the individual's background (Berkowitz 2000), areas with high population density may inhibit the ability for flight. Moreover, a high population density may increase discomfort and hence promote aggression.¹ Supporting this view, Calhoun's (1962) classic study of the effects of overcrowding on rats demonstrated a complete breakdown in normal social behavior. However, others, such as de Waal, Aurali, and Judge (2000), have noted that primates (and especially humans) may circumvent this process by using coping mechanisms (such as gaze aversion and minimizing movements) that diminish the psychological impact of crowding. It remains an open question whether the added stressor of hot temperatures could break down these coping mechanisms and lead to higher rates of violent crime in cities. Past research in human populations has in fact shown population density

to be positively related to overall crime rates. Alone, this effect may be explained by more opportunities provided by “agglomeration effects” (Glaeser & Sacerdote 1999). However T/A theory suggests that high-density areas might also show particularly pronounced *seasonal* oscillations for violent crime. This observation leads to our third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: The temperature/aggression theory suggests that areas with high population density may experience greater seasonal fluctuations in violent crime rates.

In contrast, modeling the causal mechanisms proposed by RA theory is not as daunting a task. Since the routine activities theory posits that more outdoor behavior by individuals results in more criminal opportunities, areas with a large number of eating and drinking establishments as well as amusement and recreational services establishments should provide more opportunities for criminal acts (Miethe, Hughes & McDowell 1991). The presence of a greater number of such establishments should increase crime opportunities in general and thus lead to a positive effect on overall levels of crime. Additionally, to the extent that such establishments are frequented more often during better weather, providing more potential targets, their presence may also result in particularly pronounced seasonal changes in crime, particularly for property crime. We may thus formulate our fourth hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: The routine activities theory predicts that areas with a larger number of entertainment establishments will have higher annual rates of crime and will have greater seasonal fluctuations in crime rates.

Stable Intercommunity Differences

Up to this point our discussion has focused mostly on short-term seasonal changes in crime rates. However, we also need to take into account relatively stable intercommunity differences in crime rates. We examine this issue from the perspective of social disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay 1942). Social disorganization refers to “the inability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls” (Sampson & Groves 1989:777). The cohesion of a community minimizes the negative social externality of criminal activity. Ecological characteristics of communities are posited to reduce the networks of ties among residents in the community, leading to greater disorganization and hence an inability to combat crime when it appears (Sampson 1985; Sampson & Groves 1989; Veysey & Messner 1999). For instance, residential instability is postulated to reduce the interaction among citizens in a community, thus reducing the ability for a community to police the behavior of individuals (Krivo & Peterson 1996; Skogan 1990). Similarly, areas with high levels of ethnic heterogeneity often have little cross-

race interaction which will reduce the cohesion of a community (Warner & Rountree 1997). In addition to the network of ties within the community, family ties are also hypothesized to help in fostering cohesion. In particular, areas with many divorced families lack the social oversight and role models that would inhibit crime. Finally, while areas with high rates of poverty might still have reasonable levels of social interaction, limited economic and political resources may inhibit their ability to effectively combat crime (Krivo & Peterson 1996, Sampson & Groves 1989). Following Bursik (1988) and Dahlback (1998), we combine the social disorganization theory with the routine activities theory in a dynamic model to test whether these measures of disorganization are also related to seasonal changes in crime.

Dynamic Models of Crime

While we have theoretically framed the climate/crime relationship dynamically in relation to the observed seasonal oscillations, most empirical studies have not used longitudinal methodology that would be conducive to testing hypotheses of this nature. Instead, much research has involved simple linear regressions of crime with temperature. The most common approach is to use daily data from one or two cities to test for a linear relationship between temperature and crime rates (Anderson & Anderson 1984; Cheatwood 1995; Cotton 1986; Farrell & Pease 1994; Harries & Stadler 1984; Suttles 1968). An advantage of these studies is that the daily crime and temperature data allow for a closer inspection of the temperature/crime relationship. One drawback is that such studies rarely explicitly model the nonlinear effects of climate patterns over time. By focusing on a linear relationship between temperature and crime rates, the causal mechanisms proposed by the routine activities and temperature/aggression theories cannot be distinguished. A second drawback is that it is uncommon to study a large number of communities (exceptions are DeFronzo 1984, Rotton 1993), and so the results may have little generalizability: Does the community studied represent all communities in the U.S., or does it have idiosyncratic weather/crime patterns?

Among the studies that have modeled dynamic changes in crime, a common approach is to examine a single time series of data pooled over the entire U.S. (Landau & Fridman 1993; Tennenbaum & Fink 1994; Warren 1983). The advantage of a time series approach is that it can be used to test for evidence of seasonal changes on crime and how these might change over time. The key disadvantage of a times-series approach is that with a single time series there is no opportunity to model variation in seasonal change over communities. As noted earlier, predicting such variation may help to determine why seasonal oscillations occur.

Interestingly, one study we are aware of did attempt to directly model the nonlinear seasonal changes in crime rates over multiple locations. In their model, Michael and Zumpe (1983) used a cosine function to capture the wave-like changes in crime that take place over the course of a year. This allowed them to determine the peak time point of the waves, which generally occurred in the summertime. While interesting, this study has limitations. First, most of the units of analysis were states — a unit arguably far too large to consider as a community. Considering how crime rates can vary from city to city, it is not clear that the state is an adequately homogeneous unit of analysis for measuring crime rates. Using smaller units of analysis allows other social determinants of crime to be appropriately controlled. Second, while the modeling strategy employed by Michael and Zumpe detected considerable differences in the amplitude of seasonal change in crime rates across locations, it could not be used to explore the source of those differences. As we have noted, these differences *between* communities may be important for differentiating the T/A and RA theories.

The approach we advocate embeds Michael and Zumpe's (1983) analytic approach within a latent curve model that can be used to both estimate *and* predict community-level variation in the amplitude of seasonal changes in crime rates. This novel methodological approach allows us to test the T/A and RA theories on a large sample of U.S. communities by explicitly modeling the phenomenon of interest.

Data

CRIME DATA

The data set used here uniquely combines information from a variety of sources. The crime data were obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) covering the years 1990–92 and were downloaded from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data Web site (U.S. Dept. of Justice 2000).² The Federal Bureau of Investigation collects these data from police units in the U.S., with a coverage rate of about 96% of the population (U.S. Dept. of Justice 1995).³ The UCR include monthly data on frequency of occurrences of the major types of crime as defined by the FBI. We then combined murder, robbery, and assault into a measure of violent crime and combined burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft into a measure of property crime.⁴ This scheme follows the coding by the UCR for these crime types, and for five of the six crimes used is quite uncontroversial. The one exception is robbery, as this crime entails both force and the acquisition of something of value from the victim. Some have focused on the fact that robbery involves the transfer of something of value between individuals and have classified it as a property crime (Anderson & Anderson

1984; Cohen, Felson & Land 1980). However, we follow the standard established by the UCR and focus on the fact that robbery entails the use of force and categorize it as a violent crime.⁵

While there are 12,000 to 14,000 potential reporting units in a given year, many of these units represent small reporting areas, such as university police. As a result, these small units do not represent “populations,” for their constituency lives in a local area that is served by another reporting police department. As well, they tend to report very little crime. We combine the units with zero population with the nearest reporting unit, yielding 8,460 police reporting units for our sample period.⁶ Since our study population is all cities, townships, and county sheriffs in the U.S., we can have considerable confidence in the representativeness of the results.

We then combined the crime data from adjacent months into bimonthly values. This decision was motivated by two considerations. First, there can be a measurement/interval problem when using a time series variable measured with error (Boker & Nesselroade 2002). The intuition is straightforward: as time points between observations move closer together the actual difference in the true values of two observations will generally become smaller; however, since the magnitude of the error term remains relatively constant, the ratio of the error to the true difference in the two observations becomes larger. This larger relative effect of the error term can introduce enough noise to obscure a naturally occurring process, making it more difficult to detect. A second issue is that there may be fluctuations in monthly crime data if crime is more likely to occur on weekends (Anderson & Anderson 1984; Rotton & Frey 1985). One study found that 55% of the total assaults occurred during just the three days of Friday-Sunday (Harries & Stadler 1984). As a result, monthly data can have excessive systematic fluctuation that corresponds to the number of weekends in a given month: collapsing data over two months helps to smooth out this effect (Cohn 1990b). To calculate bimonthly figures, the mean of the crime totals for the two months was obtained, then divided by the mean of the population for the two months, and finally multiplied by 100,000 to give a crime rate expressed per 100,000 population (mirroring common representation). Because these figures generally showed considerable skewness, log transformations were taken to obtain more normal distributions. Log transformations are also appealing because results can be intuitively interpreted in terms of the percentage change in the dependent variable.

CLIMATE DATA

The temperature data come from the National Climatic Data Center. We used the TD 3220 Summary of the Month cooperative data set for the average monthly temperatures, and then geospatially linked up communities with crime data to the closest reporting weather station. In general, these matches

are very close: the average station is about 14 miles from the geocoded center of the city. Given the typical circumference of a city, it is likely that these reporting stations are indeed in the city. One weather station was 380 miles from the city of interest, the next furthest distance was 63 miles, and the rest were within 40 miles.⁷ The climate of each community was captured by three variables: (1) the average temperature for the area over the entire three-year study period to capture temperature variation *between* cities (what we refer to as the “climate” of the community); (2) the standard deviation in the monthly temperatures over this three-year period to capture temperature variability *within* a city; (3) an interaction of these two variables.

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

The demographic data we used come from the 1990 U.S. census. We included four measures of the level of disorganization within a community. First, we used a measure of the percentage of the population at or below 125% of the poverty rate. Second, we calculated a measure of ethnic heterogeneity in an area. This was constructed as a Herfindahl index (Gibbs & Martin 1962) of four racial/ethnic groups,⁸ and takes the following form:

$$1 - \sum_{j=1}^{j=k} G_j^2 \quad (1)$$

where G_j represents the proportion of the population of ethnic group j out of k ethnic groups. Subtracting from 1 makes this a measure of heterogeneity, rather than homogeneity. Third, we measured residential instability by the average length of tenure at the current residence for the community.⁹ Fourth, we include a measure of the percentage of the families that are divorced. Finally, we measured the population density of the city per kilometer.

ENTERTAINMENT ESTABLISHMENTS DATA

Our measure of the number of eating and drinking establishments and the number of amusement and recreational services establishments per 100,000 population comes from the 1992 Economic Census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau (Miethe, Hughes & McDowall 1991). Since our crime data is from 1990 to 1992, temporal precedence issues arise from using 1992 establishment data as a predictor of earlier changes. However, given the stable nature of the number of such establishments, and their rank order over communities, we suggest that this figure is likely a better proxy for the number of establishments present in a city during 1990–92 than the measure collected in 1987 because 1992 is at least within the time period of the study.

TREATMENT OF MISSING DATA

While 75% of our cases had full data coverage, we used multiple imputation for cases with missing data (Rubin 1987; Schafer 1997). Multiple imputation requires weaker assumptions than less preferable means of handling missing data such as listwise deletion, pairwise deletion, or mean imputation (Allison 2001; Schafer & Graham 2002).¹⁰ Multiple imputation owes its name to the fact that a range of values (rather than a single value) are imputed for each missing data point. The actual number of imputed data sets that is optimal depends on the amount of missing data present. In our case, the missing information was only 3% for any given variable on average, and using ten imputed data sets gives us a relative efficiency for our parameters ranging from 98% to 99.97% — compared to 100% if no data were missing (Rubin 1987). Since the imputed data is “complete,” the standard errors for the parameters will be too small for any given data set. The standard errors are corrected using an algorithm that combines the results from the multiple imputed data sets. In SAS 8.2, this algorithm is implemented in the Proc MIANALYZE procedure. We calculate the chi-square and various fit statistics by taking the mean value over the 10 imputed data sets.¹¹ Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the imputed data used in the study. Note that the predictor variables were all centered on their grand means in the analyses.

Data Analysis

While past studies of seasonal crime patterns have often focused on just one or two cities, or looked at a time series for the entire U.S., the Latent Curve Model (LCM) allows us to model seasonal oscillations in crime for a large number of cities. Although latent curve models are often used to model monotonic trajectories of change over time, our approach implements a nonlinear cosine function to capture the oscillatory patterns observed in crime rates over seasons. The strength of the LCM approach is that it (1) employs a highly structured confirmatory factor analysis model for repeated measures where each “factor” represents a trajectory parameter that can vary over communities and then (2) allows us to predict these latent factors as a function of exogenous explanatory variables. These capabilities are crucial since our hypotheses predict that not all communities will experience the same magnitude of seasonal crime oscillations.

In matrix form, the LCM may be expressed as

$$y = \Lambda\eta + \varepsilon \tag{2}$$

where y is a $t \times 1$ vector of values for the property (or violent) crime rate in each city at each time point (where t is the number of time points), ε is a $t \times 1$ vector of disturbance terms for each individual case at each time point, η is a

TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for 10 Imputed Data Sets

	Property Crime		Violent Crime	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
January–February 1990	5.31	.98	3.28	1.69
March–April 1990	5.38	.93	3.38	1.71
May–June 1990	5.43	.95	3.54	1.69
July–August 1990	5.54	.94	3.55	1.71
September–October 1990	5.45	.96	3.45	1.71
November–December 1990	5.38	.98	3.30	1.70
January–February 1991	5.32	.98	3.25	1.70
March–April 1991	5.42	.94	3.40	1.70
May–June 1991	5.48	.95	3.57	1.71
July–August 1991	5.60	.94	3.64	1.69
September–October 1991	5.47	.95	3.51	1.71
November–December 1991	5.36	1.00	3.37	1.70
January–February 1992	5.34	.95	3.41	1.68
March–April 1992	5.36	.97	3.53	1.69
May–June 1992	5.43	.95	3.59	1.71
July–August 1992	5.54	.95	3.63	1.69
September–October 1992	5.43	.96	3.59	1.70
November–December 1992	5.32	1.01	3.45	1.69
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Average bimonthly temperatures, 1990–92	65.67	8.25	19.42	89.00
Standard deviation of bimonthly temperatures, 1990–92	14.72	3.18	2.51	32.71
Population density, 1990	.69	.86	.00	17.69
Percentage at 125% of poverty level and below, 1990	17.72	10.83	.00	73.46
Ethnic heterogeneity, 1990	19.99	17.80	.00	75.12
Residential instability, 1990	3.93	.39	2.55	5.52
Percentage of families divorced, 1990	18.87	7.54	.00	76.87
Entertainment venues, per 100k population, 1992	32.40	32.22	.00	1489.70

(N = 8,460)

$m \times 1$ vector for the latent variables measuring the level of crime and its change over time (where m is the number of latent variables), and A is a $t \times m$ matrix that specifies the functional relationship between these latent variables and observed crime rates. In our model, the η vector contains latent variables that capture the overall level of crime in the community as well as short-term (seasonal) and long-term (annual) crime trends.

We first discuss how we model the level of crime and the short-term seasonal oscillations. We define the “level” (η_1) and “amplitude” (η_2) factors by setting the first and second columns of L to


$$\lambda_{t1} = 1$$

$$\lambda_{t2} = \cos(2\pi * \text{freq} * (t + p))$$

where t represents time and is coded $-8.5, -7.5 \dots 7.5, 8.5$ for the 18 bimonths (to be equal to 0 at the midpoint of our study period — summer of 1991). Note that the loadings for the “level” factor (η_1) are a constant value for all time points. Since we have centered time in our models, the level term represents approximately the midpoint of the long-term time trend about which the wave cycles. And because we have centered our predictors, the conditional mean of the level term represents the average amount of crime for an average community. In contrast, the loadings for the “amplitude” factor (η_2), which captures the height of the wave, are expressed as a nonlinear function of time and two new parameters, *freq* and p . The *freq* parameter represents the frequency of the wave, which is defined as the number of complete wave cycles per unit of time. For the present application we gave this parameter a starting value of 1/6, since there is one cycle per six bi-months — or one per year.¹² To capture the location of the peak point of crime during the year, we include the phase term p , which allows the peak of the wave to shift to any time point. Freely estimating this parameter allows us to test whether the peak occurs in the summertime for violent crime and whether Quetelet’s ([1842] 1969) finding of a peak for property crime in the winter is present in these data. Since the level and amplitude terms are random, they can take on different values for various communities that depend on annual level of crime and the amplitude of the seasonal changes in crime. For instance, communities that experience large seasonal oscillations in crime rates between the winter and summer months will have larger positive values for the amplitude term than will communities with less seasonal change in crime rates. Note that it is possible for the amplitude term to vanish from the model if seasonal oscillations are not present (i.e., if it takes on a nonsignificant estimated mean and variance). As a result, the amplitude term is crucial for testing hypothesis 1: the prediction of T/A theory that *property* crime will not exhibit a seasonal effect would be supported if the mean and variance of the amplitude factor were not significantly different from zero.

While our main theoretical focus is on seasonal oscillations in crime, we must simultaneously account for longer-term time trends in crime over the three-year period of the study. We accomplish this by also including λ_{t3} to capture the linear increase in crime over the sample period for the latent “linear” factor (η_3), and λ_{t4} to capture the quadratic effect of crime over the sample period (the acceleration or deceleration rate) for the latent quadratic factor (η_4), defined as

FIGURE 2: Sample Latent Curve Model for Four Bi-months



$$\lambda_{t2} = \cos(2 \times \pi \times freq \times (t + p))$$

$$\lambda_{t3} = t$$

$$\lambda_{t4} = t^2$$

The linear and quadratic factors represent the change in crime rates over the entire three-year period. For instance, a positive coefficient for the linear term would indicate that crime is generally increasing over this period, while a negative coefficient for the quadratic term would suggest that the rate of increase is decelerating over time — perhaps even reversing and heading downward at some point. Figure 2 is a path diagram of the model for just four bi-months (for clarity), showing that the latent variables directly predict the crime rate at each time point.

Since the latent variables in η can vary over cities, we are able to explore why some cities have greater values for these latent variables than others. In matrix form, the latent variable model is

$$\eta = \mu_{\eta} + \Gamma X + \zeta_{\eta} \quad (3)$$

where μ_{η} represents the $m \times 1$ vector of the intercepts for the latent variables, X is an $n \times 1$ matrix of exogenous variables of interest (where n is the number of exogenous variables), Γ is an $m \times n$ matrix showing the effect of these exogenous variables on the latent variable, and z is an $m \times 1$ vector of the disturbance terms for the equations. The estimation of these coefficients affecting the amplitude factor is crucial for testing hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Positive values of these coefficients indicate that the variable of interest increases the community's observed amount of seasonal oscillation in crime, while negative values indicate less seasonal change in crime.¹³

TABLE 2: Model Fit Summary

	Unconditional Models		
	Level and Amplitude	Adding Linear Term	Adding Quadratic Term
Property-crime models			
χ^2	5669.535	3137.537	2098.201
χ^2 DF	164	160	155
$\text{Pr} > \chi^2$	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001
1 – RMSEA Estimate	.937	.953	.961
1 – RMSEA 90% upper confidence limit	.938	.955	.963
1 – RMSEA 90% lower confidence limit	.936	.952	.960
Incremental fit index (IFI)	.992	.996	.997
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)	.919	.958	.974
Violent-crime models			
χ^2	4942.018	1927.452	1266.46
χ^2 DF	164	160	155
$\text{Pr} > \chi^2$	< .0001	< .0001	< .0001
1 – RMSEA estimate	.941	.964	.971
1 – RMSEA 90% upper confidence limit	.943	.965	.972
1 – RMSEA 90% lower confidence limit	.940	.962	.969
Incremental fit index (IFI)	.988	.996	.997
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)	.922	.974	.983

In the following section we test our model on both violent and property crime. We first develop an unconditional model that does not include predictors of the latent factors in order to determine whether our model adequately captures seasonal oscillations in crime over this time period. We then augment the model with our predictor variables. Our analyses are first carried out on the entire sample of 8,460 communities. We then supplement these findings with “case studies” of the seasonal/crime patterns of communities in various states.

Results

UNCONDITIONAL MODEL

Our first task is to determine the adequacy of our model for seasonal changes in property and violent crime over the 1990–92 period. We begin with a basic model that includes the level and amplitude factors and does not account for long-term change in crime over this three-year period. As expected, this model

FIGURE 3: Estimates of Property Crime, 1990–92





FIGURE 4: Estimates of Violent Crime, 1990–92



does not have a particularly good fit for either property or violent crime rates, as can be seen in the first column of Table 2. The very high chi-square ($\chi^2[164] = 5,670$) for property crime suggests that the time trends in the data are not solely a function of seasonal oscillations. Because it is reasonable to expect that there are also underlying annual changes in crime, we extend the model by adding a linear term. This second model results in a large improvement in fit, nearly halving the chi-square for the property crime model ($\chi^2[160] = 3,138$) and reducing it almost threefold for the violent crime model ($\chi^2[160] = 1,927$). The IFI of .99 and the $1 - \text{RMSEA}$ of .96 for the property-crime model suggest that this model is approaching satisfactory overall fit. Nonetheless, the addition of a quadratic term to capture curvature in the underlying trajectory results in a significant improvement in model fit: the reduction in chi-square of over 1,000 for the property-crime model ($\chi^2[155] = 2,098$) and over 600 for the violent-crime model ($\chi^2[155] = 1,266$) on just five degrees of freedom are highly significant improvements over the linear model. While the chi-squares of these final models are still significant, the large sample size and the large number of time points estimated give the test considerable power to detect trivial differences between the sample and model implied covariance matrices (Matsueda & Bielby 1986). The other fit indices show a very good fit to the data: The IFI is nearly 1 in the two models, and the $1 - \text{RMSEA}$ is .96 for the property-crime model and .97 for the violent crime model. The model thus shows good approximate fit to the data (Cudeck & Browne 1992; MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara 1996).

The mean trajectories implied by the models for property crime and violent crime are plotted in Figures 3 and 4, respectively. For comparison, the average imputed bimonthly means values are also displayed, as is the model-implied long-term time trend underlying the seasonal changes. Note that one parameter estimate of these trajectories that is important for evaluating the predictions of the two theories is the mean of the amplitude factor. Consistent with the prediction of the RA theory (hypothesis 1), this parameter is significantly greater than zero for both types of crime, indicating that seasonal oscillations take place for both violent and property crime. The magnitude of these changes is apparent in Figures 3 and 4. Note the considerable seasonal effect for *violent* crime, as predicted by both theories: the average summertime peak is about 35% higher than the number of violent crimes in the winter.¹⁴ Of importance, while the T/A theory in hypothesis 1 predicts that no seasonal effect for *property* crime will be observed, in Figure 4 we in fact see considerable seasonal oscillations for property crime, with an average peak summertime crime rate almost 24% higher than during the winter.¹⁵ This is strong support for the RA perspective that seasonal oscillations in *both* types of crime can be jointly explained by the changing behavioral patterns of individuals. Also of note in Figures 3 and 4 are the longer-term changes in crime over the study

TABLE 3: Using 1990 Demographic and Temperature Variables to Predict Violent- and Property-Crime Rates, 1990–1992

	Violent Crime		Property Crime	
	Level (1)	Amplitude	Level (2)	Amplitude
Intercept	3.42841** (.01536)	.14492** (.00437)	5.39247** (.00868)	.09731** (.00266)
Average high temperature, 1990–92 (AHT)	–.00364 (.00267)	.00237** (.00078)	.00445** (.00151)	–.00266** (.00048)
Standard deviation of monthly high temperature, 1990–92 (SDHT)	.02171** (.00625)	.00705** (.00182)	.00761* (.00357)	.00649** (.00112)
AHT × SDHT	–.00272** (.00041)	.00020 (.00012)	–.00184** (.00023)	–.00044** (.00007)
Population density per square kilometer, 1990	.17028** (.01613)	–.01445** (.00469)	.09243** (.00910)	–.00920** (.00289)
Entertainment venues per 100k population, 1992	.00146** (.00043)	.00031* (.00014)	.00643** (.00025)	.00034** (.00007)
Percentage below 125% of poverty rate	–.01824** (.00159)	–.00008 (.00047)	–.01520** (.00090)	–.00106** (.00029)
Ethnic heterogeneity	.01606** (.00099)	–.00013 (.00029)	.00634** (.00056)	.00013 (.00018)
Residential instability	1.00116** (.03361)	–.02129* (.00978)	.60506** (.01909)	–.02162** (.00602)
Percentage of families divorced, 1990	.07027** (.00240)	.00017 (.00071)	.03581** (.00136)	–.00104* (.00043)
N	8,460		8,460	

Note: Standard error are in parentheses.

† $p < .10$ * $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (for two-tailed tests)

period. While property crime slowly rises and then falls, violent crime shows an accelerating increase.

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE ON CRIME RATES

We next explore why some cities experience greater seasonal oscillations in crime rates, and whether climate patterns help to explain this variation. We first examine the effects of climate patterns on violent crime. Consistent with both the T/A and RA theories, cities with greater temperature variation have greater seasonal oscillations in violent crime. Table 3 illustrates that a one-degree increase in temperature variation increases the amplitude of violent crime 4.9%.¹⁶ Also consistent with both theories, increasing the average annual

FIGURE 5: Violent Crime 1990–92 — Comparing Seasonal Effects for Cities with High, Average, and Low Annual Temperature





FIGURE 5: Violent Crime 1990–92 — Comparing Seasonal Effects for Cities with High, Average, and Low Annual Temperature (Cont'd)




temperature increases the amplitude 1.6% for each degree Fahrenheit increase in temperature.

These effects are consistent with the predictions of both theories. Where the two theories differ, however, is in their predictions of *when* crime should occur. To determine this, we first evaluate the interaction between average annual temperature and variation in monthly temperature, as hypothesis 2 of the T/A theory suggests that temperature variation will have the greatest effect on crime oscillations for communities in hotter climates. The results are inconclusive: the lack of significance for the interaction effect on the amplitude factor suggests that both theories may be at work. We can also view these results graphically to determine whether climate effects are more important in the summer or the winter. Holding average temperature within a city constant, increasing temperature variability has little effect on the seasonal oscillations in violent crime, as seen in Figure 5.¹⁷ Only in the top panel are there differences based on temperature variability, and these differences suggest both theories are at work. For instance, a hot climate area with average annual temperature variability has an average July-August high temperature of 93.6°F, while this is 88.9°F degrees in a hot climate community with low temperature variability. Consistent with T/A theory, these hotter summers lead to slightly higher crime peaks (about 2.6% higher than a city with low temperature variability). On the other hand, increasing temperature variation in the winter for

FIGURE 6: Property Crime 1990–92 — Comparing Seasonal Effects for Cities with High, Average, and Low Annual Temperature

Property Crime 1990-92: Comparing Seasonal Effects for Cities with High Annual Average Temperature



Property Crime 1990-92: Comparing Seasonal Effects for Cities with Average Annual Temperature





FIGURE 6: Property Crime 1990–92 — Comparing Seasonal Effects for Cities with High, Average, and Low Annual Temperature (Cont'd)



these hot climate areas results in lower temperatures in the more modest range of temperatures (60°F versus 56.4°F). Consistent with the RA theory, this results in a modest change in violent-crime rates at these moderate temperatures (about 2.8% lower than average variability), precisely the range where T/A theory would predict no crime variability.

Turning to property crime, the results show strong support for the RA theory. Here, the significant negative effect for the interaction term indicates that temperature variation within a city has a stronger effect on seasonal crime oscillations in cities with cooler climates than in those with hotter climates. We can see this effect graphically in Figure 6. Holding average temperature constant, we see in the middle and bottom panels that increasing temperature variation in average and cool climate areas has the strongest effect on seasonal oscillations in property crime during the summer. Since these cool-climate cities with high temperature variation have typical average July-August high temperatures of 81°F, this is consistent with the RA hypothesis that it is more pleasant temperatures that are most responsible for the observed seasonal crime oscillations for communities.

It is interesting to note that areas with hotter climates do not have higher overall levels of violent crime when controlling for demographic characteristics. This somewhat surprising finding contrasts with models run

TABLE 4: Intercept and Cosine Term Means for Models Run on Communities in Various States

Violent Crime			Property Crime		
	Level	Amplitude		Level	Amplitude
Texas	3.652	.199	Maine	5.385	.237
Illinois	3.880	.194	Minnesota	5.335	.227
Maine	3.491	.194	New York	5.391	.153
Minnesota	3.351	.162	Illinois	5.217	.114
New York	3.155	.149	Washington	5.866	.090
Arkansas	2.640	.123	Texas	5.536	.071
Tennessee	3.263	.115	Arkansas	5.214	.071
North Carolina	3.326	.115	North Carolina	5.820	.065
Washington	4.433	.112	Florida	5.961	.034
Florida	4.391	.111	Tennessee	5.464	.024
California	4.513	.095	California	5.975	.008

Note: States are arranged in descending order by the magnitude of the amplitude factor.


without our demographic controls (not shown here), where hotter temperature has a bivariate positive effect on violent crime and a much stronger positive effect on property crime.¹⁸ This suggests that a simple comparison showing that hotter areas have higher crime rates is not telling the full story. Instead, when both variable sets are included, the demographic controls explain more of the variance in levels of violent crime *across* communities. Overall, these results of the climate variables have shown considerable support for the RA theory regarding property crime and mixed results for the two theories for violent crime. We next evaluate the role of the causal mechanisms proposed by these two theories.

CAUSAL MECHANISMS

Recall that in hypothesis 3, the T/A theory suggests that population density may exacerbate the frustration induced by hot, uncomfortable temperatures of summer. However, the results in Table 3 do not support this proposition. Instead, while population density increases the overall level of violent crime (consistent with past research) it has a surprisingly strong *negative* effect on the seasonal effect of violent crime. In fact, inconsistent with the T/A theory, increasing population density one person per kilometer proportionally decreases the seasonal effect of violent crime 10% ($-.0144/.145 = .10$).

In hypothesis 4, the RA theory predicts that the number of drinking/entertainment establishments should work as a causal mechanism that both increases annual crime as well as interacting with more pleasant weather of

FIGURE 7: Estimated Violent Crime Rates by States




summer to increase the seasonal oscillations of crime rates. There is strong support for this proposition: entertainment establishments have a positive effect on both overall levels of crime and seasonal oscillations in crime. Adding 10 more drinking/entertainment establishments per 100,000 population increases the overall rate of violent crime 1.5% and property crime 6.6%.¹⁹ This same increase proportionally increases the seasonal effect of violent crime 2.1% and property crime 3.5%. These results are consistent with the RA hypothesis that increased activity outside the home increases the possibility of property crimes, such as burglary, and violent crimes, such as robbery and assault.

SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION VARIABLES

Finally, this same model also tests whether the measures of social disorganization have an effect on annual crime rates when controlling for climate variables, and whether measures of social disorganization help explain seasonal oscillations in crime rates. Regarding the first question, we see that increasing ethnic heterogeneity, residential instability, and percentage of divorces in cities all result in higher overall levels of violent and property crime, controlling for climate effects. For instance, a 1% increase in the percentage of divorces is associated with a 7% increase in the violent crime rate.

Regarding the second question of a positive impact of the social disorganization variables on the seasonal oscillations of crime rates, we see no support for this notion. Residential instability actually has a slightly negative effect on the seasonal oscillations of both violent and property crime, while

FIGURE 8: Estimated Property Crime Rates by Various States



increasing poverty and percentage of divorces both decrease the seasonal oscillations of property crime. Thus, we see a pattern where areas with greater social disorganization have somewhat higher overall rates of property crime (given the positive effects of ethnic heterogeneity, percentage of divorces, and residential instability), but fewer seasonal changes in crime. If it is the case that individuals in areas with high social disorganization are generally more cautious in their behavior in an effort to minimize the possibility of victimization (Anderson 1995), they may be less willing to alter their behavior in nicer weather. This is clearly speculative, but it suggests a direction for future research with individual-level data.

Additional Analysis: State-by-State Results

Our results using this large national data set demonstrate that the relationship between temperature and seasonal crime rates follows a distinct pattern largely consistent with the RA theory. Using the latent curve model also allows us to look more closely at the trajectories of individual communities rather than limiting ourselves to these larger overall patterns. Because our discussion of communities with high average temperature or high temperature variation is rather abstract, showing models of the communities within particular states can illustrate what seasonal crime patterns look like for communities in a relatively small geographic area with a somewhat homogeneous climate. That is, the temperate Mediterranean climate of California is very different from the climate of a northern state such as Maine. For this analysis, we select 10 states with at least 100 communities (for adequate sample size) representing different geographic regions of the U.S. We estimate models for property and violent crime containing the latent variables for the level, linear, quadratic, and amplitude terms on all the cities in the state of interest. There is considerable variation in the fit of these models: while some fit satisfactorily with 1 – RMSEA figures of .95 or above, a few have 1 – RMSEA figures less than .9. In particular, states with the least seasonal variation (such as California and Washington) show the worst fit.

For violent crime, T/A theory predicts that states experiencing the hottest summers should see the greatest seasonal variation in crime rates, while RA theory predicts that states with cooler climates will see greater variation. The results are mixed. Of the four states with the greatest seasonal oscillation in violent crime, two are states with relatively hot summers — Texas and Illinois — while the other two are the northern states of Maine and Minnesota, which have particularly mild summers and cold winters.²⁰ These results are seen in Table 4, which shows the mean values for the level factor (the average annual rate of crime for the communities within a state) and the amplitude factor (the average amplitude of crime oscillations for these cities).

However, there is support for the RA theory in that states with mild year-round climates — California, Florida, and Washington — tend to exhibit high overall rates of violent crime with relatively little seasonal variability. The mild winters and summers in these states probably lead to greater outdoor activity year round, leading to less seasonal crime variation. It is also notable that while the T/A theory predicts that the hottest states should have the highest overall rate of violent crime, Figure 7 graphing these crime trends by state shows that these three states with relatively mild year-round weather not only have the smallest seasonal oscillations, but also have the highest overall rates of violent crime.

Although the violent crime results show somewhat mixed support for the two theories, the results for property crime strongly support the RA theory. While the T/A theory predicts that we should see no seasonal oscillations here, they are quite dramatic and most pronounced in cooler climate areas. In support of the RA theory, property crime shows a strict ordering in Table 4 where the greatest seasonal oscillations occur for the two most northerly states (Minnesota and Maine), the southern states are further down the list, and two states with mild annual temperatures and little temperature variation (California and Florida) again show very high crime rates with small seasonal oscillations. In fact, the seasonal effect for California is essentially zero, as the parameter value for the amplitude term is smaller than its standard error. Similarly, the strong seasonal effect for cities in Minnesota and Maine is consistent with the explanation that cold winter temperatures in these regions lower the crime rate — indeed, Figure 8 shows that the average property crime in winter for cities in these two states are as low as those in all other states in this sample. This winter effect can be seen visually by viewing the plots in Figure 8 for Texas and Maine: while they have nearly identical levels of property crime in the summertime, Maine experiences a much deeper trough of property crime during the winter months.

Consistent with our results for the full sample of communities in all 50 states, these models run on communities within particular states generally support the RA theory. States with the coldest winter temperatures tend to have the greatest seasonal oscillations in crime, particularly for property crime. Likewise, areas with pleasant year-round temperatures have high overall rates of crime but see little seasonal change in crime. Consistent with past research, there is evidence here that the RA theory is particularly effective in predicting property crime (Bennett 1991).

Discussion

This study has detected significant seasonal oscillations for crime rates between 1990 and 1992, overlaid on more long-term changes in crime in a large sample

of communities. By employing a latent curve model with a nonlinear component (an amplitude term), we were able to empirically test predictions from two distinct theories that offer different explanations for seasonal trends in crime rates. This contrasts with prior research in this area that has typically been descriptive, involved smaller samples, and therefore been unable to adequately model specific predictions derived from the T/A and RA theories. We now briefly summarize the results for our four hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: The routine activities theory predicts that there will be a positive seasonal effect for the property crime rate, while the temperature/aggression theory predicts that there will not be a seasonal effect for *property* crime rates.

The empirical results strongly supported the routine activities theory and strongly rejected the temperature/aggression theory. Figure 4 shows considerable evidence of a seasonal effect for property crime, suggesting a concurrence in space and time of potential offenders and targets and a lack of guardians. Our models of property crime showed a very satisfactory fit, had a significant amplitude term (with a 22% oscillation between property crime in the winter and in the summer), and had a peak around August 1. The particular strength of RA theory in predicting property crime has also been noted in past empirical work (Bennett 1991; Miethe & Meier 1994; Stahura & Sloan 1988). While some studies in the past have used robbery as a measure of property crime in testing the T/A theory (Anderson & Anderson 1984), we suggest that our measures of burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny are much cleaner measures of this concept. While the seasonal changes in violent crime were predicted by both T/A theory and RA theory, only RA theory predicted the seasonal effect observed for property crime. Given the very strong results for this hypothesis, claims that T/A theory alone explains all seasonal oscillations in rates of all types of crime are clearly untenable (Anderson 2001). In contrast, RA theory provides a parsimonious explanation of seasonal changes in both types of crime.

Hypothesis 2: The effect of seasonal variability in temperature on crime rates will depend on the average climate of the community. The temperature/aggression theory predicts that temperature variability will induce the greatest seasonal changes in violent crime rates in areas with hotter climate, while the routine activities theory predicts that temperature variability will induce the greatest seasonal variability in both property- and violent-crime rates in areas with moderate climates.

There was modest support for the prediction of TA theory. We saw that increasing temperature variation had a positive effect on seasonal oscillations in our violent-crime model regardless of the climate of the community. In support of this hypothesis, temperature variation in hot climate communities had a positive effect on the oscillation in violent-crime rates. However, we also saw that temperature variation in moderate climate areas increased the

oscillation of violent crime, in direct contradiction to this proposition. Similarly, the analysis of communities within individual states showed considerable seasonal variation in violent crime rates for cold climate areas.

Mixed support was also obtained for the prediction of RA theory. On the one hand, we did find contradictory evidence that temperature variation in hot climate areas increased violent crime rates. On the other, temperature variation in moderate climate areas increased the seasonal effect for both property- and violent-crime rates. Also, the particularly strong seasonal oscillations in violent and especially property crime for cities in northerly states such as Maine and Minnesota showed the effect of moderate summer temperatures on crime rates.

Hypothesis 3: The temperature/aggression theory suggests that areas with high population density may experience greater seasonal fluctuations in violent crime rates.

We found no support for this hypothesis. In fact, population density actually had a surprisingly negative effect on the seasonal oscillations of both violent- and property-crime rates.

Hypothesis 4: The routine activities theory predicts that areas with a larger number of entertainment establishments will have higher annual rates of crime and will have greater seasonal fluctuations in crime rates.

There was considerable support for this hypothesis. Adding 32 of these establishments per 100,000 population (a one standard deviation increase) increases violent crime almost 5% and property crime nearly 23%. We also saw support for the second half of this hypothesis, in that adding 32 such establishments per 100,000 population proportionally increases the seasonal oscillation of violent crime 6.7% and property crime 11.1%.

LIMITATIONS

We point out that our model has taken the somewhat unusual approach of using contemporaneous data (our temperature measures) to predict a trajectory model, although it is more common to use temporally prior variables to predict the outcome of interest. In general, using contemporaneous data would preclude drawing causal inferences (Bollen 1989). However, we suggest our model represents a rare instance in which establishing a correlation between weather and crime patterns can be extended to a causal claim. The logic of this argument is simple: while we considered two theories that both predict that changes in temperature work through causal mechanisms to induce changes in crime patterns, we can think of no competing hypothesis that would suggest that changing crime patterns lead to changing temperature patterns. For this reason, we feel causal claims are provisionally justified in this case.

It is also interesting to note that the value of the phase term we used to locate the peak point of crime over the year showed some variation in the models run on individual states, particularly for violent crime in Figure 7. By implication, violent crime peaks at slightly different points in different states. For instance, while North Carolina shows a peak around May–June, violent crime in Illinois does not peak until July–August. This finding suggests that it might be possible to capture more of the intercommunity variability in crime trends by permitting the phase term to vary over communities. While Ware and Bowden (1977) noted the need for such an effect in oscillation models, the LCM framework cannot currently accommodate such an effect.

Conclusion

This study has illustrated the considerable fluctuation during the year in the amount of crime that occurs within a city. We also saw that while the social disorganization theory can explain much of the difference in crime rates between cities, it does not explain seasonal oscillations in crime rates. That is, our results suggest that while the demographic characteristics of a city determine *how much* crime occurs in an area over the course of a year, climate patterns affect *when* that crime occurs. Thus, individuals respond to their environment — either social or physical — in ways that can give rise to such emergent effects. Not only does this have important implications for research into the patterned behavior of individuals within communities that gives rise to crime rates, but it also suggests an important consideration for sociologists considering the patterned behavior leading to other social outcomes. Viewing how communities respond to different climate patterns can provide key insights into the mechanisms at work in such instances and suggests that our methodological strategy may be appropriate for addressing other research questions.

While we have shown considerable support for the routine activities theory, we do not suggest that the temperature/aggression theory has no merit. We saw some evidence that increasing summer temperatures in the hottest areas increase violent crime rates, and a hot climate state such as Texas showed considerable seasonal oscillations for violent crime. Additionally, past studies finding a seasonal pattern for family disturbances are consistent with the T/A theory and inconsistent with the RA approach (Michael & Zumpe 1986; Rotton & Frey 1985). That is, if colder weather confines individuals to the home more frequently, the social interaction perspective would imply that winter would be the peak time for family disturbances, when in fact the peak occurs in the summer. Our main conclusion is thus that the T/A theory may well have some use in explaining violent crime, but the bulk of our findings on seasonal changes in both violent *and* property crime can be attributed to RA theory and the fact

that the changing behavior patterns of individuals during mild temperatures increases opportunities for criminal victimization. The claim of T/A proponents that the theory explains all seasonal crime patterns clearly does not hold in this study.

Future work will need to explore the mechanisms of these theories in more depth.²¹ For instance, while the T/A theory suggests that frustration is simply a biological response to uncomfortable conditions, a reviewer suggested that inequality might be a necessary source of frustration for explaining when the temperature/aggression effect may occur. That is, introducing the sociological concept of social comparison theory suggests that individuals will be more frustrated when others near them have considerably more material objects; therefore, areas with greater inequality will have greater overall levels of frustration. In addition, this increased predisposition to frustration on the part of individuals may interact with hot weather to accentuate seasonal crime patterns. Of course, it is also possible that greater inequality is simply a proxy for greater numbers of possible offenders, and hence such a measure could also capture the effects of RA theory. While such a measure may not distinguish unambiguously between these two theories, it does suggest possible directions for integration of theories in viewing seasonal crime patterns.

Finally, we note that our findings in support of the routine activities theory do not call forth a policy response (we are not suggesting eliminating all entertainment establishments, nor suggesting a large population migration to North Dakota) but rather point out a natural tradeoff involved in lifestyle choices. That is, a hypothetical family that stays home all the time is at less risk for criminal victimization (as they by definition cannot be mugged on the street, and burglary is difficult when the home is always occupied), but at the cost of not enjoying the benefits of venturing outdoors. Our findings also do not necessarily imply a more unsafe environment for communities with greater numbers of entertainment establishments or more pleasant weather. While the patterns we have observed imply that these conditions are associated with higher crime rates, it does not follow that each individual who ventures out is more at risk of experiencing crime. To make such a conclusion with such data would be to commit an ecological fallacy. In fact, it is logically possible that the risk of crime when venturing outdoors is the same in either case, and the only variable being altered is the number of people who choose to go outdoors. In essence, we are observing overall rates here and simply arguing that these are driven by the behavioral patterns of individuals. To make the more nuanced claim that the actual risk of crime increases would require incorporating information on the actual behavior of individuals within a hierarchical model of communities. Such an approach might be a fruitful direction for future research.

Notes

1. Note that routine activities theory would have indeterminate predictions here: on the one hand, increasing density increases the number of possible victims and hence would increase crime. On the other, it would also increase the number of guardians, which would decrease crime. Hence, it does not make an unambiguous prediction in this instance.
2. The archive is housed at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) (<http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD/archive.html>).
3. In census terminology, police units are places, minor civil divisions (townships), and counties (for county sheriffs).
4. We do not use the information on rape here since it may be subject to considerable reporting error; likewise, arson does not appear to be reported consistently.
5. We also ran models excluding robbery from violent crime, or adding it to property crime, and came to the same substantive conclusions in all models.
6. Some units report crime for very few months. These cases show troubling inconsistencies when performing diagnostics, with some showing relatively high crime rates for the only month they reported (December), suggesting that at least some of these may be reporting annual data for a single month. Because of these inconsistencies, and the relatively little information such cases would provide as a result of the limited response rate on the crime variables, we chose to drop these cases.
7. We have reason to suspect that a weather station within 40 miles of our city of interest is providing fairly accurate weather patterns. We also tested models dropping the two most extreme cases — yielding virtually identical results — and also tested a model that included a variable measuring the distance of the weather station from the city of interest, and this variable had no effect.
8. This uses the following mutually exclusive groups: Anglo, African American, Asian, and Latino.
9. We used the categorization scheme of the Census Bureau for length of residence; this has a similar effect to log transforming the average number of years in each category (correlated about $-.98$). A log transformation matches the theoretical expectation that residence within the community will increase attachment to the community at a slowing rate.
10. While full information maximum likelihood (FIML) is another viable strategy for missing data, the statistical programs implementing FIML at the time we performed our analyses were unable to handle the nonlinear parameters of our latent cosine model.
11. Taking the mean value of the multiply imputed chi-squares does not take into account the variance among the chi-square estimates. Meng and Rubin (1992) provide alternative strategies for obtaining a simultaneous F-test of the multiply imputed data sets. However, methods for combining various approximate fit indices, such as the RMSEA, are less developed at this point, and so we adopted the simpler strategy of taking the average value over these 10 imputations.

12. In these models we estimate the frequency parameter. Since we have strong theoretical reasons to expect this seasonal frequency to occur over one year, we could choose to fix this value. Indeed, the estimated value is almost always right at 1/6. However, freely estimating this parameter illustrates the generality of this methodological approach when applied to other problems where the frequency of the process may not be so well defined *a priori*.

13. While it is possible to also include predictors of the variables measuring the long-term changes in crime (the linear and quadratic factors), we do not include these here. Long-term change of crime over this three-year period is not of central interest to us here theoretically, and this is too short a period for viewing longer-term trends. But while we do not explain these longer trajectories for individual cities, our model nonetheless takes this variance into account.

14. This is obtained by substituting the values of the lambdas for a particular time point to estimate the amount of crime. We calculate values for January-February and July-August for each year and exponentiate to get the amount of raw crime at that time point. Subtracting the winter from the summer value and using the winter value as the denominator yields the annual fluctuation of 34.5%. A similar calculation for property crime yields a 23.6% difference between the highest and lowest points.

15. Recall that we are able to estimate where the peak of the amplitude term occurs from the phase (p) term in the amplitude expression, which was significantly different from zero in both models. In the models, we centered our time axis at July 1. Since the estimated phase term for the violent crime model was $p = -.17$, this suggests that we would need to shift our time-coding forward .17 bi-months. This is only about 10 days, suggesting a peak of July 10. For property crime, we estimated a phase term of $p = -.44$. This implies a shift of almost one month, and a peak of August 1.

16. This is computed by dividing the coefficient estimate for temperature variation by the mean amplitude (the intercept) ($.00705/.14492 = .049$). Interpreting individually the coefficient for the main effect of a variable involved in an interaction is justified here by the nonsignificance of the interaction term.

17. In Figures 5 and 6, "hot" and "high variability" are defined as one standard deviation above the mean. We do not include an estimate of hot cities with high temperature variability in these figures because no cases in our sample exhibited this extreme pattern.

18. We also tested models including a quadratic term for temperature to see whether there is a diminishing effect for increasing temperature. This variable showed little effect and does not change any of our general conclusions here.

19. When looking at a discrete change in a variable in a semi-log model, it makes more sense to view the compound percentage increase in the y -variable for a one-unit shift in the x -variable (Halvorsen & Palmquist 1980). Essentially, this implies using the equation $g = e^{\beta} - 1$, where g is the compound percentage growth rate and b is the estimated coefficient (for a complete derivation of this, see Lardaro 1993). For violent crime: $\exp(.00146 \times 10) - 1 = .015$.

20. For comparison, while Texas cities had an average daily high summer temperature (June through August) of 92 degrees Fahrenheit over this three-year period, the Minnesota cities' daily high temperature averaged a mild 78 degrees.

21. It should be noted that some of the mechanisms are not necessarily associated with one theory or the other. For instance, consider the possibility of taking into account the amount of air conditioning in an area. On the one hand, the T/A theory would suggest that areas with less air conditioning would show greater instances of aggression during hot weather (as the lack of air conditioning means individuals lack a respite from the hot weather). On the other hand, RA theory *also* suggests that areas lacking air conditioning will have higher crime rates; however, in this instance, this posited relationship is due to the fact that in areas with ample air conditioning individuals will remain at home to stay out of the heat.

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Power, Identity, and Collective Action in Social Exchange*

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Abstract

Our research aims to bring collective action back into the study of structural determinants of power in social exchange. Previous research has focused primarily on the bargaining power of actors whose locations in exchange networks confer different risks of exclusion. We argue that structural position affects not only bargaining power but also the ability of low-power actors to organize against unequal bargaining power. We hypothesize that collective action among low-power actors is facilitated by identification with others who are structurally disadvantaged. We test two identity-theoretic expected utility models that specify how actors in a mixed-motive coalition game might take into account the payoffs to others in structurally equivalent positions. In the utilitarian model, actors maximize the greatest good to the greatest number. In the collectivist model, actors also seek to minimize in-group inequality. Results show some support for the utilitarian model among female participants and strong support for the collectivist model among both males and females. We speculate about causes of gender differences and identify directions for future exchange-theoretic research on social identity and socially embedded collective action.

Bringing Back Collective Action

Bertrand Russell (1938:12) regarded power as “the fundamental concept of social science,” while Blau (1974:616) saw the study of social structure as the “distinctive task” of sociology. Social exchange theories link these ideas by

**We wish to acknowledge the National Science Foundation (SES-9819249) for their generous support of this research. In addition, we thank Andreas Flache, Dave Willer, Robb Willer, and anonymous Social Forces reviewers for helpful suggestions on previous drafts. Direct correspondence to Brent Simpson, Department of Sociology, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208. E-mail bts@sc.edu.*

predicting interpersonal power from actors' locations in network structures (Skvoretz & Willer 1993).¹ For example, in a three-line network ($B_1 - A - B_2$), *A* has power over B_1 and B_2 because *A* has access to multiple exchange partners, each of whom has access only to *A*. But if we simply add a link between B_1 and B_2 , *A* loses its structural advantage. In this triangle network, all three actors now have equal power because all are excluded with the same probability.


The predicted effects of network structure have been strongly supported in laboratory studies of bargaining behavior (Willer 1999). However, most applications are limited in scope by the assumption that low-power actors cannot act collectively to counter the structural advantage of high-power positions (Bonacich 2000). Emerson (1962) anticipated this point over four decades ago, when he argued that power inequality is "unstable for it encourages the use of power which in turn sets in motion . . . balancing operations" (34). Similarly, Thibaut and Kelley (1959:208) noted how "power provides the problem to be solved and coalition the means of solving it." These early exchange theorists (including Blau 1964) believed coalition formation among structurally disadvantaged actors to be a fundamental means through which structurally based power inequality is "balanced."

Despite the centrality of coalitions in the work of early theorists, network exchange researchers have only recently begun to address the interplay of power and coalition processes. This paper argues that it is time to bring collective action back in to the structural analysis of power.

We argue that structure affects power through two mechanisms related to collective action, one related to the *motivation* for coalition formation among low-power actors, the other to the *success* of those coalitions. The motivation for coalition formation results from the "bidding-war problem," which arises from differences in actors' exchange opportunities (e.g., the separation of the worker from the means of production). The success of coalitions, in turn, rests on solving the "free-rider problem" that arises because potential coalition members differ in their opportunities to benefit from coalition formation without shouldering part of the coalition costs. Free riding opportunities also depend on the structure of social relations, a problem overlooked in network exchange research in which collective action cannot occur.

Ironically, the free-rider problem is also overlooked in studies of social exchange in which collective action *can* occur. Cook and Gillmore (1984), for example, tested and found support for Emerson's argument that greater power imbalance would promote formation of coalitions to countervail inequality. Although important and suggestive, Cook and Gillmore's study uses an experimental design that precludes structural constraints on collective action. In the simple three-line network they studied, both low-power actors must agree to join the coalition in order to avoid a bidding war. But other networks can make collective action more problematic. Consider, for example, the M-Branch network of Figure 1, which contains low-power bidders (the *Bs*) competing to

FIGURE 1: The M-Branch Network



participate in exchange with two high-power sellers (Ss). If coalitions are precluded, the bidding wars among the Bs will produce exchanges that greatly favor S₁ and S₂. A coalition of Bs whose members agree to bargain as a unit will solve the bidding-war problem by transforming the network into an equal-power structure in which no actor risks exclusion. But now a new difficulty arises: the free-rider problem. With three low-power actors competing for two opportunities for exchange, only two coalition members are needed to avoid bidding wars (Willer & Skvoretz 1997). The nonmember then enjoys the same bargaining power as the coalition without having to share the “profit.”²

More generally, a free-rider problem arises in networks in which a coalition improves the bargaining power not only of the members but also of other low-power actors who elect not to join (Bonacich 1995; Willer & Skvoretz 1997). In some networks, coalitions may actually benefit nonmembers much more than members, creating an incentive to “let George do it.” But if too many low-power actors choose to free-ride, the coalition will fail, as happens sometimes in unions and cartels. In short, most previous research on power in exchange networks may have overstated power inequality by assuming that collective action cannot occur. Cook and Gillmore allowed for collective action but precluded the opportunity to free-ride in order to show that coalitions can overcome the bidding-war problem. This study may have understated power inequality by assuming that collective action cannot fail.

Recent game-theoretic studies of collective action in exchange networks show that coalition formation among the structurally disadvantaged depends decisively on the ability to overcome temptations to free-ride (Bonacich 1995; Willer & Skvoretz 1997). Our previous work (Simpson & Macy 2001) tested the ability of low-power actors to overcome the free-rider problem and form an effective coalition. Although only two members were needed for the coalition to succeed, three-member coalitions were as prevalent as two-member coalitions and, once established, were more stable than two-member coalitions. This anomaly is difficult to explain with standard game theory, because dropping out of a two-person coalition causes the coalition to fail, while

dropping out of a three-person coalition does not. Why, then, were participants more likely to abandon two-person coalitions?

Research by Lawler and Yoon (1998) suggests one possible explanation. They studied how shared social identity between exchange partners affects exchange ratios in unequal-power networks. In half the conditions, participants were given information intended to activate identification with the exchange partner. As predicted by social identity theory (Tajfel 1981), participants in these conditions agreed to less unequal exchange ratios than did participants who were not led to identify with each other.

Suppose instead low-power actors identified with one another rather than with a high-power exchange partner. Bonacich and Bienenstock (1997) describe how certain exchange networks give rise to latent classes of structurally similar positions, linked not through exchange relations, as in the Lawler-Yoon study, but through a common fate in exchange relations with members of other classes. Shared fate, in turn, has been shown to be a strong basis of identity (Kramer & Brewer 1986). If identity inhibits inequality and exploitation between low- and high-power actors, then we might also expect a similar effect of identity on solidarity among low-power actors attempting to countervail unequal exchange with high-power actors.

We tested a formal specification of this identity-theoretic explanation. Like most theories of network exchange, our formal model assumes that choices are determined solely by the associated payoffs. However, based on our previous findings on coalition size, and on work by Lawler and Yoon, we relax the simplifying assumption that actors' utility functions assign zero weight to the payoffs received by others. We assume instead that utility is a weighted sum of the payoffs to self and others and explore alternative specifications of the weights suggested by social identity theory.³ Specifically, we test two formal payoff transformation models of how identity leads actors to take into account the payoffs to others in structurally equivalent low-power positions. In the utilitarian model, actors maximize the greatest good to the greatest number. In the collectivist model, actors also seek to minimize in-group inequality. Both identity-theoretic models are tested against the conventional exchange-theoretic assumption that actors are motivated purely by self-interest.

In sum, while our previous research studied the effects of coalitions on bidding wars and power inequality, the current study focuses on the effects of social identity on the formation of coalitions despite the temptation to free-ride. To preview the study, the next section briefly summarizes research on social identity and collective action. From this summary, we elaborate alternative models of the effects of social identity on the willingness to join a coalition of other low-power actors. We then introduce the experiment designed to test the models. Results show some support for the utilitarian model and strong support for the collectivist model, but the results are conditioned

by gender. The article concludes with a discussion of these gender effects based on a comparison with findings from related work. The conclusion also outlines avenues for future research suggested by these results.

Social Identity and Collective Action

This section begins with a brief review of social identity theory, focusing on Tajfel's (1981) fundamental distinction between personal and social identity, and how the theory applies to collective action. Social identity is defined as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel 1981:225). In social identity theory, the distinction between "we" and "others" comes from cognitive self/other categorization that induces "a perceptual accentuation of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences" (Turner & Onorato 1999:21).

Personal identity, on the other hand, "is highlighted by thinking of the self in terms of unique attributes" (Deaux 1996:780). Personal identity therefore accentuates the distinction between individual and collective interests and thus activates a self-interested desire to maximize individual payoffs, even when this necessitates a reduction in the payoffs to others. In contrast, social identity blurs the distinction and thus mitigates the free-rider problem in collective action. Citing parental bonding and patriotism as examples, Coleman (1990:158) characterized identification as the process through which "one actor has adopted, or taken up, the other's interest." In-group cooperation then results "from the shared and mutual perception by in-group members of their interests as interchangeable" (Turner et al. 1987:65). For this reason, Brewer and Silver (2000:154) argue, identity is a "group resource that is critical to the ability of the group to mobilize collective action among its members or to recruit members into a social movement." A number of empirical studies support this general point (Brewer & Kramer 1986; Dawes et al. 1988; de Weerd & Klandermans 1999; Kollock 1998; Kramer & Brewer 1984, 1986).

At issue is the process through which social identity influences participation in collective action. Following Brewer and Silver (2000:160), we assume that, through identification with significant others, "the meaning of 'self-interest' is transformed to the group level" such that "group welfare becomes a part of the rational calculus by which an individual evaluates the costs and benefits of intended actions and potential outcomes." In the sections to follow, we consider two models of payoff transformation suggested by social identity theory. The utilitarian model maximizes the mean of in-group payoffs ("the

greatest good to the greatest number”). The collectivist model strikes a balance between maximization of the mean and minimization of in-group inequality.⁴

Social Identity As Utilitarianism

Brewer and Silver (2000) posit a utilitarian effect of identity on cooperation. The utilitarian model assumes that social identity leads to a “transformation of social motives whereby an individualistic self-interested orientation is matched or superseded by the motivation to maximize joint or collective interests” (161). More formally, let i denote an in-group member. Then, according to the utilitarian model, the subjective utility i derives from a given payoff P is simply the mean payoff for the in-group, or

$$U_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^N P_j}{N} = \bar{P}, i \in j \quad (1)$$

where U_i is i 's utility, P_j is the objective payoff to any group member $j(i \in j)$, and N is the number with whom ego identifies (where $N = 1$ when identity is personal and N is the number of in-group members when identity is social). Note that when personal identity (self-interest) is salient, $U_i = P_i$ and the actor's subjective and objective payoffs are identical — the payoffs are not transformed.

Social Identity As Collectivism

Most applications of social identity theory to cooperation in social dilemmas assume some version of the utilitarian model, in which actors are motivated by a weighted sum of the payoffs to self and significant others, without regard to in-group differences in payoffs (Brewer & Silver 2000; Kollock 1998). However, this indifference to in-group inequality is inconsistent with a central tenet of social identity theory — that in-group members seek *maximal distinctiveness*. According to the maximal distinctiveness hypothesis, social identity leads actors to make choices that maximize the differences between the in-group and the out-group while minimizing within-group differences (Hogg 1996; Turner 1985). That the motivation to maximize group distinctiveness applies to resources, as well as attributes, has been shown repeatedly in minimal-group experiments (Tajfel 1982).⁵

Despite the centrality of the maximal distinctiveness hypothesis to social identity theory, it has remained curiously absent from research on identity and cooperation in social dilemmas, where the focus has remained almost

exclusively on the effort to maximize in-group interests. Applied to the problem of coalition formation among low-power actors, within-group homogenization implies an effort to minimize the inequality of payoffs to coalition members (the in-group). When coupled with a motivation to increase within-group welfare (as assumed by the utilitarian model), between-group differentiation implies an effort to maximize the mean of the payoffs to coalition members, which in turn entails minimization of payoffs to high-power actors (the out-group). The effort to increase in-group payoffs while minimizing in-group inequality corresponds to a collectivist image of a unitary actor, in contrast to the utilitarian idea of a mere aggregation of individuals (Leung & Bond 1984; Triandis et al. 1985). As Deaux and Reid (2000:186) write, "collectivism implies an emphasis on group cohesion, common fate, distinction from out-groups, and shared norms and standards." Recent research (Brown et al. 1992) supports this collectivist effect of identity.

We implemented a collectivist model using the mean payoff to capture maximization of in-group payoffs (as well differentiation with the out-group) and the mean absolute difference in payoffs to operationalize inequality.⁶ This gives the subjective utility to any in-group member i as

$$U_i = \bar{P} - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^N \sum_{i=1}^N |P_j - P_i|}{N(N-1)}, N > 1 \quad (2)$$

where U_i is i 's utility, P_j is the objective payoff to any group member $j(i \in j)$, and N is the number with whom ego identifies. When personal rather than social identity is salient, $N = 1$ and in-group differences are not possible; the collectivist model then implies $U_i = P_i$.

Application to Coalitions in Network Exchange

These models of social identity make competing predictions about participation in collective action among low-power actors in exchange networks. As detailed below, the predictions of both models also differ from the baseline assumption, normally employed in exchange network research, namely, that actors are motivated by self-interest. We tested these predictions using the M-branch network (Figure 1) in which three low-power bidders (Bs) compete to be included in an exchange with one of two high-power sellers (S). The Bs could benefit from forming a coalition but they could benefit even more by free riding on the bargaining power they gain if enough others form an effective coalition.⁷

TABLE 1: Payoff Matrix for Low-Power Actors in the M-Branch Network When Coalitions Are Possible, with Probability of Cooperation As Smoothed Best-Reply

Number of Cooperative Alters (B ₁ and B ₂)	B ₃ 's Strategy		Probability of Cooperation
	C	D	
0	4 4, 4	4 4, 4	.50
1	6 11, 6	4 4, 4	.73
2	8 8, 8	11 6, 6	.31

Note: Values given in bold are payoffs to B₃, the focal actor. B₁, B₂, and B₃ are as defined in Figure 1.

To illustrate, assume that each S-B exchange relation negotiates the division of 24 points and that each position is allowed only one exchange during any given round of negotiation. In the absence of an effective coalition, the three Bs must bid against each other for inclusion in two exchanges, with one actor excluded and earning 0. Although competition to avoid exclusion can drive bids up to the maximum of 23 points, actual exchange ratios rarely reach such extremes (Bonacich & Friedkin 1998; Cook & Emerson 1978; Cook et al. 1983). Two decades of research on strong-power networks like the M-branch show that exchange ratios average 18:6 in favor of the high-power actor (Bonacich 2000; Markovsky, Willer & Patton 1988; see Simpson & Macy 2001 for a formal derivation of these bidding-war payoffs). That leaves the low-power actor with 6 points. With three low-power actors competing for inclusion in two exchanges, each has a two-thirds chance that its 18-point offer will be accepted. Thus, in the absence of an effective coalition, the expected payoff is two-thirds of 6 points, or 4 points.

If, on the other hand, all three low-power actors join the coalition, they will have no risk of exclusion and will thus enjoy equal bargaining power with the high-power actors, leading to equal exchange ratios (Cook & Gillmore 1984; Willer & Skvoretz 1997). Thus the three coalition members earn 12 points in each of two exchanges, for a total of 24 points. Assuming coalition points are divided equally among the three members, each receives a payoff of 8 points.

Now suppose one of the three low-power actors decides to defect from the coalition. The two coalition members make identical 12-point offers. However, the nonmember must offer 13 (earning 11) in order to avoid exclusion. The coalition members have no incentive to improve one of their 12-point offers

TABLE 2: Utilitarian Payoff Transformation of Table 1 Payoffs

Number of Cooperative Alters (B_1 and B_2)	B_3 's Strategy		Probability of Cooperation
	C	D	
0	4	4	.50
1	7.7	4	.83
2	8	7.7	.53

Note: Payoffs are to B_3 , the focal actor. B_1 , B_2 , and B_3 are as defined in Figure 1.

because they will then be effectively undermining their other 12-point offer. They are better off to participate in a single 12–12 exchange and allow the defector to earn 11 (see Simpson & Macy 2001 for empirical support).⁸ The coalition thus earns a total of 12 points, which is divided equally between the two members, giving each a payoff of 6 points. Although the payoff of 6 to each of two coalition members is not as good as the 8 points they earn in a three-person coalition, it is still much better than the 4-point payoff they would receive if the coalition were to fail.

Table 1 summarizes these payoffs in matrix form, where the columns display payoffs depending on whether the focal actor decides to join or not join the coalition and the rows give the total number of alters (other low-power actors) who join. These payoffs show that, for the M-branch network, a coalition of two members is a strict Nash equilibrium (i.e., a set of strategies such that any unilateral deviation leads to a lower payoff). For the two-person coalition, the nonmember is worse off by joining the coalition (the payoff will decline from 11 to 8) and any member is worse off by unilaterally abandoning the coalition (the payoff will decline from 6 to 4).⁹ Assuming the actors are self-interested and able to coordinate a pure-strategy equilibrium (one in which each actor always plays the same strategy), we can expect to observe stable coalitions of two members. Three-member coalitions should be unstable.

In standard game theory, the Nash equilibrium assumes that ego's utility is solely a function of ego's payoffs. This is also the assumption in almost all network exchange research. In deciding whether to accept an offer, ego takes into account only the payoff to ego and ignores the payoff to alter. We continue to make that assumption in the model of the bargaining relation between high- and low-power actors. However, we relax that assumption in the model of the decision whether to join a coalition with other actors in a structurally equivalent position.

The two identity-theoretic models in equations 1 and 2 assume instead that ego takes into account the payoffs to alters with whom ego identifies. Applying the utilitarian transformation to the objective payoffs of Table 1 produces the subjective utilities given in Table 2. For simplicity, Table 2 displays only the

TABLE 3: Collectivist Payoff Transformation of Table 1 Payoffs

Number of Cooperative Alters (B_1 and B_2)	B_3 's Strategy		Probability of Cooperation
	C	D	
0	4	4	.50
1	4.4	4	.56
2	8	4.4	.81

Note: Payoffs are to B_3 , the focal actor. B_1 , B_2 , and B_3 are as defined in Figure 1.

utilities for focal actor B_3 . Because the utilitarian transformation takes the average of in-group members' objective payoffs, the values of Tables 1 and 2 differ only for coalitions that produce unequal payoffs to low-power actors (i.e., two-person coalitions). When any two Bs cooperate and the third defects, the defector receives 11 and each cooperator receives 6. Applying the utilitarian transformation function to these objective payoffs gives $U_{B_3} = 7.7$ for any two-person coalition, whether or not B_3 is a member.

The collectivist model in equation 2 transforms the objective payoffs of Table 1 into the subjective utilities given in Table 3. The values of Tables 1 and 3 differ only for two-person coalitions, which produce unequal objective payoffs to in-group members. When any two Bs cooperate and the third defects, the defector receives 11, and each cooperator receives 6. Applying the collectivist function for $i = B_3$ gives $U_{B_3} = 4.4$ for any two-person coalition, whether or not B_3 is a member. For all other coalition sizes in the M-branch, the subjective utilities of Table 3 are equivalent to the objective payoffs of Table 1, as well as the utilitarian subjective utilities given in Table 2.

From Utilities to Cooperation

Game theory typically assumes deterministic choices based on strict preference, that is, ego will always choose the better alternative, even if both choices have nearly identical utility. Harsanyi (1973) has proposed a more plausible theory, based on smoothed best response, in which the larger the difference in utility across alternatives, the greater the probability that a player will choose the strategy with the higher utility. Following Harsanyi, Appendix A specifies functions (see equations A1 and A2) for translating the utilities of Tables 1–3 into expected rates of cooperation. Table 1 gives the utilities and corresponding choice probabilities for the self-interest (personal identity) model in which utilities equal the untransformed payoffs, with $p = 0.5$ for zero cooperative alters, rising to $p = 0.73$ for one, and then falling to $p = 0.31$ for two. We do not expect the self-interest model to hit these marks, but we should at least expect

to see a sharp decline in cooperation as the expected number of cooperative alters increases from one to two.

This self-interest prediction provides a benchmark against which to measure the effects of social identity on the willingness to join the coalition. The far right column of Table 2 reports the probabilities of cooperation estimated from the utilitarian's subjective utilities using equations 1, A-1, and A-2. When no alters join, the subjective payoff for cooperation and defection are equal (4 points). Thus B_3 is indifferent between cooperation and defection ($p_{B3} = .5$). When one alter cooperates $p_{B3} = .83$, and when two alters cooperate $p_{B3} = .53$.

The utilitarian model generates a larger probability of cooperation for ego when one alter joins the coalition than when two others join, for the following reason: B_3 can greatly improve the payoffs to *all* in-group members by joining with one alter to form a two-person coalition. On the other hand, when two alters join, the subjective utility for cooperation ($U_i = 8$) is only slightly larger than the subjective payoff for defection ($U_i = 7.7$). That is, a third cooperator has only a small impact on the average earnings of in-group members. Thus, the utilitarian model predicts a lower probability of cooperation when two alters join than when one alter joins.

Comparison of Tables 1 and 2 shows no difference in the prediction of a nonmonotonic effect of the number of cooperative alters. The key difference is that the utilitarian model predicts a main effect of social identity, such that the rate of cooperation is higher when identity is social than when it is personal.

The estimated probabilities of cooperation for the collectivist model, formalized in equations 2, A-1, and A-2 are given in the rightmost column of Table 3. When one other joins the coalition, $p_{B3} = .56$ and $p_{B3} = .81$ when two others join. Thus, in striking contrast to both the self-interest and the utilitarian models, the collectivist model yields a much greater likelihood of cooperation when two alters cooperate than when one alter cooperates. Although the *average* payoff to in-group members is relatively high for two-person coalitions, the degree of in-group inequality is also high. Compared to the utilitarian model, the collectivist model predicts a reluctance to join a coalition of one other, even though joining one other would increase both coalition success and ego's personal (objective) payoff. This reluctance stems from the relatively high degree of in-group-inequality that results when any two actors form a coalition and the third free-rides. Because the collectivist values in-group equality, outcomes that yield unequal payoffs (e.g., two-person coalitions) are discounted. On the other hand, when all three Bs join the coalition, all receive relatively high and equal payoffs. Therefore, when two others join the coalition, the effect of social identity on cooperation is greater for collectivists (who value in-group equality) than for utilitarians (who do not).

FIGURE 2: Predicted Rates of Cooperation for the Utilitarian Model




FIGURE 3: Predicted Rates of Cooperation for the Collectivist Model




TABLE 4: Predictions of Three Models about the Effects of Identity and Alters' Cooperation on the Probability of Ego's Cooperation

	Self-Interest	Utilitarian	Collectivist
Alters' cooperation	(-)	(-)	0
Social identity	0	(+)	0
Interaction	0	0	(+)

Hypotheses

Figures 2 and 3 display the predicted rates of cooperation for the utilitarian and collectivist models, respectively. Each figure graphs the probability of cooperation (Y-axis) against the number of cooperative alters (X-axis). The dashed lines give predicted cooperation rates when personal identity is salient (i.e., when objective payoffs are not transformed). The plotted values, which are identical for that case in Figures 2 and 3, are taken directly from the rightmost column of the objective payoff matrix given in Table 1. The solid lines give predicted probabilities of cooperation when social identity is salient, as transformed by the utilitarian (Figure 2) and the collectivist (Figure 3) utility functions. These values are taken from the rightmost columns of Tables 2 and 3, respectively.

For ease of presentation, Table 4 organizes these derivations of the self-interest, utilitarian, and collectivist models as a series of three hypotheses, based on the main effects of (1) alters' cooperation, (2) social identity, and (3) their interaction.

Hypothesis 1: Ego's cooperation rate decreases with the number of cooperative alters.

Hypothesis 1 follows from the self-interest and utilitarian models, as illustrated by the negative slopes of both lines of Figure 2. In contrast, the collectivist model predicts no main effect for alters' cooperation, as shown by the opposite sign of the slopes in Figure 3. The utilitarian model also predicts a main effect for social identity, as given by hypothesis 2:

Hypothesis 2: Ego's cooperation rate increases with the strength of social identity.

Hypothesis 2, which corresponds to the utilitarian model, is indicated by the vertical distance between the two lines in Figure 2. In contrast, the self-interest model predicts no main effect. If coalition behavior is motivated strictly by self-interest, social identity will not result in a transformation of outcomes and thus will have no effect on cooperation.

While the self-interest and utilitarian models predict identical effects for alters' cooperation, the self-interest and collectivist models give convergent predictions about the main effects of social identity, but for very different

reasons. As shown in Figure 3, the collectivist model predicts a positive effect of social identity when two alters cooperate but a *negative* effect when one cooperates, due to the increase in inequality. Simply put, both main effects are suppressed by their interaction, as formalized in hypothesis 3:

Hypothesis 3: The effect of number of cooperative alters depends on the strength of social identity.

Because the self-interest model assumes no transformation of objective payoffs, it predicts changes in ego's cooperation on the basis of alters' behavior, an effect that does not depend on whether ego identifies with other low-power actors. Similarly, as shown in Figure 2, the utilitarian model predicts that alters' cooperation and social identity have only additive effects on ego's cooperation.

In contrast, Figure 3 shows the strong interaction effect predicted by the collectivist model. The predicted interaction reflects the value the collectivist places on in-group equality, which the utilitarian and self-interest models do not share. In the M-branch, when two actors cooperate and a third defects, the level of in-group inequality is greatly increased. On the other hand, when all three actors cooperate, all receive relatively high *and* equal payoffs.

By testing the divergent predictions outlined in Table 4, we can determine whether identity affects cooperation, and, if so, whether the effects reflect a concern for group *welfare* (hypotheses 1 and 2), as suggested by most previous social dilemma research, or group *distinctiveness* (hypothesis 3).

Gender, Identity, and Cooperation

Gender differences are relatively uncommon in network exchange experiments (see Molm 1988). However, our design differs from almost all these studies in that it poses a social dilemma. Previous social dilemma research suggests the need to block participants on gender. Kramer and Brewer's (1984) study of social identity and cooperation in social dilemmas found that males were more responsive than females to a manipulation of social identity. Another social dilemma study (Simpson 2003) tested gender differences in cooperation when the motivation for defection is decomposed into fear (of being suckered by a partner who is expected to defect) and greed (the temptation to sucker a partner who is expected to cooperate). Results confirmed that males respond more noncooperatively than females to the greed component. The social dilemma posed by coalition formation in networks like the M-branch entails greed but not fear. If no one else joins the coalition, ego's payoff is the same whether or not ego cooperates. Hence, there is no fear of being suckered. However, a low-power actor who expects both alters to join the coalition is better off free riding. The actor who does so is responding to the greed component.

Thus, while our main theoretical interest is the effect of social identity on collective action among structurally disadvantaged actors, previous work on social identity and social dilemmas suggests the need to block participants on gender. We therefore consider coalition behavior separately for males and females.

Experimental Design

Participants were undergraduates at a large private university, recruited via flyers advertising the opportunity to earn \$10 to \$20 for participation in a one-hour experiment. We emphasized participants' self-interest in earning money in order to satisfy the scope conditions of the game-theoretic predictions and to provide a strong test of the identity-theoretic alternatives. As detailed below, the instructions repeatedly stressed that each participant's cash reward would be determined by the total number of points that participant accumulated during the experiment. A total of 114 students (50 males and 64 females) participated.

SETTINGS AND PROCEDURES

Participants were scheduled in groups of four.¹⁰ Upon entering the laboratory, each participant was escorted to a private station equipped with a computer. Participants were aware that they were in a group but never actually met one another. Online instructions informed participants that they would not see other participants at any point during or after the experiment. The instructions then described the experiment in detail, followed by several practice sessions and an on-line quiz that assessed participants' understanding of the procedure. Each incorrect response was followed by a detailed explanation of the correct answer. As explained below, very few participants had problems understanding the procedures and most reported being highly involved in the experiment.

The network used was the M-branch of Figure 1.¹¹ Although participants were led to believe that the other network positions were occupied by students, in reality all but the participant's position were occupied by computer-simulated actors. Computer simulants were needed in order to manipulate the number of other low-power actors who join the coalition. The four students in each scheduled group actually participated in independent, randomly assigned, conditions.

For clarity, the instructions referred to the network as a market, and to network positions as sellers and bidders (cf. Bonacich 2000; Kollock 1994; Lawler & Yoon 1998). Positions in the M-branch labeled S and B were sellers and bidders, respectively. Each participant was led to believe that she had been

randomly assigned to the role of B_3 . The instructions introduced the task as follows:

Bidders and sellers will earn points by bargaining with others in the game. Your objective as a bidder is to “exchange” with sellers. Exchange occurs when a seller accepts a bidder’s offer. When a bidder and seller exchange, they both earn points. Because you are paid according to the number of points you earn, the more exchanges you make (and the more points you get in each exchange), the more money you earn.

The instructions then explained how to make offers, complete exchanges, and observe bargaining among others. Participants had full knowledge of the value of others’ offers and exchanges.

To be consistent with related research (Simpson & Macy 2001; Willer & Skvoretz 1997), only bidders could make offers.¹² Each bidder was allowed to make as many offers as desired until one of the following occurred: the bidder’s offer was accepted, both sellers accepted offers from the other two bidders, or time expired. If the participant’s offer was not accepted, she was excluded from exchange in that round.

The (actual or simulated) occupant of each position was limited to one exchange on any given round. Since there were three bidders and two sellers, at least one bidder was excluded (and earned 0) on any given round of negotiations. This structure was designed to create bidding wars, such that exchange ratios would strongly favor sellers. We used these power inequalities to motivate low-power actors’ option to form a coalition in the second stage.

A TWO-STAGE EXPERIMENT

The experiment was divided into two games, each of which lasted 15 rounds. In game 1, bidders were not allowed to form coalitions. After game 1, the computer informed participants that bidders would now have the option to form a bargaining coalition. The instructions explained the coalition option as follows:

At the beginning of each round, each bidder will be asked if he or she wishes to join the coalition for that round. If a coalition forms, each member will vote on the bid he or she wants the coalition to send to sellers. Each member gets one vote, the average of which is the coalition bid. The coalition bid will be sent by all members and cannot be changed during the round. All points earned by the coalition will be divided equally among coalition members.

Bidders who do not join the coalition will not vote on the coalition bid, nor will they be required to send the coalition bid. (Bidders who do not join will negotiate just as in game 1.) Points earned by bidders who are not members of the coalition will not be shared with others. It takes at least two bidders to

form a coalition. If less than two bidders vote to join, no coalition will exist for that round.

The instructions explained in detail the rules for allocating points earned by a coalition, illustrated with hypothetical examples. However, at no point did the instructions suggest that coalition outcomes were better or worse than outcomes in which coalitions did not form.

At the beginning of each round of game 2, the participant was asked whether she wished to join the coalition for that round. The participant and other potential coalition members ostensibly decided whether to join the coalition simultaneously. If the participant joined, she was told which others joined (if any), and prompted to submit a vote for the coalition bid. (Bidders who did not join the coalition did not vote, nor did they observe the voting process.) The average of coalition votes was the coalition bid. The coalition bid was sent automatically from each coalition member to each seller and could not be changed during a round. In other words, coalitions did not bargain as a single unit; rather, the coalition prevented bidding wars by simply restricting the number of offers, a much simpler way to accomplish the same end.

During the bidding, the computer screen displayed a list of the coalition members and the coalition bid, whether or not the participant was a member. When only one bidder voted to join the coalition, the bidder was not bound by the coalition rules. However, the participant's screen identified the bidder as a coalition member. This allowed the participant to see which others were willing to join a coalition for that round and to signal to other bidders a willingness to join.

SIMULATED ACTOR STRATEGIES

Appendix B gives a detailed account of the simulated actors' strategies employed in games 1 and 2. The strategies were designed to appear highly realistic and to achieve two necessary objectives: (1) to generate bidding wars (which always occur in game 1, and also in game 2 if fewer than two low-power actors join the coalition) and (2) to give experimental control over the number of others who joined the coalition, thereby allowing a more parsimonious test of the hypotheses than would be possible if other positions were occupied by human participants. Manipulation checks (reported below) indicate that both objectives were fully realized.

EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS AND DEPENDENT MEASURES

The experiment used a two by three factorial design (one or two cooperative alters and three levels of identity: in-group, out-group, and none). Both factors were between-subject and were fully crossed. In addition, the multiple rounds in each stage allowed repeated within-subject measures of participant behavior.

TABLE 5: Schedule of Alters' Coalition Behavior in Game Two, by Treatment Condition

Round	One Alter Joins		Two Alters Join	
	B ₁	B ₂	B ₁	B ₂
1-2	C	D	C	C
3	D	C	C	D
4	C	D	D	C
5	D	D	C	D
6-15	C	D	C	C

Factor 1: Cooperative Alters

The first factor was the number of simulated bidders that typically joined the coalition. In the one-cooperator condition, B₁ almost always joined and B₂ almost always defected, with the exceptions noted in Table 5. In the two-cooperator condition, B₁ and B₂ always joined the coalition, with exceptions noted in Table 5. In both conditions, the exceptions occurred early in the game, in rounds 3 and 5, to suggest simulant exploration prior to fixing on a preferred strategy (see Appendix B). We analyzed participant behavior only in rounds 8-15, after participants were fully aware that the other players were locked into permanent roles as joiners or free-riders.¹³

We excluded the case of both simulants settling into a pattern of free riding because participant responses to this condition would provide no information that could be used to test our hypotheses. When no alters join, an actor should be indifferent between joining and not joining the coalition, given the inability of one-person coalitions to control bidding wars, as supported by our earlier study (Simpson & Macy 2001). Accordingly, all three models (self-interest, utilitarian, and collectivist) give identical predictions for cases in which no alters join the coalition. The predictions differ only for cases in which at least one alter joins the coalition.

Factor 2: Social Identity

We tested competing explanations for cooperation by manipulating participants' identification with incumbents of structurally equivalent positions in game 2. Shared fate (Sherif et al. 1961) has been shown to be a highly salient basis of identity, but it is very difficult to design an experiment that can prevent this effect from being confounded by self-interested responses to the incentive structure of the game. Therefore, in order to tease apart the effects of identity and incentives, we manipulated an attribute orthogonal to incentives to

strengthen or dampen identification with occupants of structurally equivalent positions.

Following a standard procedure (Kollock 1998), we varied the information given to participants about the school affiliation of the four other actors in the game. At the beginning of the experiment, participants in all conditions read "Students from [Large Private] University and [Small Private] College are participating in the study," but were given no other information until the conclusion of Game 1. (Actual school names were given to the participants but are deleted here.) Mentioning school affiliation early reduced the risk of later statements surprising participants. In addition, this statement made others' identity ambiguous in the no-identity conditions. After game 1, all participants read a statement that identified the roles they would play in game 2. This statement was modified slightly, in accord with the identity condition. The following passage identifies the modifications, with in-group information underlined, and the [out-group information] bracketed:

We are now ready to begin the second game, which will differ slightly from the first. Before the first game, you and two LPU [SPC] students were assigned to bidder roles, and two SPC [LPU] students were assigned to seller roles. In game 2, each participant will continue to occupy the same role s/he occupied in the first game. But in each round of game 2, bidders (You, B_1 and B_2) will be able to form a "bargaining coalition."

Alters' school affiliation was not referred to at any other point during the experiment.

In the in-group condition, participants decided whether to join a coalition with other bidders ostensibly from their own school (or in-group) against sellers from another local school (out-group). In this case, school-based and network-based identities were aligned. In the out-group condition, participants decided whether to join a coalition with bidders ostensibly from another local school (out-group) against sellers from their own school (in-group). In these conditions, school-based and network-based identities were in conflict. As a manipulation check on the effects of school affiliation (discussed below), we also included a no-information condition that eliminated reference to others' school affiliation before game 2.

The two fully crossed factors yielded six treatment groups. In each group, the primary dependent measure was whether the participant voted to join the coalition in each of 15 rounds of game 2. We also measured exchange ratios for games 1 and 2, but these were used primarily as manipulation checks (reported below).

After the 15 rounds of game 2, each participant was paid according to the number of points he/she accumulated during the study and then asked to complete a post-treatment survey. Survey responses identified six participants who failed to understand the instructions or who expressed suspicion about

the use of computer simulants. Data for these six participants were therefore isolated, leaving 108 participants (59 females and 49 males).¹⁴ A few weeks after the experiment, we mailed all participants a detailed explanation of the study, including all deceptive aspects.

Results

We report results in two parts, beginning with a discussion of the manipulation checks. We then report results from game 2 that test the hypotheses.

MANIPULATION CHECKS

A fair test of the hypotheses requires that two conditions be realized. First, we know from Cook and Gillmore's (1984) experiment that coalitions do not form under equal power conditions. Thus, in the absence of coalitions, bidding wars must produce sufficient power inequality to motivate coalitions. We used exchange ratios for game 1 to determine whether bidding wars produced the power inequalities needed to motivate coalition formation in game 2. Results show this condition was realized. The average exchange ratio for participants in game 1 was 17.9:6.1, favoring high-power actors, virtually identical to the ratio of 18:6 observed in previous studies of strong-power networks. It is important to note that these payoffs did not differ across low-power positions (i.e., between participants and simulants); nor did rates of exclusion.

Second, two-person and three-person coalitions must produce the expected exchange ratios with high-power actors, such that someone who free rides on a two-person coalition earns a higher payoff than does a member of a three-person coalition. The exchange ratios reported in Appendix C show that the observed payoff structure corresponded to the expected payoff matrix in Table 1. Thus, if we find that three-person coalitions are preferred over two-person coalitions, it cannot be because participants earned more by joining than by free riding.

As an additional check on the payoff structure required for the coalition game, we tested to make sure that shared school affiliation did not affect bargaining in the out-group condition (when participants shared school affiliation with high-power actors but not with other low-power actors). Lawler and Yoon (1998) found that exchange partners who were led to identify with each other agreed to less unequal exchange ratios than did partners who did not identify with each other. It was therefore important for our study that participants not identify with high-power actors in the out-group condition when they shared the same school affiliation, because this might alter bargaining behavior and distort the payoff schedule assumed in the predictions about coalition formation.

TABLE 6: Analysis of Variance in Cooperation, by Alters' Cooperation, Social Identity, and Gender

	In-group and Out-group		In-group Only	
	<i>F</i> (1, 108)	<i>p</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 108)	<i>p</i>
Gender (G)	.544	.46	.501	.48
Alters' Cooperation (AC)	4.972	.03	6.660	.01
In-group (IN)	5.306	.02	5.562	.02
Out-group (OUT)	.256	.61		
G × AC	.687	.41	.180	.67
G × IN	1.497	.22	.645	.42
AC × IN	1.708	.20	3.107	.08
G × OUT	1.021	.32		
G × AC × IN	3.655	.06	4.060	.05
G × AC × OUT	.093	.76		

To check this, we compared exchange outcomes in the out-group and no-information conditions. According to social identity theory, when social identity is salient, actors suppress perceptions of in-group differences. If (as we suspect) shared fate as low-power actors is more salient than school affiliation, participants can be expected to tune out information about school affiliation and continue to identify with other low-power actors even when they are from another school. In this case we should observe similar exchange outcomes in the out-group and no-information conditions. However, if school affiliation is more salient than shared fate, participants should ignore in-group differences in structural location and, in concord with Lawler and Yoon (1998), we should observe differences between exchange ratios in the no-information conditions and out-group conditions (where participants shared school affiliation with high-power actors).

Results strongly support the validity of the design. Game 2 exchange outcomes were nearly identical in the out-group and no-information conditions, regardless of coalition size. If participants in the out-group conditions had identified with high-power actors, payoffs from these conditions should have differed from the payoffs in the no-information conditions. That no comparison resulted in significant differences suggests that school affiliation was not a salient basis of identity between incumbents of low-and high-power positions in the out-group conditions.

As a final check on the design, we tested whether the out-group and no-information conditions differed in the rates of cooperation by participants. If we observe lower cooperation rates in the out-group condition (when affiliations of low-power actors differ) than in the no-information condition, we would be led to suspect that participants identified with high-power actors in the out-group condition, and the effects on bargaining behavior might then

TABLE 7: Analysis of Variance in Cooperation by Alters' Cooperation and Social Identity, for Females and Males

	Females				Males			
	In-group and Out-group		In-group Only		In-group and Out-group		In-group Only	
	<i>F</i> (1, 59)	<i>p</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 59)	<i>p</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 49)	<i>p</i>	<i>F</i> (1, 49)	<i>p</i>
Alters' cooperation (AC)	5.465	.02	5.123	.03	.845	.36	2.061	.16
In-group (IN)	6.898	.01	5.670	.02	.524	.47	1.073	.31
Out-group (OUT)	1.299	.26			.113	.74		
AC × IN	.203	.65	.036	.85	4.659	.04	6.326	.02
AC × OUT	.214	.65			.000	1.00		

violate the assumptions on which the predicted game payoffs are based. Again, results are highly reassuring. We found almost identical rates of cooperation in the out-group and no-information conditions, regardless of coalition size, a finding also supported in the analyses below.

GENDER, UTILITARIANISM, AND COLLECTIVISM

We analyzed cooperation rates for the final 8 of the 15 rounds of game 2. The analyses do not include the initial 7 rounds because, as detailed in Appendix B, the simulated buyers were programmed with a mixed strategy during rounds 1 to 5 of game 2. We therefore needed to give participants sufficient time to form strong expectations of alters' cooperation after the simulants had settled on a fixed strategy. We also wanted to give participants sufficient time to experience the effect of coalitions on bargaining. Extensive robustness checks (using still fewer rounds) give almost identical results.

Table 6 reports overall differences in coalition behavior in a 2 (gender) × 2 (cooperative alters: one vs. two) × 2 (a dummy variable, with the in-group coded as 1) × 2 (a dummy variable, with out-group coded as 1) ANOVA. As shown in the first column, the initial analysis revealed significant main effects for alters' cooperation ($p = .03$), and in-group ($p = .02$). However, both main effects were qualified by a three-way interaction between gender, in-group, and alters' cooperation ($p = .06$).

It is important to note that the out-group dummy variable revealed no effect ($p = .61$), nor did the term interact with any other variables ($p > .30$ for all interaction terms). On the basis of these results and the manipulation checks reported in the previous section, we therefore aggregated the out-group and no-information conditions into a single weak-identity category (in which shared fate is not reinforced by school affiliation). We compare this with a

FIGURE 4: Observed Cooperation Rates among Females





FIGURE 5: Observed Cooperation Rates among Males



strong-identity condition in which shared fate is reinforced by shared school affiliation (the in-group condition). This facilitates a more straightforward interpretation of interaction effects. (As a robustness check, we also report results with the two conditions disaggregated).

As shown in the rightmost columns of Table 6, the aggregated data yield very similar results, with significant main effects for alters' cooperation and in-group membership, and a significant three-way interaction between gender, identity, and alters' cooperation ($p = .05$). We therefore conducted separate analyses for males and females.

Table 7 reports the effects of alters' cooperation and social identity separately for males and females. The results are graphically depicted in Figures 4 and 5 for females and males, respectively. As in Table 6, the results are unaffected by aggregation of the out-group and no-identity treatments as a single weak-identity condition.

Hypothesis 1, based on the self-interest and utilitarian models, predicts a decrease in the rate of cooperation by participants as the number of cooperative alters increases from one to two. Table 7 reports a significant main effect of alters' cooperation among females ($p = .03$). However, Figure 4 shows that the effect is in the opposite direction from that predicted by hypothesis 1. Females' cooperation rates were higher when two alters cooperated, independent of social identity. Hypothesis 1 is also not supported among males. Data from males revealed no main effect for alters' cooperation ($p = .16$).

Hypothesis 2, based on the utilitarian model, predicts higher cooperation when social identity is reinforced by common school affiliation than when it is not. The self-interest and collectivist models predict no main effect. As shown in Table 7 (second column) and Figure 4, results from females yield strong support for this prediction. Cooperation rates were higher in the strong-identity (in-group) condition than in the two aggregated weak-identity conditions ($p = .02$).

As with hypothesis 1, results from males are inconsistent with the predicted main effect. As shown in the rightmost column of Table 7, there was no main effect of identity on cooperation ($p = .31$). Thus, data from females provide support for hypothesis 2 and the utilitarian model, while data from males support the collectivist model, which predicts no main effect.

Hypothesis 3, based on the collectivist model, predicts an interaction between identity and the number of cooperative alters. We found no interaction effect among females ($p = .85$), confirmed by the parallel lines in Figure 4. The slopes do not change with the strength of identity.

In striking contrast, Table 7 (rightmost column) and Figure 5 show strong support for the predicted interaction among males ($p = .02$). Here the effects of identity depend decisively on the number of cooperative alters, as predicted by the collectivist model. Social identity increased cooperation when two alters cooperated, but *decreased* cooperation when one alter cooperated.

In sum, data from females fit two of the predictions of the utilitarian model, the positive effect of social identity, and the absence of an interaction between identity and alters' cooperation. However, the main effect of alters' cooperation, while significant, was in the wrong direction, with female cooperation rates *higher* when two alters cooperated. This positive effect among females is consistent with the collectivist model. Even more striking was the fit between data from males and the collectivist model, clearly evident in a comparison of Figures 3 and 5. For males, social identity increased cooperation when two alters cooperated, but decreased cooperation when one alter cooperated.

The most plausible conclusion from these data is that identity matters, and it matters because it motivates an effort not only to increase in-group payoffs but also to decrease in-group inequality. The latter possibility is strongly suggested by social identity theory and research on the maximal distinctiveness hypothesis, but it has been curiously overlooked in previous research on identity and cooperation in social dilemmas.

Discussion

We argue that structure affects power through two mechanisms, one related to the *motivation* for collective action, the other to the *success* of collective action. The motivation for collective action results from bidding wars, based on actors' locations in social structures. The success of collective action, in turn, rests on solving the free-rider problem. In short, social structures determine power not only by shaping opportunities to exchange, but also by shaping opportunities to act collectively to counteract structural disadvantages.

This argument is not new. Collins (1985), for example, argues that unequal exchange between capital and labor reflects not only a structural asymmetry in the ability to exclude workers from access to the means of production, but also the structural constraints on the ability of workers to act collectively to protect themselves from exclusion. Similarly, Marx (1844) points to both the asymmetry between labor and capital in their dependence on exchange with each other, and the greater difficulty entailed in the organization of workers: "The capitalist can live longer without the worker than the worker can live without him. Combination among the capitalists is habitual and effective, while combination among the workers is forbidden and has painful consequences for them" (19).

Our work focuses on structures deliberately chosen to make collective action among low-power actors possible but uncertain. Consistent with the argument that networks constrain free riding on coalitions, we found less cooperation in the M-branch exchange network than was observed in the Cook and Gillmore (1984) study. However, we found that low-power actors were more likely to join than free-ride when two others joined a coalition, even though the

coalition needed only two members to obtain an equal exchange with a high-power actor.

The reluctance to free-ride does not, however, lead us to embrace the assumption that collective action to balance structural inequalities is unproblematic. On the contrary, we suspect that the explanation for the surprising frequency of three-person coalitions lies in another structural mechanism that researchers have largely overlooked. Social relations may not only structure *incentives* to bargain and organize, they may also structure social *identities*, based on perceptions of shared fate. Identification with occupants of structurally equivalent low-power positions leads actors to take into account the payoffs to others like themselves.

Although our theoretical interest centers on structural determinants of identity, it is difficult to tease apart the incentive and identity effects of structural disadvantage by manipulating network configurations. Any structure that assigns a shared fate to a set of positions also assigns an isomorphic common interest (Bonacich Bienenstock 1997). Therefore, we induced identification with (or against) other low-power positions using a cultural attribute — school affiliation — that is orthogonal to incentives and can be easily crossed with structural similarity.

We tested two specifications of the effects of social identity on payoff transformations. The utilitarian model assumes that utility functions take into account the payoffs to all in-group members. This is similar to the approach taken in most previous studies of the effect of identity on cooperation in social dilemmas. However, social identity theory suggests a somewhat more complicated mechanism: the maximization of group distinctiveness. Accordingly, we also tested a collectivist utility function that maximizes the mean payoff while giving equal weight to the similarity of payoffs among in-group members. We found support for both models, but not among the same participants. Females seem to respond to identity as a goal amplification effect (Kramer & Goldman 1995), while males respond as a goal transformation. Figure 4 shows that, for females, social identity simply increases baseline levels of cooperation. As shown in Figure 5, among males, the effect of identity on cooperation changes directions and depends on the number of cooperative alters.

Most important, when social identity was salient, both males and females were much more likely to cooperate when two alters cooperated than when one alter cooperated. This is clearly contrary to the dictates of pure self-interest. It also contradicts the utilitarian model based on the maximization of group interests. Instead, the results support the collectivist model in which in-group members also seek to maximize similarity within. Although this possibility has strong theoretical and empirical support in other avenues of social identity research, it has been overlooked in previous studies of identity and cooperation in social dilemmas. Our findings suggest that future work in this area needs to

consider not only the effects of identity on the level of in-group payoffs but also on the variance.

GENDER AND COALITIONS

Although gender differences are not the focus of this study, some related research led us to anticipate this possibility, clearly confirmed in Figures 4 and 5. It is important to note that the gender differences are evident primarily in the personal identity (self-interest) conditions, contrary to the finding by Kramer and Brewer (1984) that males and females responded differently to manipulation of social identity. Our results are consistent, however, with recent research on males' greater responsiveness to the greed component in social dilemmas (Simpson 2003). Our coalition design tempted participants with an opportunity to free-ride (greed) but did not pose a risk of being suckered (fear). Comparison of Figures 4 and 5 shows that in the weak identity conditions, when payoffs to self are relatively more important, males are more likely than females to take the bait. In the social identity conditions, when payoffs to alter become more salient, the temptation diminishes and so too does the difference between male and female behavior. Thus, the gender differences from this study are consistent with those reported by Simpson (2003) for a different type of collective action setting.¹⁵

Conclusion

This study breaks new ground by bringing collective action back into the study of structural disadvantage. As such, we invite readers to regard these results as tentative. The important lesson to draw from this research is the need for much more attention to a problem that has been badly neglected. We therefore conclude by identifying the directions for future work we see as most pressing.

Foremost, we need to find ways to directly manipulate the structural basis of identity. While the use of school affiliation to induce in-group bias is a useful starting point, it is clearly not an adequate test of a structural theory of identity. We assume that school affiliation reinforces identification with other low-power actors, much the way union affiliation reinforces class identification with other structurally disadvantaged workers. However, we do not have a direct test of the theory of structural sources of identity. Having found strong indirect support for the theory, we plan a follow-up study to test whether structural equivalence can produce similar effects when actors share no other basis of identity.

We also see the need for research that more fully explores the effects of social identity on coalition joining. Our study is limited to utility functions that take into account the payoffs to in-group members. This is a convenient starting

point because it integrates the effects of incentives and identities within a single formal model. However, identity may have other important effects on participation in coalitions, such as increasing the expectation that others will cooperate (Yamagishi & Kiyonari 2000), or increasing feelings of guilt for free riding on cooperative members of the in-group (as suggested by one reviewer).

The effects of social identity reinforce Bonacich and Friedkin's (1998) call for the explicit incorporation of extraegoistic motives into models of exchange networks. These motives "have been viewed as confounding the study of structural effects, but they may be worth including as part of the specification of a general social exchange model" (170). More generally, as noted by Emerson (1987), sociological models of exchange differ decisively from economic models of a fully connected market by theorizing interactions embedded in a web of social relationships. Yet social exchange theory has been reluctant to abandon the economic model of the self-interested actor. Recent exceptions (Cook & Hegtvedt 1986; Lawler & Yoon 1998) demonstrate the need for a relational conception of the actor, in which behavior is influenced by social ties to significant others.

We also need to know more about the return path, in which behavior alters the structure of social ties. Actors often can and do form coalitions to successfully transform power structures and countervail existing power inequalities. Exchange network theories must move away from the traditional conception of social structure as fixed and unyielding. Our study is only a first step in this direction; much remains to be done. For example, we did not allow countermobilization by high-power actors, either via the formation of countercoalitions (see Borch & Willer 2001) or by divide-and-rule tactics (such as collaboration with free riders). These are important directions for future research, but we caution that Emerson's balancing processes need to be better understood before we complicate the picture with counterbalancing.

A related point is that future research needs to address questions from the social psychological literature on coalitions, such as what rules coalition members use to divide resources (Gamson 1961; Komorita & Chertkoff 1973). In our coalition design, profits from coalition members' exchanges were redistributed automatically and equally to all members. Given that low-power positions in our study were structurally equivalent, no actor had a *structural* basis for making claims to a larger share of coalition earnings. Thus, the equal redistribution rule is a reasonable simplification in the current context. The assumption is less tenable, however, for networks in which potential coalition members are not structurally equivalent and, as a result, may have different effects on coalition success. We expect rules governing intra-coalition resource distribution will be especially important in these networks. More generally, future research might fruitfully employ a network exchange approach to

illuminate the *structural* determinants of the processes that have long concerned social psychologists interested in coalitions.

Our results also suggest new directions for the growing body of literature on socially embedded collective action (Marwell, Oliver & Prahl 1988; Snow, Zurcher & Ekland-Olson 1980). These studies show how networks help *solve* collective action problems. The possibility that networks might *create* these problems remains largely unexplored. Moreover, we need to explore how these effects vary with network structure. The motivation for staying outside the coalition depends decisively on the shape of the network structure (Bonacich 1995; Willer & Skvoretz 1997). For example, Willer and Skvoretz (1997) show that coalition formation in some networks poses an assurance game, characterized by fear but not greed. Recent research (Simpson 2003) found no gender differences in games like Assurance, while we found that males and females respond differently in a chicken-like game characterized by greed but not fear. Future research should further explore the possibility that the effects of gender and social identity depend on the incentive structure of network configurations.

In closing, we hope our research has shed new light on the dynamic and reciprocal relation between network structure and the ability to organize as well as bargain. We also hope these early findings will encourage others to bring collective action back into sociological research on power in social exchange.

APPENDIX A: Translating Payoffs into Cooperation Rates

We assume that, for any given rate at which players discount future payoffs, the larger the difference in utility across immediate choices, the greater the probability that players will choose the strategy with the higher utility. We formalize this using Harsanyi's (1973) purification theorem, which gives probabilities for cooperation based on smoothed best responses, given random payoff perturbations (Fudenberg & Levine 1999). In other words, we assume that a choice between two strategies with almost identical utilities will be much closer to 0.5 probability than to 1.0, as would be the case if we assumed strict preference.

More precisely, let $U_i(S)$ represent the utility of strategy S for player i , where $S = [C,D]$. (We assume for the moment that utility is the same as the payoff for a given strategy.) We then norm the utility of cooperation as

$$v_i = \frac{U_i(C)}{U_i(C) + U_i(D)} \tag{A1}$$

and then derive the probability p that i cooperates as

$$p_i = \frac{1}{1 + e^{(1-2v_i)M}} \tag{A2}$$

where M is a slope parameter for the cumulative logistic function and $M > 1$. If $M = 1$, the function approaches linearity such that an increase in the relative payoff yields a proportional increase in the likelihood of cooperation (but within a truncated range). As M increases, the function approaches the discrete step function for deterministic strict preference, in which values around the inflection point produce large shifts in the probability of cooperation. We chose an intermediate value, $M = 5$, that preserves the strict-preference tipping point but relaxes the deterministic prediction. At $M = 5$ the stochastic function is sigmoid and approximates a cumulative normal logistic function. Application of this function to the utilities given in Tables 1–3 results in the predicted cooperation rates given in the rightmost column of each table.

APPENDIX B: Simulated Actor Strategies

The strategies of simulants were based on previous studies using programmed actors (Cook & Gillmore 1984; Willer & Skvoretz 1997). Programmed sellers accepted their highest offers; and chose randomly among tied offers. These strategies were then evaluated and refined in pretests to appear highly realistic. A seller monitored changes in its best offer as bidding continued. Pretests suggested that allowing sellers to accept a few offers prematurely increased realism. Otherwise, sellers waited until the value of the best offer stopped increasing, indicating that bidding had stopped or slowed. Sellers followed this bargaining algorithm throughout the experiment with two exceptions. To prevent mechanistic behavior, we programmed one of the two sellers to deviate from the algorithm in rounds 4 and 8. In these two rounds, this seller refused all offers if the best offer was less than 20 points.

During game 1, simulated bidders used a Monte Carlo algorithm to choose an initial offer, with a normal probability distribution centered on the value of its exchange in the previous round, with a range of ± 3 . Specifically, imagine that B1 and S1 exchanged at 13:11 (favoring S1) at round t . Then at $t + 1$, B1 offered 13 (with $p = .25$); 12 or 14 (each with $p = .1875$), 11 or 15 ($p = .125$) or 10 or 16 ($p = .0625$). If B1 did not exchange the previous round, its initial offers were based on B2's exchange outcome. If B2 did not exchange, B1's initial offers were based on the subject's exchange. For the first round, a previous exchange ratio of 12:12 was assumed.

After initial offers, each simulated bidder responded to competing offers from other bidders using a similar Monte Carlo algorithm, but with the probability distribution now centered on an expected offer that was one point more than the competing offer, with a range of -1 to $+3$. If the subject exchanged before both simulated bidders, the simulants responded to each other's offers until a chance refusal to outbid triggered acceptance by one of the simulated sellers. Thus, the participant observed the bidding process continuing if she exchanged first.

The Monte Carlo methods prevented the appearance of mechanistic behavior by the simulated bidders. To add to realism, simulants did not immediately respond to competing offers but instead adjusted their offers at randomly selected intervals. These delays prevented simulants from appearing overly responsive to the participant's actions and ensured that the participant and each simulant were included in about the same number of exchanges, which would be expected if all bidder positions were occupied by human actors.

In game 2, the simulated bidders voted whether to join the coalition. Simulant voting was predetermined, based on the treatment condition (see text) and the round, as shown in Table 5. These decisions were one of the experimental manipulations, and the rationale is elaborated below in the discussion of the treatment conditions. Note that simulants were programmed with a mixed strategy early in game 2 (with deviations in rounds 3 and 5), to give the impression that they were exploring their options before settling on a pure strategy.

If fewer than two bidders joined a coalition, the simulants used the same bidding strategies as in game 1. However, if two or more bidders formed a coalition, the simulated coalition members voted on the coalition bid using a Monte Carlo algorithm, with a normal probability distribution centered on the last group vote and with a range of ± 3 . Finally, if the participant and one simulated bidder formed a coalition and the other simulant did not, the simulated free rider used the same Monte Carlo bidding algorithm as in game 1, with an expectation of beating the coalition offer by 1 point.

TABLE A-1: Observed Payoffs (Not Transformed) and Predicted Probability of Cooperation As Smoothed Best Reply

Number of Cooperative Alters (B ₁ and B ₂)	B ₃ 's Strategy		Probability of Cooperation
	C	D	
0	6.6 6.6, 6.6	6.9 6.9, 6.6	.47
1	8.2 15.15, 8.2	6.4 6.4, 6.4	.65
2	11.11 11.11, 11.11	15.15 8.2, 8.2	.32

Notes: Values given in bold are payoffs to B₃, the focal actor. B₁, B₂, and B₃ are as defined in Figure 1.

APPENDIX C: Coalition Payoffs in Game 2

We used exchange ratios for game 2, broken down by coalition size, to determine whether the observed incentive structure corresponded to the incentives derived from the theory of countervailing power (Table 1). Manipulation checks confirm the similarity of the incentive structures.

The observed payoffs from game 2 are reported in Table A1. These payoffs show that free riding on a two-person coalition yields a better payoff than cooperating with two others. Similarly, two-person coalitions yield a better payoff to members than defecting when one other cooperates. As can be seen by comparing Table A1 with Table 1, for each coalition size, the observed payoffs are about 3 points greater than the corresponding prediction, but the ordinal relationship is preserved, leaving the observed marginal returns for cooperation very close to the predicted values. Indeed, the marginal return for cooperation when two alters join the coalition is actually even more strongly negative (−4.04) than predicted (−3).

Notes

1. For an overview of social exchange theories, see Molm and Cook (1995). For representative studies, see Cook and colleagues (1983), Bienenstock and Bonacich (1992), Friedkin (1992), Markovsky, Willer, and Patton (1988), and Whitmeyer (1999).
2. The nonmember is a free rider in that she enjoys the public benefits of coalition formation while avoiding the private costs associated with joining the coalition. A familiar example in natural settings is the worker who enjoys the benefits of a union while refusing to join and pay dues.
3. Following Lawler and Yoon (1998), our research is based on social identity theory, rather than role-identity or collective-identity theory. In very broad strokes, the three

approaches focus on three sources of identity: groups, roles, and shared beliefs/commitments. Differences between these three approaches are discussed by Stryker (2000). Klandermans and de Weerd (2000) compare collective- and social-identity theories in application to collective action. We leave exploration of alternative theories (and sources) of identity in coalition formation to future research.

4. Utilitarianism and collectivism are not the only possible payoff transformations. Other possibilities are rational altruism ("maximize the payoffs to other in-group members without regard to your own") egalitarianism ("minimize the differences in payoffs to all in-group members, regardless of the mean"), and competitiveness ("maximize differences in payoffs to in-group and out-group, without regard to individual members' outcomes"). Our focus on the utilitarian and collectivist models is based on previous research by Brewer, Kollock, Yamagishi, and others; we leave other possible specifications for future research.

5. The maximal distinctiveness hypothesis complements Brewer's theory of optimal distinctiveness, which "postulates that social identification is derived from the opposing forces of two universal human motives — the need for inclusion and assimilation on the one hand and the need for differentiation from others on the other The need for inclusion/belonging is met within the in-group; the need for differentiation, by distinctions between in-groups and out-groups" (Brewer & Silver 2000:155). Thus, while optimal distinctiveness determines the *level* or *basis* of social identification, maximal distinctiveness processes are consequences of these "optimally distinct" in-group/out-group distinctions.

6. See Van Lange (1999) for a similar formal specification of how prosocial actors strike a balance between joint outcomes and equality of outcomes.

7. For a formal derivation of this coalition game, see Simpson and Macy (2001). For related discussion of the social dilemmas entailed in coalition formation in exchange networks, see Bonacich (1995) and Willer and Skvoretz (1997). For a theory of "who forms coalitions with whom," see Bonacich (2000).

8. Why does the coalition settle for one exchange rather than offer fourteen and try to outbid the free rider for the second exchange? The free rider only has to outbid the lower of the coalition's two offers to avoid exclusion. Thus, the coalition is better off earning 12 points in one exchange than excluding the free rider by making two offers that are so high the free rider cannot improve on the lower of the two offers.

9. In a weak Nash equilibrium, unilateral deviation does not change the payoff. In the M-branch coalition game, zero cooperation is a weak Nash equilibrium. At zero cooperation, players are indifferent between defection and unilaterally switching to cooperation. However, should one player cooperate out of indifference, the others will no longer be indifferent and will now prefer cooperation.

10. We used the M-branch network, which contains five positions, but only four participants were scheduled for each session. However, the arrangement of partitions ensured that participants could not tell how many others were in the laboratory.

11. We decided against using the simpler network used in our previous work, which contained one high power actor who could exchange with any two of three low-power

actors. Although that network is behaviorally equivalent to the M branch used in this study, we didn't use the simpler structure because, unlike the M branch, using it would have required us to explain to participants that some positions could exchange only once, while others could exchange more than once. More substantively, we wanted to use a network that made salient in-group/out-group distinctions and felt that a group of two high-power actors would be more salient than a group of one.

12. Most network exchange experiments allow all positions to make offers and counter-offers. While it is relatively straightforward to create realistic simulated bidders that respond convincingly to a participant's offers, it is much more difficult to create simulated sellers that react to participants' offers with credible counter-offers and related negotiation activity. Thus, as in our previous work and related work by Willer and Skvoretz (1997), only bidders were allowed to make offers. Sellers could either accept standing offers or refuse them. It is important to note that Willer and Skvoretz (1997) show that such decision strategies on the part of simulated high-power actors produce power inequalities similar to those that emerge when high-power positions are occupied by human actors who *can* make offers.

13. Alternatively we could have provided participants with knowledge of others' cooperation by using sequential play with rotating order. However, this would allow two-person coalitions with rotating opportunities to free-ride, yielding equal payoffs to all in-group members. Equal payoffs with two-person coalitions would preclude a test of the collectivist model.

14. The post-treatment survey detected suspicion by asking participants to describe any aspect of the study they found hard to believe. This item may overestimate suspicion by motivating participants to search post hoc for deceptive aspects of the study. Reanalysis with suspicious participants included gave virtually identical results. This suggests that suspicion may have been induced by the survey item or suspicious participants became immersed in role-playing. For example, one participant who suspected the other bidders were fake nevertheless responded to a subsequent item that asked about motives for joining the coalition by stating "I joined to try and establish a bond with the other players, so that we could work together."

15. One reviewer asked whether the gender differences observed in this study may have resulted from the use of competitive terms such as *market* and *bidders*, or by our manipulation of identity using school affiliation (which may be associated with athletic rivalries and hence may be more important to males). However, a gender difference in the salience of school affiliation would lead us to expect gender differences in coalition behavior in the in-group condition — a difference we did not observe. It is more difficult to rule out the possibility that gender differences were induced by the framing of the situation as a competitive market exchange. However, gender differences have not been observed in a number of exchange studies using similar market-like scenarios (Kollock 1994; Lawler & Yoon 1998).

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Concentration and Diversity Revisited: Production Logics and the U.S. Mainstream Recording Market, 1940-1990*

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Abstract

What shapes the diversity of media markets? A literature on the U.S. recording industry offers competing accounts. The cyclical account stresses the negative effect of market concentration, where high concentration dampens diversity. The open system account stresses a mitigated effect, where the logic of decentralized production reduces concentration's negative effect. However, both accounts contain notable gaps. This article fills these gaps and consequently advances this literature. Most notably, it adjudicates these accounts by analyzing time series data on two carriers of diversity: performing acts and recording firms. When decentralized production is low, as in the 1940s, high concentration reduces the number of new performers and new firms. When decentralized production grows more pronounced, as in the 1980s, concentration's negative effect is reduced and eventually eliminated.

When considering media production, social scientists have long been concerned with the issue of diversity. Their concern is justified by three empirical tendencies. First, the products that media firms offer are but a small fraction of the potential products. For example, news media do not report on all that is newsworthy (e.g., Clayman & Reisner 1998; McCarthy, McPhail & Smith 1996), nor do recording firms offer products that fully exhaust the extant

** I am indebted to the Emory University Research Committee for its financial support and the Record Industry Association of America for providing information. I thank the following for their helpful comments: Courtney Bender, Maureen Blyler, Anne Borden, Terry Boswell, Hildie Cohen, Paul DiMaggio, Frank Dobbin, Paul Jean, Cathy Johnson, Rodney Lacey, Michèle Lamont, Frank Lechner, Kathy Liddle, Kim Lupo, Jenna Nelson, Reed E. Nelson, Damon Phillips, Huggy Rao, Lauren Rauscher, Cesar Rebellon, Eric Riles, Marc Schneiberg, Tracy Scott, Jamal Shamsie, Kees van Rees, Marc Ventresca, Bob Wuthnow, and the anonymous reviewers. I especially thank Alex Hicks for his suggestions and methodological insights. Direct correspondence to Timothy J. Dowd, Department of Sociology, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322. E-mail: tdowd@emory.edu.*

range of musical styles (e.g., Negus 1999; Peterson 1997). Second, media firms — especially established ones — face inertial pressures in the production process. As a result, major film studios tend to release products that resemble past successes (e.g., Baker & Faulkner 1991; Litman 1998). While these two tendencies constrain diversity, the final tendency promotes it: Media firms sometimes expand their range of products. In comparison to the past, for instance, news media are now more likely to offer critical coverage and commentary (Schudson 1978, 1995), recording firms are more likely to release the music of black performers (Dowd 2003), and film studios are more likely to offer works that are deemed art (Bauman 2001). Given these tendencies, numerous scholars have sought to *explain* the level of diversity found in media production, especially its historical waxing and waning. Their explanations have touted a variety of factors, including hegemony (e.g., DiMaggio 1977; Gamson et al. 1992).¹

One literature has proven to be especially influential in the study of media diversity. Its contributors have focused on the U.S. recording industry while drawing on intellectual traditions that range from economics to cultural sociology (Dowd 2000; Peterson & Berger 1996). One notable feature of this literature is its conceptual clarity. Building on the seminal study of Peterson and Berger (1975), its contributors examine how diversity in the recording industry is reduced by “market concentration” — the extent to which a few firms dominate a market. They have clearly specified, then, at least one factor that can account for the waxing and waning of diversity. This clarity also extends to the outcome of interest. Contributors propose that “diversity” rises when there is increasing variability among the recording industry’s content or producers. In analyzing the content of recordings, they have relied on such indicators as the range of lyrical themes and the extent of musical dissimilarity — where high scores for either indicator denote greater diversity (Dowd 2000; Peterson & Berger 1972, 1975). In studying producers, they have turned to such indicators as the number of recording firms and racial heterogeneity among performers — where high scores denote greater diversity (Dowd & Blyler 2002; Rothenbuhler & Dimmick 1982). Another notable feature of this literature is its potential generalizability, as many media industries are marked by shifting levels of market concentration (Bagdikian 2000; Kaestle 1991).

Others have noted the general contributions of this literature on the U.S. recording industry (e.g., Crane 1992; DiMaggio 2000). I suggest that this literature is also important because its competing accounts hold implications for the study of hegemony. Consider first the competing accounts. Although all the contributors to this literature explore market concentration, they nevertheless diverge in their portrayal of the effect of market concentration. Proponents of the cyclical account propose a negative effect, where high concentration squelches diversity. This negative effect plays out in a cyclical fashion: long periods of high concentration and low diversity are punctuated

by short spells of low concentration and high diversity (Peterson & Berger 1975). Proponents of the open system account posit a mitigated effect. When centralized production prevails, as it did in the 1940s, high concentration dampens diversity; when decentralized production prevails, as it did in the 1980s, the negative effect of high concentration is reduced if not eliminated (Dowd 2000; Lopes 1992).

These accounts address the issue of hegemony. Recent works note the ability of powerful media firms to co-opt once marginal and even oppositional forms of music (Hesmondhalgh 1998a, 1998b; Seiler 2000). The cyclical account is possibly at odds with such works. It predicts that greater diversity does not occur until the power of dominant firms is momentarily ruptured. The open system account resonates with such works, as it predicts that greater diversity can occur when dominant firms ably absorb an expanding range of producers and genres. Moreover, this account offers a mechanism (i.e., the expansion of decentralized production) by which the hegemonic process occurs.

Despite its influence and importance, the literature on the U.S. recording industry is plagued by three gaps. Two result from methodological limitations. First, previous studies have usually relied on descriptive statistics and have rarely employed multivariate analysis. As a result, most have not statistically controlled for other factors that could likewise shape diversity in the U.S. recording industry. Recent studies offer exceptions: They find that concentration has an effect on diversity, but it is not the sole effect. For example, musical diversity is also fostered by performer autonomy (Dowd 2000), and the racial diversity of performers is reduced in periods of industry recession (Dowd & Blyler 2002). This gap thus raises the question of robustness: Do the cyclical and open system accounts fare well in the presence of *other* factors that could explain the waxing and waning of diversity? Second, to my knowledge, no study has statistically modeled the interaction between concentration and decentralized production — the interaction that distinguishes the open system from the cyclical account. Dowd and Blyler (2002) come close when demonstrating that, on the one hand, rising concentration reduces the racial diversity of performers and, on the other hand, the expansion of decentralized production increases racial diversity. This second gap raises the issue of relative strength: Does the open system account, with its mitigated effect, offer a better explanation than the cyclical account?

The final gap results from a substantive omission. Although a few studies have recently offered multivariate analyses of musical diversity and the racial diversity of performers (Dowd 2000; Dowd & Blyler 2002), the literature apparently lacks such analyses for new performing acts and recording firms. That is, none has demonstrated whether concentration has any *independent* impact on the number of acts and firms. This is unfortunate because contributors to this literature agree that performing acts and recording firms are important “carriers” of content diversity. Indeed, historical studies show that the musical contributions of new performers and firms have transformed

the U.S. recording industry (Dowd 2003; Kennedy 1994; Peterson 1997). Besides issues of robustness and relative strength, then, this final gap raises a fundamental question: Does either the cyclical or open system account sufficiently explain when one should expect to see a flurry of new performing acts and recording firms?

The present study fills these gaps. Furthermore, as detailed below, it extends the open system account by offering an argument regarding the cooptation of musical styles within the mainstream market. It does so by analyzing time series data on the number of new performing acts and recording firms in the mainstream market and by avoiding the methodological limitations listed above. The following comments offer clarification. "Performing act" refers to musicians or vocalists who have signed recording contracts with recording firms (Denisoff & Bridges 1982), and "recording firm" refers to the organizational entity that, among other things, releases a recording (Negus 1999). "Mainstream" refers to the largest market for musical recordings in the U.S. (Dowd 2000; see Appendix). "New" acts and firms are those that enjoy first-time success in the mainstream market (see Lopes 1992). Finally, because of the paucity of market-level data on performers and firms, proponents of the competing accounts have tracked the mainstream market via the popularity charts of *Billboard* (see Appendix). By summarizing weekly sales and airplay of recordings, these charts detail which acts and firms enjoyed mainstream success in a given week and, consequently, which ones enjoyed first-time success (see Anand & Peterson 2000; Ennis 1992). The time series data for this study track all acts and firms responsible for the 22,561 recordings found on *Billboard's* mainstream charts from 1940 to 1990.

Competing Accounts Regarding Diversity in the U.S. Recording Industry

Two types of record firms figure prominently in the cyclical and open system accounts: majors and independents. Majors typically are large corporations that dominate the market's output and earnings. Each major can easily manufacture recordings and rapidly distribute them nationally and internationally. Independents are small in comparison and, typically, are privately owned. They have the resources to create musical recordings, but they often lack sufficient resources to manufacture numerous copies or to distribute these copies across the U.S. (King 1966; Negus 1999; Sanjek 1988).

Two outcomes figure in this literature: diversity and innovation. Peterson and Berger (1975), for example, discussed how concentration affects diversity, and in the process, they proposed several indicators of diversity. Some have followed Peterson and Berger's example and focused only on indicators of diversity — including the number of new acts (Burnett 1990). Others, however, have offered indicators of both diversity and innovation — with new acts

sometimes serving as an indicator of innovation (Lopes 1992). Because the predictions embraced by Lopes are symmetrical (i.e., because concentration has a similar impact on diversity and innovation), the use of new acts as an indicator of either diversity or innovation is not problematic. Nevertheless, this article uses the distinction offered by DiMaggio and Stenberg (1985): diversity is an outcome associated with aggregates while innovation is an outcome associated with individual units. Hence, I treat the number of new acts and new firms as indicators of diversity in the mainstream market.

THE CYCLICAL ACCOUNT

Origins

The cyclical account has its roots in economic research on market innovation. Schumpeter (1936, 1976) provided the initial argument that large firms are more innovative than small firms, as they have the financial capacities to pursue extensive research and to absorb costs associated with development. Large firms, then, are the motors of market change. A number of economists subsequently disagreed. They argued that the nature of bigness — which includes extensive hierarchy — often leads to inertia rather than innovation (see Adams & Brock 1986). By logical extension, innovation and diversity suffer when a few large firms dominate a market (see Bain 1956; Greer 1992).

Peterson and Berger (1975, 1996) explicitly drew on the above economic research when positing that concentration shapes the amount of diversity found in media markets. Diversity wanes in times of high market concentration, they argued, whereas it increases in times of low concentration. Peterson and Berger substantiated their argument by examining several indicators of diversity in the mainstream recording market — including the number of new acts and the proliferation of competing firms. They found that, between 1948 and 1973, new acts generally declined as concentration levels increased. “In a period of oligopolist control [i.e., high concentration], one would expect the introduction of few ‘new’ products, in this case new performers” (Peterson & Berger 1975:163). They likewise found that the number of competing firms declined in periods of high concentration. They wrote, “increased competition among music producers [i.e., recording firms] should make for greater diversity of product” (Peterson and Berger 1975:165). Their article presaged research on other media markets that also posits a negative relationship between concentration and diversity (Adams & Brock 1989; Bagdikian 2000; Dominick 1987; Dominick & Pearce 1976; Ryan 1985).

Basic Argument

Peterson and Berger (1972, 1975) augmented their “concentration-diversity” proposition with an informed historical perspective. They argued that the effect of concentration is embedded in a cyclical pattern. Long periods of high concentration and low diversity are separated by short periods of low concentration and high diversity. Long periods of concentration occur as majors thwart independents by commandeering both artistic talent and distribution channels. Fearing no competitive reprisals, the conservative majors stress the types of musical products that generated past success rather than attending to the shifting demands of current consumers. Short periods of competition occur when unique historical factors produce a gap in the majors’ control. Independents exploit these factors in order to gain access to a wide consumer audience. This access produces a flurry of attention from consumers whose tastes are not served by the majors, thus initiating a period of competition and diversity that lasts until the majors absorb this new challenge.

Historical Application

Peterson and Berger (1975; see also Peterson 1990) used the cyclical account to explain dramatic changes in the mainstream market of the 1950s. Prior to this time, the majors stressed the styles of song that had generated past success while intentionally avoiding the emergent styles of rhythm and blues and rock and roll. The conservatism of the majors, then, led them to downplay growing demand for these emergent styles and the performers who specialized in them. Independents, however, were more than happy to exploit the realignment of mainstream demand, for they had long emphasized the styles and performers that many teens now preferred. These small firms benefited from a confluence of historical developments — such as the explosive proliferation of radio stations that targeted teens. Atlantic, Chess, and a host of other independents quickly prospered and spurred the success of rock and roll and rhythm and blues in the mainstream (see also Gillett 1983). Their collective success severely challenged the dominance of the majors. Hence, according to Peterson and Berger, a period of diversity and low concentration emerged around 1955 in the mainstream market, which included a proliferation of new performers and recording firms.

The majors were slow to respond to their newly competitive market, for they expected that tastes for rhythm and blues and rock and roll would subside (Peterson & Berger 1975). Several years later, the majors realized that these tastes represented a permanent fixture, and they took steps to quash the success of the independents. For instance, the majors eventually lured newly successful acts away from the independents that had discovered them (see also Gillett 1983). Another long period of high concentration and low diversity followed,

Peterson and Berger argued, as the majors reestablished their dominance during the 1960s and early 1970s.

While Peterson and Berger's (1975) analysis ended with 1973, they speculated about the post-1973 market. They noted that the negative relationship between concentration and diversity showed signs of weakening in the early 1970s, as majors aggressively sought to address a wide range of musical styles. Given their cyclical account, however, Peterson and Berger suggested that concentration would rise again and prompt a decline in diversity. Others have since concurred, suggesting that the post-1973 mainstream market has returned to a period of high concentration and low diversity. A reduced number of acts and firms are but two manifestations of this low diversity (Alexander 1990, 1994; Black & Greer 1987; Horner 1991; Rothenbuhler & Dimmick 1982). If the cyclical account holds for 1940 to 1990, and if the number of new acts and firms are reasonable measures of diversity, the following should hold:

Hypothesis 1. Concentration will have a negative effect on the number of (a) new performing acts and (b) new recording firms.

THE OPEN SYSTEM ACCOUNT

Origins

I suggest that the roots of the open system account lay in the more general post-WWII movement of U.S. firms toward decentralized production — a movement documented in organizational studies (e.g., Hollingsworth 1991; Kanter 1991; Powell 1990). Rather than stressing production capabilities that served them well in the stable past, some large firms now stress information capabilities that help them negotiate the unstable present. Consequently, such firms seek to reduce the centralized hierarchies that slow both the processing of information and the implementing of change. The result has been the proliferation of semi-autonomous divisions within firms and the establishment of numerous alliances between firms. Such decentralization supposedly allows large firms to emulate the adaptability of small firms without sacrificing advantages associated with size. Open system proponents add to organizational studies by heeding the shift toward decentralized production in the U.S. recording industry (Burnett 1990, 1992; Burnett & Weber 1990; Dowd 2000; Dowd & Blyler 2002; Frith 1987, 1988; Hellman 1983; Lopes 1992).²

Basic Argument

Open system proponents argue that the effect of concentration is mitigated by the reigning logic of production.³ In an earlier era of centralized production (i.e., a closed system), the majors relied on an extensive bureaucracy in the

production of recordings and simultaneously sought to limit the success of independents. High concentration levels resulted when majors succeeded, which led to reduced diversity in the mainstream market. The logic of centralized production therefore created the situation described by Peterson and Berger (1975). However, the conservatism engendered by centralized production created unmet demand that independents could exploit when given the chance. Indeed, the ability of the independents to exploit such demand eventually prompted the turn to decentralized production (Dowd 2000; Dowd & Blyler 2002; see Frith 1988).

In the era of decentralized production (i.e., an open system), the majors have dismantled once-sizable bureaucracies by turning to freelance producers, establishing a host of semi-autonomous divisions (i.e., subsidiary labels⁴), and pursuing contractual alliances with numerous independents. Because of this decentralization, the majors are organizationally prepared for addressing the changing tastes that eluded them in the past. The logic of decentralized production has thus led to a situation that departs from the prediction of cyclical proponents. "The cycles have changed into symbiosis. The new state of competition has to some extent created a musical culture richer in variation" (Hellman 1983:355). In particular, the negative effect of concentration is reduced, if not eliminated, when majors successfully employ decentralized production (Dowd 2000; Dowd & Blyler 2002; Lopes 1992). The recent findings of open system proponents complement research on other media markets, which also shows that production factors can promote diversity and/or offset concentration's negative effect (e.g., Barnes & Thomson 1994; Hellman & Soramaki 1985; Kaestle 1991; Powell 1985; Simonet 1987).

Open system proponents have focused on different moments in the shift to decentralized production. Early work emphasized the 1980s, when the negative effect of concentration had waned or disappeared (Burnett 1990, 1992; Burnett & Weber 1990; Frith 1988; Lopes 1992). This article follows recent work emphasizing the origins of decentralized production in the mid-1950s and its subsequent expansion (Dowd 2000; Dowd & Blyler 2002). In the next section, I show how the decades-long expansion of decentralized production offset concentration's negative effect, drawing on historical materials on performers and firms in the mainstream market.

I make one caveat before proceeding. The shift to decentralized production that began in the mid-1950s was not without precedent in the recording industry. In the early 1900s, recording firms sometimes operated with numerous labels. This allowed them to offer different lines of recordings for particular consumers (e.g., rural whites, blacks), locales, and/or retailers. This early form of decentralized production declined as the industry nearly met its demise in the 1930s, when it faced the Great Depression and other challenges. As the recording industry rebounded in the late 1930s and early

1940s, centralized production quickly became the standard. At that time, the majors would deactivate or underutilize once notable subsidiary labels (Dowd 2003; Lopes 2002; Sutton 2000).

Historical Application

I argue that the open system account explains both the musical rupture of the 1950s, when rhythm and blues and rock and roll erupted in the mainstream market, and the musical expansion that occurred in subsequent decades — when a variety of musical genres (e.g., hip hop) were absorbed into the mainstream market. To make this argument, I spend time detailing the historical specifics. But first, I give a brief overview. The logic of production plays a central role in this explanation. In the 1940s and early 1950s, centralized production fostered among the majors a conservative approach to their performing acts and an antagonistic approach to their small competitors. The fragile dominance that resulted was sorely challenged as mainstream demand shifted to rhythm and blues and rock and roll — styles in which the conservative majors were not well versed. This spelled the doom of centralized production. From the mid-1950s onward, decentralized production fostered among the majors a less conservative approach to their performing acts and a favorable approach to their small competitors. The durable dominance that the majors now enjoyed was not challenged by emergent musical genres. Indeed, they readily turned to new acts and new firms for the provision of such music. I now detail the historical specifics by drawing on primary and secondary sources.

When pursuing centralized production in the 1940s and early 1950s, each major relied on a hierarchical division of labor that contained creative (e.g., performers) and technical personnel. A select group of individuals (i.e., artist and repertoire staff) at each major supervised performing acts and oversaw the selection of music that these acts recorded (Cassell 1972; Davis 1975; Kealy 1979; RCA 1953). A Capitol Records document summarized, “In those days, staff A&R men signed singers and vocal groups, chose songs, hired musicians and arrangers and produced the company’s artists in company studios. These A&R men oversaw everything from promotion to cover art, from unions to budget” (Grein 1992:97).

The discourse of participants suggests that at least three aspects of centralized production encouraged conservatism about selection of performers (Davis 1975; Fox 1986; Gillett 1983; Wexler & Ritz 1993). First, A&R staff typically stressed performers and music that were consistent with their respective musical backgrounds. The president of Columbia Records, for example, recalled that his A&R chief was “most reluctant to acknowledge rock and roll as acceptable for recording by our company” (U.S. Congress 1958:900). He likewise noted that, while others profited from rhythm and blues

performers, “the rhythm and blues category has been far from emphasized in our catalog” (U.S. Congress 1958: 900). Second, the majors were more interested in promoting their proven rather than new performers, as an emphasis on the familiar made daily operations somewhat predictable. In the face of burgeoning demand for rhythm and blues and rock and roll, for instance, majors sought to stimulate demand for its big band performers (Dowd 2003). Finally, given the sizable rosters of each major, A&R staff could not fully exploit the talents of their numerous performers. Instead, A&R staff recorded many acts in a standardized fashion. “[RCA] Victor has about 175 artists,” observed one founder of an independent. “They can’t possibly do justice to all of them” (U.S. Congress 1958: 572). Thus, when employing centralized production, success for the majors led both to heightened concentration and to relatively few new acts. Their lack of success, however, resulted in lowered concentration and opened a window of opportunity for the host of unknown performers associated with independents.

When pursuing centralized production, the majors sought to maintain their dominance by limiting the success of independents, for the products of the latter could easily upset the status quo. The majors pursued a number of strategies to that end (Sanjek 1988), including the use of “covers” (Ennis 1992; Gillett 1983). Whenever one firm’s recording garnered significant success, the majors would quickly release their own respective versions (called covers) to limit this success. When the majors covered each other’s songs, as they had done since the 1930s (see Whitburn 1986), it constituted a mild nuisance among equals. When they covered the songs of independents, however, it could extinguish the success of small firms and drive them out of the market (Mabry 1990). As the majors succeeded with strategies to limit competition, concentration rose and the number of new firms likely fell.

The dominance of the majors was a fragile one during the era of centralized production, as their conservatism failed to address significant shifts in mainstream demand (Dowd 2003). In 1940, three majors — Columbia, Decca, and RCA — accounted for 100% of all mainstream hits and 99% of all U.S. record sales (Dowd 2000; U.S. Congress 1942). Yet, as the 1940s unfolded, their dominance waned dramatically. For example, three new recording firms — Capitol, Mercury, and MGM — enjoyed such great success that they joined the ranks of the majors, turning the “Big Three” into the “Big Six” (Dowd n.d.; Sanjek 1988). The success of Capitol and the other new entrants was indicative of a larger trend that escalated well into the 1950s, despite the majors’ various strategies for stemming the tide of new firms.⁵ As bandleader Sammy Kaye noted, “In the early 1940s, there were, as a practical matter, only three record companies in the U.S.: [RCA] Victor, Columbia, and Decca. Today there are literally hundreds” (U.S. Congress 1958:545). Many of these independents trucked in musical styles that the majors did not address — rhythm and blues and rock and roll — and attracted consumers who desired such music (*Billboard*

1954d; Gillett 1983). Concentration fell sharply and the number of new firms exploded during the last years of centralized production.

The majors responded to their waning dominance with a tentative shift to decentralized production. They created subsidiary labels so as to diversify their respective rosters, as mainstream tastes had gravitated away from established musical styles to those championed by many independents. Decca took a step in 1949, when it established the Coral label to emphasize rhythm and blues. By 1953, Coral had generated sizable profits and expanded its operation to include country music (*Billboard* 1950a, 1953b; Sanjek 1988). Columbia established Epic to augment the range of popular music — including rhythm and blues — found on the Columbia label (*Billboard* 1953a; Davis 1975; Sanjek 1988). The remaining majors soon followed suit. By 1954, a “rundown of the major firms and their subsidiary labels now shows RCA Victor with three via Groove, Camden, and ‘X’; Decca with two in Brunswick and Coral, M-G-M via Lion, Columbia with two in Epic and Okeh, and Capitol and Mercury in the aforementioned labels [Kenton Presents and Emarcy, respectively]” (*Billboard* 1954a; see *Billboard* 1954b, 1954c, 1956). As 1955 opened, each major had at least one specialized label that extended its traditional offerings in popular music. This heralded the collective rise of decentralized production among the majors.

After the collective shift in 1955, the majors notably increased their reliance on decentralized production. Each major expanded its number of subsidiary labels — both by creating new ones and acquiring existing ones. Each major also augmented its collection of subsidiary labels by contracting with a growing number of independents, which provided each major with extra income and product (Dowd & Blyler 2002). The increase in reliance on decentralized production was further reinforced when an emergent firm used this production logic to great success. Kinney entered the recording industry by acquiring a number of labels (see Table 1). Its executives organized these newly acquired subsidiaries loosely, a tactic that they kept various record labels (e.g., Atlantic) separate and relatively autonomous. Kinney added to its collection of owned labels by allying with an array of small firms. In essence, Kinney presided over a collection of competing record labels. When its expanding web of subsidiary and allied labels increased market share, the other majors followed its example — which soon renamed itself Warner Communications. Decentralized production thus grew more extensive for the majors, which now included Warner (see Bruck 1994; “Janus” 1990; Sanjek 1988; Terry & Verna 1993). For instance, TimeWarner (the successor to Warner Communications) was associated with more than 75 labels by the early 1990s (Album Network 1994).

As they increasingly relied on decentralized production, the majors moved away from a hierarchical division of labor and, for several reasons, grew less conservative in their treatment of performing acts. First, each major increasingly utilized numerous freelance producers and engineers to supervise

TABLE 1: Selected Labels Associated with Kinney (Warner Communications)

Year	Label	Nature of Association
1969	Warner Brothers	Acquired
1969	Reprise	Acquired
1969	Atlantic	Acquired
1969	Atco	Acquired
1969	Alston	Allied
1971	Capricorn	Allied
1971	Elektra	Acquired
1972	Asylum	Acquired
1972	Bearsville	Allied
1972	Rolling Stones	Allied
1972	Chrysalis	Allied
1974	Big Tree	Allied
1974	Buddah	Allied
1974	Discreet	Allied
1975	Curtom	Allied
1975	Wing and a Prayer	Allied
1976	Dark Horse	Allied
1976	WMOT	Allied
1977	Pacific	Allied
1977	Westbound	Allied
1978	Island	Allied
1978	Sire	Acquired
1978	Scotti Brothers	Allied
1980	Qwest	Allied
1980	Mirage	Allied
1980	Geffen	Allied
1981	Modern	Allied

Sources: See Appendix

the recording process. Consequently, the preferences of a few A&R chiefs no longer constrained the majors (see Davis 1975; Tobler & Grundy 1982). Second, each major spread its numerous performing acts across semiautonomous labels, with relatively few acts at each label. This helped the majors avoid the standardized approach to acts that they had exhibited in the past (see Cassell 1972; Hunter 1990). Finally, the growing number of contractual alliances provided the majors with easy access to their small competitors' performers. The sizable rosters found at each major no longer represented sunk costs that discouraged the exploration of new performers (see Clevo & Olsen 1993; Hilburn & Philips 1992). The success of the majors, then, resulted in heightened concentration but not necessarily in a reduction of new performing acts.

The expansion of decentralized production led the majors to change their approach to small competitors. In some instances, they actually encouraged the market entry of new firms by subsidizing or sponsoring new record labels. They did so because each looked on independents as potential resources rather than competitive threats, especially because the latter represented potential allies and future acquisitions. Whether as an ally or acquisition, independents provided the majors with a way to broaden their range of products and, in turn, bolster their market shares (see Goldberg 1991; Melcher & Lieberman 1989; Rosen 1989; Rosen & Holley 1991). While the success of the majors led to heightened concentration, it did not necessarily result in a decreased number of new recording firms.

The majors used decentralized production, in the words of Gillet (1983:402), “to forestall a repeat of the fifties situation, when indie [independent] labels specializing in black music had sprung a surprise on them.” The initial shift to decentralized production helped the majors cope with the rise of rhythm and blues and rock and roll. In the years that followed, the majors would use this new production logic to co-opt a procession of emergent musical styles — including soul, disco, punk, new wave, hip hop, and dance (Davis 1975; Dowd & Blyler 2002; Garofalo 1997; Hesmondhalgh 1998a, 1998b; Joe 1980; Lopes 1992; Negus 1999). They could do so because widely flung rosters of performers and expansive webs of subsidiary and allied labels facilitated their absorption of once-peripheral genres. As such cooptation of musical styles occurred, the musical diversity in the mainstream market expanded — despite heightened concentration levels (Dowd 2000). If the open system account holds for 1940 to 1990, and if new acts and firms are reasonable measures of diversity, the following should hold:

Hypothesis 2: The expansion of decentralized production reduces the negative effect of concentration on the number of (1) new performing acts and (2) new recording firms.

Control Variables

If cyclical and open system accounts are to prove compelling, their respective predictions must hold in the face of other factors that could likewise shape the number of new acts and firms. While proponents of both accounts have mentioned such factors, many have not controlled for their impact. Consequently, most have not demonstrated the robustness of their respective predictions. I address this situation by including two types of control variables.

The first type of control variable concerns historical developments in the U.S. recording industry. Academics and business personnel alike have suggested that five developments led to the flourishing or floundering of new performers and firms: (1) the *AFM recording ban*, perhaps the most significant labor

development during this study's time frame; (2) the *dominance of network radio*, the most important outlet for the early recording industry; (3) the *industry recession of 1979 to 1982*, the most notable economic development during this time frame; (4) the *impact of MTV*, the most celebrated outlet for recorded music that emerged during this period; and (5) the *relative size of the youth population*, possibly the most important demand factor during this period. Cyclical and open system proponents have also noted the importance of these developments, yet for the most part, they have not systematically assessed the impact of each.

The second type of control variable concerns ecological dynamics that are common to disparate markets. Ecological research has routinely found that a given market can support only a finite number of actors (e.g., firms). Ecologists have also found that the market entry of new actors tends to occur in waves. Thus, density and previous entries can shape the number of new acts and firms found in the mainstream market (see below). While cyclical and open system proponents have mostly neglected such dynamics, the findings of ecologists address their importance (Carroll & Hannan 2000).

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS

AFM Recording Ban

A brief flurry of new performers and firms might have occurred during the recording ban of the American Federation of Musicians — the union that represented the majority of U.S. instrumentalists (Dowd n.d.). The ban resulted from fears that recordings would displace the employment of instrumentalists. To address those fears, AFM leaders announced in June 1942 that, as of August 1, its members would not make commercial recordings until all record firms agreed to payment of royalties into an AFM unemployment fund (Ennis 1992; Leiter 1974; Sanjek 1988).

The ban severely limited the production of new recordings and may have created a window of opportunity for new performers and firms. The majors did not immediately comply with AFM stipulations because each possessed a large backlog of unreleased recordings by their established performers. They also tried to compensate by recording acts whose members were not eligible for AFM membership — such as harmonica and ukulele players. Still, the majors eventually faced a dearth of recordings. The annual number of *all* recordings produced by Columbia Records, for instance, dropped from 2,360 in 1940 to 62 in 1944 (Leiter 1974; U.S. Congress 1942, 1958). Meanwhile, some newly established independents had also created a backlog of recordings in anticipation of the ban. Many of their recordings, moreover, involved unknown performers (see Grein 1992; Sanjek 1988). It appears that consumers flocked to the recordings offered by these new performers and new firms.

Executives at the majors realized that “the only way we could survive was to agree to the payment of that royalty” (U.S. Congress 1948:189). Decca signed an agreement with the AFM in September 1943; CBS and RCA Victor eventually signed in November 1944. The window of opportunity enjoyed by new performing acts and firms closed, as each major returned to full production and to full promotion of their established acts (Leiter 1974; U.S. Congress 1942, 1948).

Dominance of Network Radio

Facing regulatory limits on the number of stations that any interest could own, CBS and NBC built networks of owned *and* affiliated stations that numbered in the hundreds (Leblebici 1995; Sterling 1984). This enabled both to target national rather than local demand and, in turn, to attract advertisers who sought a mass audience. Both networks quickly became dominant players in the radio industry. Two aspects of network radio likely worked against the interests of new performers and firms. First, the parent companies of CBS and NBC also owned, respectively, Columbia Records and RCA Victor. This apparently resulted in the networks favoring the well-known performers associated with these majors (FCC 1941). Second, the emphasis on mass appeal meant that traditional forms of popular music and classical music were offered far more than emergent styles such as rhythm and blues (Dowd 2003; Dowd et al. 2002), which probably favored the majors and their established performers (Dowd & Blyler 2002).

While the networks dominated radio in the 1940s, the situation changed in the early 1950s, as CBS and NBC transferred the bulk of their programming and advertising to television. Network radio now played a greatly reduced role, leaving a void in the radio industry (Douglas 1999). An exploding number of local stations filled that void. They targeted local demand with specialized programming and received financial support from like-minded advertisers (Leblebici 1995). The decline of traditional network dominance may have resulted in unprecedented exposure for performers and firms who were previously ignored or underemphasized by radio (Dowd 2003; Dowd & Blyler 2002; Ennis 1992).

Industry Recession

The industry recession of 1979 might have been a boon for new performers and firms (or a bust; see Dowd & Blyler 2002). Prior to this recession, sales had risen fairly steadily since the mid-1950s and continued until 1978, when total sales hit an all-time high of \$4 billion dollars. The recession began in 1979, with total sales declining by almost \$0.5 billion (Dannen 1991; Denisoff 1986; RIAA n.d.). During the recession, consumers sometimes gravitated toward *new* acts

and did not always purchase the expected number of recordings made by established acts; this may have benefited new firms as well. The recession continued until the end of 1982, when Michael Jackson's *Thriller* signaled the return of rising sales and the return to power of established acts and the majors (Frith 1988; "Janus" 1990; Straw 1990).⁶

The Impact of MTV

Researchers are divided over the impact of Music Television (MTV). MTV emerged in 1981 as a result of a joint venture between Warner Communication and American Express. It soon became a major force in commercial music, especially after consumer surveys showed that video broadcasts stimulated album sales (Banks 1996; Denisoff 1988). Some have suggested that MTV provided an ideal medium for exposure of new acts and new firms (Garofalo 1997; Lopes 1992). Others have argued that MTV engendered a superstar phenomenon, whereby the established acts of majors enjoyed success at the expense of new performing acts and independents (Frith 1988; Philips & Schlattmann 1990). Rather than privilege either position, I control for MTV's impact in my analysis.

Relative Size of the Youth Population

Recording firms did not begin sophisticated analyses of consumer demand until the 1990s (Negus 1999). An internal document for Warner Communications (1978:2) concedes this point when it noted the following:

Considering the size of the industry there is a surprising lack of accurate data about the market for the industry's products . . . The available data could not even answer the most fundamental questions about this industry. At best, there were only limited data on the age, race, and sex distributions of current buyers, and most of these data were methodologically questionable.

Consequently, there are no systematic consumption data that span the time frame of this study. Nevertheless, the literature suggests one important aspect of demand: the expansion of the youth population contributed to the flurry of new performers and firms in the mid-1950s and 1960s (Dowd 2003; Garofalo 1997; Peterson & Berger 1975).

ECOLOGICAL DYNAMICS

Density

Ecologists find that the number of incumbent market actors (i.e., density) has an impact on the subsequent number of new actors (Hannan & Carroll 1992).⁷ An increasing total denotes a market flush with resources and legitimacy

(e.g., consumer interest), thereby attracting a growing number of new actors. However, a market can support only a finite number of actors ("carrying capacity"). Once carrying capacity is reached, the density dampens the subsequent number of new actors. Dampening occurs because competition for finite resources is now intense and because existing demand is apportioned among existing actors. The relationship between density and the number of new actors takes the form of an inverted U. Ecologists have modeled this inverted-U relationship with a quadratic ($x - x^2$), which I also follow.

Previous Numbers

Ecologists sometimes find that the previous number of new actors shows an inverted-U relationship with the current number of new actors. An increasing number of new actors signals a hospitable market with numerous resources, thereby stimulating the number of new actors in subsequent periods. However, an extremely high number of new actors signals a crowded market with limited resources, thereby dampening the number of new actors in subsequent periods. Ecologists have modeled this inverted-U relationship with a quadratic ($x - x^2$), which I likewise do (Dobbin & Dowd 1997).

The Data

SETTING THE TIME FRAME

The data for this study begin in 1940. A number of trade publications previously detailed mainstream performers and firms, including *Phonoscope* in the late 1800s, *Talking Machine World* in the 1910s and 1920s, and *Variety* in the 1930s. In July 1940 *Billboard* initiated the charts for best-selling records of mainstream performers. These weekly charts offered a significant improvement by relying on information gleaned from retailers and (later) from broadcasters. As a result, *Billboard* charts provided systematic information on both majors and independents and their respective performing acts (Ennis 1992; Sanjek 1988; Whitburn 1986).

By relying on *Billboard* charts for data, this study follows the example offered by proponents of the cyclical (e.g., Peterson & Berger 1975) and open system (e.g., Lopes 1992) accounts. By beginning in 1940, this study has a starting year that precedes or equals that of the cited studies. By ending in 1990, the closing year exceeds or equals that of these studies. Its time frame is thus well suited for testing the hypotheses of both accounts.

Beginning the data in 1940 raised the issue of left truncation. That is, some acts and firms may have enjoyed mainstream success before 1940. I addressed this problem by tracking the career histories of each act and firm via a number

FIGURE 1: New Performing Acts in the Mainstream Market




FIGURE 2: Mainstream Market Concentration




FIGURE 3: Carrying Capacity of Mainstream Acts





FIGURE 4: Decentralized Production in the Mainstream Market



of sources (Lissauer 1991; Rust 1984; Sutton 2000; Whitburn 1986). For example, I did not code Bing Crosby as a new performer in 1940, because his mainstream career dated back to the 1930s, nor did I code Victor as a new firm in 1940, because its mainstream success extends to the early 1900s.

SETTING THE POPULATION

I relied on weekly *Billboard* mainstream charts that address individual songs (i.e., singles) rather than albums; singles charts detail the relative success of individual songs in terms of a combination of factors (e.g., jukebox play, radio air play, and retail sales) and album charts detail the relative success of long-playing units (e.g., vinyl records, compact discs) in terms of retail sales (see Appendix). I did so for three reasons. First, singles charts spanned the entire period, whereas charts for long-playing albums did not begin until 1957 (Dowd n.d.). The singles charts therefore provide a consistent metric throughout the time frame of this study. In fact, both Burnett (1990) and Lopes (1992) rely solely on the singles charts when examining the relationship between concentration and diversity from the late 1940s to the late 1980s. I follow suit in the present study. Second, since 1957 there has been considerable overlap between the singles and album charts. While albums came to earn the bulk of income (Frith 1988; Lopes 1992), singles remain a primary means for introducing a given album to the market (Clevo & Olsen 1993). For example, business personnel seek radio air play for the individual songs found on a particular album (Dannen 1991; Davis 1975; King 1966; Negus 1999). Not surprisingly, success on the singles charts often leads to success on the album charts and vice versa, as when a top-selling album also produces multiple hit singles (Alpert 1983; Burke 1996; Dixon 1982). Finally, beyond their substantial overlap, singles charts should identify a greater number of new acts and firms than do album charts. On the one hand, it has been easier to secure a modicum of jukebox or radio play for a given song (and thus enjoy some success on the singles charts) than to secure one of the top-selling albums (see Belafinte & Johnson 1982; Dowd 2003). On the other hand, even in the age during which albums dominate, some firms and performers try to break into the business by releasing primarily — if not solely — singles in analog (e.g., vinyl) or digital (e.g., CD; MP3) formats. This approach poses low barriers to entry because it requires fewer production expenditures than does releasing an entire album of songs. Dance music offers but one example of this approach (Hesmondhalgh 1998a; Straw 1990; see also Jones 2000).

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Using *Billboard's* singles charts, I have compiled weekly information on performers and firms from July 27, 1940 to December 22, 1990. Regarding performing acts, I replicated Lopes (1992) and coded an act as new when it enjoyed its first mainstream success *and* when none of its members had belonged to acts that previously enjoyed mainstream success. This coding scheme ensured that the recirculation of personnel from established acts was not mistaken for the emergence of new acts.⁸ I employed several sources to ascertain whether the members of a given act were new to the mainstream market (Hardy & Laing 1991; Lissauer 1991; Rees & Crampton 1991; Whitburn 1986, 1994a, 1994b). Regarding recording firms, I coded a firm as new when it enjoyed its first mainstream hit recording. I employed numerous sources to track the ownership of each firm across every year (see Appendix). This ensured that I did not treat a firm as new when, in fact, it had merely changed its name.

Figures 1 and 2 detail the two dependent variables. I organized the data in quarter-years. The two dependent variables, then, are expressed in quarterly numbers. Figure 1 shows that the number of new performing acts briefly rose in the early 1940s, exploded in the mid-1950s, peaked in the early 1960s, and declined slightly thereafter. Figure 2 shows that the number of new firms was slight in the 1940s, pronounced in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and moderate to slight in the years that followed.

By relying on *Billboard's* singles charts, I did not identify every new performing act or firm. In particular, I missed those performers and firms who succeeded on album charts but did not succeed on singles charts. However, I did identify comparable or greater numbers than did previous studies. For instance, Lopes (1992) tracked new performing acts by examining the top 100 singles and top 100 albums for each year (i.e., 200 spots per year). From 1969 to 1990, he identified 420 new acts on the singles charts and 389 on the album charts. If there was no duplication of new acts between the singles and albums charts (which is highly unlikely), Lopes identified a total of 809 new acts. In contrast, I tracked new acts by examining *all* charts for weekly singles (i.e., 100 spots per week, 5,100 per year). From 1969 to 1990, I identified 1,892 new acts and, from 1940 to 1990, I identified 3,876 new acts (see Figure 1). Now consider recording firms. Rather than distinguishing the number of unique firms on the singles and album charts, Lopes (1992) counted the total number found in the top 200 spots per year. From 1969 to 1990, he noted 161 firms on the singles charts and 144 on the albums charts. He thus counted some 300 firms but most likely counted many of the same ones from year to year. In contrast, I identified 159 unique firms from 1969 to 1990 and 641 from 1940 to 1990 (see Figure 2).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Concentration

I relied on the Herfindahl index to measure market concentration. This index simultaneously assesses the total number of firms and their respective market shares. The Herfindahl index ranges between 0 and 10,000, where 0 indicates perfect competition and 10,000 indicates perfect monopoly (Dobbin & Dowd 2000). I divide the index score by 10 to constrain its range.

In the present study, the Herfindahl index gauges the quarterly share of hit singles enjoyed by each firm. Replicating previous research (see Lopes 1992), I credited a firm with a hit when it owned or distributed the label on which the hit was released. This approach, then, gauges concentration in a manner that captured the expanding array of alliances between record firms (Peterson & Berger 1996). The Appendix details sources for identifying the owning or distributing firms that were responsible for each of the 22,561 singles that occurred from 1940 to 1990. Each hit was individually attributed to the firm that released it so as to recognize the numerous changes in ownership and distribution arrangements that occurred between 1940 and 1990. Figure 3 shows that concentration levels declined dramatically in the 1940s and 1950s and increased after the early 1960s.

Decentralized Production

I measured decentralized production by noting the quarterly number of labels that enjoyed hits relative to the number of recording firms that did so. As Lopes (1992) notes, this ratio nicely captures the shift in production logic that is at the core of the open system argument. I constructed this ratio by relying on the same sources used for the concentration variable (see Appendix). Figure 4 shows that decentralized production was initially slight, dipped in the mid-1940s, rose in the late 1950s, and grew prevalent thereafter — with up to three times as many labels enjoying hits as firms.

CONTROL VARIABLES

AFM Recording Ban and Industry Recession

Two of the historical developments correspond to a delimited span of time. Consequently, I relied on dummy variables that respectively tapped the AFM ban (1942-44) and the industry recession (1979-82), where 1 indicates the occurrence of each development and 0 depicts its absence.

Impact of MTV

I evaluated the impact of MTV by measuring the quarterly percentage of hit singles that had an accompanying video. I gleaned such information from weekly *Billboard* charts. The percentage of singles with accompanying videos rose quickly in the 1980s, reaching 50% in 1985 and nearing 80% by 1990. In a relatively short time, MTV videos had become commonplace.

Dominance of Network Radio

I gauged the dominance of network radio by noting its share of radio advertising dollars. I obtained this information from Sterling (1984) and from *Standard and Poor's Industry Surveys*. Given the relatively smooth pattern that appeared in the annual percentages, I interpolated to create quarterly percentages. During the early and mid-1940s, network radio accounted for more than 40% of all radio advertising dollars. The dominance of network radio faded with the initial onset of television; the percentage of network advertising dropped to nearly 30% in the late 1940s and dropped below 10% by the late 1950s. In the years that followed, with the proliferation of specialized radio and local advertising (Leblebici 1995), the percentage remained under 10%.

Relative Size of Youth Population

I relied on government figures to ascertain the proportion of the population consisting of youth. In particular, I noted the percentage of the population between the ages of 15 and 24. Encouraged by the smooth pattern that emerged from these annual percentages, I interpolated to create quarterly percentages. From the early 1940s to the mid 1950s, the percentage went from more than 18% to less than 14%. The percentage rebounded in the late 1950s, reaching 20% in the mid-1970s. The percentage began to decline in the early 1980s, approaching 15% by 1990.

Density of Performers and Firms

To assess the market's capacity for performing acts and recording firms, I documented the total number of acts and firms that existed at the end of each quarter. This required that I construct a life history for each act and firm that enjoyed mainstream success, detailing when it enjoyed its first and last mainstream hit singles. Coding such life histories raised the issue of right truncation. That is, some acts and firms could have enjoyed their last hit after 1990. I addressed this by tracking each act and firm until 1995, thereby ensuring that I did not prematurely code its demise. From 1940 to 1973, the

density of performers mostly rose in gradual fashion, going from its minimum of 94 to its maximum of 430; the density of performers mostly waned thereafter, dropping to 234 by 1990. The density of firms rose slowly in the first decade, rising from its minimum of 3 in 1940 to 14 in 1949. The density of firm then shot up dramatically and reached a maximum of 99 in 1961. Thereafter, the number of firms mostly declined, hovering in the 20s throughout the 1980s and 1990.

Methods

POISSON AND NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSION

I used Poisson and negative binomial regression to model the quarterly number of new acts and firms. Both techniques are appropriate for a dependent variable that consists of counts (e.g., 0, 1, 2 . . .), with negative binomial offering a generalization of the Poisson model (Barron 1992; Long 1997). Poisson regression is based on the assumption that the variance and mean of the event counts are equal: $Var(Y_t) = E(Y_t)$. This restrictive assumption often does not hold, as the variance may sometimes exceed the mean (i.e., overdispersion). When overdispersion is present, the use of Poisson estimates leads to deflated standard errors and, hence, to the erroneous rejection of the null hypothesis. In such cases, researchers often turn to negative binomial regression, since it compensates for overdispersion. I followed suit and used the quadratic parameterization of negative binomial regression, for it allows the variance to exceed the mean: $Var(Y_t) = E(Y_t) + aE^2(Y_t)$. A *t* test of the hypotheses that the overdispersion parameter, *a*, differs significantly from zero verifies overdispersion, indicating the need for negative binomial regression.

I used LIMDEP to derive Poisson and negative binomial models via maximum likelihood estimation (Greene 1992). In each model, I lagged the independent and control variables, so that each predicts the effect of variables in quarter_(t-1) on the number of new acts or firms in quarter_(t). Two points of interpretation are important when using Poisson and negative binomial regression. First, the impact of independent and control variables is given by the following formula: $100 \times [\exp(\text{coefficient}) - 1]$. This demonstrates the effect that a one-unit change in an independent variable has on the expected number of new acts/firms in the following quarter. Second, the fit of a given model is given by comparing the log-likelihoods of nested models by using the following formula: $(-2) \times [(\log\text{-likelihood of model A}) - (\log\text{-likelihood of model B})]$. This formula yields a likelihood-ratio chi-square by which to gauge the improvement in fit, with degrees of freedom corresponding to the number of variables unique to model B.

TABLE 2: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates for the Quarterly Number of New Performing Acts in the Mainstream Recording Market, 1940–1990

	Model			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intercept	4.224** (.151)	4.316** (.167)	3.286** (.984)	3.954** (.249)
Concentration (b_1)	-.152e ^{-01**} (.009e ⁻⁰¹)	-.093e ^{-01**} (.015e ⁻⁰¹)	-.074e ^{-01**} (.026e ⁻⁰¹)	-.084e ^{-01**} (.016e ⁻⁰¹)
Decentralized production (b_2)	-.216** (.091)	-.368* (.208)	-.127 (.280)	-.312** (.089)
Concentration * Decentralized production (b_3)	.369e ^{-02**} (.053e ⁻⁰²)	.221e ^{-02**} (.085e ⁻⁰²)	.104e ⁻⁰² (.139e ⁻⁰²)	.226e ^{-02**} (.059e ⁻⁰²)
AFM recording ban		.658** (.174)	.618** (.201)	.562** (.189)
Dominance of network radio		-.030** (.006)	-.028** (.008)	-.026** (.006)
Relative size of youth population		.013 (.023)	.029 (.029)	
Industry recession		.163* (.093)	.117 (.099)	
Impact of MTV		.322e ^{-02**} (.143e ⁻⁰²)	.236e ⁻⁰² (.156e ⁻⁰²)	
Density of performers			.218e ⁻⁰² (.467e ⁻⁰²)	
Density of performers ²			-.604e ⁻⁰³ (.845e ⁻⁰²)	
Previous new performers			.212e ^{-01*} (.104e ⁻⁰¹)	.253e ^{-01**} (.100e ⁻⁰¹)
Previous new performers ²			-.336e ^{-03*} (.169e ⁻⁰³)	-.398e ^{-03**} (.165e ⁻⁰³)
a	.028** (.008)	.018** (.008)	.016* (.008)	.019** (.008)
Log-likelihood	-605.31	-587.96	-584.36	-587.99
(N = 201)				

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

* $p < .05$ ** $p < .01$ (one-tailed tests)

INTERACTIONS

I assess the interaction between concentration (Conc) and decentralized production (Decen) with a multiplicative term (Conc \times Decen). The following equation demonstrates:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 Conc + b_2 Decen + b_3 Conc \times Decen + e. \tag{1}$$

Equation 1 describes a model with conditional effects, which diverges from an additive model in several ways (Friedrich 1982). First, the b_1 coefficient details the effect of concentration *only when* the decentralized production variable equals zero. Inserting the 0 into equation 1:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= b_0 + b_1 Conc + b_2(0) + b_3(0) \times Conc + e, \\ Y &= b_0 + b_1 Conc + e. \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

The standard error for b_1 likewise applies only to the situation in which the decentralized production variable equals zero. Second, the b_2 coefficient and its attendant standard error describe the effect of decentralized production *only when* the concentration variable equals zero. Inserting the 0 into equation 1 produces:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= b_0 + b_1(0) + b_2 Decen + b_3 Decen \times (0) + e, \\ Y &= b_0 + b_2 Decen + e. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Given that neither the concentration nor the decentralized production variable has a value of zero (see Figures 3 and 4), the b_1 and b_2 coefficients lack substantive meaning. Finally, the b_3 coefficient *combines* with the b_1 coefficient to depict the effect of concentration at a particular value of the decentralized production variable. Inserting the minimum value of the decentralized production variable (1.07) into equation 1 illustrates:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= b_0 + b_1 Conc_1 + b_2(1.07) + b_3(1.07) Conc + e \\ Y &= [b_0 + (b_2 \times 1.07)] + [b_1 + (b_3 \times 1.07)] Conc + e. \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

Friedrich (1982) has shown that following formula provides the standard error for the combination of b_1 and b_3 at this particular value of the decentralized production variable:

$$\text{Standard error}_{(b_1 + b_3)} = (\text{var}(b_1) + [(1.07)^2 \times \text{var}(b_3)] + [2 \times (1.07) \times \text{cov}(b_1, b_3)])^{1/2} \tag{5}$$

In the analysis that follows, I examine both the size and the direction of the interaction across the entire range (1.07 to 3.68; see Figure 4) of the decentralized production variable. That is, I examine the conditional impact of concentration by inserting successive values of the decentralized production variable into equation 4. I also examine the statistical significance of the

TABLE 3: Poisson Regression Estimates for the Quarterly Number of New Recording Firms in the Mainstream Recording Market, 1940-1990

	Model			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	4.605** (.301)	4.919** (.367)	3.982** (.894)	4.633** (.301)
Concentration (b_1)	-.209e ^{-01**} (.021e ⁻⁰¹)	-.173e ^{-01**} (.038e ⁻⁰¹)	-.139e ^{-01**} (.054e ⁻⁰¹)	-.216e ^{-01**} (.021e ⁻⁰¹)
Decentralized production (b_2)	-1.358** (.190)	-1.280** (.412)	-1.075* (.515)	-1.358** (.190)
Concentration * Decentralized production (b_3)	.626e ^{-02**} (.120e ⁻⁰²)	.521e ^{-02**} (.201e ⁻⁰²)	.409e ⁻⁰² (.252e ⁻⁰²)	.643e ^{-02**} (.121e ⁻⁰²)
AFM recording ban		.946** (.404)	.789* (.439)	.733* (.370)
Dominance of network radio		-.016 (.014)	-.014 (.016)	
Relative size of youth population		-.028 (.047)	-.021 (.052)	
Industry recession		.183 (.303)	.162 (.306)	
Impact of MTV		-.238e ⁻⁰² (.522e ⁻⁰²)	-.179e ⁻⁰² (.525e ⁻⁰²)	
Density of firms			.062e ⁻⁰¹ (.199e ⁻⁰¹)	
Density of firms ²			-.067e ⁻⁰¹ (.149e ⁻⁰¹)	
Previous new firms			.518e ⁻⁰¹ (.398e ⁻⁰¹)	
Previous new firm ²			-.089 (.174)	
Log-likelihood (N = 201)	-346.28	-343.14	-340.60	-344.61

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

* p < .05 ** p < .01 (one-tailed tests)

interaction across the entire range of the decentralized production variable. I do so by inserting successive values of the latter variable into equation 5 and then conducting a *t* test at each value. Such examinations are crucial, for "not until conditional slopes and *t* tests are calculated within the observed range of the experience of the variables can valid conclusions be drawn. Statistically insignificant b_1 's, b_2 's, and b_3 's may nevertheless combine to produce statistically significant conditional effects" (Friedrich 1982:821).

Results

Tables 2 and 3 contain the models by which I test hypotheses regarding, respectively, new performing acts and new recording firms in the mainstream market. I analyzed the number of new acts and firms across 201 quarters (Oct.–Dec. 1940 to Oct.–Dec. 1990); hence, the *N* is 201. For each model, I generated both Poisson and negative binomial estimates. In Table 2, no model met the assumptions of Poisson regression since the overdispersion parameter (*a*) of each significantly differed from zero (Barron 1992). As a result, I report only the negative binomial regression estimates for new performing acts. In Table 3, no model demonstrates evidence of overdispersion. Because there is no overdispersion, I report only the Poisson regression estimates for new recording firms.

I turn first to the quarterly number of new performers (see Table 2). Model 1 offers a significant improvement in fit when compared to the null model ($\chi^2 = 349.4$; *df* = 3). It also offers a straightforward adjudication of the cyclical and open system accounts. If the cyclical account is accurate, then concentration will have a negative effect on the quarterly number of new performing acts, regardless of the extent of decentralized production; that is, the interaction between concentration and decentralized production will be statistically insignificant (hypothesis 1a). If the open system account is accurate, then the negative impact of concentration will grow less pronounced as the extent of decentralized production increases; the interaction between the two variables will be significant (hypothesis 2a). Recall that the b_1 coefficient ($-.152e^{-01}$) refers to the impact of concentration when the open system variable equals 0 and the b_2 coefficient ($-.216$) refers to the impact of decentralized production when concentration equals 0 (see equations 2 and 3 in the methods section). Both coefficients refer to outcomes that did not historically occur (see Figures 3 and 4). Meanwhile, the b_3 coefficient ($-.369e^{-02}$) in isolation does not address the interaction between concentration and decentralized production. Instead, this interaction is captured by the combination of the b_1 and b_3 coefficients across the range of values associated with the decentralized production variable; the attendant standard errors for each of the com-

binations likewise depends on the values of the decentralized production variable (see equation 4 and 5 in the methods section).

Three patterns emerge in model 1. First, concentration has a negative and statistically significant effect on the quarterly number of new performers when decentralized production ranges from 1.07 to 3.64. Second, this negative effect decreases in magnitude as the extent of decentralized production increases — becoming statistically insignificant at the highest values of the latter variable (i.e., 3.65 – 3.68). When decentralized production equals 1.07, the combination of the b_1 and b_3 coefficients ($-.152e^{-01} + [.369e^{-02} \times 1.07]$) yields a coefficient of $-.113e^{-01}$ (t value = -31.59). At this minimum level of decentralized production, each one-unit increase in concentration dampens the expected number of new performers by 1.12% ($100 \times [\exp(-.113e^{-01}) - 1]$). Note that quarterly values of concentration have a considerable range (24 to 451; see Figure 3). When decentralized production reaches 3.64, the combination of the b_1 and b_3 coefficients ($-.152e^{-01} + [.369e^{-02} \times 3.64]$) only yields a coefficient of $-.018e^{-01}$ (t value = -1.68); each one-unit increase in concentration reduces the subsequent number of new performing acts by only .18% ($100 \times [\exp(-.018e^{-01}) - 1]$). Finally, because of the historical tendency whereby the extent of decentralized production has mostly increased since 1960, the negative impact of concentration on new performers has grown considerably less pronounced in recent decades. Taken together, the three patterns disprove the major hypothesis of the cyclical account and provide support for the open system account. The negative impact of concentration is not uniform across the time frame of this study; rather its impact is mitigated by the extent of decentralized production.

Model 2 adds control variables for historical developments and offers a significant improvement in fit over model 1 ($\chi^2 = 34.7$; $df = 5$). The mitigated effect demonstrated in model 1 remains mostly the same. In the presence of these control variables, the negative effect of concentration still grows less pronounced as the extent of decentralized production rises. When decentralized production equals 1.07, each one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number of new acts by .69% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 1.07] = -.069e^{-01}$; t value = -7.93); when it equals 3.04, each one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number by only .26% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 3.04] = -.026e^{-01}$; t value = -1.66). The negative effect of concentration becomes insignificant once decentralized production equals or exceeds 3.05. Note the statistically significant effect of three historical developments. The AFM recording ban represented a temporary boon for new performing acts, raising the expected number of new acts by 93% ($100 \times [\exp(.658) - 1]$). The dominance of network radio worked against the debut of new performing acts; each one-unit increase in the percentage of network advertising lowers the expected number by nearly 3% ($100 \times [\exp(-.030) - 1]$). The industry recession spurs the number of new performers by 18% ($100 \times [\exp(.163) - 1]$). The rise of MTV

likewise spurs the number of new performers, as each one-unit increase in the quarterly number of recordings that have an accompanying video increases the expected number of new acts by .32% ($100 \times [\exp(.322e^{-02}) - 1]$). The increasing percentage of young Americans has no significant impact on the quarterly number of new performing acts. Model 2 demonstrates that the mitigated impact of concentration significantly captures a pattern that is separate from key historical developments. It clearly disproves the central hypothesis of the cyclical account (hypothesis 1a) while supporting the open system account (hypothesis 2a).

Model 3 builds on the previous one by adding ecological controls and offers a significant improvement in fit over model 1 ($\chi^2 = 41.9$; $df = 9$). It shows several interesting results. First, the interaction continues to be significant across a range of values regarding decentralized production. When decentralized production equals 1.07, each one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number of new acts by .63% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 1.07] = -.063e^{-01}$; t value = -4.41); when it equals 3.23, each one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number by .40% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 3.23] = -.040e^{-01}$; t value = -1.65). Second, the AFM ban remains a boon for new acts, while the dominance of network radio continues to hamper new acts. Third, the previous number of new acts significantly shapes the subsequent number in the expected fashion: a low to moderate number of new acts in one quarter stimulates an increasingly high number of new acts in the following quarter, yet a high number of new performers has the opposite effect. Fourth, the significance of the previous number of new performers renders insignificant the impact of both the recession and MTV.⁹ Finally, the total number of performing acts does not have a statistically significant effect. Model 3 shows that the mitigated impact of concentration obtains in the presence of historical and ecological controls, again disproving hypothesis 1a and supporting hypothesis 2a.

Model 4 provides the best and final model, eliminating the noise of insignificant variables found in previous models; it offers a significant improvement in fit over model 1 ($\chi^2 = 34.6$; $df = 4$). The results are consistent with those of earlier models. Consider first the control variables. The AFM ban accounts for a brief flurry of new performing acts in the early 1940s. The imposition of this ban raises the expected number of new acts by 75% ($100 \times [\exp(.562) - 1]$). The dominance of network radio quashes the number of new acts, with each one-unit increase in the percentage of network advertising reducing the expected number of new performers by 2.57% ($100 \times [\exp(-.026) - 1]$). The waning dominance of network radio thus created an environment conducive to new performing acts. The previous number of new performing acts significantly shapes the number of subsequent acts in an inverted-U fashion. Now consider the contingent effect of concentration in Model 4. Concentration has a statistically significant and negative effect when decentralized production ranges in value from 1.07 to 3.04. At 1.07, each one-unit increase in concen-

tration reduces the expected number of new acts by .60% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 1.07] = -.060e^{-01}$; t value = -5.41); at 3.04, each one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number by .15% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 3.04] = -.015e^{-01}$; t value = -1.66). When controlling for significant historical developments and ecological processes, the increasing reliance on decentralized production reduces the negative effect of concentration by a factor of 3 (i.e., .60% versus .15%); moreover, when decentralized production surpasses 3.04 — which it mostly did from 1979 to 1990 — the negative effect of concentration is no longer significant. Model 4 therefore offers further evidence on the limitations of the cyclical account and the superiority of the open system account.

I now turn to the quarterly number of new recording firms (see Table 3). Model 5 offers a significant improvement in fit over the null model ($\chi^2 = 501.85$; $df = 3$), as well as a simple test of the cyclical and open system accounts. Concentration has a significant and negative impact on the quarterly number of new firms, with its impact declining and ultimately fading as decentralized production grows more pronounced. When decentralized production equals 1.07, a one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number of new firms by 1.41% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 1.07] = -.142e^{-01}$; t value = -13.99); when decentralized production equals 2.89, a one-unit increase in concentration reduces the expected number by only .28% ($b_1 + [b_3 \times 2.89] = -.028e^{-01}$; t value = -1.66). Once decentralized production exceeds a value of 2.89 — which became commonplace in the late 1970s and 1980s — concentration no longer has a statistically significant impact on the number of new firms. These results are clearly at odds with the cyclical account (hypothesis 1b) and entirely consistent with the open system account (hypothesis 2b).

Models 6 and 7 build on previous models by introducing control variables, respectively, for historical developments and ecological processes. Neither model offers a significant improvement in fit over model 5. This is not surprising because all but one of the control variables — the AFM recording ban — fail to attain statistical significance. Unlike the case of new performers, then, market concentration and decentralized production show palpable effects on firm entry, rendering insignificant many control variables.

Model 8 includes only those variables attaining significance in previous models. It likewise offers no significant improvement in fit over model 5 ($\chi^2 = 3.34$; $df = 1$). Hence, model 5 is the optimal model in the context of the variables analyzed. It shows that the proliferation of decentralized production reduces the negative impact of concentration more than fourfold (1.41% versus .28%) before rendering it insignificant in recent decades. This finding provides yet further support for the open system account and clearly challenges the continued applicability of the cyclical account.¹⁰

Conclusions

What explains the waxing and waning of media diversity? To address this question, I drew on a literature that deals with the U.S. recording industry, one that is marked by competing accounts. Proponents of the cyclical account stress the negative effect of market concentration, where high concentration dampens diversity (e.g., Peterson & Berger 1975). Proponents of the open systems account likewise note the negative effect of concentration, but they also stress its mitigated impact. They argue that the expansion of decentralized production reduces, if not eliminates, the negative effect of concentration on diversity (e.g., Dowd 2000).

This article contributes to this influential literature by adjudicating its accounts. It does so by examining the number of new performing acts and new recording firms in the mainstream market, as both are acknowledged indicators of diversity. The results overwhelmingly support the open systems account. When centralized production reigns, as it did in the 1940s and early 1950s, high concentration reduces the number of new acts and new firms. When decentralized production expands, as it did from the mid-1950s onward, high concentration has less of a negative effect. In fact, the expansion of decentralized production reduces concentration's negative effect on new performers by a factor of 3 and its negative effect on new firms by a factor of 4. When decentralized production becomes most expansive, concentration no longer has *any* effect on either the number of new performing acts or new recording firms. The mitigated impact of concentration persists in the presence of numerous variables that control for historical developments and ecological processes — including the AFM recording ban that spurred a flurry of new acts in the early 1940s and the waning dominance of network radio that resulted in a heightened number of new acts. This clearly shows the relative strength and robustness of the open systems account.

This article also contributes by extending the open systems account. It does so with an argument regarding the cooptation of musical styles within the mainstream market. During the era of decentralized production, the majors sought dominance by exploiting their respective rosters of established performers and by quashing the success of independents. This resulted in a fragile dominance that was eventually ruptured by the emergence of rhythm and blues and rock and roll in the mainstream market. Having learned their lesson, the majors shifted to a production logic that was increasingly decentralized. They pursued a widening roster of established *and* unknown performers, and they pursued alliances with an increasing number of independents. Consequently, the majors were well situated to absorb a succession of musical styles that ranged from punk to hip hop. Not surprisingly, musical diversity rose from 1955 onward, even in the midst of heightened concentration (Dowd 2000). This is not to say that new performers and

independents create more musically diverse recordings than their established counterparts, for quantitative analyses of musical content have found that not to be the case (Dowd 1992, 2000). Instead, I argue that musical diversity rose as new performers and firms brought an expanded range of musical material into the mainstream market — as decentralized production allowed majors to co-opt the raw prototypes of emergent styles and to exploit further the elaborated treatments of established styles.

In extending the open systems account, I also show its relevancy to students of hegemony. The results of this study suggest a key mechanism (i.e., decentralized production) by which record companies commodify musical genres that were once on the periphery of the market. The importance of this mechanism is further illustrated by the work of Lopes (2002). He shows, among other things, that as various sectors of the music business (e.g., radio, recording, publishing) shifted to centralized production in the 1930s, dominant firms in each of these sectors moved their attention away from the full breadth of jazz — an emergent (and once-peripheral) genre that enjoyed commercial success in the 1920s — and toward a relatively narrow range of music associated with Tin Pan Alley. It appears, then, that the logic of production shapes whether dominant record firms are — to the use the parlance of another literature (see Bryson 1996) — cultural “univores” or “omnivores.” When pursuing a logic that stresses highly bureaucratic, in-house production, the majors are more likely to favor a few genres — especially those with which they are familiar. When pursuing a logic that stresses alliances with freelance personnel and small firms, as well as semiautonomous divisions in-house, the majors are somewhat attuned to genres on the hinterlands that may one day prove profitable.

The salience of the present article is not limited to the literature on the U.S. recording industry. To begin with, its results are potentially generalizable to other media markets. Some of these markets have likewise embraced decentralized production in the post-WWII era. In the motion picture business, for example, dominant firms have abandoned in-house production of films (i.e., centralized) and have adopted a project-based approach (i.e., decentralized). These dominant firms now release films that typically result from temporary combinations of firms and freelance workers, where each combination disbands upon completion of a given film (Bielby & Bielby 1999; Christopherson & Storper 1989; Faulkner 1983; Faulkner & Anderson 1987; Jones & Walsh 1997). While evidence suggests that this shift has yielded an increasing number of new personnel and firms, it remains to be seen whether this is the result of an interaction between concentration and decentralized production. Of course, some media markets have recently shifted to centralized production. In the network television business, for instance, the major networks (e.g., ABC, CBS) increasingly rely on in-house production in the wake of deregulation and high costs. As this centralized production combines with increasing concentration, the diversity of the program supply is declining

(Bielby & Bielby 2003). Thus, the open systems account may offer a ready purchase on a range of media markets.

Finally, the present results may have relevance for markets in general. Consider first the ecology of markets. Organizational ecologists find that some established markets enjoy a phase of renewal, where "late-stage renaissances consist primarily of the proliferation of specialist organizations" (Carroll & Hannan 2000:261). In such markets, high concentration and high diversity can coexist, as a few dominant firms service broad demand and a plethora of small firms services the specialized tastes that dominant firms overlook. The explosion of micro-breweries amidst a concentrated beer industry offers but one example. Perhaps the expansion of decentralized production — including a reliance on interfirm alliances — plays a role in such a proliferation of specialists. Consider next the construction of markets. In exploring the contingent impact of institutional logics on the evolution of markets, economic sociologists demonstrate a striking variety of markets found across time and place, rather than a singular ideal type (e.g., Dobbin & Dowd, 2000; Schneiberg & Bartley 2001; Thornton & Ocasio 1999; see note 3). The results of this study clearly show that a singular ideal type does not apply to the mainstream: its logic of production shifted over the course of five decades, thereby yielding dramatically different conditions for competition and diversity. It will be interesting to see, then, how the mainstream market will fare in the face of online music. What logic of production will become dominant, what will be the fate of diversity, and what variety of market will it become? Those questions await further theorizing and research.

Notes

1. Media diversity also holds implications for audiences. The range of available media content can shape, among other things, public opinion (e.g., Iyengar & Kinder 1987), collective action (e.g., Roscigno & Danaher 2001), and identity formation (e.g., Bryson 1996).
2. Peterson and Berger (1971, 1975) hint at this shift to decentralized production in early work. They acknowledge this shift in recent work (Peterson & Berger 1996).
3. My particular notion of production logic draws on the definition that Scott and colleagues (2000: 20) offer for the general notion of institutional logic — “the cognitive maps, the belief systems carried by participants in the field to guide and give meaning to their activities.”
4. “Label” refers to the organizational identity or logo prominently displayed on each recording. During the era of centralized production, the label often (but not always) shared the name of the owning firm (Peterson & Berger 1975). RCA Victor, for example, released its recordings on the RCA Victor label. During the era of decentralized production, the ownership of multiple labels undermined this correspondence between label and firm name. RCA, for instance, also began releasing recordings on its X and Groove labels (Gillett 1983).
5. As the number of mainstream firms increased, so did the number of recordings that could be covered. Retailers soon complained about the overabundance of covers, because they could not discern *which* version was actually the hit. Meanwhile, the distributors who conveyed recordings to retailers and jukebox operators could not handle the swelling volume of products (*Billboard* 1950b). The majors eventually restricted their total output (*Billboard* 1953c), thereby limiting the number of covers each could release. The effectiveness (and use) of the cover strategy further declined when mainstream consumers began favoring original versions offered by independents (Gillett 1983; see *Billboard* 1954d; Lichtman 1990).
6. Analysts proposed several reasons for the sudden recession, including the aging of baby boomers, the emergence of video games, and the overabundance of disco records. Nevertheless, the majors blamed the recession on the cassette tape, claiming that consumers were illegally taping recordings rather than purchasing them. Warner Communications estimated that home taping cost the industry some \$2.8 billion a year. Although a government study found no support for these estimated losses, the majors remained adamant that home taping threatens revenues (Dowd n.d.).
7. The work of ecologists is typically limited to organizations, yet Hannan and Carroll (1992) note that ecological dynamics should apply to other types of actors.
8. I did not consider studio musicians to be members of a performing act (see Peterson & White 1989).
9. One reviewer suggested that the impact of MTV is best captured with a dummy variable that compares pre- and post-MTV periods. When substituting this dummy variable into model 3, I found that the impact of MTV loses significance in the presence of ecological controls. Indeed, in all the reported models that contain a variable for MTV, I found that the continuous and dummy measures of MTV yield substantive results that are similar.

APPENDIX

HISTORICALLY GROUNDING THE MAINSTREAM MARKET

In the late 1800s, the mainstream market constituted the sole market for commercial recordings in the U.S. Early mainstream recordings encompassed a disparate range of musical styles — including martial, operatic, and dance music. This grab bag of styles eventually gave way in the early 1900s, as the music of New York publishers (i.e., Tin Pan Alley) became the dominant mainstream style for decades to come (Dowd 2003; Gellatt 1977; Lopes 2002; Sanjek 1988).

Two additional markets for popular music joined the mainstream in the 1920s: the “race” market that supplied blues recordings (later called “rhythm and blues”) and the “hillbilly” market that supplied folk-based recordings (later called “country”). Their respective products stood in stark contrast to the Tin Pan Alley products that reigned in the mainstream. By the 1940s, the three markets for popular music were formalized to the extent that specific retail and broadcasting organizations serviced each. Such formalized arrangements were the basis for the popularity charts by which industry personnel did (and still do) assess activity and success within each market (Anand & Peterson 2000; Dowd 2003; Ennis 1992).

In the mid- to late 1950s, the mainstream evolved as the stylistic dominance of Tin Pan Alley gave way to rhythm and blues and rock and roll. Since the 1960s, mainstream products have become stylistically more varied as nonmainstream acts have enjoyed crossover success. That is, the initial popularity of acts in one market — such as the relatively new market of rap — has translated to success in the mainstream. Still, the mainstream has remained a distinct market in terms of its broadly appealing music and its high volume and sales (see Anand & Peterson 2000; Dowd 2000, 2003; Dowd & Blyler 2002; Ennis 1992; Lopes 1992).

ASSESSING NEW PERFORMERS AND NEW FIRMS IN THE MAINSTREAM MARKET

Following the example of cyclical and open system proponents, I relied on *Billboard*’s popularity charts to track performing acts and recording firms (e.g., Burnett 1990; Lopes 1992). These charts are an attractive source because they offer systematic data that span decades (Peterson & Berger 1975) and because they constitute the information by which industry personnel evaluate and interpret their markets (Anand & Peterson 2000; Ennis 1992). To be sure, these charts do not offer an exhaustive listing of every act and firm that participated in the U.S. mainstream market, but no source of any kind does that. The lack of an exhaustive listing is partly due to the fact that the majority of recording firms are privately owned; as a result, they are not legally required to provide public information and most do not.

In its charts, *Billboard* ranks the relative success of recordings on a number of criteria. I utilized the weekly charts that detailed the success of individual songs (i.e., singles) in the mainstream market (as opposed to charts that detailed success in, say, the rhythm and blues market). From 1940 to 1957, *Billboard* supplied separate singles charts based respectively on retail sales, radio play, and jukebox play. I tracked performers and firms in all three types of charts. In 1958, *Billboard* collapsed the three charts into one singles chart that calculated hit position on the combined basis of sales and airplay (Hesbacher, Downing & Berger 1975). *Billboard* made

APPENDIX (Continued)

this change in the wake of expansive growth; thus, changes in its charts followed rather than led developments in the recording industry (see Dowd 2003; Ennis 1992; Sanjek 1988). From 1958 to 1990, *Billboard* provided its weekly *Hot 100* charts, which were based on a combination of sales and radio play. I used these charts to track all performers and firms listed in each of the 100 spots per week.

The criteria by which the charts were constructed did go through some minor changes from 1940 to 1990; nevertheless, one important aspect remained the same. All *Billboard* charts reported how successful an individual song was relative to others. Indeed, the charts reported *only* such rankings (e.g., number 1 on the charts versus number 99) rather than actual sales or radio play. All the charts thus share a consistent metric.

TRACKING LABELS AND FIRMS

The *Billboard* charts list the label on which each hit single was released. Given the increasingly loose correspondence between the names of labels and owning firms, I proceeded in the following manner. First, I noted the label for each of the 22,561 hits. Then I tracked down the firm that owned the label *at the time of each hit*. While utilizing a variety of sources (e.g., corporate annual reports), I routinely relied on the following for ownership information: weekly issues of *Billboard*, annual issues of *Billboard's Buyer's Guide*, Lexis-Nexis, annual issues of *Moody's Industrial Manual*, various issues of *The Recording Industry Sourcebook* and *The Yellow Pages of Rock*, and volumes by Gart (1989), Gillett (1983), Rust (1984), Sanjek (1988), and Sutton (2000).

With the onset of the open system, certain firms aggressively pursued alliances with labels belonging to small competitors. For instance, an independent would release recordings on its own label, and a major would distribute this label to retailers across the nation. When assessing market concentration, some have treated such distribution arrangements as comparable to ownership for the distributing firm, for these arrangements provide distributing firms with "pseudo subsidiaries" (see Burnett 1990; Lopes 1992; Peterson & Berger 1975). Replicating the approach of past researchers, I tracked down whether each hit record's label was currently distributed by another record firm. I routinely used the sources listed above to track distribution arrangements and other forms of alliances (as well as physical inspection of credits on numerous recordings). On July 25, 1970, *Billboard* charts began to provide information on recording firms that distributed hit singles of other firms, which greatly simplified my task.

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Conceptualizing Political Opportunity*

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Abstract

This article reviews central problems in political opportunity theory and explores the implications of adopting certain conceptualizations of political opportunities for explaining the emergence, development, and influence of protest movements. Results from multivariate analyses of civil rights protest, organizational formation, and policy outcomes indicate significant variation depending on (1) whether the political opportunity structure is conceptualized broadly or narrowly, (2) the dependent variable concerned, and (3) the underlying assumptions about the mechanisms through which opportunities translate into action. We argue that the variation in results can best be understood by adopting a broader understanding of protest and the political process and that theory development requires more careful and more explicit — although not necessarily more uniform — conceptualization and specification of political opportunity variables and models.

“Political opportunity structure,” applied to the world outside a social protest movement, has been the appropriate focus of much of recent theory and research on political protest. The basic premise is that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be

** We presented earlier versions of this article at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, in Toronto, Canada, in August, 1997, at the New York University Colloquium on Power, Politics, and Protest in October, 1997, and at the Social Movements/Social Justice Workgroup at the University of California, Irvine in October 2002. We appreciate helpful comments from the participants in those sessions, and from Edwin Amenta, Kenneth Andrews, Leslie Bunnage, Stephanie Dialto, Bob Edwards, John Hammond, Sharon Lean, Deana Rohlinger, Kurt Schock, Henrik Sommer, Gerry Spivak, Yang Su, Dave Snow, and the anonymous reviewers. Peter Hoff provided critical methodological advice. The research was supported by a Social Science Faculty Research Grant from Yale University and by the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California-Irvine. Rabab Abdulhadi, Jaqueline Ortiz, and Deana Rohlinger provided invaluable assistance on this project. Direct correspondence to David S. Meyer, Department of Sociology, University of California-Irvine, Irvine, CA 92697-5100. E-mail: dmeyer@uci.edu.*

exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy. This is a great deal of weight for any concept to bear. Social movement researchers in both sociology and political science have continued to add new tasks and mechanisms to the concept, such that, as Gamson and Meyer (1996: 275) warn, "The concept of political opportunity structure is . . . in danger of becoming a sponge that soaks up every aspect of the social movement environment." To avoid this fate, we need to pay much more systematic attention to questions of operationalization of this concept and specification of political opportunity models, synthesizing and cumulating the research done under its rubric.

We begin by offering an overview of the political opportunity approach, noting the variety of outcomes that analysts use different conceptualizations of political opportunity to explain. Using data on the civil rights movement, we then demonstrate the consequences of different strategies of conceptualization and model specification in analyzing the relationship between political opportunities and protest, organizational formation, and policy outcomes. We are particularly concerned with three key issues: (1) distinguishing between general openness in the polity and openness to particular constituencies, that is, issue-specific opportunities; (2) distinguishing between models that emphasize formal structural aspects of political openings and those that emphasize the perceptual elements of opportunity; and (3) assessing the effects of different elements of political opportunities on different outcomes. Our goals are primarily methodological and theoretical; we are less interested in explaining the particular case of the civil rights movement with political opportunity theory than in demonstrating the need for more careful and more explicit conceptualization and specification of political opportunity variables and models, and for a broader and more nuanced understanding of the relationships among institutional politics, protest, and policy.

Political Opportunity Theory: Problems and Prospects

Political opportunity theory promises a means to predict variance in the periodicity, style, and content of activist claims over time and variance across institutional contexts. Explanations emphasize the interaction of activist efforts and more mainstream institutional politics. The premise underlying this approach — that protest outside mainstream political institutions is closely related to more conventional political activity within — was hardly completely novel to political science or sociology (e.g., Lipset 1963), but its systematic application to the analysis of protest politics represents an important step toward greater coherence and comparability in understanding a range of social protest movements.

Eisinger's (1973) effort to explain why *some* American cities witnessed extensive riots during the late 1960s, the first explicit use of a political opportunity framework, focused on the openness of urban governments to more conventional means of making claims. By inviting conventional means of participation to redress grievances, Eisinger found, some cities preempted protest. In contrast, cities without visible openings for participation repressed or discouraged dissident claims and organization to the extent that protest did not emerge. Subsequent cross-sectional comparisons employed different models of political opportunity to explain variance across states and nations as well (e.g., Amenta, Dunleavy & Bernstein 1994; Amenta & Zyglidopoulos 1991; Banaszak 1996b; Joppke 1993; Kitschelt 1986; Snow, Soule & Cress 2003; Van Dyke & Soule 2002).

Temporal and sectoral variations in political opportunity have been most extensively explored in longitudinal studies of single movements that focus on a movement's trajectory. McAdam's (1982) treatment of the civil rights movement in the U.S., conceptualized as an exemplar of a larger theoretical orientation (see Tilly 1978), was particularly important. For McAdam, changes in demography, repression, migration, and political economy contributed to a climate in which African Americans *could* organize collective action, and claims about racial justice *would* be more readily received by at least some governmental institutions. To some extent, McAdam's work serves as a model for longitudinal studies of particular movements (e.g., Cooper 1996; Costain 1992; Meyer 1990, 1993b) and protest movements more generally (e.g., Clemens 1997; Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1989).

The challenge facing researchers concerned with political opportunity and protest is explaining which aspects of the external world affect the development of social movements and how this development is affected. Synthesized in numerous versions, analysts generally refer to the world outside the social movement as the "structure of political opportunities." Tarrow (1994:85) offers a succinct and helpful definition: "consistent — but not necessarily formal or permanent — dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure." Predictably, analysts concerned with different kinds of movements and different questions about the same movement identify different factors as political opportunity. In general, those seeking to explain how and why seemingly similar movements differ emphasize more stable aspects of states and societies, essentially holding them constant for cross-sectional comparisons. Those conducting longitudinal studies to explain the stages and cycles of social protest movements tend to neglect the constants used in cross-sectional analyses to focus on more volatile aspects of political opportunity, such as public policy and political alignments. This diversity of approaches may provide credible answers to particular problems, but it also produces a situation in which the same terms are used to describe completely different factors.

Some of the obstacles to the accumulation, testing, and development of concepts across problems and circumstances can be overcome with greater theoretical clarity and conceptual specificity. Presently, there is no shortage of conceptual statements of political opportunities. Beginning with Eisinger's (1973) focus on the "openness" of government as the key factor in opportunity (also see Koopmans 1996), scholars have proffered different visions of the number and content of essential political opportunity components. Kitschelt (1986) added state capacity to openness, proposing two variables; Clemens (1997) employs two similar dimensions, although operationalized differently, and Esman (1994) uses two slightly different dimensions, both addressing openness. Others have offered conceptualizations that employ three (Costain 1992; Jenkins & Klandermans 1995; Kriesi 1996; Kriesi et al. 1992; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1989), four (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996; Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1994), and five elements of political opportunity (Tarrow 1988, 1998). Despite overlapping concerns, scholars use different terms for the same phenomena and offer different understandings of which phenomena are relevant altogether.

Moreover, there is often incongruity between conceptual statements (e.g., Tarrow 1998; McAdam, McCarthy & Zald 1996; Gamson & Meyer 1996), which essentially leave the specification to later analysts, and analytical examinations of cases. Both Eisinger (1973) and Kitschelt (1986) urge the reader to inquire privately about operationalization. Kriesi (1996) examines a number of elements of governance structure to generate a 2×2 table of state strength (weak versus strong) arrayed against the "dominant strategy" of political management (inclusion versus exclusion), but it is not clear how another analyst would apply those categories to other cases. Rucht (1996) disaggregates conceptually cultural, political, and social elements of what he describes as the "context structure." In examining political context, he makes judgments about a challenger's access to the party system, the state's policy implementation capacity, "alliance structure," and "conflict structure," though his specification and coding is unclear. Clemens (1997), in explaining policy innovation across U.S. states, uses the number of Progressive reforms effected by 1913 as a measure of openness and the value added to productivity by manufacturing as a measure of capacity. Costain's (1992) three dimensions include mobilization of indigenous resources (not generally considered external to the movement); consciousness raising of potential supporters; and government action. Only the last of these components gets much weight, and Costain considers a wide range of factors as specific to women, such as presidential appointments, legislation, and presidential rhetoric. McAdam's (1982) treatment of political process emphasized factors particularly germane to African Americans in the U.S. during the period of his study, including the collapse of the cotton economy, resultant black migration and voting, an electoral shift of blacks to the Democratic

party, the development of the U.S. as a global power, and a number of favorable government actions. All these factors suggest an orientation to understanding a movement, but not variables easily transferable to other causes or constituencies.

To sort out the conceptual challenges facing analysts employing political opportunity frameworks and work toward building a larger understanding of the concept, we identify three areas that demand more conceptual attention. First, analysts are not clear about the importance of general political opportunities relative to issue- or constituency-specific factors. Second, analysts use different dependent variables, looking to political opportunities to explain outcomes that are likely to respond differently to the same factors. Third, analysts offer different conceptions about how political opportunities work, that is, the mechanisms by which conditions in the polity can translate into collective action. We address these issues in sequence.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR WHOM?

The sets of factors relevant to social protest vary across issues and constituencies, although much of the literature focuses on general elements in the political system, regardless of constituency (e.g., Oberschall 1978; Rucht 1996; Tarrow 1989). What provokes mobilization for one movement or constituency may depress mobilization of another, and be completely irrelevant to a third. The decline in the number of lynchings in the U.S., which McAdam (1982) credibly argues provided a political space for African Americans to organize to act collectively, is unlikely to be relevant to other significant movement actors in American politics. Similarly, Costain's (1992) focus on federal government action against discrimination against women, itself an odd product of the civil rights movement, had no appreciable influence on opportunities for environmental or peace activists.¹ And advocates concerned with spending on social welfare, for example, are unlikely to be planning their activities in response to foreign policy or environmental regulations.

The critical analytical work to be done is to parse out the relative weight of issue- or constituency-specific factors and broader changes in the political context, including economic and political instability writ large. In doing so, we can begin to assess which aspects of political opportunity theory, honed mostly in advanced industrialized nations, can be applicable to other contexts.² These steps will allow us to build a fuller, more robust, and still more finely tailored conception of political opportunity.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WHAT?

Analysts also use political opportunity structure to explain different outcomes, which produces some amount of frustration and constitutes an obstacle to the

cumulation of knowledge (McAdam 1996). Although the political opportunity or political process approach presumes that protest can sometimes affect changes in public policy, social movement analysts have yet to develop a comprehensive and generalizable framework for assessing the impact of social protest on policy. The factors that give rise to social mobilization are also those that give rise to policy change, and disentangling the independent role of protest is no simple matter.³ Tracing the two together, analysts run the risk of making two very different, but serious errors: either factoring out the role of social protest altogether; or ascribing all policy changes to movement activism, without allowing for the influence of broader social changes that create the conditions for movements.

The difficulties of sorting out these phenomena have led to confusion and conflation of opportunities for social mobilization and opportunities for policy change. Landmark longitudinal studies of particular movements (see especially Costain 1992; McAdam 1982) confuse the broader issue because in the case of certain movements, opportunities for mobilization appear to move in concert with those for formal policy change. Advocates mobilizing inside and outside the political system for both African Americans and women moved roughly in concert, with ostensibly opposing strategies converging to produce a synergistic effect.

This is not the case for all movements, however; unfavorable changes in policy may also spur mobilization, even when mobilization is unlikely to have much noticeable effect on policy. In tracing antinuclear mobilization over time in the U.S., Meyer (1993b) found that activists are most likely to succeed in reaching broader audiences and mobilizing extrainstitutional support when government policy appears particularly hostile and bellicose, and when institutional routes for political influence appear foreclosed — precisely those times when they are unlikely to get the policies they want. We can see a similar pattern for environmental activists (Schlozman & Tierney 1986), for anti-intervention activists (Smith 1996), and for abortion rights and anti-abortion activists (Staggenborg 1991).

Only by separating the analysis of opportunities for policy reform from those for political mobilization can we begin to make sense of the relationship between activism and public policy. Additionally, because policy itself is multidimensional, analysts must choose an operational definition from many possibilities that do not necessarily move in concert, including formal recognition versus new advantages for a constituency (Gamson 1990; Santoro 2002; Strong et al. 2000), introduction and adoption of discrete policy changes (Banaszak 1996b; Burstein 1991; McCammon et al. 2001; Soule et al. 1999; Van Cott 2001), levels of appropriations (Amenta, Dunleavy & Bernstein 1994; Button 1978), policy implementation (Andrews 2001), or actual practices (Einwohner 1999; Krain 1997). Core elements of political opportunity, such as political openness, are likely to operate differently for these distinct

dependent variables — and for different sorts of claims. Changes in policy, for example, may alert citizens of the need to act on their own behalf (Opp 2000) or may cause elite actors to try to activate a largely disengaged public (Meyer 1993a).

As with policy, scholars differ in both conceptualizing and operationalizing mobilization. Eisinger's (1973) formulation was designed to explain only one form of behavior — riots — and other studies of the same period focused on unruly and disruptive activism (e.g., Button 1978; Lipsky 1970; Piven & Cloward 1977). Other scholars have looked at mobilization through organizations, through the formation of interest groups (Minkoff 1994) or political parties (Lucardie 2000; Redding & Viterna 1999), through membership in dissident organizations (Amenta & Zylan 1991), through running identified candidates for office (Button, Wald & Rienzo 1999), or through development and deployment of particular identities (e.g., Bernstein 1997; Gotham 1999; Schneider 1999). More recent studies using event data consider the wide variety of activities in which dissidents engage, ranging from forms of action that in liberal polities are relatively orderly and nondisruptive such as petitions and permitted demonstrations — to strikes and to political violence (see Jenkins 1985; Kriesi et al. 1995; Maney 2000; McAdam 1982; Roscigno & Danaher 2001; Tarrow 1989; Tilly 1995). Clearly, a polity that provides openness to one kind of participation may be closed to others, and employing a unidimensional conception of openings will lead to misunderstandings.

HOW DO POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES WORK?

Although changes in political opportunity correlate with changes in the volume and tactics of social mobilization, we know less about how opportunities translate into collective action. Clearly, understanding the relationship between context and action is critical to tackling the larger theoretical question of the relationship between structure and agency. The literature is unclear on this critical issue. Some studies emphasize factors completely outside the control of activists, such as population growth (Goldstone 1991), while others suggest perceptions of opportunity are far more important to collective action than the actual strength of a regime (Kurzman 1996). Analytically, we want a robust theory that allows us to separate the relative weight of strategic choices and contextual constraints, one that allows us to see opportunities not only in retrospect as evidenced in mobilization but also opportunities prospectively and opportunities missed retrospectively (Sawyers & Meyer 1999).

Analysts are divided on the degree to which activists are cognizant of changes in political opportunity. In some versions of the theory (e.g., Tarrow 1996, 1998), activists are relatively rational entrepreneurs waiting for signals from the state and the larger society about what claims to lodge and how. Others

are agnostic about the cognizance and intentionality of political actors. Gamson and Meyer (1996) suggest that activists are by disposition unduly optimistic about opportunities, and do not necessarily calculate with any rigor the likely prospects for successfully mobilizing or generating policy reform; they just keep trying and *sometimes* succeed in engaging a broader public. It seems most likely that social movements are composed of coalitions of more or less rational, entrepreneurial, and perceptive organizers, who are consequently more or less responsive to changes in political opportunity.

Although we can correlate changes in political opportunity with changes in mobilization or policy change, it is not clear whether the signals sent by elite actors encourage mobilization, or whether structural changes in opportunity effectively allow ongoing efforts at mobilization to proceed further than it would under other circumstances. Examining this issue will help us to understand the mechanisms by which changes in opportunity translate into changes in mobilization, organizational formation, or public policy.

Specifying Political Opportunities

Taken together, the diversity of approaches to using political opportunity theory presents a challenge to researchers. Rather than abandoning the concept or the pursuit of a broader understanding of the politics of social protest altogether (see Goodwin & Jasper 1999), we think it is productive to use the disputed issues in the field that we have identified to structure research. In this spirit, we examine different visions of political opportunity to explore their effects on different dependent variables: mobilization, organizational development, and policy change. We are particularly interested in two basic issues that cut across these dependent variables: (1) the effects of structural changes in opportunities as differentiated from effects of signals sent by the political system and (2) the relative weight of issue-specific versus general openings in the polity. Our analytic strategy is to differentiate what we denote as a "structural" model from a "signal" model and then to explore the variable effects of issue-specific and general political opportunity factors on key mobilization-related outcomes.

Our overarching objective is to analyze a particular case to explore conceptual disputes in order to further the goal of building theory that will cross cases. We therefore chose a case on which there is an extensive literature: African American political mobilization. The civil rights movement, operating in a range of venues over a long period of time, provides a good case for developing and testing theories about the relationship between movements and context. We assume that the basic structures and rules of U.S. politics are essentially constant over the period under study, with a few dramatic exceptions. In choosing variables, we have sought to find readily available data

representing elements of political opportunity likely to be relevant to civil rights advocates, although not necessarily those things of which activists would be aware.

Measures and Model Specification

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

We examine the effects of political opportunities on three dependent variables: civil rights protest mobilization, organizational formation, and policy outcomes between 1955 and 1985. The measure of civil rights protest refers to the total number of black-movement-initiated events, including protest and unruly actions but excluding more routine action such as lobbying and electoral campaigning (see Jenkins & Eckert 1986). To index organizational formation, we use a measure of the total number of civil rights and black protest and advocacy organizations formed each year (see Minkoff 1995).⁴ As a measure of civil rights policy, we use the annual outlays for the Commission on Civil Rights (*Budget of the United States Government*, in 1982 constant dollars). Funding appropriations were initiated in 1957 and provide a concrete indicator of the federal commitment to protect and advance the civil rights of black Americans.

Figures 1, 2, and 3 present time-series graphs of the three dependent variables. Figure 1 includes data on civil rights protest, Figure 2 on social movement organization (SMO) founding, and Figure 3 presents civil rights budget data (1982 constant dollars). Figure 1 confirms McAdam's description of the period 1961–65 as the heyday of black insurgency, with much of the action taking place through the mid-1960s and declining gradually throughout the following decades. The peak in organizational formation (Figure 2) follows the peak of the civil rights protest, providing some descriptive evidence that protest activity spurs new SMO formation as suggested by Tarrow (1994) and suggesting a process of institution building and, possibly, strategic shifts from protest to more institutional politics.

Figure 3 depicts the relatively slow growth in funding for civil rights beginning with the first appropriations in 1957. The early years indicate growth in tandem with protest mobilization between 1960 and 1965, with a steeper increase immediately following the mid-1960s protest peak (and a slight decline between 1968 and 1970, which corresponds to Nixon's election and reactions to the urban riots of that period). Outlays for civil rights increase substantially from 1970 to 1978, despite the decrease in protest and organizational mobilization. Federal funding for civil rights declines after 1978, with a possible reversal in the last year of this study.

FIGURE 1: Civil Rights Protest (1955-85)




FIGURE 2: Civil Rights SMO Formation (1955-85)





FIGURE 3: Civil Rights Policy Outcomes (1955-85)



INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND MODEL SPECIFICATION

We specify two distinct political opportunity models for each of the dependent variables: one model emphasizes *structural changes* in political alignments and policies; the second uses more *visible signals* of such changes in the political environment, which may have greater symbolic than substantive import. Of course, the assignment of any variable to one category of another is a potential matter of dispute, as certain variables could conceivably operate as both structural openings *and* signaling mechanisms. We have, nonetheless, tried to assess both the visibility of a particular variable to the relevant constituency and the practical consequence — apart from signaling — of each variable. Sometimes signals and structures will be aligned, but such alignment shouldn't be assumed. Each model includes measures that index general openness in the polity and openness to particular constituencies, examining the effects of each dimension of the political opportunity separately. We also provide a full model combining *issue-specific* and *general* political opportunity factors. Table 1 details the variables included in each of the models; Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for these measures.

Structural Model

The structural model includes variables that track formal changes in rules and policies affecting political access, as well as the changed practices that follow

TABLE 1: Variables Included in Structure and Signal Model Specifications

	Structure Model		Signal Model ^a	
	Issue-Specific	General POS	Issue-Specific	General POS
Post-1965	X			
Black voter registration rate	X			
Civil rights budget	X		X	
Civil rights protest	X		X	
Number of blacks in Congress			X	
Supreme Court rulings			X	
Presidential attention			X	
Media attention			X	
Democratic advantage in Congress		X		X
Congressional turnover		X		
Contested election		X		X
Election year		X		
Democratic president		X		X

^a All variables in signal model lagged one year except presidential attention (measured at time _t) (see text).

from them. We conceptualize the post-1965 period, the black voter registration rate, and federal appropriations for civil rights as issue-specific structural opportunities. Years after 1965 are represented as a dummy variable coded 1 for those years following the passage of such critical legislation as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, both of which marked a significantly more open political and legal environment for civil rights activism. This legislation legitimated black activism as well as grassroots mobilization by diverse marginalized groups (Oberschall 1978). The black voter registration rate (percentage of eligible African Americans registered to vote; Horton & Smith 1990) is conceptualized as a measure of access to participation.⁵ Annual outlays for the Commission on Civil Rights (*Budget of the United States Government*, calculated in 1982 constant dollars) is included as a measure of policy influence. In modeling social movement organization (SMO) formation and social movement outcomes we also consider the level of civil rights protest as a movement-specific form of political leverage (a measure of prior protest is included as a control variable in the protest event analysis).

Our first measure of the general political opportunity structure is Democratic advantage in Congress, measured as the difference between the numbers of Democrats and Republicans in the House of Representatives (*Congressional Quarterly*, various years). Partisan control of the legislature is a critical feature of the U.S. policy-making structure, and a stronger Democratic majority should improve the prospects of certain challenging groups mobilizing

TABLE 2: Means and Standard Deviations

	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Number of cases
Civil rights protest	42.77	53.10	2	240	31
SMO founding	3.00	3.09	0	13	31
Civil rights budget	778,0572	5,205,092	0	16,050,613	31
Post-1965 period (1 = yes; 0 = no)	.65	.47	0	1	31
Black voter registration rate	50.05	14.10	25.1	66.9	31
Annual change in civil rights budget	.105	.236	-.297	.236	31
Number of blacks in Congress	10.74	6.30	3	21	31
Positive Supreme Court cases	3.16	2.53	0	10	31
Presidential attention (State of the Union)	.52	.51	0	1	31
Democratic advantage in Congress	78.35	42.26	29	155	31
Congressional turnover	260.90	21.36	232	295	31
Contested election year (1 = yes, 0 = no)	15.58	16.27	0	47	31
Democratic president (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.39	.50	0	1	31

and exercising influence.⁶ Short-term changes in the political environment are indexed by variables that capture national level political uncertainty. Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that movements are most likely to effect policy change in times of electoral volatility. We use the absolute value of change in number of Democrats in Congress to capture such volatility. A second variable is the number of closely contested congressional elections, operationalized as the number of elections decided by a 4% margin or less (*Guide to U.S. Elections*, 1985). A final measure of political turbulence is a dummy variable indexing presidential election years, which can direct activist efforts away from issue-based advocacy to campaign work (see Meyer 1993a). Finally, to capture the availability of support from authorities, we include a dummy variable coded 1 during years that coincide with Democratic presidential administrations, presumably more open to civil rights claimants (see Soule et al. 1999).

Because the structural model is premised on the vision of activists constantly trying to mobilize and succeeding more or less according to changes in political institutions, the independent variables included in the structural model are measured contemporaneously with the dependent variable. Table 3 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for the continuous variables included in the structural model.

Signals Model

The logic of this model is that activists and officials monitor changes in the political environment, looking for encouragement for mobilization and for advocating policy reforms. The model includes issue-specific and general opportunity variables that savvy activist entrepreneurs could read as invitations to mobilize. We include a number of measures that are specifically relevant to the civil rights movement. Annual change in civil rights funding at the federal level (derived from the federal budget measure described above) is included as an indicator of short-term gains and losses in movement success; our assumption is that changes in federal effort are more visible to activists than an absolute measure. The number of black members of Congress (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1978; U.S. Dept. of Commerce 1989:244) is conceptualized as a signal of governmental openness.⁷ We also explore the effects of the number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions (see Barnes & Connolly 1999) in favor of black civil rights (compiled yearly from *Congress and the Nation*, vols. I-VIII and calculated as the total number of decisions minus the number of negative or neutral rulings). We also include a dummy variable coded 1 if there was any positive mention of civil rights in the yearly State of the Union address by the president (*Public Papers of the President*, 1955–85). This address, as an annual ritual statement of the president's agenda, sends a message about executive priorities (Meyer 1995). A final issue-specific indicator of political opportunities is the extent of media coverage of civil rights, measured as the total number of mentions of civil rights activity in the *New York Times Index* minus the number of protests and unruly activities. This net measure captures media attention to more routine forms of political challenge, such as lobbying and electoral campaigning.⁸ In estimating models of SMO formation and outcomes we also include a measure of civil rights protest to capture the "demonstration effect" (Tarrow 1994) of protest.

We think that three general opportunity variables are plausible perceptual indicators of a favorable environment for activism: Democratic advantage in Congress, the number of contested elections, and whether there is a Democratic president (see above for descriptions). Note that the structural and signal models include both these measures, since they have both substantive and symbolic importance. Democratic advantage in Congress or the incumbency of a Democratic president may represent both an actual increase in elite support and a signal that opportunities for activism are favorable.

Because a signaling approach implies a different understanding of how, and how quickly, changes in the environment translate into protest, we have lagged almost all the measures one year to account for the time necessary for information about perceived changes to be translated into action. The presidential attention variable is not lagged because the State of the Union address, delivered each January, is a regularly anticipated event. Table 4 presents

TABLE 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients — Structure Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Civil rights protest	1.00							
2. SMO founding	-.04	1.00						
3. Civil rights budget	-.51	.15	1.00					
4. Black voter registration	-.31	.39	.79	1.00				
5. Democratic advantage	.24	-.04	.35	.20	1.00			
6. Congressional turnover	.22	-.04	.01	.05	.36	1.00		
7. Contested election	-.08	.09	-.11	-.10	-.05	-.06	1.00	
8. Protest _(t-1)	.33	.02	-.48	-.23	.09	.04	.21	1.00

Pearson correlation coefficients for the continuous measures included in the signal models.

Methods

We model protest and founding rates between 1955 and 1985 using Poisson regression analysis, appropriate for use with count data. The Poisson model estimates the probability of protest and organizational formation each year, assuming that the probability of event occurrence is constant over the year and independent of all previous events (King 1992). One limitation of the Poisson formulation is that it fails to account for overdispersion and can result in spuriously small standard errors of the exogenous variables (Barron 1992). A common correction is to estimate the event count using negative binomial regression, which is a generalization of the Poisson model. Choice of the model is based on standard tests of fit for nested models (King 1992). In the analyses discussed below, the negative binomial specification is more appropriate for estimating yearly protest; in the analysis of SMO founding rates, the Poisson model provides the best fit to the data. Poisson and negative binomial regression analyses were carried out using LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene 1991).

We use time series regression to estimate the relationship between political opportunity variables and movement outcomes between 1955 and 1985. Since observations in time series data drawn from different time points are routinely related to each other in a systematic way, OLS regression is not appropriate because the assumption of independence of the error terms is violated. Violation of this assumption can bias significance tests by underestimating the error variance (see Ostrom 1990). To take account of autocorrelation in the dependent variable, we estimate autoregressive time series models (also known as Box-Jenkins models). This is a maximum likelihood method that specifies the autoregressive parameter *p*. Based on exploratory analysis, we specify a

TABLE 4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients: “Signal” Model

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Civil rights protest	1.00									
2. SMO founding	-.04	1.00								
3. Civil rights budget	-.51	.15	1.00							
4. Percent budget change _(t-1)	-.17	-.15	-.35	1.00						
5. Blacks in Congress _(t-1)	-.60	-.04	.92	-.39	1.00					
6. SC rulings _(t-1)	.04	.12	.37	-.33	-.36	1.00				
7. Media attention _(t-1)	.57	.34	-.34	.01	-.48	.26	1.00			
8. Democratic advant _(t-1)	.12	-.07	.40	-.11	.27	.17	.11	1.00		
9. Contested election _(t-1)	.28	-.21	-.06	-.16	-.10	-.02	.12	-.06	1.00	
10. Protest _(t-1)	.33	.02	-.48	.24	-.55	-.04	.66	.24	-.10	1.00

second-order autoregressive model, AR2. This model implies that the current disturbance is made up of portions of the previous two disturbances or, in other words, that the series value is affected by the preceding two values (independent of one another). Maximum likelihood estimation was conducted using the ARIMA procedure in SPSS version 10.0.5 (SPSS 1989–99).

Results

Our analyses address the following questions: How complete is our understanding of political mobilization if we conceptualize political opportunities as issue-specific or more general features of the political system? What are the implications of our specifications of political opportunity models? And how do the observed effects vary by outcome or dependent variable? We offer this analysis in order to provide an empirical corrective to debates over the analytic utility of political opportunity concepts and models (e.g., Goodwin & Jasper 1999), with the intent of improving theories about political opportunity and social movements.

CIVIL RIGHTS PROTEST

Table 5 presents the results from a series of negative binomial regression analyses of civil rights protest between 1955 and 1985. The first three columns represent our attempt to specify a structural model, distinguishing between conditions particularly relevant to the civil rights movement (issue-specific) and more general features of the political environment; the third column presents

TABLE 5: Negative Binomial Regression Estimates of Civil Rights Protest, 1955-1985

	Structure Model			Signal Model		
	Issue-specific	General POS	Full Model	Issue-Specific	General POS	Full Model
Post-1965	-1.106† (.619)		.021 (.882)			
Black voter registration	.035† (.019)		.014 (.022)			
Civil rights budget	-.144e ^{-2**} (.056e ⁻²)		-.212e ^{-2**} (.059e ⁻²)	.153 (.201)		-.166 (.352)
Number of blacks in Congress				-.121** (.029)		-.166** (.030)
Supreme Court rulings				-.030 (.070)		-.002 (.048)
Presidential attention				.684** (.263)		.130 (.350)
Media attention				.269e ⁻² † (.156e ⁻²)		.125e ⁻² (.151e ⁻²)
Democratic advantage in Congress	-.266e ⁻² (.647e ⁻²)	-.563e ⁻² (.461e ⁻²)		.160e ⁻² (.462e ⁻²)		.629e ^{-2*} (.246e ⁻²)
Congressional turnover		.017 (.016)	.570e ⁻² (.955e ⁻²)			
Contested election		-.005 (.020)	-.010 (.013)		.016 (.010)	.008 (.006)
Election year		.199 (.671)	-.062 (.439)			
Democratic President		.928† (.514)	.569† (.312)		-.027 (.349)	.324 (.346)
Protest	.178e ⁻² (.310e ⁻²)	.097e ⁻² (.346e ⁻²)	.135e ⁻² (.166e ⁻²)	-.352e ⁻² (0.284e ⁻²)	.928e ^{-2*} (.491e ⁻²)	-.386e ⁻² (.366e ⁻²)
Alpha	.404** (.154)	.803** (.318)	.241* (.101)	0.201* (0.089)	.818*** (.276)	.147* (.071)
Constant	3.429** (.066)	3.11** (.583)	3.534** (.911)	4.033** (0.393)	2.843*** (.549)	4.123** (.477)
Log-likelihood	-131.459	-142.794	-123.904	-121.321	-143.12	-118.047

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

^a Variables in structure model measured at time_t, except protest (measured at time_(t-1)); variables in signal model lagged one year, except presidential attention (measured at time_t).

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

estimates from a model that combines both sets of factors. The same logic of analysis applies to the final three columns of the table, in which we conceptualize political opportunities as signals of opportunities for protest mobilization.

Turning first to the structure model, the measures included in the baseline issue-specific model appear to be correlated with protest activity. The variable indexing the post-1965 period is marginally significant and it appears that the probability of protest diminished after the passage of critical civil rights legislation that shifted the balance of power in favor of blacks. Increases in federal funding for civil rights have an even more significant negative effect on protest. As others have suggested, these institutional responses may have channeled black insurgency to more conventional means of making claims (Jenkins & Eckert 1986). At the same time, increases in the black voter registration rate, which we conceptualize as a measure of black political access, is positively correlated with protest activity. Tentatively, this suggests that, although protest tends to fall off with formal legislative gains, the more tangible disruptive potential (Piven & Cloward 1977) of the black vote has a synergistic effect with political activism. Perhaps most striking, there does not appear to be a statistically significant relationship between the number of prior and current protests (a result that holds when the civil rights budget, which is significantly correlated with lagged protest, is excluded from the model).⁹

The second partial model, which isolates general structural opportunities, provides very little insight into the process of protest mobilization. Neither partisan control of the legislature nor a measure of political uncertainty significantly affects the protest rate. In fact, the only general feature of the U.S. political system that appears to promote protest is the incumbency of a Democratic president, which we conceptualize as a measure of government support.

The third column of Table 5 includes both issue-specific and general political opportunity variables. When controlling for both sets of factors, there is no longer a significant difference in the probability of protest after 1965 nor a statistically significant increase in protest with a gain in voter registration.¹⁰ In this model, the two main factors influencing civil rights protest over the 1955–85 period are incumbency of a Democratic president, which tends to increase the protest rate as predicted by political opportunity models, and increase in funding for civil rights, which tends to decrease the protest rate.¹¹ This latter finding suggests that movement outcomes are themselves a significant feature of the political environment and may hinder a continued mobilization.

Conceptualizing political opportunities as influencing protest through a perceptual mechanism provides a rather different picture of civil rights protest. The issue-specific signal model appears to do a fairly good job of explaining protest activity, with three of the five variables included in this partial model

reaching statistical significance. The impression of greater political access, measured by the number of blacks elected to Congress, is significant and negatively associated with the protest rate — contradicting expectations drawn from a model of expanding political opportunities (e.g., McAdam 1982). However, presidential attention to civil rights and media coverage of institutionally oriented civil rights activity significantly increase the rate of protest, whereas the number of favorable Supreme Court rulings is not statistically significant.¹² This suggests that activists take advantage of what they perceive to be a favorable climate of political support and public opinion. Despite the importance of federal levels of civil rights funding in the structural model, annual percentage change in budget appropriations does not significantly influence protest activity. Nor are levels of prior protest significant in this partial model.

None of the variables in the partial model of general opportunities is statistically significant (column 5).¹³ However, once all factors are included in the fully specified signal model (column 6), the measure of Democratic congressional advantage becomes significant and has a clear positive effect on civil rights protest. Also noteworthy is the substantial effect of the number of blacks elected to Congress: the addition of one representative diminishes the protest rate by 15%. Symbolic openness, not necessarily connected with legislative capacity, appears to discourage extrainstitutional efforts at influence.

What can we take away from this analysis? First, issue-specific variables tend to be more relevant for civil rights protest than more general features of the political environment, regardless of whether we posit structural or signaling mechanisms. Second, the influence of structural and symbolic factors do not always follow the expected positive association between openings and activism. To illustrate, in the partial models, increases in potential black electoral leverage, positive presidential attention to civil rights, and greater media emphasis are positively correlated with the protest rate, whereas prior movement gains and black congressional representation tend to offset activism. One possible interpretation of these results is that these latter two factors may represent changes in the political structure that make institutionally oriented activities more attractive as a strategy for influence than protest. This would support a curvilinear understanding of the relationship between openness and protest (e.g., Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978). This finding also suggests the need to examine broader processes of institutionalization (Meyer & Tarrow 1998) in understanding the political trajectory of protest movements.

Finally, we see that structural and signal models provide distinctive accounts of the civil rights movement. Had we approached this analysis only from a structural perspective we would argue that the key factors influencing the movement's protest activity are prior movement gains — which diminish further activism— and the presence of elite support as measured by a

Democratic president in power. Alternatively, had we emphasized the symbolic dimension to the exclusion of structure we would have emphasized the offsetting effect of institutional access and the facilitative influence of Democratic control of the legislature. But if we understand political opportunities more broadly, we can see complementary aspects of these accounts. If, for example, we reconceptualize the number of blacks in Congress as a measure of movement outcomes and realize that partisan advantage may be an indicator of elite support equivalent to the incumbency of a Democratic president, the story is substantially the same: controlling for other factors, the (actual or perceived) presence of supportive allies in government improves the prospects of insurgency, whereas (actual or perceived) institutional gains diminish incentives for further extrainstitutional mobilization.

SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATION FORMATION

The next set of analyses addresses a different dependent variable, the founding of social movement organizations. Although there is reason to expect that the factors influencing organizational dynamics differ from those promoting protest (Piven & Cloward 1992), researchers tend to employ similar models of explanation uncritically (e.g., Minkoff 1997). Here, we assess such differences, concentrating on the variable effects of model specification.

Table 6 presents Poisson regression estimates of civil rights SMO formation (measured as the founding of black protest and advocacy groups). We follow the same logic employed in the protest event analysis but also include civil rights protest as a predictor of SMO formation in the issue-specific models.¹⁴ We focus on the findings from the full models; results from the partial specifications of both the structure and signals models are substantially the same.

The first four variables in the full structure model (column 3) reference issue-specific factors. There is a marginally significant positive effect of increases in African American electoral strength on the SMO founding rate (each percentage increase in registered voters increases the founding rate by slightly less than 4%), but no evidence that new SMO activity is higher after 1965 or in response to movement protests. This latter finding suggests that organizational mobilization takes place independently of protest mobilization, challenging Tarrow's (1994) protest cycle model and confirming Minkoff's (1997) analysis of the feminist and civil rights movements over the same period. In contrast with the protest analysis, the measure of social movement outcomes is significant only in the partial model, with a similar negative association with the founding rate.¹⁵

The remaining variables in the structure model are intended to capture the more general political opportunity structure facing movement organizers. Political uncertainty, indexed by congressional turnover and the number of closely contested congressional elections, does not appear to be a relevant fac-

TABLE 6: Poisson Regression Estimates of Civil Rights SMO Formation, 1955–1985

	Structure Model			Signal Model ^a		
	Issue-specific	General POS	Full Model	Issue-Specific	General POS	Full Model
Post-1965	.302 (.668)		.876 (.700)			
Black voter registration	.030* (.020)		.036+ (.020)			
Civil rights budget	-.788 ^{e-3} * (.396 ^{e-3})		-.661 ^{e-3} (.504 ^{e-3})	-.006 (.006)		-.016* (.007)
Civil rights protest	.035 ^{e-2} (.291 ^{e-2})		.315 ^{e-2} (.417 ^{e-2})	-.178 ^{e-2} (.230 ^{e-2})		-.922 ^{e-2} ** (.395 ^{e-2})
Number of blacks in Congress				.013 (.039)		.044 (.037)
Supreme Court rulings				-.009 (.032)		-.074 (.053)
Presidential attention				-.811** (.263)		-.975** (.330)
Media attention				.004** (.001)		.005** (.001)
Democratic advantage in Congress		-.336 ^{e-2} (.295 ^{e-2})	-.279 ^{e-2} (.388 ^{e-2})		-.216 ^{e-2} (.255 ^{e-2})	-.578 ^{e-2} (.394 ^{e-2})
Congressional turnover		-.281 ^{e-2} (.676 ^{e-2})	-.012 (.008)			
Contested election		-.374 ^{e-2} (.814 ^{e-2})	.253 ^{e-2} (.874 ^{e-2})		-.015* (.007)	-.028** (.009)
Election year		.563* (.278)	.551* (.276)			
Democratic President		.458* (.228)	.496* (.248)		.018* (.008)	.162** (.059)
Constant	-.974 (.703)	1.144** (.291)	-.976 (.827)	.907* (.421)	1.504** (.257)	1.857** (.488)
Log-likelihood	-67.085	-73.331	-61.270	-64.648	-74.999	-56.725

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

^a Variables in structure model measured at time_(t); variables in signal model lagged one year, except presidential attention (measured at time_(t)).

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

tor in SMO mobilization. Nor is partisan advantage a significant predictor of organizational founding. However, organizers do appear to respond favorably to two general political conditions: They are more likely to establish new SMOs

during national election years and when there is a Democrat in the White House. Taken together, these findings suggest that movement entrepreneurs are more likely to establish new organizations when they can capitalize on improvements in their constituency's political access and when there are predictable opportunities for action offered by electoral campaigns. Given the more institutional nature of organizational formation, this is not surprising, a point we take up again below.

The results from the full signal model (column 6) offer a contrast. First, two issue-specific factors that were not significant in the structural model appear to play an important role: change in federal budget appropriations and prior protest levels. Both features of the opportunity structure — the first indexing prior movement gains and the second demonstrating the extent of political openness to group claims — significantly *lower* the SMO founding rate. Presidential attention to civil rights also appears to significantly depress the incentive for SMO formation, which contrasts with the positive influence of this variable on the protest rate (as indicated by the partial results presented in Table 3, column 4). Alternatively, media attention to civil rights promotes the SMO founding rate, apparently signaling an opportune moment for committing resources to ongoing organizational activities.

The final three variables in the full signal model reference general features of the political opportunity structure. Democratic advantage in Congress, which promoted civil rights protest, is not significant, but two other general opportunity measures have a statistically significant relationship with SMO formation. The number of closely contested congressional elections, an indicator of electoral instability, is negatively correlated with the founding rate. This provides some indirect confirmation of the point made above that organizers appear more likely to respond positively to relatively predictable changes in the political system and to be more cautious when the balance of power is less certain. Alternatively, the presence of a Democratic presidential administration signals an opportunity for SMO formation.

To summarize, these results suggest that if we conceptualize political opportunity operating as a structural mechanism, organizers appear more responsive to general factors in the political environment than to issue-specific conditions. Both the presence of potential allies in power and the opportunities presented by routine shifts in the balance of power promote the SMO founding rate; although improvements in African American political access also increase the founding rate, this effect is only marginally significant statistically. Such factors as positive gains of the movement and levels of insurgency, as well as political uncertainty and improvements in political access, do not appear to play a significant role in generating new organizational activity.

Conceptualizing political opportunities as signals modifies our understanding of the process of SMO formation in important ways. First, organizers appear to respond to movement outcomes and recent protests, but such factors

tend to inhibit the creation of new movement-affiliated groups. In addition, to the extent that movement concerns appear to be a presidential priority, organizers seem less likely to invest in organization building, as is also the case in responding to electoral instability. Importantly, had we limited ourselves to a more structural perspective, we would have overlooked this factor's significance. Offsetting such constraints, both general increases in media attention to civil rights and the presence of a Democratic president promote the SMO founding rate. Notably, the presence of a Democratic president, which indexes allies in power, is significant in both model specifications. As a final point, on balance it appears that both issue-specific and general political conditions are relevant predictors of the SMO founding rate when the opportunity structure is conceptualized as operating through a signaling effect.

MOVEMENT OUTCOMES

The final set of results (Table 7) examines the relevance of political opportunity models for explaining policy gains.¹⁶ Three of the variables included in the full structure model are statistically significant, while none of the variables in the signaling model is significant. From the coefficients presented in column 3, our account is relatively straightforward: controlling for a range of issue-specific and general features of the political environment, and taking into account the temporal interdependence of the budget process, federal appropriations for civil rights are significantly higher after passage of key civil rights legislation in the mid-1960s, increase when the Democratic party has control of the White House, and increase in response to extrainstitutional political pressure.

Simply put, protest matters, along with the development of a new legislative framework and elite support for movement objectives. These influences on policy outcomes are direct and immediate, a claim that is supported by the finding that neither of the lagged controls for protest or elite support are significant in the signal model. And there is no indication that political authorities respond to the same opportunity signals that invite organizers' efforts.

Political Opportunity for What?

Table 8 summarizes the results discussed above and provides an opportunity to consider the implications of assuming that the political environment provides a consistent set of opportunities and constraints for different forms of mobilization and for policy influence. These results highlight the importance of carefully theorizing the role of political opportunities in terms of the specific outcome of interest. By paying too little attention to the different effects of political opportunities on different outcomes, while often conflating structural

TABLE 7: Time Series (AR) Regression Estimates of Civil Rights Budget, 1955–85

	Structure Model			Signal Model		
	Issue-Specific	General POS	Full Model	Issue-Specific	General POS	Full Model
Post-1965	2075265.33† (1204707.89)		2439777.45* (1099542.00)			
Black voter registration	18404.98 (57861.78)		25506.56 (55063.80)			
Civil rights protest	3854.52 (3026.91)		5565.96* (2656.96)	189.72 (2561.45)		669.58 (3118.28)
Number of blacks in Congress				-75833.67 (150714.91)		-13239.62 (169347.27)
Supreme Court rulings				13390.52 (67845.23)		24754.38 (90387.95)
Presidential attention				11010.50 (316472.19)		-19110.49 (411171.84)
Media attention				-814.89 (2945.30)		-1034.09 (3923.82)
Democratic advantage in Congress		1981.68 (4365.03)	-1570.02 (4546.27)		2054.30 (4598.30)	970.40 (15647.03)
Congressional turnover		-6743.58 (9575.01)	-4623.81 (9459.05)			
Contested election		-131.62 (6414.14)	-2049.24 (6549.32)		4345.88 (4452.81)	5143.90 (6444.34)
Election year		-224863.29 (309543.73)	-111534.65 (303482.72)			
Democratic President		945369.45* (440282.84)	1248114.69* (447262.88)		-224450.45 (480830.15)	-143237.70 (740460.40)
AR1	1.32** (.17)	1.48** (.16)	1.48** (.17)	1.44** (.175)	1.40** (.17)	1.41** (.18)
AR2	-.35* (.17)	-.51** (.17)	-.51** (.17)	-.46* (.17)	-.42* (.17)	-.43* (.18)
Constant	4642806.19 (4560207.59)	6492906.77 (5034790.72)	6492906.77 (5034790.72)	7469873.22 (6077410.62)	6484425.10 (4892314.91)	6583687.64 (5911488.50)
Log-likelihood	-470.022	-466.888	-463.410	-457.162	-456.41	-456.95

Note: 1982 constant dollars; standard errors in parentheses. Variables in structure model measured at time_t; variables in “signal” model lagged one year, except presidential attention (measured at time_t).

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

and perceptual mechanisms in model specification, social movement researchers risk developing incomplete or even misleading understandings of the relationship between context and protest.

TABLE 8: Summary of Results

	Structure Model		
	Protest Mobilization	SMO Mobilization	Policy Outcomes
Issue-specific			
Post-1965	(-)		+
Black voter registration	(+)	+	
Civil rights budget ^a	-	(-)	
Number of blacks in Congress			
Supreme Court rulings			
Presidential attention			
Media attention			
Protest			+
General POS			
Democratic advantage			
Congressional turnover			
Contested election			
Election year		+	
Democratic president	+	+	+
Signal Model			
	Protest Mobilization	SMO Mobilization	Policy Outcomes
Issue-specific			
Post-1965			
Black voter registration			
Civil rights budget ^a		-	
Number of blacks in Congress		-	
Supreme Court rulings			
Presidential attention	(+)	-	
Media attention	(+)	+	
Protest	(+)	-	
General POS			
Democratic advantage	+		
Congressional turnover			
Contested election		-	
Election year			
Democratic president		+	

+ denotes a significant positive coefficient

- denotes a significant negative coefficient. Results summarized in parentheses indicate that the variable is significant in partial model only.

^a Civil rights budget not included in policy outcomes model; see note 17 in text.

First, note that there is only a small overlap in the *consistent effects* of the political opportunity structure on the three dependent variables studied here: protest, SMO formation, and policy influence. The most striking finding is that Democratic presidential administrations consistently promote movement mobilization and outcomes. This effect is significant in each of the structural models, which implies that government support effectively alters the balance of power in favor of the movement and its chances for success. The lagged measure is significant in the signal model of SMO formation, suggesting that it also represents an important cue for activists interested in establishing organizations. There is also evidence that both protesters and organizational entrepreneurs are influenced by movement gains, but improvements in the policy arena tend to diminish both routine and institutional collective action.¹⁷ There is also some tentative evidence that African American electoral access is a structural facilitator for protest and SMO formation and that attention from the mainstream media signals favorable opportunities for both kinds of activity.

Second, elements of the political opportunity structure exercise *differential effects* on protest mobilization and other outcomes. Notably, protest pressures public officials to respond to movement claims but also diminishes the rate of new organizational activity. This latter finding lends credence to the idea that there is a trade-off between protest and organization building, as Piven and Cloward (1977) contend. However, as Minkoff (1997) has documented, an organizational infrastructure is a critical feature in the development of subsequent protest. To the extent that movement actors choose protest over organizational formation, they may be opting for shorter-term mobilization at the expense of longer-term institutional building that supports greater policy influence, albeit over a longer period. This is one possible interpretation of the decline in protest, SMO formation, and funding levels after 1976 documented in Figures 1-3.

Two other, more tentative, differential effects are worth comment. First, when there is some indication that movement concerns are a presidential priority, activists are less likely to establish new organizations and more likely to press their claims using protest. Evidence for the influence of presidential attention on protest is provisional, but it is worthwhile to think more about what is going on. One plausible hypothesis is that a signaled shift in the political environment may be interpreted as a potentially time-limited opening of a "policy window" (Kingdon 1984; Meyer 1993a) that activists seek to exploit. Given the costs and time horizon of organization building, activists may choose to exert what influence they can immediately, rather than establishing new foundations for subsequent action, effectively piggybacking on institutional initiatives (Minkoff 1995).

The final differential effect we want to comment on is the influence of legislative openings on mobilization and policy outcomes. Whereas the post-

1965 period is clearly marked as a favorable context for civil rights outcomes, the results from the partial structural model of protest suggest that activists may have been less interested in — or capable of — staging protest after passage of the Voting Rights Act. McAdam's (1982) historical account of the shift to more institutional strategies by the integrationist wing of the civil rights movement at this juncture — and the division this created within the movement leadership and base — supports this interpretation. Again, although these results are provisional, our point is simple: clarifying “political opportunity for what” is as essential for theory development as is providing a clear specification of the mechanisms by which opportunities translate into action.

Conclusion

The political opportunity perspective has come to structure increasing amounts of research on social protest, dissidence more generally, and even policy reform. From its earliest uses, employed in analysis of dissent in liberal western polities, the approach has been extended back in history (e.g., Amenta & Zylan 1991; Clemens 1997; Tilly 1995) and to other sorts of political contexts (e.g., Boudreau 1996; Brockett 1991). The promise of the approach is accompanied by substantial challenges for researchers. Although the approach can surely explain a great deal, it is less important to run opportunity approaches against alternatives (see Snow, Soule & Cress 2003; Van Dyke & Soule 2002) than to discover the relationships of particular variables to the outcomes examined.

Our contribution here has been to consider the implications of developing models of protest, organization building, and policy outcomes that correspond to whether political opportunities are theorized as influencing action through relatively consistent and enduring aspects of the political structure (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986) or via a signaling effect (Tarrow 1996), distinguishing between issue-specific opportunities (not translatable across social movements) (Banaszak 1996a; Meyer 1993a) and more general elements of the political system. Researchers not only make different assumptions about the mechanisms through which opportunities translate into action or outcomes, but they also employ different concepts and measures of political opportunity that follow from these assumptions.

Our results strongly suggest that we need to consider more seriously how political opportunities operate through different causal mechanisms that depend on the political process. Movement-related policy outcomes are unequivocally determined by structural elements in the polity (see also Amenta 1998). In contrast, the dynamics of SMO formation are most closely linked to a signaling process, especially with respect to issue-specific conditions, but also

in terms of the general component of the opportunity structure. Protest dynamics are more difficult to evaluate in this regard, since very few of the selected variables were significant. However, these results suggest that the issue-specific models we examined have greater explanatory power than general dimensions of the political system. This is somewhat surprising, given the attention paid to establishing the relevance of formal features of the political system for explaining both movement-specific and society-level protest potential (Jenkins & Klandermans 1995) or broad structural changes that accompany a cycle of protest (Tarrow 1989).

In addition, much current work posits a simple, positive relationship between openings in the political structure and mobilization, providing little theoretical leverage to explain ostensibly contradictory results of the sort that we encountered. Instead, we think it will be much more productive to think more carefully about what might lead to such different effects — on the same dependent variable as well as across different outcomes. For example, we have suggested distinguishing between what can be considered more enduring and positive changes in the political structure that diminish the incentives for extra-institutional action and conditions that seem immediately relevant or amenable to intervention. Activists and political officials make decisions about when to capitalize on political change and when to be cautious — and such decisions are themselves likely to depend on the form of the action to be taken. More generally, we need to develop a more nuanced understanding of the possibly contradictory influences of what are currently conceived of as straightforward openings and closings of the political opportunity structure and to be concerned with the question of “political opportunity for what” — recognizing that the political environment provides both consistent and variable influences across outcomes.

This article is a first step toward untangling the wide range of exogenous factors often grouped under political opportunity, in order to contribute to a better understanding of the relationship of these aspects of opportunity on the politics and development of dissident protest. It seems worthwhile to build on these efforts to develop a fuller, curvilinear model of political opportunities and protest, building on this analysis and earlier conceptions of political opportunity structure (e.g., Eisinger 1973; Tilly 1978). In the case of African American activists, both from these findings and from broader historical accounts, we conclude that that insurgents responded to both structural changes in the polity and signals from particular institutional actors to mount protest campaigns in the 1950s. Political figures signaled a willingness to respond, and activists formed organizations, making inroads into institutional politics, to some degree turning from protest to more conventional ways of making claims. Activist efforts contributed to structural changes, which led to changes in policy. Within the polity, not all doors and windows are opening simultaneously, but

in a sequence dependent upon a pattern of institutionalization (Meyer & Tarrow 1998), one that is likely to depend upon the initial positioning of the movement constituency. These broader patterns are worth establishing and then comparing across cases and contexts.

Finally, and perhaps most critically, we need to understand the interplay of opportunity, mobilization, and political influence. It is important, both as both scholars and citizens, to understand how activists can make the most of their opportunities and maximize their influence under particular historical circumstances.

Notes

1. This is not to suggest that social movements operate in isolation from each other. Recent work points to the ways that the protest activities of other actors may also influence the mobilization of a new constituency through a variety of mechanisms (e.g., McAdam 1995; Meyer & Whittier 1994; Minkoff 1997). Such indirect intermovement effects require greater theorization to describe their influence on political opportunities. Our purpose here is to focus on more proximate or direct effects. In this respect, the civil rights movement that is the focus of our empirical analysis is least likely to be influenced by other social movements that followed it (Minkoff 1997).

2. Party systems, for example, are critical for understanding protest politics in European countries but less relevant in states where parties exercise less influence and do less of the mobilizing. Boudreau (1996), in seeking to apply opportunity theory to less-developed nations, suggests that the scope and strength of the state are critical dimensions that must be added and reconfigured to any conception of political opportunity drawn from “northern theory” (see also Almeida & Stearns 1998; Brockett 1991; Schock 1999; Van Cott 2001).

3. This subject has properly been the matter of some debate. See particularly the disputes reprinted in Gamson (1990) and discussions in Amenta, Dunleavy, and Bernstein 1994; Amenta and Zylan 1991; Burstein 1991, 1999; Burstein and Linton 2002; Giugni, Tilly, and McAdam 1999; Meyer & Marullo 1992. Cross-sectional studies that examine the effects of comparable movements on policy (e.g., Amenta, Dunleavy & Bernstein 1994; Joppke 1993) implicitly assume that factors that give rise to movements are roughly comparable across the units sampled.

4. Craig Jenkins generously provided protest event data. Organizational data were collected from the *Encyclopedia of Associations* and include national membership associations that promote African American civil rights through the use of extrainstitutional protest or institutional policy advocacy (see Minkoff 1995).

5. The Voting Rights Act did not affect the number of eligible black votes, but did affect resources to increase actual registration. Our use of the voter registration rate as a variable demonstrates the complications inherent in this enterprise. We could consider the black voter registration rate as an outcome variable — if our purpose had been to examine multiple political outcomes. There is also some contention about the implications of an increase in voter registration as a measure of participation itself. Higher registration rates

do not necessarily lead to increases in voting, and there is no evidence that it leads to other forms of participation — despite the hopes of registration advocates (e.g., Bennett 1990; Gans 1990; Piven & Cloward 1988, 1989, 1990; Rosenstone & Hansen 1993).

6. It is important to acknowledge that Democratic majorities for much of this period were composed to a substantial extent of representatives elected from the South who were often hostile to the cause of civil rights. The measure of advantage, however, still reflects the capacity of government to act when pushed to do so. It is critical to remember that Congress passed major civil rights legislation in the middle 1960s when organized by very large Democratic majorities, including a large number of conservative southern Democrats.

7. Because policymaking in the U.S. is heavily constrained by partisan alignment, the ethnic background of elected officials is more important as a signal of openness than as an actual measure of either the capacity or willingness of Congress to act.

8. Our view is that media attention to such nondramatic, intrinsically less disruptive forms of protest offers a more valid indicator of a perceived opening of the opportunity structure in that such reporting legitimates the issue of civil rights in the public domain. This measure is also expected to be less sensitive to the documented biases in reporting protest events, both with respect to frequency and content (e.g., McCarthy, McPhail & Smith 1996; Oliver & Maney 2000; Oliver & Myers 1999; Olzak 1989; Rucht & Neidhardt 1999). The initial data set of protest events were checked and corrected for double-counting (see Jenkins & Eckert 1986), which would otherwise artificially deflate the measure of attention to nondramatic forms of collective action.

9. Minkoff (1997) found a significant positive relationship between prior and current protest but used a broader measure that included both conventional and contentious events — pointing again to the importance of conceptualization and measurement in systematic analyses of political opportunity theory.

10. This result also holds with the exclusion of the budget measure, which is strongly correlated with the black voter registration rate, suggesting that the lack of statistical significance is not the result of multicollinearity (results available from authors).

11. The protest rate is expected to be 76% higher when a Democrat is in the White House. This figure is based on the multiplier of the rate: $100[\exp(b) - 1]$ where b is the coefficient of an independent variable x . This gives the influence of a 1-unit change on the protest rate.

12. The strong correlation between Supreme Court rulings and black congressional representation could be suppressing statistical significance in this case; in supplementary analysis the measure of Supreme Court rulings is significant at the 0.01 level when number of blacks in Congress is omitted from the model. The coefficient is negative, again suggesting that gains in the political-legal arena might diminish protest odds.

13. The control for prior protest reaches statistical significance at the 0.10 level, but this effect diminishes when all variables are included in the fully specified signal model.

14. We do not control for prior SMO founding, since it is not significant in any of the models and its omission does not change the observed pattern of results (results available

from authors). We also excluded this variable from the models of policy outcomes presented below.

15. Given the strong bivariate correlations between budget levels and the black voter registration rate and protest events, we also separately examined models omitting each of these variables. When protest is excluded from the full model, the civil rights budget becomes marginally significant (.10 level); omitting the voter registration rate does not influence the results. The protest variable does not attain statistical significance when either budget levels or voter registration rates are omitted. This suggests that the statistical significance of the civil rights budget might be suppressed by multicollinearity, but we have elected a more conservative interpretation of these results.

16. These results are based on second-order autoregressive time series regression estimates, which take into account the correlation between the civil rights budget in the current year and outlays in the two preceding years. Our decision to include two autoregressive parameters was based on the significant improvement in fit over first-order autoregressive models, as indicated by the significant *t*-ratio for the AR2 parameter, and the significant difference in log-likelihood functions. In each of the models, the AR1 parameter is positive and the AR2 parameter is negative. Although we are not directly interested in the temporal correlation in the budgetary process, one possible interpretation of these effects is that when the budget is large there is not likely to be much increase in outlays in the subsequent two years — or else the rate of growth is dampened by appropriations in the preceding two years.

17. Prior budget is not included in the models of policy outcomes, and a significant result for this variable is statistically not possible given the models we estimate. However, as indicated in note 17, the significant autoregressive parameters can be interpreted as demonstrating that current budget appropriations are contingent on previous gains.

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Disaster, Litigation, and the Corrosive Community^{*}

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Abstract

Disaster researchers have debated the utility of distinguishing “natural” from “technological” catastrophes. We suggest that litigation serves as a source of chronic stress for victims of human-caused disasters involved in court deliberations for damages. Data from the Exxon Valdez oil spill are used to evaluate a social structural model of disaster impacts three and one-half years after the event. Results suggest that the status of litigant and litigation stress serve as prominent sources of perceived community damage and event-related psychological stress. We conclude that litigation is a critical characteristic of technological disasters that precludes timely community recovery and promotes chronic social and psychological impacts. Suggestions for alternatives to litigation are provided.

As we enter the twenty-first century, it is increasingly clear that large-scale disasters will be pervasive features of social life. The impact of disasters, according to the 2002 *World Disasters Report*, has significantly changed since

**An earlier version of this research was presented at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, California, August 1998. The authors acknowledge the contributions of Dan Dennard and G. David Johnson to this initial presentation. Funds for the collection and analysis of the data were provided by the National Science Foundation, Polar Social Science Division, Grants DDP-910109, OPP-0082405, and OPP-0002572. Additional support was provided by the University of South Alabama (College of Arts and Sciences) and the Mississippi Agricultural and Forestry Experiment Station (MIS-605080). Appreciation is expressed to Linda Burcham for her technical assistance in the preparation of the manuscript. The onsite field support provided by the Prince William Sound Science Center, Native Village of Eyak, Copper River Delta Institute, and the Cordova City Council is gratefully acknowledged. The authors would like to thank Russell Dynes, Enrico Quarantelli, Benigno Aquirre, Bob Gramling, James Lee, and anonymous Social Forces reviewers for helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this article. The authors are solely responsible for the contents. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Direct correspondence to Dr. J. Steven Picou, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of South Alabama, 307 University Boulevard, N., HUMB 34, Mobile, AL 36688-0002. E-mail: spicou@usouthal.edu.*

the early 1970s, as the number of those affected has increased and the number of deaths has decreased (IFRC/RCS 2002). People affected by disasters, by definition, require "immediate assistance during a period of emergency, i.e., requiring basic survival needs such as food, water, shelter, sanitation and immediate medical assistance" (IFRC/RCS 2002:181). Provision of such assistance is necessary in the short term, but long-term social and psychological consequences of disasters for individuals and communities are typically overlooked and outside the purview of emergency response efforts. Different types of disasters, including natural, technological, and mass violence, have caused severe psychological impairment (Norris et al. 2001). In a comprehensive review of articles examining the effects of 130 disasters, Norris et al. (2001) found that in the U.S. technological disasters were more psychologically stressful than natural disasters. Evidence indicates disasters also have impacts at the community level (Erikson 1994).

The term *corrosive community* (Freudenburg 1993, 1997, 2000; Freudenburg & Jones 1991) captures a set of debilitating processes first identified in seminal research on technological disasters (e.g., Erikson 1976; Kroll-Smith & Couch 1990; Levine 1982). As the term implies, negative effects of some disasters damage individuals and communities over a long period of time (Freudenburg 1997, 2000). Although many factors have been identified as contributing to the emergence and persistence of corrosive communities, we contend that none are as debilitating as litigation processes that typically ensue to redress environmental, economic, social, and psychological damages.¹ To our knowledge, no study systematically examines social and psychological affects of litigation on individuals and communities and the degree to which these effects impede timely postdisaster recovery.

The analytical framework presented in this article and the specification of the structural equation models are based on assumptions primarily derived from natural disaster studies (Bolin 1982; Clausen et al. 1978; Dynes 1974; Peacock & Ragsdale 2000) and our extension of these studies to include key variables identified in literature on technological disasters (Erikson 1994; Freudenburg 1997). The litigation hypothesis and analytical framework developed below will be operationalized and evaluated for the *Exxon Valdez* oil spill (EVOS), a major twentieth-century technological disaster. We examine the litigation hypothesis by presenting data from structural equation models of event-related psychological stress and perceived community damage. Longitudinal data are available, allowing for an assessment of long-term (3.5 years) impacts of the EVOS and subsequent litigation on residents of a small resource-dependent fishing community in Prince William Sound, Alaska.

Disasters

Although systematic studies of disaster impacts began in the 1940s (e.g., Lemons 1957), much of the sociological research on disasters occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and examined short-term, immediate social responses to natural disasters (Fritz 1961; Kreps 1985; Quarantelli & Dynes 1977). From a sociological perspective, these studies have emphasized that consequences of any "crisis situation" can be viewed in terms of ecological vulnerabilities and social definitions constructed by people, organizations, and communities (Kreps 1989, 1998; Quarantelli 1998). Disasters emerge as "nonroutine events in societies . . . that involve conjunctions of historical conditions and social definitions of physical harm and social disruption" (Kreps & Drabek 1996:133).

Disaster outcomes are based on preexisting social structures and the consequences of these structures for both organizational and individual responses (Dynes 1993; Kreps 1985, 1989; Oliver-Smith 1996). Disasters are "catalysts for collective action," but more important they are also "systemic" events that permeate community social structure, producing social responses that are both emergent and constraining (Dynes 1974; Kreps 1985, 1998). The response of disaster victims is most often viewed in terms of a socially constructed "definition of the situation." Most natural disasters have been found to produce only limited long-term cultural, social, economic, and psychological consequences for individuals and communities (Drabek 1986; Green 1996; Mileti, Drabek & Haas 1975; Quarantelli 1985). Emergency response efforts are designed to provide social, economic, and financial support that generates an emergent "therapeutic community" (Barton 1969; Fritz 1961). As such, natural disasters are viewed as a "consensus-type" crisis, where coordinated response efforts push for a timely recovery for victims (Quarantelli & Dynes 1976).

Disaster researchers have distinguished natural disasters as "acts of God" and technological disasters as "human caused" (Barkun 1974; Fritz 1961). With the emergence of large-scale, human-caused disasters in the late 1960s and 1970s, however, the social and psychological significance of this typology became a source of discussion and debate in the literature. Different response patterns by victims have led researchers to investigate two distinct types of disasters — natural and technological (Cuthbertson & Nigg 1987; Goldsteen & Schorr 1982). The empirical validity of this distinction, according to technological disaster researchers, is supported by evidence documenting that "technological disasters create a far more severe and long lasting pattern of social, economic, cultural and psychological impacts than do natural [disasters]" (Freudenburg 1997:26). However, a number of natural disaster researchers have argued that such a distinction is theoretically and practically specious (Alexander 1993; Quarantelli 1992, 1998). This discourse continues to pervade much of the literature on disasters.

Corrosive Communities

In the aftermath of a catastrophic technological failure or toxic contamination of the biophysical environment, the defining characteristic of the postdisaster phase is the emergence of a corrosive community — that is, a consistent pattern of chronic impacts to individuals and communities (Baum 1987; Baum & Fleming 1993; Brown & Mikkelsen [1990] 1997; Clarke & Short 1993; Couch & Kroll-Smith 1985; Cuthbertson & Nigg 1987; Edelstein 1988, 2004; Erikson 1976, 1994; Freudenburg 1993, 1997; Freudenburg & Jones 1991; Green 1996; Kroll-Smith & Couch 1993a; Picou & Gill 2000). Technological disasters have been described as “conflict prone” and “never ending,” because they often distribute imperceptible contaminants into the environment, creating risks and uncertainties about personal and ecological exposure (Erikson 1994; Hallman & Wandersman 1992; Kroll-Smith & Couch 1993b; Vyner 1988). It is worth noting that unconstrained competition between organizations, agencies, and local community groups following natural disasters can also seriously impede community recovery (Peacock & Ragsdale 2000).

From a wealth of research on technological disasters, three particularly significant factors for understanding why corrosive communities emerge and persist have been identified (Marshall, Picou & Gill 2003). These factors are (1) the mental and physical health of victims (Arata et al. 2000; Baum & Fleming 1993; Freudenburg & Jones 1991; Green 1996; Picou & Gill 1996, 2000); (2) “recreancy,” or perceptions of governmental or organizational failure (Couch 1996; Freudenburg 1993, 1997, 2000; Marshall 2004; Marshall, Picou & Gill 2003); and (3) protracted litigation (Gill & Picou 1991; Marshall, Picou & Schlichtmann 2004; Picou 1996a, 1996b; Picou & Rosebrook 1993). The latter two factors will be discussed in greater detail.

Recreancy is a form of institutional malfeasance where an expert, or specialized organization, fails to carry out a responsibility that is expected of them (Freudenburg 1993, 1997, 2000). Evidence indicates recreancy is associated with heightened perceptions of risk (Freudenburg 1993; Marshall 1995), high levels of psychological distrust (Couch 1996), and perceived community damage. Mobilization of groups, organizations, and institutions should engender support and collective trust from disaster victims. The fact that litigation often exposes such experts, or specialized organizations, as irresponsible, incompetent, and untrustworthy contributes to a persistence of chronic disaster impacts through loss of trust in traditional institutional support systems (Freudenburg 1997, 2000). Thus, protracted litigation results in the loss of “trust and goodwill” in agencies and organizations established to protect the public (Edelstein 1988, 2004). Recreancy, another characteristic typical of technological disasters, contributes to a pattern of long-term psychological stress and perceived damage to the community.

Litigation

Compared to the legal systems of other economically advanced democratic nations, the U.S. system is uniquely adversarial and expensive (Kagan 2000). The litigation process itself can be a source of stress for litigants (Cohen & Vesper 2001; Lees-Haley 1988; Strasburger 1999). Indeed, "There is an inherent irony in the judicial system in that individuals who bring suit may endure injury from the very process through which they seek redress. The legal process itself is often a trauma" (Strasburger 1999:204). Limitations of an adversarial legal system are most revealed in multiparty cases that are factually and/or legally complex (Sward 1989). Litigation involving factual information that is scientifically complex necessitates the reliance, by both plaintiffs and defendants, on paid experts to collect and analyze data (Sward 1989). Without prior knowledge of the case or subject matter, judges face the arduous task of choosing between competing scientific claims presented by opposing experts (Sward 1989).

Lawsuits filed in the aftermath of large-scale technological disasters are typically complex because of the scientific nature of factual information and, in most cases, the involvement of multiple parties. In such cases, litigation is stressful due to the adversarial nature of the process itself and legal and scientific uncertainties regarding key aspects of the case. Human-caused disasters evoke a need to identify organizational and institutional entities that can be held accountable for reckless and wanton malfeasance. Yet, definitive identification of the "principal responsible party" is often confounded by inconclusive scientific findings, responsible party denial, and ineffective government response. As such, restoration of damage claims and community recovery are indefinitely deferred to the courts as litigants deal with complex and lengthy legal issues that originate from the "polluter pays" principle (Gill & Picou 1991; Picou 1996b; Picou & Rosebrook 1993). Although community responses to natural disasters may include legal claims by victims, technological disasters almost always result in class action and personal damage claims (Picou 1996b; Picou & Rosebrook 1993).

The significance and contribution of litigation to chronic disaster impacts are relatively unstudied in the sociological literature. Indeed, because of the very private nature of the "discovery" phase of litigation, as well as "sealed" legal settlements, systematic data on social and psychological consequences of litigation rarely have been collected and reported. Given this dearth of inquiry, we evaluate the hypothesis that communities damaged by disasters experience additional, significant impacts from litigation processes which, in turn, undermine a timely recovery process. These impacts include conflict over equitable damage payments, stress from protracted legal procedures, and uncertainty about litigation outcomes.

New Issues in Disaster Research

Recognizing contributions of earlier disaster research, we contend that an *a priori* classification of an event as either a “natural” or “technological” disaster is conceptually and analytically possible, but increasingly empirically difficult. We make this claim for two reasons. First, the dichotomy is problematic because disaster researchers are attempting to comprehend the impacts of a third type of large-scale disaster — terrorism (Marshall, Picou & Gill 2003; Waugh 1986; Webb 2002). On one hand, initial responses to the 9/11 attacks were similar to how people and communities typically respond to natural disasters (Webb 2002). On the other hand, factors identified in technological disaster research as causing community breakdown, rather than recovery, are beginning to surface (Marshall, Picou & Gill 2003). For instance, despite initial efforts by Congress and the Bush administration to forestall a “class action free-for-all,” it now appears that litigation will be a central feature of post-9/11 long-term recovery. Attempting to fully understand the effects of the 9/11 attacks solely from disaster research literature belies the significance of disparate outcomes of the attacks, such as the “rally around the flag” effect, the number of fatalities, the simultaneous creation of a disaster and crime scene, and the degree of trauma experienced by those beyond “ground zero” (Marshall, Picou & Gill 2003).

Second, the severity and duration of disaster impacts may be ascribed to anthropogenic factors, even though a disaster itself may be perceived as an “act of nature” or “God.” Two case studies lend credence to complexities arising from such a possibility. Erikson (1976) and other researchers, in the classic study of a dam collapse and subsequent massive flooding at Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, were puzzled that people seemed much more distressed than might be expected from a natural disaster. Researchers discovered that people did not consider the flood to be an “act of God,” but rather, responsibility was attributed to a coal company for building an ineffective dam. Blocker and Sherkat (1992), examining the aftermath of a major urban flood, found that even though the flood was perceived to be a natural disaster, 65% of respondents assigned responsibility to government for not controlling nature.

If people begin to commit to a worldview in which all elements of the environment are befouled by the spoils of human endeavors, then all disaster events may be perceived as rooted in anthropogenic forces. Indeed, Beck (1992) argues that it is no longer viable to refer to the environment as “natural,” since the sheer expanse of humanity and its by-products have extracted the “natural” from the environment. More than 40 years ago, Rachel Carson (1962) anticipated this perspective, asserting that everywhere on the planet there were measurable levels of DDT. In short, all disasters may be viewed as stemming from anthropogenic forces, with responsibility ascribed to industry or government for causing disasters,

and to the latter for not enforcing regulations, anticipating disasters, or responding in a manner expected by victims.


The model presented in Figure 1 provides a general interpretive framework enabling a study of disaster events without prematurely classifying an event as "natural" or "technological." The task for researchers is to identify variables explaining impacts of a disaster event on communities and individuals, some of which may be more characteristic of natural disasters (i.e., damage to the built and modified environments) and others more characteristic of technological disasters (i.e., damage to the biophysical environment). According to the model, all disasters lead to "social crisis situations" (Kreps 1985; Quarantelli 1985, 1998). In turn, the socially constructed "crisis situation" has an impact, albeit not monolithic, on existing community social structures. The severity of impacts is based on predisaster levels of structural and cultural vulnerability for different victimized groups (Bates & Peacock 1993; Bolin 1982; Dynes 1998; Morrow & Enarson 1996; Oliver-Smith 1996).

Over time, the social crisis context affects social structural characteristics, which, in turn, has consequences for the behaviors and attitudes of those most vulnerable to the impacts of a disaster event. We assume certain social structural characteristics facilitate effective coping and adaptation for some groups, whereas others may be disadvantaged by social structural location or resource characteristics (Arata et al. 2000; Bolin 1982). Outcomes of this model include either long-term collective trauma or collective recovery. Over time, the socially constructed disaster event continues to contribute to the cognitive, behavioral, and adaptive responses of victims.

The *Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill

The *Exxon Valdez* oil spill was the largest and most ecologically damaging spill in North American history. This event created a social crisis situation for numerous resource-dependent communities in the spill area. The spill occurred on March 24, 1989, in Prince William Sound, Alaska, and was followed by a response failure to the catastrophic release of 42 million liters of oil. By June 1989, oil had contaminated more than 1,900 kilometers of Alaskan coastline. Because the EVOS occurred during the season of greatest biological activity, it also had severe impacts on both the natural environment and resource-dependent communities in Prince William Sound (Lord 1997; National Response Team 1989; Spies et al. 1996). Long-term monitoring of ecological damages reveals that only six species (bald eagle, river otter, black oystercatcher, common murre, pink salmon, and sockeye salmon) had recovered by 2002 and that damage continues to plague many species of marine mammals, birds, and fish (*Exxon Valdez* Oil Spill Trustee Council 2002). Repeated failures

FIGURE 1: Conceptual Model for Chronic Disaster Impacts



of herring and salmon fisheries in Prince William Sound have resulted in declines in subsistence harvests, as well as negative economic impacts on local fishing communities and Alaska Native villages (Cohen 1995, 1997; Fall & Field 1996; Picou, Gill & Cohen 1997). Oil still remains in Prince William Sound, as demonstrated by a beach cleanup conducted eight years after the spill that located and retrieved substantial amounts of toxic *Exxon Valdez* oil (Heintz, Short & Rice 1999). Marine scientists have determined that severe declines in herring and pink salmon fisheries appear to be related to chronic contamination of spawning areas in Prince William Sound (Carls, Rice & Hose 1999; Heintz, Short & Rice 1999).

The EVOS also resulted in hundreds of civil and criminal law suits. By all standards, the EVOS resulted in "high stakes" litigation (Picou 1996b). With billions of dollars on the line, legal deliberations on this event will continue well into the future (Hirsch 1997). By 1990, many local fishermen, business owners, and Alaska Natives in Prince William Sound were involved in the most complex and protracted court case regarding environmental contamination in the history of maritime law. As of 2003, no substantive damage payments have been made, despite a \$5.3 billion jury verdict rendered in September 1994 (Hirsch 1997).

Previous litigation in 1989 found the state of Alaska filing civil lawsuits against Exxon for compensation of damages. Exxon countersued, claiming that the state of Alaska did not allow the company to effectively and properly respond to the spill. In 1990, the U.S. Department of Justice filed criminal charges against Exxon, and, in 1991, Exxon came to agreement on criminal charges and civil damages (Piper 1997). A \$1 billion settlement ensued, with funds earmarked only for restoration of natural resources, with no money available to compensate individuals or communities for damages.

Research reveals severe initial and chronic psychosocial impacts of this disaster for Alaska Natives (Gill & Picou 2001; Palinkas et al. 1992, 1993). Studies have also identified high levels of social disruption and psychological stress for commercial fishermen in Prince William Sound, when contrasted with commercial fishermen in communities of Southeast Alaska not affected by the spill (Picou & Gill 1996, 2000; Picou et al. 1992).² Research has also provided descriptive information documenting typical long-term corrosive patterns observed for the EVOS and other technological disasters (Arata et al. 2000; Gill & Picou 1998). The present research expands this specific line of inquiry by evaluating a causal model of chronic disaster impacts from data collected in 1991 and 1992. Given our analytical framework, we suggest that disasters alter social structure on a systemic level and, in turn, that social structural change affects existing levels of vulnerability, resulting in disruptive and stressful social experiences. Together, social structural change and continuing social conflict and uncertainty result in chronic community damage and event-related psychological stress.

Methodology

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data were collected as part of a longitudinal study of social and economic impacts attributed to the EVOS (Cohen 1995; Gill 1994; Picou & Gill 1996; Picou et al. 1992). Data collection originated in Cordova, Alaska, in 1989 and continued through 1992.³ Cordova was selected as an "impact" community because it is economically dependent on commercial fishing and characterized by culturally prescribed subsistence behaviors. Cordova is a "renewable resource community," that is, a community with a resource-based economy and a blending of traditional and Alaska Native cultural values that link human behavior to the biophysical environment (Gill 1994; Gill & Picou 2001; Picou & Gill 1996; Picou, Gill & Cohen 1997). Cordova is located in southeastern Prince William Sound, is geographically isolated, and has a population that varies from 3,500 residents during the summer fishing season to fewer than 2,000 during the winter.

Data collection in Cordova in 1991 was designed as a geographically stratified, random household sample that incorporated and expanded an initial stratified, random sample selected in 1989 (Picou & Gill 1996; Picou et al. 1992). Surveys in 1991 were conducted by personal interviews and resulted in a sample size of 228 respondents. In July 1992, a follow-up mail survey was conducted in Cordova. This survey employed a modified version of Dillman's mail survey protocol (Dillman 1978). A small number of surveys were also administered in the field. The final sample size for the 1992 Cordova household follow-up survey was 163 respondents.⁴

INDICATORS AND MEASURES

The variables utilized in this study were derived from data available from 1991 and 1992 household surveys administered in Cordova. Social structural characteristics of respondents were determined by 1991 data on gender (0 = female; 1 = male), marital status (0 = unmarried; 1 = married), occupation (0 = nonfisherman; 1 = fisherman), and involvement in oil spill litigation (0 = nonlitigant; 1 = litigant). The measurement scales used were constructed from data collected in 1992 and include work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, oil spill risk, community attachment, community damage, and intrusive stress. Scales range from three to seven items and, unless otherwise noted, the response set for items is a five-point Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree).

Work Disruption

This scale was constructed in terms of three items measuring disruptive changes in “future plans of respondents,” “future plans of family members,” and “changes at work.” Responses for each item were coded “0” for no work disruption and “1” for work disruption. The final scale was composed by summing the scores for all items. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for this scale was .67.

Community Attachment

This scale consisted of four items measuring appropriateness of the Cordova community for “raising children,” “meeting needs,” “being a great place to live,” and “being unaffected by the spill.” The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for this scale was .75.

Recreancy

This institutional trust scale was constructed from five items measuring the trust respondents had in actions and policies of organizations and institutions responding to the EVOS. These items measured feelings that specific institutions and organizations (i.e., federal government, Alaska government, Exxon, Alyeska Pipeline Corporation, and VECO — the cleanup contractor) honestly responded to spill-related issues. The alpha coefficient for this scale was .92.

Litigation Stress

This scale consisted of three items that operationalized litigation stress through “time spent with attorneys,” “demands made by litigation,” and “unpleasant memories from the litigation experience.” The alpha coefficient for this scale was .81.

Oil Spill Risk

This scale was developed from responses to items that measured “being upset by tankers operating in Prince William Sound,” “feeling that another big oil spill would probably never occur,” and “feeling that environmental damages from the EVOS would eventually be gone.” The alpha coefficient for this scale was .62.

Community Damage

This scale was operationalized by summing four items measuring the degree to which people in the community “had changed,” “were stressed,” “had financial problems,” and “had suffered more problems since the spill.” The alpha coefficient for this scale was .82.

Intrusive Stress

This variable was measured by the intrusive stress component of the Impact of Event Scale (IES) (e.g., see Horowitz 1976; Horowitz, Wilner & Alvarez 1979). This seven-item scale measures event-related intrusive recollections and is a standardized indicator utilized in mental health research. The IES has also been found to be correlated with clinical diagnoses of posttraumatic stress disorder and other stress-related illness (Baum & Fleming 1993). For each question, respondents indicated if, during the “past seven days,” a specific intrusive recollection occurred “not at all,” “rarely,” “sometimes,” or “often.” The alpha coefficient for this scale of EVOS-related psychological stress was .91.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Structural equation modeling (SEM) combines factor analysis and multiple regression. SEM differs from principal components analysis and exploratory factor analysis in that it takes a confirmatory approach to multivariate data analysis; that is, the pattern of interrelationships among the constructs is specified a priori and grounded in established theory. SEM is more versatile than most other multivariate techniques — such as multiple regression, MANOVA (multiple analysis of variance), discriminant, and canonical analyses — because it allows for simultaneous estimation of all coefficients in the model. The ability to simultaneously treat variables as both independent and dependent constructs allows estimation of direct and indirect effects. One of the most important strengths of SEM is its ability to correct for measurement error. Other multivariate analytical tools are limited by the assumption of error-free relations among variables.

Two types of variables are used in SEM. Latent variables are unobserved latent constructs. Manifest variables are observed measures associated with each latent variable. The estimation method used in AMOS is maximum likelihood (generalized least squares).⁵ We used the two-step modeling procedure (e.g., see Anderson & Gerbing 1988; Kline 1998). The measurement model is specified in the first step. This model is similar to confirmatory factor analysis in that the unobserved latent constructs (factors) are posited as underlying causes of observed manifest variables (indicators). If the overall fit of the measurement model is poor, then the researcher must locate the source of poor model fit before moving to the next step. Given an acceptable measurement model, the second step is to specify the structural model. The structural model, similar to path analysis, identifies relationships (directional or bidirectional) between latent constructs. The two-step procedure is recommended because it allows researchers to better pinpoint the source of poor model fit (Kline 1998).

Goodness-of-fit indices used to evaluate structural equation models are numerous and a source of considerable discussion among researchers (e.g., see Bollen & Long 1993; MacCallum 1990; Mulaik et al. 1989). Although differing opinions abound regarding particular fit indices, most agree that the chi-square statistic is problematic and thus a model should not automatically be rejected if chi-square is large and significant (the traditional null hypothesis is reversed for SEM — the model is supported by failing to reject the null hypothesis).

The following indices are reported: chi-square, relative chi-square, goodness-of-fit (GFI), comparative fit (CFI), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Relative χ^2 in AMOS is labeled CMIN/DF, which is the χ^2 -fit index divided by the degrees of freedom, thus making it less dependent on sample size. Some researchers suggest CMIN/DF values as large as 5 indicate an adequate fit, but we use Kline's (1998) more restrictive criteria of 3 or less. GFI varies from 0 to 1 and, by convention, should be equal to or greater than .90 to accept the model. CFI varies from 0 to 1, with a value close to 1 indicating a very good fit and a value above .90 indicating an acceptable fit (Bentler 1990). The CFI is considered to be a good general purpose index that is consistent across varied sample sizes (Gerbing & Anderson 1993; Quintana & Maxwell 1999).

RMSEA is recommended because it uses a confidence interval, rather than a point estimate (Quintana & Maxwell 1999). A poor-fitting model can be rejected if the 90% confidence interval for RMSEA falls below the somewhat arbitrary value of .10 (MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara 1996). The conventional interpretation of RMSEA values is as follows: 0 = exact fit, < .05 = close fit, .05–.08 = fair fit, .08–.10 = mediocre fit, and > .10 = poor fit (MacCallum, Browne & Sugawara 1996; Quintana & Maxwell 1999). RMSEA assesses degree of fit between the data and hypothesized model.

Results

The hypothesized community damage and intrusive stress models are specified as fully saturated models, with casual paths from each social structural variable (commercial fisherman, litigant, gender, and marital status) to each intermediate construct (work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, oil spill risk, and community attachment), and from each intermediate construct to the endogenous dependent variables (community damage and intrusive stress). The social structural variables were allowed to covary.

In AMOS, the significance of a specific path coefficient is evaluated by a *t*-test labeled "C.R." (critical ratio). If the critical ratio is greater than or equal to 1.96, then the coefficient is significant at the .05 level. All factor loadings in the measurement models (community damage and intrusive stress) were statistically significant. Overall, most factor loadings (standardized regression co-

efficients) were fairly large for each of the six latent constructs — litigation stress (range of .709–.861), recreancy (.708–.890), oil spill risk (.505–.674), community attachment (.715–.797), community damage (.471–.799), and intrusive stress (.648–.813). Twenty of the 27 factor loadings were larger than .700.

The community damage and intrusive stress measurement models met the requirements for identification. The number of observations was greater than the number of free parameters, and each latent construct was measured by at least two manifest variables (Kline 1998). Based on the fitted covariance matrices and the modification indices, a second measurement model identical to the initial analysis was calculated, with two exceptions. The residual variances of the indicators measured by two latent constructs (specifically, the recreancy construct in the community damage model and the intrusive stress construct in the intrusive stress model) were allowed to covary. These respective modifications improved the goodness of fit of the community damage and intrusive stress measurement models. The goodness-of-fit indices and path coefficients presented below were drawn from the modified measurement model.

COMMUNITY DAMAGE MODEL

As shown in Table 1, the χ^2 value for the measurement model is 211.3 ($df = 139$), indicating there was not an exact fit to the data. Values of other fit indices ($\chi^2/df = 1.52$; GFI = .88; CFI = .96), however, reveal that the measurement model adequately fits the data. Finally, the 90% confidence interval for the RMSEA was .04 to .07 for these data, suggesting a fair fit with the data. Given the limitations of the χ^2 statistic, the values of the other fit indices, and the significance and size of the factor loadings, we proceeded to the second step of the two-stage process.

The χ^2 value for the structural model is 431.0 ($df = 223$), indicating there was not an exact fit to the data. Values for other fit indices ($\chi^2/df = 1.93$; GFI = .81; CFI = .89) indicate that the structural model adequately fits the data. The RMSEA interval (.07–.09) indicates a fair fit to the data. The fit indices for the structural model are not as strong as those for the measurement model. Loss of fit may stem from increased complexity of the structural model coupled with the caveats of using SEM with a small sample size ($N = 163$).

Table 2 presents unstandardized regression coefficients, standard of error, critical ratios, and standardized regression coefficients for each path in the structural model. Each nonsignificant path ($C.R. \geq 1.96$) was omitted from Figure 2 only for presentation purposes — model trimming was not used to respecify the model. As such, the goodness-of-fit indices (above) and the path coefficients (below) were derived from the initial model.

The parsimonious community damage model is presented in Figure 2. Notably, the squared multiple correlation of .73 was very strong, indicating that the five manifest and four latent variables accounted for 73% of the variance

TABLE 1: Goodness-of-Fit Indices for Community Damage and Intrusive Stress Models

	N	df	χ^2	p	χ^2/df	GFI	CFI	RMSEA
<i>Community Damage</i>								
Measurement	163	139	211.3	.000	1.52	.88	.96	.04–.07
Structural	163	223	431.0	.000	1.93	.81	.89	.07–.09
<i>Intrusive Stress</i>								
Measurement	163	170	252.4	.000	1.49	.88	.96	.04–.07
Structural	163	264	510.5	.000	1.93	.81	.89	.07–.09

of community damage. The path coefficients in Figure 2 are standardized regression coefficients. The mediating variables of work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, oil spill risk, and community attachment all had significant direct effects on community damage. Relatively speaking, litigation stress had the strongest effect ($\beta = .44$) on community damage, followed in order by oil spill risk (.33), recreancy (.30), community attachment (.24), and work disruption (.18).

AMOS also provides the standardized indirect effect of each variable on community damage (not presented in Figure 2). Of the four manifest social structural variables in the model, litigant status had the strongest standardized indirect effect ($\beta = .48$) on community damage through its significant direct effects on four of the five mediating variables — work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, and oil spill risk. The standardized total indirect effect of litigant status is more than double the indirect effect of the next-strongest variable. The standardized indirect effect of commercial fisherman on community damage was found to be .23 through the mediating variables work disruption, recreancy, and community attachment. The standardized indirect effects of gender (via oil spill risk and community attachment) and marital status (via community attachment) were $-.21$ and $-.08$, respectively.

In summary, perceptions of chronic community damage were primarily predicted by variables associated with the litigation process. Being a litigant predicted work disruption, stress from litigation, a lack of trust in institutions (recreancy), and perceptions of increased risk for future spills (oil spill risk). All of these characteristics predicted perceptions of chronic community damage, with litigation stress manifesting the strongest direct effect. Compared to men, women were more likely to fear future spills and more attached to the Cordova community. Married respondents were more attached to the community than nonmarried respondents. Commercial fishermen had their work disrupted more often, became less trusting of institutions, and were more attached to the community than those in nonfishing occupations. Impacts of litigation and

TABLE 2: Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients for Paths in the Community Damage Model


Regression Weights	Estimate	SE	Critical Ratio	Standardized Coefficient
<i>Work Disruption</i>				
Fisherman	.601	.179	3.357	.266
Litigant	.648	.167	3.873	.295
Gender	-.246	.161	-1.525	-.111
Marital status	-.118	.207	-.571	-.040
<i>Litigation Stress</i>				
Fisherman	.252	.193	1.301	.104
Litigant	1.342	.188	7.132	.571
Gender	-.184	.174	-1.059	-.078
Marital status	.156	.224	.697	.049
<i>Recreancy</i>				
Fisherman	.345	.170	2.024	.177
Litigant	.423	.160	2.653	.224
Gender	.017	.153	.110	.009
Marital status	-.054	.197	-.275	-.021
<i>Oil Spill Risk</i>				
Fisherman	.209	.171	1.219	.126
Litigant	.422	.165	2.560	.262
Gender	-.519	.161	-3.219	-.321
Marital status	-.227	.198	-1.146	-.105
<i>Community Attachment</i>				
Fisherman	.306	.139	2.205	.208
Litigant	.146	.129	1.133	.102
Gender	-.342	.125	-2.729	-.238
Marital status	-.400	.161	-2.482	-.208
<i>Community Damage</i>				
Work disruption	.151	.053	2.826	.180
Litigation stress	.343	.061	5.613	.437
Recreancy	.289	.065	4.423	.296
Oil spill risk	.374	.103	3.635	.326
Community attachment	.303	.091	3.312	.235

recreancy on perceptions of chronic community damage are apparent in Figure 2.

INTRUSIVE STRESS MODEL

As presented in Table 1, the χ^2 is 252.4 (df = 170) for the measurement model, indicating there was not an exact fit to the data. Values for other fit indices ($\chi^2/\text{df} = 1.49$; GFI = .88; CFI = .96; RMSEA = .04-.07) indicate that the measurement model adequately fits the data. In the second step of the two-stage

FIGURE 2: Parsimonious Causal Model for Community Damage



process, the results ($\chi^2 = 510.5$, $df = 264$) indicate that there was not an exact fit to the data for the structural model. Values for the other fit indices ($\chi^2/df = 1.93$; GFI = .81; CFI = .89), however, indicate that the structural model adequately fits the data. The RMSEA interval (.07-.09) suggests a fair to mediocre fit to the data. As with the community damage model, the fit indices for the structural model are not as strong as those for the measurement model.

Table 3 includes unstandardized regression coefficients, standard of error, critical ratios, and standardized regression coefficients for each path in the structural model. For presentation purposes, nonsignificant paths (C.R. ≥ 1.96) are not included in Figure 3. It should be noted that the path coefficients (standardized regression coefficients) are derived from the initial structural model.

The parsimonious intrusive stress model is presented in Figure 3. The squared multiple correlation of .47 is fairly strong. The mediating variables of work disruption, litigation stress, and oil spill risk have a significant direct effect on intrusive stress. The direct effects of recreancy and community attachment on intrusive stress were not statistically significant. Litigation stress had the strongest direct effect ($\beta = .44$) on intrusive stress, followed by oil spill risk (.31) and work disruption (.18). Similar to the community damage model, litigant status had the strongest standardized total indirect effect (.39) on intrusive stress. This indirect effect was mediated through the work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, and oil spill risk variables. The total indirect effects of commercial fisherman and gender on intrusive stress were .17 (via work disruption and community attachment) and $-.12$ (via oil spill risk and community attachment), respectively.

In summary, as with perceptions of chronic community damage, levels of spill-related psychological stress were predicted by characteristics (work disruption, litigation stress, and oil spill risk) of the litigation process. Recreancy and community attachment were significant intervening predictors of community damage but, contrary to expectations, not of intrusive stress. One possible explanation is that since recreancy and community attachment tap more cognitive, community-level assessments, they are significant predictors of community damage but not of intrusive recollections, which are more emotive, individual-level responses. Being involved in litigation produced stress related to the original trauma of the oil spill. Commercial fishermen were characterized by higher levels of psychological stress due to disruption of their fishing activities. Compared to men, women were more fearful of future spills, which, in turn, raised their levels of intrusive stress.

Discussion and Conclusions


Extensive discourse in the sociological study of disasters has been preoccupied with the theoretical utility of classifying such events as either "natural" or

TABLE 3: Unstandardized and Standardized Regression Coefficients for Paths in the Intrusive Stress Model

Regression Weights	Estimate	SE	Critical Ratio	Standardized Coefficient
<i>Work Disruption</i>				
Fisherman	.601	.179	3.357	.266
Litigant	.648	.167	3.873	.295
Gender	-.246	.161	-1.571	-.111
Marital status	-.118	.207	-.571	-.040
<i>Litigation Stress</i>				
Fisherman	.305	.194	1.570	.126
Litigant	1.316	.188	6.985	.560
Gender	-.160	.174	-.916	-.068
Marital status	.085	.224	.379	.027
<i>Recreancy</i>				
Fisherman	.310	.168	1.848	.163
Litigant	.435	.157	2.763	.235
Gender	.052	.150	.346	.028
Marital status	-.078	.194	-.405	-.032
<i>Oil Spill Risk</i>				
Fisherman	.278	.157	1.769	.187
Litigant	.334	.150	2.235	.232
Gender	-.377	.146	-2.588	-.261
Marital status	-.304	.181	-1.679	-.157
<i>Community Attachment</i>				
Fisherman	.320	.140	2.289	.216
Litigant	.157	.130	1.211	.109
Gender	-.341	.126	-2.705	-.236
Marital status	-.402	.162	-2.480	-.208
<i>Intrusive Stress</i>				
Work disruption	.214	.085	2.512	.180
Litigation stress	.491	.096	5.115	.441
Recreancy	.145	.103	1.407	.102
Oil spill risk	.554	.178	3.119	.305
Community attachment	-.042	.139	-.303	-.023

“technological” in origin (Drabek 1994; Erikson 1994; Freudenburg 1997; Quarantelli 1998). In an attempt to move beyond this impasse, we have presented an analytical model of chronic disaster impacts that incorporate variables central to studies of both natural and technological disasters. The significance of social structural impacts has been established by decades of research on natural disasters (e.g., see Bolin 1982; Kreps 1989; Quarantelli 1998), while the importance of litigation and recreancy were derived from more recent research on technological disasters (Erikson 1994; Freudenburg

FIGURE 3: Parsimonious Causal Model for Intrusive Stress



1993). We contend that communities may be uniquely vulnerable to disaster-induced changes in social structure, which, in turn, has continuing consequences for chronic social and psychological impacts.

Longitudinal data collected in a resource-dependent fishing community affected by the EVOS were used to evaluate the utility of this framework. Using SEM techniques, results for the community damage and intrusive stress models support the analytical framework in terms of model fit and explanatory power. Most important for the focus of this research, the mediating variables — work disruption, litigation stress, recreancy, risk of future spills, and community attachment — were predicted by exogenous social structural characteristics. The indirect effects of social structure on event-related psychological stress and perceived community damage empirically verify our proposed theoretical relationships for understanding the dynamics of chronic disaster impacts previously documented by ethnographic studies (Drabek 1994; Edelstein 1988, 2004; Erikson 1994).

The contamination of Prince William Sound by oil from the *Exxon Valdez* represented, at once, an immediate and long-term threat to commercial herring, salmon, and halibut fisheries. Commercial fishing was immediately closed in many areas in 1989, and fishing seasons fell below expectations in 1991 and 1992 (Gill 1994). Commercial fishing provides the primary basis for occupational structures for renewable resource communities such as Cordova. The spill, cleanup, and subsequent work disruption affected not only commercial fishermen and their families but also many residents in fishing-related occupations (e.g., deckhands, net menders, electricians, etc.). The *Exxon Valdez* disaster amplified and exacerbated basic distinctions between fishing and nonfishing occupations in Cordova's social structure.

Initially, commercial fishermen were affected by the spill in terms of complete disruption of their harvest activities in 1989. Furthermore, this occupational group experienced relatively high levels of recreancy, or loss of trust in the institutions and organizations responsible for the spill and subsequent cleanup activities. Commercial fishermen were also found to have relatively strong positive feelings about their community in terms of "being a good place to live" and "raise children" and of "meeting family needs." In short, the EVOS directly affected the social structure of a renewable resource community (Cordova) by disrupting commercial fishing harvests. In turn, work disruption, loss of institutional trust, and community attachment were all intervening variables predicted by occupational status and subsequently predicted perceptions of community damage three and one-half years after the EVOS. Psychological stress was also indirectly affected by impacts to the occupational structure through the intervening variables of work disruption and community attachment.

According to our data analysis, however, the most important social structural characteristic was being a plaintiff in the civil litigation. In fact, one could argue that the EVOS generated a new and problematic social structural characteristic in Cordova, that is, the status of litigant. In turn, litigants became vulnerable to a secondary source of trauma, litigation stress, which resulted from time spent with lawyers, trying to understand complex litigation issues, and recurrent unpleasant memories of the spill. Litigants were similar to nonlitigants in our sample, with two exceptions.⁶ First, more litigants (58%) were employed in commercial fishing than nonlitigants (19%), and second, average household income was considerably higher for litigants (\$105,000) than nonlitigants (\$55,000). These differences are not surprising given dependence on commercial fishing in this renewable resource community. Litigants also exhibited higher levels of intrusive stress and perceived more community damage than nonlitigants. Specifically, intrusive stress was higher for litigants, in part because they experienced more work disruption, were more stressed from litigation processes, and had heightened fears of future oil spills. Litigants perceived more community damage than nonlitigants for the same reasons outlined above, but also because they had a stronger attachment to the Cordova community and manifested a greater loss of trust in organizations and institutions responsible for spill prevention and response.

Stress and uncertainty generated by contamination of the biophysical environment and failure of a technology guaranteed by experts to be infallible seem to be extended and exacerbated by participation in litigation. Certainly, a lack of a resolution to damage claims produces economic stress, as well as increased personal and collective attention to adversarial discourses characteristic of "high stakes" litigation (Picou 1996a, 1996b). Economic damages to local fisheries in 1989 and 1990 attributed to the EVOS totaled more than \$154 million (Cohen 1995, 1997), reflecting the economic significance of litigation for victims in the Cordova community. Perhaps equally important, but more difficult to quantify, is the cultural and spiritual significance of damage to the biophysical environment and community. Furthermore, negative consequences of these damages may be significant long after lawsuits are settled and the economy has recovered.

We conclude by posing a question that should serve as a guide for future disaster research. How do we mitigate social and psychological impacts of adversarial litigation, thus facilitating timely recovery for victims? The first answer, in postdisaster situations where protracted litigation is unavoidable, is implementation of a long-term clinical intervention program, one that simultaneously enables therapeutic processes and disables corrosive processes (Couch 1996, 1999; Marshall, Picou & Gill 2003; Picou 2000; Picou, Johnson & Gill 2001; PWSRCAC 1999). Evidence regarding a clinical intervention program administered after the EVOS disaster (from January 1996 to February 1997) indicates modest short-term reduction in event-related intrusive stress, but

long-term recovery remains elusive due, in part, to ongoing litigation (Marshall, Picou & Schlichtmann 2004; Picou 2000; Picou, Gill & Cohen 1997; PWSRCAC 1999). For instance, intrusive stress levels for litigants were higher in 2000, eleven years after the spill, than in 1991 (Marshall, Picou & Schlichtmann 2004). What is more, evidence from multiple regression analyses indicates that being involved in oil spill litigation became a relatively stronger predictor of intrusive stress over time (1992 to 2000), whereas being in a fishing-related occupation was a significant predictor of intrusive stress in 1992 but not in 2000 (Marshall, Picou & Schlichtmann 2004). Most important, our results suggest that intervention strategies for reducing chronic social and psychological impacts of disasters may be severely limited due to the adversarial nature of our legal system, the legal policy of the “polluter pays” principle, and the “burdens of proof” required of disaster victims. It is more than ironic, in fact tragic, that the very process of bringing closure to the EVOS — that is, litigation — is in and of itself a source of chronic psychological stress and community damage.

The second answer is to circumvent chronic effects of adversarial litigation altogether by employing nonadversarial legal means of adjudication. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms include arbitration, negotiation, minitrials, mediation, and use of independent court-appointed experts (Sward 1989). Examples of effective applications of ADR mechanisms include the standstill agreement and negotiated settlement in the contaminated drinking water case in Toms River, New Jersey; the negotiated partnership in a contaminated water case in Groton, Massachusetts; and the court-ordered research in a train derailment case in Livingston, Louisiana (for a review of these cases, see Marshall, Picou & Schlichtmann 2004). By usurping protracted litigation, ADR mechanisms in each of these cases may have averted what otherwise could have been a source of secondary trauma to victims of the initial disaster.

As one theorist contends, “The legacy of industrial society’s faith in progress is that the legal system assumes that industrial production will be benign unless demonstrated otherwise” (Goldblatt 1996:166-67). Our findings suggest that the legal system itself can become a secondary disaster, exacerbating and prolonging psychological stress and perceived community damage. Indeed, as technological disasters increase and as natural disasters increasingly are viewed as human caused, the legal system in an already litigious society will play an even more prominent role in postdisaster damage awards. Given our findings and the fact that the *Exxon Valdez* litigation has yet to be resolved, future research needs to examine long-term consequences of litigation and its subsequent correlates for individuals and communities characterized by various forms of collective trauma. More important, we also need to assess what types of postdisaster scenarios would prove most effective for ADR strategies and what incentives

are necessary to entice all parties involved to engage in such nonadversarial resolutions for future technological disasters.

Notes

1. Litigation is neither a "universal" nor "culturally specified" characteristic of technological disasters. It is, however, a defining characteristic of most technological disasters in the U.S. (e.g., see Erikson 1994; Picou 1996b; Picou & Rosebrook 1993) and, to a lesser degree, characterizes such events in Europe. Litigation was a part of restitution for the Bhopal chemical disaster and the *Amaco Cadiz* oil spill. Nonetheless, litigation does not characterize technological disasters in China, Russia, Somalia, and many developing countries. With increased environmental consciousness and human rights recognition, however, litigation may become a global characteristic of such events in the future.
2. Although there are several women who fish commercially, most prefer to be called commercial fishermen rather than commercial fishers or some other gender-neutral label. Thus, we use the term "commercial fishermen" to denote all individuals engaged in commercial fishing.
3. The original research design included a demographically matched control community located in Southeast Alaska. Data from the control community (Petersburg) are not included in the present study (for more information, see Picou & Gill 1996; Picou et al. 1992).
4. In 1991, 228 respondents completed the survey. Of these respondents, 163 completed the follow-up survey in 1992. Thus, 65 of the 1991 respondents did not participate in 1992. We compared the 1992 respondents with those who did not respond in 1992. We can make this comparison only for variables in our model that were collected in the 1991 survey. Cross-tabulation procedures and independent sample *t*-tests were used to identify statistically significant ($p < .05$) group differences between 1992 participants and nonparticipants. The comparison included the variables measured by the intrusive stress, oil spill risk, and work disruption scales. Differences between the 1992 participants and nonparticipants were not statistically significant for any of the three attitudinal constructs. Of the four social structural variables in the model (gender, marital status, occupation, and oil spill litigant), only marital status differences were statistically significant. More participants (83.4%) were married than nonparticipants (67.1%); thus, married people were slightly overrepresented in the 1992 survey.
5. AMOS is a statistical package with the name based on an acronym for "analysis of moment structures."
6. In order to better characterize the litigants in Cordova, we compared litigants and nonlitigants on a number of different characteristics. Given that 46% of the respondents were male, litigants were somewhat disproportionately male (51%) compared to nonlitigants (41% male). Minimal differences exist regarding marital status, with 85% of litigants married and 82% of nonlitigants married. Similarly, litigants (13.1) and nonlitigants (14.1) had roughly the same number of years of education. On average, litigants were 42 years old and had lived in the community for 20 years; nonlitigants

were slightly older (45) and had lived in the community for about the same number of years (19). It should be noted that none of the above differences between litigants and nonlitigants were statistically significant.

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Unequal Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real Housing Appreciation among Black, White, and Hispanic Households*

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Abstract

This article assesses whether housing in predominantly minority and integrated neighborhoods appreciates more slowly than comparable housing in predominantly white communities, and if so, the extent to which inequality is due to neighborhood racial composition per se rather than nonracial socioeconomic and housing structure factors. I take a dynamic approach to the issue of housing appreciation, considering both racial, ethnic, and poverty composition at purchase and change in those characteristics over time. I examine differences in real housing appreciation across black, white, and Hispanic households by applying a hedonic price analysis to data from the Health and Retirement Study, combined with data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census. While much of neighborhood appreciation inequality is explained by nonracial (particularly socioeconomic) factors, minority composition continues to exert a significant effect on appreciation even net of these considerations, particularly in highly segregated communities and those that experience large increases in black representation. Unequal housing appreciation has a large negative impact on the overall wealth holdings of mature minority households, and has important implications for racial and ethnic stratification.

It has often been asserted that the returns to housing investments are lower among minority than non-Hispanic white (hereafter “white”) households (Lake 1980; Oliver & Shapiro 1995; Parcel 1982), which if true, would represent an important source of racial and ethnic stratification in both housing and financial wealth. Appreciation in housing values represents a valuable hedge against inflation and is a key source of wealth accumulation for many families. This is particularly true for low to middle income families, for whom housing

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absorbs a larger fraction of household income, leaving few opportunities for alternative investment.

Residential segregation and the concomitant concentration of poverty and social dislocations in minority neighborhoods (Jargowsky 1997; Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1996) are a likely source of unequal housing returns across groups. However, surprisingly little research examines the mechanisms through which neighborhood racial composition affects minority housing appreciation, and empirical findings are somewhat mixed. Specifically, it remains unclear whether race per se undermines housing appreciation in minority neighborhoods, or whether the socioeconomic correlates of race such as poverty and the myriad of associated social problems do so. Furthermore, studies that take a dynamic approach to the study of race and housing appreciation, considering *change* in neighborhood composition in addition to contemporary conditions, are relatively scant. More importantly, examinations of housing returns among minority groups other than blacks are virtually nonexistent. The two-dimensional black-white focus of previous studies of housing values is especially problematic in light of the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in recent decades, and the growing ethno-racial complexity of the urban landscape (Waldinger 1989).

Whether and why minority-owned homes appreciate less than white-owned homes is important from both a theoretical and public policy standpoint. Theoretically, the issue is highly salient to the ongoing debate about whether race or socioeconomic status is more centrally determinant of the life-chances of minority members in the U.S. The issue also bears directly on the most efficacious public policy means for redressing racial iniquities in housing — i.e. whether augmented efforts to combat residential segregation or additional neighborhood development programs in minority communities would better mitigate inequality.

Accordingly, this paper compares real housing appreciation across black, white, and Hispanic origin pre-retirement households. I estimate a hedonic price model of real housing appreciation to assess whether, in fact, housing appreciation differs according to neighborhood racial composition, and if so, whether the effects are attributable to race per se or to nonracial socioeconomic and structural conditions highly correlated with race. I also assess the impact of change in neighborhood conditions over time, in addition to static neighborhood composition, to examine the dynamic nature of neighborhood effects on property values. Moreover, I explicitly compare the relationship between appreciation and black and Hispanic neighborhood composition. Determining whether Hispanic-owned homes appreciate less than white-owned homes and how neighborhood Hispanic composition affects appreciation is a major addition to prior literature on racial differences in housing values. And finally, I also demonstrate the effect of lower housing

appreciation of minority-owned homes on overall levels of housing wealth inequality. That is, I estimate how much higher black and Hispanic housing wealth would be if they lived in communities comparable to whites.

Theoretical Background and Literature Review

The classical economic model of supply and demand suggests that rates of appreciation should be uniform across housing units in the long term. Theoretically, the mobility of individuals and changes in the supply of housing eradicate any differences in appreciation rates, resulting in long-term equilibrium. Therefore all homeowners across a particular metropolitan area and across the country should experience the same expected rate of housing appreciation, and no systematic differences in appreciation should exist across racial groups. However, considerable empirical evidence documents that this is not, in fact, the case.¹

Instead, several studies have found that homeowners' race significantly affects housing appreciation. For example, Lake (1980) examined short-term (between 1974 and 1975) differences in housing appreciation between black and white suburban homeowners. He found that suburban housing units owned by blacks were less likely to increase and more likely to decrease in value than units owned by whites at every level of initial housing value. He argued that this resulted from the weaker demand for black-owned homes that accompanies residential segregation. Because blacks seeking to sell their homes faced a restricted pool of largely black home-seekers, they were burdened with the lower purchasing power of black home-seekers, thereby undermining their housing appreciation.

Oliver and Shapiro (1995) likewise report differential rates of housing appreciation by race at all levels of initial housing values. Between 1978 and 1988 whites who bought less expensive homes enjoyed appreciation rates of 122%, relative to only 79% for blacks. Whites who bought more expensive homes enjoyed appreciation rates of 56%, relative to only 44% for blacks. Racial differences in housing appreciation were even greater between 1967 and 1977, when lower-priced white-owned homes appreciated 325% relative to only 175% for blacks. Higher-priced white-owned homes appreciated 148% relative to only 88% for blacks.

Not all studies found lower rates of housing appreciation for minority-owned homes, however. Coate and Vanderhoff (1993) used Annual Housing Survey data from 1974 to 1983 to examine the impact homeowners' race on the appreciation of single-family homes. They found no significant differences between black- and white-owned homes, net of metropolitan-wide differences in per capita income and population growth. Long and Caudill (1992) also reported similar housing appreciation for blacks and whites using Census data.

Even if it were unambiguously true that black-owned homes appreciate less than white-owned homes, the mechanisms behind this disparity remain unclear. Because homeowners' race and neighborhood racial composition are so highly correlated, these studies could be mistaking neighborhood effects for individual race effects. Several studies have in fact documented that proximity to black populations and high levels of poverty undermine minority housing values (Harris 1999; Pandey & Coulton 1994).

Other studies have emphasized that racial change rather than racial composition per se drives neighborhood differences in housing values and appreciation. For example, Phares (1971) examined the effect of racial change on housing values in an inner suburb of St. Louis. He found that housing in transition areas appreciated less than housing in stable, all-white areas² and that differences between stable and transition areas decreased as the process of racial change intensified. Thus in the case of St. Louis, appreciation began to fall in transition areas beginning in 1963. The expectation of non-white migration into the area increased the willingness of whites to sell their homes, which raised the supply of housing, lowering prices in the short run. However, pent up housing demand among blacks led to an increase in demand in transition areas, gradually raising prices.

Devaney and Rayburn (1993) also examined the effect of neighborhood racial transition on housing returns between 1970 and 1980. They found that neighborhoods with the largest decline in white population experienced the largest declines in housing values. However, racial change had to be rather large to see any effect. Like Phares, they found that the negative impact of racial change was greater when the neighborhood started off with a large white population, and more modest among areas that had already begun to change populations in an earlier period.

Pandey and Coulton (1994) examined the effect of neighborhood racial change on housing values in Cleveland during the 1980s. They found a cyclical relationship between property values and neighborhood racial and poverty composition. The increasing geographic concentration of poverty, and consequently of the social ills associated with poverty (such as joblessness, unwed motherhood, and crime) negatively affected property values in those areas. As property values fell, poverty rose because nonpoor and two-parent families moved out of the neighborhoods in search of greater stability.

Other studies, however, concluded that racial composition did not affect housing appreciation. Holmes and James (1996), for example, examined the impact of ethnic and racial composition on housing price trends in Houston and found no clear effects. Using the median home value in a census tract in 1990 as the dependent variable, they found no significant differences in housing values with respect to racial composition once socioeconomic and housing unit characteristics are controlled. However, they also controlled for what they called "depreciation risk," which was the change in home values

between 1980 and 1990. When these risk variables were omitted, the effect of racial composition and neighborhood change became negative and significant. Thus while they drew the opposite conclusion with respect to housing values at a point in time, their findings support the argument that housing in minority neighborhoods is more likely to depreciate over time than housing in white neighborhoods.

RACE VS. CLASS: MECHANISMS THROUGH WHICH NEIGHBORHOOD COMPOSITION AFFECTS APPRECIATION

Although research on racial inequities in housing appreciation spans several decades and covers a wide range of settings (i.e., national, city-specific, and suburban-only studies), many gaps and unanswered questions remain. There is still controversy as to whether in fact minority-owned homes appreciate more slowly than white-owned homes. More importantly, the mechanisms through which neighborhood composition affects housing appreciation remain ambiguous. Specifically, it is unclear whether racial composition *per se* determines housing appreciation, or whether lower appreciation in minority neighborhoods is a function of the lower socioeconomic standing of those communities.

There are two principal mechanisms through which neighborhood minority composition affects housing appreciation. The first is a pure discrimination effect, in which whites avoid neighborhoods with minority residents because they have a "taste for discrimination" (Harris 1999). Bobo and others have documented that whites express considerable resistance to co-residence with blacks using vignette studies (Bobo 1997; Bobo, Klugel & Smith 1997; Farley & Frey 1994), and Massey (Massey, Gross & Shibuya 1994) has shown that racial composition is a critical determinant of white residential mobility. White preference for racially homogeneous neighborhoods undermines minority housing appreciation by lowering the demand for housing in integrated communities, thereby lowering prices.

The second mechanism through which minority composition could affect appreciation is through its association with other conditions that affect the utility and desirability of neighborhoods, such as school quality, crime, poverty levels, and a host of social ills associated with poverty (Harris 1999; Taub, Taylor & Dunham 1984). For example, Harris (1999) demonstrated that neighborhood racial composition no longer predicted housing values once socioeconomic differences across neighborhoods were controlled, at least among renters. However, among homeowners, the target population of my analysis, housing in neighborhoods that were at least 60% African American had lower values than comparable housing in predominantly white communities.

A related dimension of nonracial neighborhood characteristics not commonly considered in studies of housing appreciation is the type and quality of

housing units available in minority neighborhoods. Residential segregation generally confines minorities within a metropolitan area to the oldest, most dilapidated neighborhoods with the lowest preponderance of single-family units (Bianchi, Farley & Spain 1982; Straszheim 1974). These unfavorable housing conditions could lower demand for housing in minority neighborhoods and contribute to unequal housing returns across groups, and yet they remain understudied in the literature on neighborhood composition and housing appreciation.

Research Objectives and Hypotheses

The primary objective of this article is to determine whether neighborhood racial and Hispanic origin composition continues to significantly impact housing appreciation once their socioeconomic and housing structure correlates are taken into account. While I expect a large part of the effect of neighborhood racial composition on appreciation to be mediated by socioeconomic factors, particularly poverty composition and poor housing conditions, I nonetheless expect racial and ethnic composition to exert a significant influence on appreciation even net of these other factors.³

Another central objective of this article is to reinstate a dynamic approach to the study of housing appreciation. While several studies document the importance of neighborhood succession to the evolution of housing values, they were primarily conducted on data from the 1970s and early 1980s. Relatively few studies have examined the issue with more recent nationally representative data. Recent demographic shifts render this lack of data problematic. The 1960s and 1970s were characterized by rapid neighborhood racial succession as pent-up black housing demand combined with white exodus to suburban areas to rapidly push out the boundaries of segregated ghettos. The 1980s and 1990s, however, witnessed a dramatic transformation of that pattern. The cessation of Northward migration of rural Southern blacks eased population pressures among blacks, and urban abandonment by the middle classes of all races (Wilson 1987) contributed to a sharp increase in the concentration of poverty (Jargowsky 1997). Thus while the boundaries of the ghetto continued to spread outward in many cities through the 1980s and 1990s, issues of depopulation and abandonment rose in prominence, representing a very different housing environment from earlier decades. These factors may have shifted the relative importance of racial and poverty composition to housing appreciation, and warrant further examination. I expect neighborhood change in both minority and poverty composition to play an important role in undermining the housing appreciation of black and Hispanic neighborhoods. Communities with sizeable

minority populations are more likely to gain minority and poor population over time, which likely contributes to their lower housing appreciation.

A third objective of this analysis is to address a critical gap in the literature on inequality in housing appreciation, namely the absence of information on minorities other than blacks. Hispanics, in particular, are an important group to study owing to their rapid growth and low socioeconomic status (Bean & Tienda 1987; Morales & Bonilla 1993). While generally less segregated and less disadvantaged than blacks in terms of homeownership and housing equity (Alba & Logan 1992; Flippen 2001a, 2001b; Krivo 1986), how they fare relative to whites and blacks in terms of housing appreciation remains an open question. I hypothesize that Hispanic concentration is less disadvantageous than black concentration for housing appreciation, owing to their lower segregation from whites and geographic concentration in regions of the country experiencing the most rapid growth in housing prices. I also expect the population pressures associated with increasing Hispanic immigration to U.S. cities to boost housing appreciation in areas of high Hispanic representation.

Data and Methods

HRS AND CENSUS DATA

The analyses below combine data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census of Housing and Population. The HRS is a nationally representative, longitudinal survey of the pre-retirement population and their spouses or partners. The survey was constructed to follow a cohort of adults born between 1930 and 1941 (and therefore aged 51 to 61 at the time of initial interview in 1992), through the retirement process and into old age. The HRS includes a total of 12,654 individuals and 7,607 households. Of those, 74.4% are white, 16.3% are black, and 9.3% are Hispanic.⁴

The HRS is particularly well suited to study racial and ethnic appreciation inequality for several reasons. First, the focus on the pre-retirement population maximizes the opportunity to examine inequality in housing price growth. According to life-cycle theories of savings, homeownership peaks during the years proximate to retirement, allowing for the largest sample with which to measure housing appreciation. This is particularly important for minority members, who tend to be older when they buy their first home than similarly situated whites. This population also offers a better view of housing appreciation than younger age groups because older Americans tend to be less residentially mobile than their younger peers. This thus provides us with a longer perspective to view housing price change, resulting in more variation in the dependent variable and averaging out short-term volatility in housing prices.⁵

Second, the HRS is one of the only nationally representative surveys of older populations to over-sample Hispanics in addition to blacks. While a rapidly growing segment of the U.S. population in general and of the older U.S. population in particular, very few nationally representative surveys of older Americans contain enough Hispanic respondents to allow for their separate analysis. Moreover, nationally representative surveys of more diverse age groups that also contain housing data (such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics) also usually lack a sizeable number of Hispanics. This is thus a critical advantage of the HRS over other data sources.⁶

A third major advantage of the HRS is that it contains ample housing data, including the current value (as reported by the homeowner), purchase price, and year of home purchase. This information is necessary to calculate real housing appreciation (i.e., indexed to inflation) over time. The HRS also contains basic information on housing characteristics, such as whether the unit is single family or multi-family, whether it is a mobile home or farm property, and so forth. Unfortunately, little information was collected on detailed housing characteristics, such as size or age. The HRS also does not measure investments in housing after purchase, such as renovations or major repairs.⁷

In the HRS, deficiencies with respect to housing characteristics are compensated for by the availability of geographic identifiers that allow merging with other data sources. This allowed me to merge the HRS with data from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses to examine neighborhood contributors to housing inequality. This offers a major advantage over other housing surveys. Most studies of racial and ethnic inequality in housing entail small-scale studies of individual metropolitan areas, which suffer from concerns over the generalizability of their findings; analyses of national-level census data, which are forced to infer individual level behavior from aggregate level changes across groups; or information from the Annual Housing Survey (AHS), which lacks information about neighborhood context. The combination of household information from the HRS with tract level census data allows me to directly examine neighborhood contributors to housing inequality. Moreover, by tracing neighborhood indicators across censuses I am able to formulate a more dynamic model that considers how change in neighborhood conditions influence housing appreciation inequality. In these analyses I use census tracts as a proxy for neighborhoods. Designed by the U.S. Census Bureau to approximate neighborhoods (with an average size of 4,000 residents), tracts are commonly used by social scientists to capture neighborhood conditions.

There are, however, several methodological challenges associated with linking the 1970, 1980, and 1990 census data owing to changes in the definition of tracts over time. Specifically, there are numerous tracts in 1990 that were not demarcated in either 1980 or 1970. Eliminating such tracts from the analysis would be problematic for two reasons. First, the roughly 253 such tracts

(153 from 1980) represent 31% of the HRS sample of homeowners (21% from 1980). Second, the tracts that were not present in earlier census enumerations differ systematically from those that were previously defined with respect to characteristics of central interest for my analyses. Specifically, they are largely outlying suburban areas that are disproportionately white. These areas, which grew rapidly between 1970 and 1990, are likely to exhibit patterns of appreciation that differ significantly from other, more established areas.

I therefore devised a method for imputing the variables of interest (racial, ethnic, and poverty composition) of these tracts in 1980 and 1970 when the actual data was missing. These cases all had information available at the county level in 1970 and 1980. Rather than use the county figures as the imputed values, which would overestimate minority representation in many tracts because of their uneven distribution over the county, I took the ratio of the percent black (Hispanic, poor, etc.) at the tract level to the percent black at the county level in 1990 and applied that ratio to the 1980 or 1970 county level black percentage.⁸ This procedure assumes that the percentage black (Hispanic, poor, etc.) in a given tract remains proportionate to the percentage black in the county over time. That is, my imputation procedure assumes that tracts do not change in their racial composition radically faster than city-wide changes in racial composition. This assumption is no doubt not always correct, particularly in the context of rapid racial succession in which minority populations expand outward, as in the case of Chicago during the 1950s and 1960s (Hirsch 1983; Speare 1967). However, this pattern of rapid neighborhood racial succession is not likely to apply to areas that were not previously demarcated because they are overwhelmingly located in outlying suburban areas, which did not experience dramatic change in racial or poverty composition between 1970 and 1990.⁹

A second methodological problem that arises when linking 1970, 1980, and 1990 census data is that several tracts split over time, dividing into multiple tracts as their population grew. In these cases, I pooled the split tracts when defining my 1990 tract-level variables in order to keep constant geographic areas over time. As a further test that these measures did not bias results I estimated models with only those tracts that remained constant over time. The main substantive findings, reported below, did not change.

And finally, in cases where the year of purchase fell between census enumerations, I employed linear extrapolation to estimate the neighborhood racial, ethnic, and poverty composition at the time of purchase. Again, this presumes a uniform rate of growth between census takings, and if anything understates racial and poverty composition at purchase, if tipping point models of neighborhood change are accurate.

MODEL ESTIMATION AND SPECIFICATION

The dependent variable in the analysis is the log of current home value,¹⁰ which I estimate using a hedonic price model. Hedonic pricing involves modeling the implicit value of attributes of a commodity rather than the price of the commodity itself. Hedonic price models have been extensively applied in economics to infer the demand for environmental characteristics through the analysis of marketed goods whose value depends, in part, on those attributes. It is therefore an ideal methodology to assess the appreciation "value" associated with various housing characteristics.

I estimate current home prices according to housing purchase characteristics, household socioeconomic resources, and both neighborhood conditions at purchase and change in those conditions over time. The coefficients resulting from the hedonic price analysis represent the housing value "pay-off" to various independent variables. Hedonic methods are preferable over other approaches to estimating housing appreciation because they produce readily interpretable results, allow us to compare the prices of a constant-quality house across different housing markets, and can measure both the effect of previous neighborhood characteristics as well as neighborhood change (Crone & Voith 1992).

The equation to be estimated is:

$$\ln(P) = \alpha + \sum_{j=1}^p \beta_j X_j + \sum_{i=1}^q \gamma_i Z_i$$

where P is the current value of the home; X_j is the j th household level characteristics ($j = 1, \dots, p$); Z_i is the i th neighborhood characteristics ($i = 1, \dots, q$), and b_j and g_i are unknown regression coefficients. The logarithmic specification of the dependent variable implies that the coefficients in the model represent the percentage change in housing values for a unit change in the independent variable.¹¹ The logarithmic specification of the dependent variable implies that the coefficients in the model represent the percentage change in housing values for a unit change in the independent variable.

Independent variables in the analysis, whose definitions are reported in Table 1, fall into two broad classes. The first contains attributes of the individual housing unit and purchase, such as the log of the purchase price of the home and the year of purchase. In all cases the reported purchase price is converted into 1992 dollars, the year of the baseline HRS survey and thus the year for which the current value of the home is estimated. Following Gyourko and Linneman (1993, 1997), I convert prices to 1992 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) minus the shelter component. By excluding the shelter component we get a clearer sense of how the value of a particular housing unit has changed relative to other consumer goods, rather than relative to both consumer goods and other homes. I also control for region (Northeast, South,

TABLE 1: List of Variables and their Operationalization**Household and Housing Unit Characteristics**

Household resources	
Household income	Total household income from all sources
Marital status	4 mutually exclusive dummy variables: married, divorced, widowed, never married
Education	Years of education of household head
Professional occupation	Dummy variable: 1 if household head is a professional worker
Housing unit	
Multi-unit	Dummy variable: 1 if housing unit is part of multi-unit structure
Purchase price	Log of purchase price, adjusted for inflation (CPI minus shelter component) to 1992 dollars
Year of purchase	Year in which current housing unit was purchased
Location	
Region	4 mutually exclusive dummy variables: Northeast, West, Midwest, or South (reference)
Urban	Dummy variable: 1 if housing unit located in urban area
Population size	Log of population size of metropolitan area of residence
Change in population size	Percent change in metropolitan population size since time of purchase

Neighborhood Population Characteristics

Initial racial composition	5 mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating percent black in tract during year of purchase: 0, between 0 and 1.99, between 2 and 29.99, between 30 and 64.99, and 65 or more
Initial Hispanic origin composition	4 mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating percent Hispanic in tract during year of purchase: 0-2, between 2 and 4.99, between 5 and 9.99, and 10 or more
Initial poverty composition	5 mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating percent poor in tract during year of purchase: 0-5, between 5 and 9.99, between 10 and 29.99, and 30 or more
Percent foreign born	Percent of tract reporting foreign birth

Change in Population Characteristics

Change in percent black	4 mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating percentage point increase in percent black in tract between time of purchase and 1990: negative change, no change, between 0 and 10 percentage point increase, and 10 percentage point increase or greater
Change in percent Hispanic	4 mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating percentage point increase in percent Hispanic in tract between time of purchase and 1990: negative change, no change, between 0 and 5 percentage point increase, and 5 percentage point increase or greater
Change in percent poor	4 mutually exclusive dummy variables indicating percentage point increase in percent poor in tract between time of purchase and 1990: negative change, no change, between 0 and 10 percentage point increase, and 10 percentage point increase or greater

Housing characteristics

Percent vacant	Percent of housing units in tract that were vacant in 1990
Percent large units	Percent of housing units in tract that had 6 rooms or more in 1990
Percent old units	Percent of housing units in tract that were built before 1940 (from 1990 census)

Midwest, and West), urban residence, and metropolitan size and growth to capture intra- and intercity differences in housing price trends. In addition, I include measures of household resource characteristics (specifically household income, low educational attainment, and professional occupation of the household head) as a proxy for possible home improvements and renovations.¹²

The second broad class of variables in the analysis relates to neighborhood characteristics that influence housing appreciation, and are drawn from tract-level census data. These include population characteristics, such as the percent white, black, and Hispanic at the time the home was purchased,¹³ as well as change in these characteristics over time. This group of neighborhood characteristics also contains measures of the housing conditions in the community. This includes factors such as the proportion of all units that are vacant, large (i.e., 6 rooms or more), and relatively old (i.e., built before 1940). These variables both control for important aspect of neighborhood quality and act as crude proxies for the characteristics of the housing unit itself. Unfortunately, factors such as the incidence of unwed motherhood, low educational attainment, unemployment, and median housing values are highly colinear with poverty composition. It was therefore impossible to distinguish between the effects of poverty per se on housing appreciation, and the effects of the social ills associated with poverty.

As with all wealth data, outliers are an issue in the HRS sample. It is difficult to assess the reliability of values of our dependent variable since purchase price and length of occupancy vary considerably. I therefore compute average annual appreciation to check for the presence of unrealistic values. A small number of such cases stand out. A closer inspection of these outliers shows that many involve relatively recent home purchases, and thus are especially dubious as they entail very large changes in home value in a short time span. These values could either result from measurement (respondent) error, or could reflect substantial investments made in the properties after home purchase. In either case, they are likely to poorly measure real housing appreciation and could also exert an undue influence on subsequent analyses. I therefore eliminate all households reporting a rate of real housing appreciation or depreciation of greater than 75% per anum.¹⁴ This restriction eliminates 22 households, and leaves a final sample size of 4,953 homeowners.

When findings are reported at the household level, household race is defined as the race of the husband in the case of married households. Mixed race/ethnicity households in the HRS are relatively rare. Over 97 percent of married white males and over 95% of married black males have same-race spouses. Married Hispanic men, on the other hand, are least likely to be in a dual-Hispanic household, with just under 88% married to a Hispanic wife. Thus a small number of cases will be defined as white, black, or Hispanic that are in fact mixed. This lends a conservative bias to my results, because it reduces the

TABLE 2: Housing Values and Real Housing Appreciation by Race and Hispanic Origin

	White		Black		Hispanic	
	Mean	Median	Mean	Median	Mean	Median
Current value	117,018	90,000	71,171	55,000	90,157	65,000
Absolute appreciation	19,231	5,925	3,606	-710	13,062	2,448
Percent appreciation	19.7	7.0	5.3	-1.3	16.9	3.9
N	3,772		806		375	

observed differences between whites and other groups. All analyses are weighted at the household level in order to adjust for the survey's minority oversample.

Results

REAL HOUSING APPRECIATION ACROSS GROUPS

Table 2 presents a description of the dependent variable, current home value, and real housing appreciation reported separately by race and Hispanic origin. Several points are noteworthy. First, consistent with the lower average housing equity held by minority households (Myers & Chung 1995), the current value of minority-owned homes is substantially below that of white-owned homes. This holds for both mean and median home values. More importantly, levels of appreciation are also markedly lower for blacks than for whites, and are somewhat lower for Hispanics. It is telling that the median black appreciation is actually negative, indicating that mature black homeowners experience depreciation more often than appreciation.

Additional tabulations reveal that the lower appreciation of black and Hispanic-owned homes holds across all price ranges of homes (i.e., low, medium, and high purchase prices), and all eras of home purchase (i.e., before 1970, 1970 to 1980, and after 1980), with the exception of homes bought after 1980, in which no statistically significant differences are found. Interestingly, race differences are larger in more expensive homes and earlier eras of purchase. This suggests the cumulative nature of unequal housing returns, which are magnified by longer periods of gestation and larger initial investments.

These differences in housing appreciation by race of homeowner are likely a function of group differences in neighborhood characteristics. Table 3 presents differences in housing appreciation by neighborhood minority and poverty composition at the time of home purchase, and by change in composition over time. Several conclusions obtain from this table. First, neighborhoods

TABLE 3: Appreciation and Neighborhood Racial, Ethnic, and Poverty Composition

	Current Value	Appreciation	Percent Appreciation	N
Initial Racial/Ethnic and Poverty Composition				
Percent black				
0	107,711	21,193	24.5	1,146
0-2	135,648	24,993	22.6	1,646
2-30	95,159	8,951	10.4	1,331
30-65	75,141	2,807	3.9	478
65+	66,136	4,726	7.7	352
Percent Hispanic				
0-2	99,413	12,477	14.4	3,074
2-5	135,883	29,252	27.4	838
5-10	128,949	24,257	23.2	357
10+	98,020	12,889	15.1	684
Percent poor				
0-5	159,635	32,334	25.4	1,338
5-10	107,454	15,989	17.5	1,427
10-20	86,355	12,756	17.3	1,211
20-30	64,693	181	0.3	547
30+	59,712	-2,981	-4.8	430
Change in Racial/Ethnic and Poverty Composition				
Percentage point change in black				
Negative	90,615	9,595	11.8	989
Zero	113,582	14,411	14.5	986
0-10	116,758	20,406	21.2	2447
10+	85,214	12,642	17.4	531
Percentage point change in Hispanic				
Negative	102,937	13,857	15.6	996
Zero	98,321	5,878	6.4	597
0-5	111,888	16,918	17.8	2,683
5+	105,094	26,060	33.0	677
Percentage point change in poverty				
Negative	106,115	19,083	21.9	1,983
Zero	134,026	16,024	13.6	985
0-10	100,757	15,156	17.7	1,645
10+	71,704	5,260	10.5	340

TABLE 4: Neighborhood Poverty, Neighborhood Change, and Housing Structure by Racial and Hispanic Origin Composition

	Percent Poor 1970	Neighborhood Change 1970–1990			Housing Structure 1990		
		Change Poverty	Change Black	Change Hispanic	Percent Vacant	Percent 6 Rooms	Percent < 1940
Percent black							
0	8.8	.9	3.7	6.4	8.3	48.4	16.3
0–2	6.8	1.8	1.8	4.0	6.4	53.0	13.7
2–30	11.9	1.1	13.0	3.9	8.8	43.4	13.3
30–65	21.6	–.1	10.0	4.3	8.9	44.9	17.4
65+	27.2	.4	–4.5	1.8	10.0	41.4	25.1
Percent Hispanic							
0–2	10.4	–.1	4.8	3.1	7.9	50.9	16.2
2–5	8.9	2.0	9.3	4.9	8.0	46.1	14.5
5–10	11.3	4.3	8.9	6.3	9.9	39.8	15.0
10+	21.1	2.1	4.6	15.5	10.4	31.1	16.1

significantly less growth in value than those with smaller initial black populations. Moreover, large differences in appreciation appear after a very small increment in black population. That is, the appreciation experienced by homes in neighborhoods that were between zero and 2% black at purchase is significantly less than homes in neighborhoods with zero black population. Second, the relationship between initial Hispanic population and housing appreciation is less monotonic, with the highest levels of appreciation registered among homes in neighborhoods with intermediate initial Hispanic populations. Third, the strong inverse relationship between initial poverty composition and appreciation is more approximately linear. As initial neighborhood poverty increases, appreciation decreases, particularly when neighborhood poverty exceeds 20%. And finally, neighborhood change is also related to appreciation. While the relationship for change in black population shows no clear pattern, for Hispanics we again see a curvilinear relationship in which appreciation is higher for homes in areas that either gain or lose Hispanic population. Homes located in tracts that gain more than 5 percentage points in their Hispanic composition experienced particularly high levels of appreciation. Once again, poverty is strongly associated with housing price growth, as housing in tracts that lost poverty population (i.e., gentrifying neighborhoods) experienced the greatest appreciation while those with the greatest increase in the percent poor experienced the lowest levels of appreciation.

TABLE 5: Coefficients from Models of Log of Current Home

	Model				
	1	2	3	4	5
Initial Minority and Poverty					
Percent black (ref = 0)					
0-2	-.0407**	-.0472**	-.0462**	-.0421**	-.0367**
2-30	-.0892***	-.0742***	-.0599***	-.0524**	-.0274
30-65	-.1879***	-.1231***	-.0778**	-.0650*	-.0499
65+	-.2607***	-.1611***	-.1312***	-.1102***	-.1014***
Percent Hispanic (ref = 0-2)					
2-5	.0693***	.0666***	.0642***	.0681***	.0374**
5-10	-.0846***	-.0678**	-.0816***	-.0722***	-.1251***
10+	-.1306***	-.0685***	-.0938***	-.0829***	-.2849***
Percent poor (ref = 0-5)					
5-10		-.0967***	-.0955***	-.1003***	-.0745***
10-20		-.1387***	-.1394***	-.1452***	-.1317***
20-30		-.1896***	-.2014***	-.2117***	-.1828***
30+		-.2874***	-.3042***	-.3217***	-.2970***

POVERTY, NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE, AND HOUSING STRUCTURE BY ETHNO-RACIAL COMPOSITION

Before analyzing how neighborhood racial and Hispanic origin composition affect housing appreciation it is important to illustrate how they are related to other determinants of housing prices, namely poverty composition, neighborhood change, and structural housing conditions. Table 4 presents how these characteristics vary by minority neighborhood composition in 1970. The figures clearly show the higher prevalence of poverty in integrated and predominantly minority communities. While ethno-racial composition in 1970 is not clearly associated with change in poverty population over time, neighborhoods with intermediate minority concentrations in the 1970s experienced the largest percentage point increases in black and Hispanic representation over time. Structural housing conditions in 1990 also vary appreciably by 1970 racial composition, as neighborhoods with larger minority populations exhibit generally higher vacancy rates, a lower preponderance of large homes, and, for blacks, a higher share of relatively old housing units. All of these factors are likely to undermine housing appreciation in minority communities. Thus, in the next section, I model the effects on housing appreciation of minority composition and neighborhood change using multivariate methods to address whether housing in integrated and minority neighborhoods continues to experience lower appreciation when these other factors are taken into account.

TABLE 5: Coefficients from Models of Log of Current Home

	Model				
	1	2	3	4	5
Change in Minority and Poverty					
Black (ref = no change)					
Negative			.0078	-.0050	.0010
0-10 percentage point increase			.0025	.0137	.0189
10+ percentage point increase			-.1198**	-.0740*	-.0717*
Hispanic (ref = no change)					
Negative change			.0348	.0313	.0364
0-5 percentage point increase		.0404†	.0421*	.0223	
5+ percentage point			.0972**	.1253**	-.0236
Poverty (ref = no change)					
Negative				.0309	.0319†
0-10 percentage point increase				-.0706**	-.0777**
10+ percentage point increase				-.1192**	-.1505**
Percent foreign					1.5774**
Housing characteristics					
Percent vacant					-.1996*
Percent 6 rooms or more				.1125*	
Percent built before 1940				.0286	
Household resources					
Household income	.0000**	.0000**	.0000**	.0000**	.0000**
Education	-.1119**	-.0979**	-.1008**	-.0999**	-.1095**
Professional occupation	.0897**	.0839**	.0836**	.0817**	.0780**
Housing unit characteristics					
Multiunit	-.1771**	-.1824**	-.1865**	-.1768**	-.2564**
Ln purchase price	.5670**	.5480**	.5475**	.5431**	.5160**
Year purchased	.0000	-.0002	.0001	-.0001	-.0001
Location					
North	.3413**	.3038**	.3016**	.2874**	.2333**
West	.3787**	.3539**	.3483**	.3532**	.3512**
Midwest	-.0547**	-.0923**	-.0865**	-.0844**	-.0773**
Urban	.2125**	.1649**	.1665**	.1735**	.1281**
Ln population size	.0962**	.0784**	.0745**	.0660**	.0273†
Percent change in pop. size			.0000	-.0001	.0000
Intercept	3.9804**	4.7074**	4.1630**	4.7886**	5.3445**
Adjusted R ²	.6296	.6350	.6366	.6398	.6626
N	4,953	4,953	4,953	4,953	4,953

† p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01

MODELS PREDICTING LOG OF CURRENT HOME VALUE

Table 5 reports the coefficients and significance levels for a series of models predicting current home value as a function of purchase price, year of purchase, and neighborhood population and housing characteristics. Of great substantive interest are the effects of minority and poverty composition on housing appreciation. When first introduced in model 1, which includes only racial and ethnic composition at the time of purchase and controls for household resources, location, metropolitan size, and purchase characteristics, neighborhood racial composition is strongly related to housing appreciation. Each successive increase in the size of the initial black population is associated with progressively larger decrements in current home values. For example, homes located in neighborhoods that were 65% or more black at the time of purchase are worth 26% less in 1992 than comparable homes purchased in all-white neighborhoods. Further, even a small increase in the initial black population (i.e., greater than zero but less than 2%) is associated with significantly lower housing values in 1992 than homes purchased in all-white neighborhoods.

However, the effect of initial black population is largely mediated by other factors, particularly poverty composition. When initial poverty composition is introduced in model 2, the coefficients for initial black population fall considerably, particularly for the higher levels of black concentration. Introducing change in minority population in model 3 further reduces the coefficients of neighborhood racial composition, and including change in poverty composition and housing characteristics in models 4 and 5 virtually eliminate the initial race effects. However, the negative effect on home appreciation of having a very large initial black population (i.e., greater than 65%) at the time of purchase remains statistically significant even after accounting for all other factors that influence housing appreciation. This indicates that a high concentration of black residents depresses housing values over and above the association of poverty with high minority representation. This is not surprising in light of research by Bobo and others showing strong white aversion to living in neighborhoods with large minority representation.

Initial Hispanic composition follows a completely different pattern. When first introduced in model 1, a curvilinear pattern is evident. Homes in neighborhoods with small (i.e., between 2 and 5%) Hispanic populations at the time of purchase appreciate more than those in neighborhoods with almost no Hispanics. At higher levels of concentration, on the other hand, Hispanic composition negatively affects housing appreciation. Like blacks, the coefficients associated with high Hispanic concentration are significantly reduced when initial poverty composition is controlled. Unlike blacks, however, controlling for change in minority and poverty composition in models 3 and 4, and for housing characteristics in model 5, actually increases the negative effect of high initial Hispanic concentration on home appreciation. This

suggests that Hispanic concentration in the West, where housing is newer, larger, and less likely to be vacant, makes them appear relatively well off with respect to housing appreciation. When these factors are statistically controlled, however, a pattern of clear disadvantage appears with respect to areas of high initial Hispanic concentration.

Initial poverty composition has a very large impact on housing appreciation across models. When first introduced in model 2, each successive increase in the percent poor in a community is associated with a larger penalty in current home values. Homes located in communities in which 30% or more of residents were below poverty at the time of purchase are worth roughly 29 percent less in 1992 than homes purchased in neighborhoods that were less than 5% poor. Moreover, this staggering differential is barely affected by the introduction of neighborhood change and housing characteristics in models 3 through 5. Neighborhood poverty can reduce appreciation in a number of ways. First, household income determines a family's ability to maintain a home. A high preponderance of poverty would then indicate that many households in the community are not able to afford basic upkeep, leading to deterioration in the housing stock (Gyourko & Linneman 1993), which can then become self-perpetuating. That is, as poor neighbors are unable to maintain their properties, nonpoor residents are less motivated to make additional investments in their properties and/or seek to leave the community (Pandey & Coulton 1994; Taub, Taylor & Dunham 1984). A cycle of disinvestment and decline results in the large differences in property appreciation evident in Table 5.

Also of great substantive interest are the effects on housing appreciation of change in minority and poverty composition over time. When first introduced in model 3, only a relatively large percentage point increase in black representation has a significant effect on housing values. Homes in neighborhoods that either lost black population or increased between 1 and 10 percentage points in their proportion black were indistinguishable from homes in tracts experiencing no change in black composition, net of initial minority and poverty composition. Housing in neighborhoods that increased 10 percentage points or more in their black population, however, experienced significantly lower housing appreciation than other homes. At the same level of initial black and poverty composition, purchase price, and so on, homes in neighborhoods that increased in their black population at least 10 percentage points were worth 12% less in 1992 than comparable homes in neighborhoods experiencing no change in black concentration. Once again, these effects are mediated to some extent by change in poverty composition, which when introduced in model 4 reduces the effect of change in black composition considerably. However, a large change in the percent black continues to exert a significant negative effect on appreciation even in the final model, again highlighting the importance of race over and above its socioeconomic correlates in structuring neighborhood housing price change.

TABLE 6: Simulation of Impact of Neighborhood Composition on Minority Housing Appreciation

	Black			Hispanic		
	Predicted Values	Absolute Change	Percent Change	Predicted Values	Absolute Change	Percent Change
With actual means	57,937			71,937		
Substituting						
White initial minority comp.	60,705	2,768	4.8	88,055	16,118	22.4
+ White initial poverty comp.	65,395	7,458	12.9	101,811	29,874	41.5
+ White change in minority comp.	67,008	9,071	15.7	103,811	31,874	44.3
+ White change in poverty comp.	69,641	11,704	20.2	107,090	35,153	48.9
+ White housing characteristics	69,181	11,244	19.4	109,777	37,840	52.6
+ White controls	90,034	32,097	55.4	130,094	58,157	80.8

Once again, the effect of Hispanic neighborhood change on appreciation differs dramatically from blacks. When first introduced in model 3, both small (0 to 5 percentage point) and larger (greater than 5 percentage point) increases in Hispanic population are associated with *higher* housing appreciation — the exact opposite pattern than for blacks. Moreover, controlling for changes in poverty composition only serves to accentuate this effect. However, when we introduce the percent foreign born and housing characteristics this effect is completely eliminated and change in Hispanic population no longer affects housing appreciation. I argue that the ongoing steady growth in the Hispanic immigrant population uniquely affects their housing appreciation, creating a situation of high demand for housing in and around Hispanic areas of settlement. This high demand for housing raises prices, at least in the short term, and leads to higher housing returns to homeowners in these areas. This interpretation is supported by the strong positive effect of percent foreign born on housing appreciation. Thus while Hispanic concentration in and of itself undermines appreciation (as evinced by the negative association between appreciation and Hispanic concentration at the time of purchase), the large number of foreign born in areas with growing Hispanic populations leads to rising home values in those areas.

Change in poverty composition also exerts a strong influence on housing appreciation. Neighborhoods in which the poverty population decreases in relative size experience greater appreciation (although the effect is only marginally significant in the final model), while those that increase in poverty population experience markedly lower levels of appreciation. Moreover, the negative effect of increasing neighborhood poverty is not reduced when differences in housing characteristics are taken into account.

And finally, housing stock characteristics also influence housing appreciation. A high proportion of vacant units depresses appreciation, while a greater preponderance of larger (i.e., greater than 6 rooms) units increases appreciation, net of other factors. The proportion of housing units that are relatively old (i.e., built before 1940) does not exert a significant effect on housing appreciation once population characteristics and purchase price are taken into account.

SIMULATION OF EFFECT OF INEQUALITY IN APPRECIATION ON MINORITY HOUSING WEALTH

These results clearly establish that neighborhood minority composition exerts a large effect on housing appreciation, both directly at high levels of concentration and indirectly through the association between minority and poverty compositions. Thus the fact that black and Hispanic pre-retirement adults are much more likely to reside in neighborhoods with sizeable minority populations is likely an important source of racial and ethnic inequality in housing equity. To address this issue, I next estimate the effect of disparate neighborhood experiences on inequality in housing wealth by simulating how much higher black and Hispanic current home values would be if they lived in neighborhoods comparable to those of whites.¹⁵ Results, reported in Table 6, show that if the average black (Hispanic) HRS respondents lived in the same neighborhoods as the average white HRS respondent, their home would be worth \$24,500 (\$59,300) more in 1992 than if they lived in the typical black (Hispanic) neighborhood. This would represent a 39% and 76% increase in current home values for blacks and Hispanics, respectively.¹⁶

Thus the concentration of pre-retirement minorities in communities that are segregated and that undergo greater change in poverty and minority composition over time dramatically undermines their housing appreciation. Previous research demonstrates that segregation also increases the level of neighborhood poverty experienced by blacks and Hispanics, independent of household income and resource characteristics (Krivo et al. 1998; Massey 1983). Table 6 demonstrates the negative effect of this increased contact with poverty on appreciation.

Conclusions

This article applies hedonic price analysis of data from the HRS and 1970, 1980, and 1990 census to address three fundamental questions: do homes in integrated and predominantly minority neighborhoods experience lower appreciation than comparable homes in predominantly white communities; if so, can differences be explained by nonracial socioeconomic and housing

structure differences across neighborhoods; and how do the effects of neighborhood composition differ between blacks and Hispanics?

I find clear evidence that for both blacks and Hispanics, high levels of neighborhood minority concentration undermine housing appreciation. While controlling for differences across neighborhoods in socioeconomic and housing stock characteristics eliminates the negative effects of integrated neighborhoods relative to all-white neighborhoods, highly segregated minority neighborhoods continue to experience lower price growth even net of these nonracial factors. Furthermore, I demonstrate the importance of change in neighborhood composition in addition to static levels. Increase in black neighborhood representation over time detracts from property value growth over and above its association with initial minority concentration and change in poverty composition.

Hispanics and blacks show both important similarities and major differences with respect to the effect of neighborhood composition on housing. Hispanic neighborhood concentration significantly depresses housing appreciation, suggesting that segregation is equally pernicious whether it involves blacks or Hispanics. The fact that Hispanic segregation tends to moderate with rising socioeconomic status to a greater extent than is the case for blacks does not seem to mitigate the deleterious effect of high Hispanic concentration on returns to housing investments. However, growth in Hispanic population over time, while at first seeming to increase appreciation, has no real effect on housing values once other factors associated with this demographic change are taken into account. A key element of Hispanic housing appreciation is the effect of immigration on price changes. Population pressures in areas of high immigrant settlement act to raise property values, which gives areas with a growing Hispanic population a substantial boost. Thus it seems that the 1990s for Hispanic neighborhoods are roughly analogous to the 1950s and 1960s for black neighborhoods, when the northern black population was growing rapidly, driving up prices in the ghetto and "transition" areas (Galster 1977; King & Mieszkowski 1973).

The effect of concentrated poverty on housing appreciation is large and robust, both in terms of initial poverty composition and change in poverty over time. Concentrated poverty has the largest deleterious impact on housing values of all the neighborhood characteristics considered, and explains a large part of neighborhood racial and ethnic inequality in appreciation. This has rather ominous implications if trends towards the concentration of poverty continue, particularly since it has a disparate effect on minority households (Jargowsky 1997). That residential segregation has a direct impact raising minority contact with neighborhood poverty (Krive et al. 1998; Massey & Denton 1993) indicates a kind of double jeopardy to minority housing wealth. Segregation depresses the returns to minority housing investments not only because racial composition per se affects housing appreciation, but also because

it increases poverty in minority neighborhoods, which further erodes housing values.

These findings have implications for a number of central issues of public policy concern. The contribution of segregation to racial and ethnic housing appreciation inequality suggests a very important and previously under-explored source of asset inequality. Racial and ethnic inequality in wealth is staggering — far larger than inequality in income (Oliver & Shapiro 1995; Smith 1995). Moreover, this disparity is far from explained by objective characteristics. For the vast majority of households, who lack significant financial investments, homeownership is the single most important form of investment. My results demonstrate that the lower appreciation of minority-owned homes costs them literally tens of thousands of dollars in housing equity, the adverse effects of which accumulate over the life course and contribute to the dramatically lower asset accumulation of minority families.

Unequal housing appreciation also contributes substantially to the intergenerational transmission of inequality. A recent study by Conley (1999) found that asset inequality was central to perpetuating racial inequality in education, occupation, and income. Several seemingly intractable differences between blacks and whites, ranging from educational deficits to welfare receipt and pre-marital childbearing, were eliminated when differences across groups in household wealth were accounted for. Residential segregation, by undermining wealth accumulation among minorities via lower housing returns, thus has a potentially large effect sustaining racial and ethnic inequality across generations.

The findings presented above also have implications for the pre-retirement population and inequality in aging. While the rising economic circumstances of the elderly relative to other age groups is one of the most championed public policy achievements of our time, these auspicious trends have not benefited all groups of elderly equally. Instead, racial and ethnic minorities continue to face a high risk of poverty in old age (Rendall & Speare 1993), a problem that will only intensify in coming decades as minorities' share among the elderly rises. A substantial body of research suggests that racial and ethnic inequality increases with age, as the effects of lower levels of education, poor employment prospects, and poor health accumulate over the life-course to heighten inequality and jeopardize the economic well-being of minority seniors (Crystal & Shea 1990; Henretta & O'Rand 1999). My findings suggest that unequal housing returns are another source of economic vulnerability for minority elders, and another source of widening inequality with age.

These results also portend serious challenges to Hispanic well-being, particularly among the elderly. Hispanics are exposed to less residential segregation and concentrated poverty than blacks and also conform more closely to status attainment and assimilation models of residential segregation. That is, their segregation from whites falls significantly as their socioeconomic

standing rises, which is not the case for blacks to nearly the same extent. This could lead one to expect that the effects of Hispanic segregation from whites would not be as severe as black segregation from whites. However, my results indicate that this is not the case. High levels of Hispanic concentration significantly undermine housing appreciation. This has ominous implications for the future well-being of Hispanic origin groups, whose rapid growth in the U.S. population suggests rising segregation in the years to come. These findings also bear directly on underclass research. While the favorable stereotypes enjoyed by Hispanics (particularly Mexicans) with respect to employment and relatively low rates of unemployment and non-participation bode well for Hispanic upward mobility, persistent inequality with whites with respect to wealth and housing could signal more deeply rooted, intractable sources of inequality.

And finally, these findings add another layer to the literature on neighborhoods and life-chances, highlighting the devastating effect of ghetto residence on housing wealth. Ghetto neighborhoods have long been a source of concern in the sociological literature for their pathological concentration of deprivation, marginalization, and isolation (Anderson 1990; Clark 1967; Hannerz 1969; Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1996, 1987). Characterized by social disorganization, a lack of social control, and an extreme dearth of mainstream opportunities for advancement, ghetto residence has a significant negative effect on a wide range of outcomes, including educational attainment, teenage childbearing, marriage formation and stability, occupational attainment, and health and mortality. This article documents yet another adverse impact of ghetto residence on the life-chances of its residents, namely the lower ability to accumulate wealth. Both high minority concentrations and concentrated neighborhood poverty exert a powerful negative impact on housing wealth. This represents yet another example of how structural conditions impede the ability of minority Americans to fulfill their aspirations, and suggests a bleak picture for many minority families who have been caught in the web of concentrating neighborhood poverty during the 1980s and 1990s.

The results presented above accent the need for improved policies to combat residential segregation. Even if blacks and Hispanics were to achieve full parity with whites with respect to education, occupation, and income, their disproportionate geographic concentration in poor and segregated communities would continue to undermine their wealth accumulation via lower housing appreciation. Further, my findings present cause for optimism with respect to the impact of integration on property values. It is commonly believed that integration results in an erosion of property values, which is one of the often-cited justifications given by whites for preferring racially homogeneous, white communities. However, my results clearly show that racially integrated communities do not differ significantly from all-white neighborhoods with respect to appreciation once socioeconomic and structural

considerations are taken into account. That ghetto-ization is extremely detrimental to property values while integration is not only serves to strengthen the case for more forceful implementation of anti-discrimination policies.

Notes

1. Three broad classes of variables have been shown to systematically affect housing appreciation: aggregate economic conditions, neighborhood conditions, and housing-unit specific characteristics. First, housing appreciation varies considerably across metropolitan areas and regions. Newer cities and those that experience faster population growth, particularly in higher income populations, enjoy higher housing appreciation than other cities (Kiel & Carson 1990; Manning 1986). In recent decades, West Coast and Northeastern regions have enjoyed greater real housing appreciation than other regions (Myers & Wolch 1995). Within metropolitan areas, neighborhood characteristics such as proximity to manufacturing, pollution, and crime all detract from the value of neighborhoods, while high quality schools and proximity to amenities such as coasts, parks, and recreation facilities can elevate price growth in a community (Phares 1971). Appreciation also tends to be lower in central city areas than in outlying suburban areas (Kiel & Carson 1990). And finally, characteristics of the housing units themselves, such as size and price range, also affect appreciation (Dale-Johnson & Phillips 1984; Kiel & Carson 1990; Oliver & Shapiro 1995).

2. Interestingly, these transition areas had lower rates of appreciation even before the onset of racial turnover. Phares concluded that when whites secede part of their territory, it is generally the lowest quality neighborhoods that are already not appreciating. Another possibility is that appreciation slows in anticipation of succession.

3. Of course, we cannot conclusively attribute all of the remaining differential to a pure discrimination effect, as neighborhoods also differ with respect to crime, school quality, and other factors which potentially affect desirability which are unmeasured in this analysis.

4. Overall, the HRS achieved a response rate of roughly 82%. Analysis of data from the Nonresponse Study, in which basic information was collected on households refusing to participate in the survey, suggests that non-responding households were more likely to be married, in good health, employed, white, and wealthy (Juster & Suzman 1995). Thus for a study of racial and ethnic inequality, the nonresponse bias is likely to result in a slight underestimation of inequality, as the more privileged were more likely to refuse to participate than the less privileged. For more information on the HRS, refer to the 1995 special issue of the *Journal of Human Resources*, volume 30.

5. Using this age group does raise concerns as to generalizability, however. For instance, lower residential mobility could potentially translate into preretirement adults living in slightly older neighborhoods than their younger peers. To evaluate the impact of using this sample on the generalizability of my findings, I compared the neighborhoods (Census tracts) included in the HRS with all Census tracts in the 1990 Census. In other words, I compared the HRS *sample* of neighborhoods to the *population* of neighborhoods from the 1990 Census. Results (available upon request) indicate remarkably few statistically

significant differences between HRS respondents' neighborhoods and those of the total population. In fact, the age distribution of HRS neighborhoods does not differ significantly from the total population of Census neighborhoods, strongly contradicting the idea that the age of HRS respondents results in atypical neighborhood characteristics. Those differences that are significant reflect the oversample of black and Hispanic households in the HRS survey, and are statistically controlled for in the analysis.

6. One important caveat to the Hispanic sample in the HRS is that it is not precisely nationally representative. Rather, the over-sampling technique focused on metropolitan areas with high Mexican origin settlement (primarily in the West and Southwest), and within those larger geographic areas, secondary sampling units of greater than 10 percent Hispanic population. Therefore, the Hispanic sample in the HRS is slightly biased in favor of Mexican-origin Hispanics living in areas of high Hispanic concentration.

7. The absence of information on the individual housing units is a definite shortcoming of the HRS, but one that is unfortunately endemic to data sets that contain both housing and neighborhood level information. I address this, to some extent, by controlling for whether the unit is in a multi-unit structure and for the average size and age of housing in the neighborhood. The latter variables act as rough proxies for the size and age of the respondents' home, since tracts tend to be somewhat homogeneous with respect to housing characteristics. Moreover, Harris (1999) compared data from the Annual Housing Survey and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and found that having few housing characteristics (i.e. whether the unit was single family, the number of rooms, and owner occupancy) did not significantly bias his estimates of racial inequality in housing values in the PSID.

8. For example, if Tract A is 5% black and located in a county that is 40% black in 1990, then the ratio of tract-to-county percent black is one-eighth. If the county was 30% black in 1980, then the imputed percent black in Tract A is one-eighth of 30%, or 3.8%.

9. Nonetheless, I performed diagnostic tests of this method of imputation, applying the procedure to tracts in which data is available in 1970 and 1980. The correlations of imputed and actual percent white, black, Hispanic, and poor were very high. Imputations for 1980 all have correlations of over .90, and those for 1970 are all above .80. It is likely that the accuracy of the actual imputed data is even higher, because areas that were not previously demarcated are more homogeneous, more similar to the racial composition of the county, and less likely to have changed over time than areas closer to central cities.

10. The current value of the home is self-assessed by the homeowner. Previous research has examined in depth whether such owner-reported values are systematically biased. Kain and Quigley's (1972) seminal work on the subject found that while owner-estimates are often inaccurate, they are not systematically biased. This conclusion was shared by Kiel & Carson (1990) and Goodman & Ittner (1992).

11. This procedure is outlined in more detail by Crone and Voith in their 1992 article evaluating different methods of estimating housing price appreciation.

12. Homeowner's race is not included in the model because it is highly colinear with neighborhood racial composition, particularly in predominantly minority communities.

13. Rather than arbitrarily defining uniform dummy categories of black, Hispanic, and poverty composition, I performed sensitivity tests to determine the best cutting-point for each group. I first broke the distribution of minority/poverty compositions into deciles and then regressed them on current housing values (controlling for other characteristics) to determine the optimal divisions.
14. Coate and Vanderhoff (1993) eliminated all those reporting appreciation or depreciation of greater than 50% per annum.
15. This is accomplished by substituting white neighborhood and housing means into the final model equation from Table 5.
16. Care should be taken when considering the size of the Hispanic estimates. Because the Hispanic sample in the HRS draws disproportionately from areas of high Hispanic concentration, these figures likely overstate the impact of segregation on the average Hispanic American's housing appreciation.

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
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Intergenerational Religious Dynamics and Adolescent Delinquency*

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Abstract

Integrating theories about religious influence, religious homogamy, and delinquency, this study examines religion's potential for both reducing and facilitating adolescent delinquency. Analyses of data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health show that the more religious mothers and their adolescent children are, the less often the children are delinquent; however, the effect of one's religiosity depends on the other. When either a mother or child is very religious and the other is not, the child's delinquency increases. Thus, religion can be cohesive when shared among family members, but when unshared, higher adolescent delinquency results. These findings shed light on how family religious dynamics shape well-being and more generally emphasize that the influence of religiosity depends on the social context in which it is experienced.

Sociological interest in the relationship between religion and crime has a long history extending back to Durkheim's ([1897] 1951) discussion of religion as an integrative force fostering social regulation and morality (also see Bainbridge 1989; Kvaraceus 1944; Lombroso 1911; Schur 1969). Studies of adolescent delinquency draw upon and extend Durkheim's interest in social integration by using social control theory, differential association theory, and/or ideas of cognitive dissonance to explain how religion discourages delinquency among adolescents (Baier & Wright 2001; Tittle & Welch 1983). Empirical evidence generally supports the idea that religiosity is a protective fac-

** This research is based on data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health project, a program project designed by J. Richard Udry and Peter Bearman and funded by Grant P01-HD31921 from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development at the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. We would like to thank Chris Knoester for feedback on earlier drafts of this article. The authors alone are responsible for any errors. Direct correspondence to Lisa D. Pearce, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Hamilton Hall—CB#3210, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3210. E-mail: ldpearce@unc.edu.*

tor. A recent review of the literature (Baier & Wright 2001) concludes that a consistently inverse relationship exists between religiosity and delinquency across studies, with the strength of the association varying by both the type of delinquency and the dimension of religiosity being examined (e.g., Benda & Corwyn 1997; Burkett 1980; Burkett & White 1974; Elifson, Peterson & Hadaway 1983; Stark, Kent & Doyle 1982). In particular, the religion-delinquency association is strongest when the focus is on nonvictim crimes such as delinquency and drug use and when a highly religious sample is selected (see Baier & Wright 2001 for a detailed discussion of these findings). In addition, studies conducted in more religious regions of the U.S. find stronger effects of religion (e.g., Stark 1996; Stark et al. 1982).

While these results and others suggest that religion, in certain contexts, is associated with greater social control and integration (Bainbridge 1989), religion can also, in some circumstances, serve as a source of conflict, and under these conditions, is associated with negative outcomes. For example, religious conflict between or within nations, often a result of differing religious affiliations and beliefs, can lead to violence and unrest (Basu 1995; Demerath 2001), religious conflict within congregations fosters tension and interpersonal struggles (Starke & Dyck 1996), and within families, religious dissimilarity can challenge marital and parent-child relationships (Glenn 1982; Heaton & Pratt 1990; Lehrer & Chiswick 1993; Ortega, Whitt & Williams 1998; Pearce & Axinn 1998). For these reasons, we argue that a full understanding of how religion influences adolescents' lives should go beyond examining how individual-level religious characteristics shape their behavior by also considering the religious characteristics of those around them and how they interact with one another. In other words, it is important to consider the religious nature of the contexts in which adolescents live, or the religious characteristics of those with whom they interact. For example, the research of Stark and colleagues (Stark 1996; Stark et al. 1982) demonstrate that the more religious a teen's community of residence is, the greater the influence of that youth's own religiosity on his/her behavior. We transfer these ideas to the family context and the kinds of religious processes at work intergenerationally. To do this, we draw upon prior work illustrating the influence of religious homogamy in families on other outcomes.

There is a substantial literature on marital religious homogamy demonstrating that when husbands and wives are similar with regards to religious affiliation, practice, and belief, they report greater personal well-being, more satisfaction with their marital relationships, less abuse in the relationship, and a lower likelihood of divorce (Chi & Houseknecht 1983; Glenn 1982; Heaton 1984; Heaton & Pratt 1990; Lehrer & Chiswick 1993). Ellison, Bartkowski & Anderson (1999) push theorizing about religious homogamy further by testing effects of the magnitude and direction of religious dissimilarity on domestic violence. Their findings indicate that when husbands are more theologically

conservative than their wives, they are more likely to act violently towards their wives, compared to husbands who are less conservative, or as conservative, as their wives. The general interpretation of these findings, as a whole, has been that religious differences among couples can lead to more opportunity for couples to disagree (especially when the differences are greater in magnitude and in certain directions), resulting in a greater likelihood of conflict and abuse among partners. In contrast, having the same religious affiliation, practices, or beliefs provides couples with a sense of shared experience that enhances their relationship (Ellison et al. 1999; Lehrer & Chiswick 1993).

Studying religious dynamics between parents and children, Rossi and Rossi (1990) find parents and children who report more similar values, including religious values, perceive greater affective closeness to one another. Pearce and Axinn (1998) find that when mothers and children differ in the importance they place on religion in their life, they report having lower quality relationships than those mother-child dyads who find religion similarly important or unimportant. Together, these studies suggest religion has the potential to be a shared aspect of life for family members, increasing social integration as Durkheim initially suggested. On the other hand, when family members differ in terms of religious identity, religion can be a source of conflict generating negative outcomes. This suggests that in understanding the influence a person's own religious identity has on his/her behavior, it is important to consider the religious identities of influential others, such as family members.

This study contributes to research on religious influence, determinants of adolescent delinquency, and general family well-being, by exploring how intergenerational religious dynamics influence adolescent delinquency. First, we weave a theoretical framework using theories about religious influence among adolescents, including effects of parental religious characteristics and religious dynamics within families, and delinquency. We then test a set of hypotheses drawn from this theoretical framework using a nationally representative, multiwave study of American adolescents. Most studies of religion and delinquency to date use cross-sectional data and correlate current religion measures to past delinquency measures (Baier & Wright 2001; Johnson et al. Li 2001; for an exception, see Regnerus 2003a), thus our analyses provide more accurate estimates of the effect of religiosity on subsequent delinquency.¹ Another benefit of these data for our study is the availability of information from both the adolescent and his/her mother about their own religiosity.² This allows us to explore their independent effects as well as how one is affected by the other. Our findings shed light on the role of family religious dynamics in preventing or facilitating delinquency among youth.

Theorizing the Relationship between Religion and Delinquency

ADOLESCENTS' OWN RELIGIOSITY AND DELINQUENCY

As outlined above, most research on religion and adolescent delinquency finds evidence of an inverse relationship between teens' own religiosity and their delinquency (Baier & Wright 2001). This evidence is generally considered to be in support of three well known theories of deviance. First, the differential association theory (Sutherland 1947) and a theoretical extension discussed as the social learning paradigm (Akers 1997) emphasize the influence that others have in teaching behavior that is either conducive or hindering to delinquency. From this perspective, religion and religious others (e.g., parents, clergy, peers, etc.) generally encourage law abiding behavior (Smith 2003). Second, strain theory predicts that when strain is reduced, adolescents are less likely to be delinquent (Agnew 1992) and religious involvement and salience provide social and coping skills that help them avoid and overcome common causes of strain in adolescence (Smith 2003). These two theories are not mutually exclusive, but together suggest multiple mechanisms for how religious involvement and salience may buffer adolescents from delinquent involvement.

A third theory of deviance often cited in work on religion and delinquency is social control theory. Social control theory predicts that interaction with others (peers and adults) reinforces moral norms and fosters social attachment (Coleman 1988; Grasmick, Bursik & Cochran 1991; Hirschi 1969; Liu, Ryan & Aurbach 1998; Stark & Bainbridge 1996). Religion is a social institution that facilitates social and intergenerational closure (Smith 2003); therefore, most studies have assumed that religiously involved teens will have more social closure in their lives making them less likely to be delinquent. Implicit in social control theory, however, is the idea that religious teens whose lives are embedded in religious social networks will be even more buffered from delinquent involvement. Supportive of this idea are the findings of Stark and his colleagues (Stark 1996; Stark et al. 1982) that living in a religious community increases the protective effect of religiosity on teen's delinquency. Because of the overall importance of family dynamics for adolescent well-being, we propose that the family might also be a context in which religious closure serves to reinforce an expectation of upstanding behavior and might provide a reduction in the strain common to adolescent lives.

INTERGENERATIONAL RELIGIOUS DYNAMICS AND DELINQUENCY

Until now, considerations of family religious influence in studies of deviance and other outcomes have mainly followed a model of intergenerational religious transmission assuming the influence of parental religiosity operates through children's own similar religiosity (Regnerus 2003a). While the correlation

between parental and child religiosity is significant, parents and children can disagree about religiosity (Rossi & Rossi 1990). Sociologists are increasingly recognizing that children are agents in their socialization and do not always agree with the beliefs and values their parents may wish them to inherit and youth may rebel against those beliefs and values parents are most adamant about fostering (Alanen 1990). In terms of religiosity, dissimilarity in religious practices and beliefs can introduce stress and tension within families, reduce intergenerational closure, and increase the chance that children will externalize this conflict in delinquent ways.

Given that agreement on religious matters could foster intergenerational closure while disagreement could promote tension and strain, studies should assess the relative impact of parents' and children's religious characteristics *and* conceptualize their effects as dependent on one another. For example, drawing on social control theory (Hirshi 1969), having a religious parent may reinforce the protective nature of religion if a child is religious, while a having a religious parent might lead to more conflict when a child is less religious, increasing the child's risk of subsequent delinquency. Though it is less common, if a child is very religious and his/her parent is not, there will also be opportunity for disagreement and a lack of closure that will lessen the protective power of that child's own religiosity on his/her delinquency. Finally, dyads in which both mother and child are *not* religious also have something in common, perhaps making the child in this dyad at lower risk for delinquency than if they disagreed over religion, but not lowering the risk more than those mother-child pairs who are similarly religious and, therefore, also have access to the protective power that religious participation itself provides.

In sum, we argue that it is useful to expand upon the work that has viewed marital religious heterogeneity as a source of conflict in families by examining the consequences of religious differences between parents and children on adolescent delinquency. This tells us more about religious dynamics within families and provides further insight into how religion impacts adolescent delinquency.

FAMILY WELL-BEING'S INTERMEDIARY ROLE

One way to understand the effect of family religious dynamics on delinquency is to view them as causes and/or consequences of general family well-being. For example, research has shown that children who are emotionally close to their parents are more likely to follow their parents' religious preferences and choices (Rossi & Rossi 1990; Sherkat & Wilson 1995). However, it is also likely that shared religious beliefs and practices bring family members closer together and increase the quantity and quality of their interactions (Regnerus 2003b). Either way, the association between religious solidarity and family well-being may help explain religion's connection to delinquency. Therefore, our study incorporates

some dimensions of family well-being in the analyses to determine whether certain dimensions of family well-being mediate the relationship between intergenerational religious dynamics and adolescent delinquency.

Hypotheses

Drawing upon the framework described above, we posit four hypotheses describing how mothers' and children's religious characteristics might independently and interactively affect adolescent delinquency.

Hypothesis 1: A mother's religiosity will be inversely related to her adolescent child's subsequent delinquency.

Hypothesis 2: A child's religiosity will be inversely related to his/her subsequent delinquency and will partially explain the effect of his/her mother's religiosity.

Hypothesis 3: The effect of a child's religiosity on his/her subsequent delinquency will depend on the level of his/her mother's religiosity (i.e., whether it is the same or different, in either direction).

Hypothesis 4: The total effects of family religious dynamics will be partly explained by their association with family well-being.

Data and Methods

To test our hypotheses regarding religion and adolescent delinquency, we use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health), a longitudinal study of American adolescents in grades 7 through 12. This study draws on two waves of in-home interviews conducted with adolescents in 1995 and 1996. In addition, parents were interviewed during the 1995 in-home survey administration and we use information on mothers' religiosity obtained during these interviews.

During the in-home phase, a random sample of adolescents attending schools in the original sampling frame³ were interviewed in depth about sensitive health-risk behaviors, including criminal activities, and their religious beliefs and practices. All sensitive questions, such as those eliciting delinquency and criminal involvement information, were asked using audio-casi technology in which adolescents listened to questions through earphones and entered their responses on a laptop computer. This approach reduces pressure to give socially desirable answers.

There are 12,314 adolescents who completed both wave 1 and wave 2 in-home interviews and had a parent interviewed in 1995. We further limit this sample to those adolescents for whom a biological, step, or adoptive mother

completed the parent interview, and for whom sampling weights are available, resulting in a sample of 10,444 adolescents and their mothers.⁴

Variables

To reduce problems associated with endogeneity, all measures of religious characteristics and control variables come from the data collected in 1995 (wave 1) and the dependent variable, delinquency involvement, is measured from data collected in 1996 (wave 2). To assure that the observed effects of religiosity on delinquency are not a result of previous religiosity influencing both wave 1 religiosity and wave 2 delinquency, we include the respondents' prior delinquency (measured at wave 1) as a control variable. Thus, we are essentially predicting change in delinquent behavior between waves 1 and 2 of the Add Health study and providing conservative estimates of the effect of religion on adolescent delinquency.⁵

We measure the dependent variable, delinquency involvement, with a commonly used index based on adolescents' self-reports of their participation in 14 different delinquency activities participated in during the past year.⁶ These 14 activities include: painted graffiti, damaged others' property, shoplifted, stole something worth less than \$50, stole something worth \$50 or more, burglarized, borrowed a car without the owner's permission, sold drugs, was involved in a serious physical fight, seriously injured another, used or threatened to use a weapon, participated in a group fight, pulled a knife/gun on someone, or shot/stabbed someone. Adolescents are asked to report how often in the past 12 months they have participated in these activities. Each response is coded 0 if the respondent reported not participating and 1 otherwise.⁷ With a Cronbach alpha of 0.83, the delinquency index has considerable internal consistency. Although the average delinquency level (wave 2) is 1.79, with considerable variation around this mean (std. dev. = 2.33), many adolescents report never participating (48%) in any delinquent activities. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for delinquency involvement as well as all other variables incorporated into subsequent analyses.

To assess the influence of mothers' and children's religiosity on children's delinquency, we create a two-item scale of religiosity by averaging responses to a question about frequency of religious service attendance and a question about the importance of religion. Regarding religious service attendance, mothers and children with a religious affiliation are asked: "In the past 12 months, how often did you attend religious services: once a week or more; once a month or more, but less than once a week; less than once a month; or never?" These four response choices are coded so that higher numbers equal more frequent attendance (0 = never). The importance of religion to both mothers and children is assessed by asking those with a religious affiliation: "How

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Analyses

	Survey Weighted Mean	Person- Weighted Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variable				
Delinquency index (wave 2, 1195)	1.79	2.33	0	14
Independent variables (all from wave 1, 1995)				
Mother's religious affiliation				
Black Protestant	.09	.28	0	1
Evangelical Protestant	.23	.42	0	1
Mainline Protestant	.26	.44	0	1
Catholic	.28	.45	0	1
Other religion	.07	.25	0	1
No religious affiliation	.07	.26	0	1
Mother's religiosity (attendance and importance averaged)	2.07	.91	0	3
Child's religiosity (attendance and importance averaged)	1.86	1.05	0	3
Child argued with mother in last week	.34	.47	0	1
Mother trusts child	4.31	.86	1	5
Family protective factors scale	4.05	.66	1	5
Delinquency index (wave 1, 1995)	1.37	2.33	0	14
Race/ethnicity				
Black	.14	.35	0	1
White	.68	.47	0	1
Other race/ethnicity	.18	.38	0	1
Age	14.93	1.61	11	21
Female	.50	.50	0	1
Parent's education (highest of the two)	6.19	2.12	0	9
Two-parent household	.77	.42	0	1
Region ^a				
South	.37	.48	0	1
Northeast	.14	.34	0	1
Midwest	.34	.47	0	1
West	.16	.37	0	1

(N = 10,444)

important is religion to you: very important, fairly important, fairly unimportant, or not important at all?” The four response choices are coded so that higher numbers represent more importance placed on religion (0 = no importance). Those who report no religious affiliation are not asked the

questions regarding attendance or importance, but are assigned a value of 0 for this variable in our models.⁸ To create an index of religiosity, we average the responses to the question on religious service attendance and importance. The resulting two-item scale has a Cronbach's Alpha of .75 for the mothers and .81 for the adolescents.⁹

Because religiosity and family religious dynamics may vary by religious affiliation, we include controls for mothers' religious affiliation in all models. Mothers are asked, "What is your religion?" Their responses are coded into dummy variables representing black Protestant, Evangelical Protestant, Mainline Protestant, Catholic, other religion, and no religious affiliation following the coding scheme described by Steensland and colleagues (2000).

Previously, we discussed the possibility that family well-being might mediate some of the effect of mothers' and childrens' religiosity, as well as the interaction of the two, on adolescent delinquency. In our models, we test for evidence of this mediation with three different measures. The first is a measure of whether or not the child reports having a "serious argument" with their mother in the last week (0 = no, 1 = yes). The second is a measure of how often a mother feels she can "really trust" her child (coded 1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always). Third, we code a set of variables by averaging adolescents' answers to the following four questions: "How much do your parents care about you?," "How much do you feel that people in your family understand you?," "How much do you feel that you and your family have fun together?," and "How much do you feel that your family pays attention to you?" These 4 items have a Cronbach's alpha of .75 and we call this a scale of family protective factors.

Because both the measures of family well-being and the measures of religious characteristics are from wave 1 data, we are unable to determine the causal nature of their relationship to one another. However, regardless of which came first (religion effects or family well-being effects), we are interested in whether the association between these variables explains some of the relationship between intergenerational religious dynamics and adolescent delinquency. That is, we do not attempt to specify the causal ordering of their effects, but rather to determine whether or not intergenerational religious dynamics and family well-being have statistically independent effects on subsequent delinquency.

In all analyses we include controls for demographic variables commonly associated with delinquency including adolescents' race, age, gender, parent's educational level, family structure, and geographical region of the country. Race is represented with dichotomous variables that indicate whether the adolescent is African American, non-Hispanic white, or another race (1 = yes, 0 = otherwise in each race category). The adolescent's age is measured in years calculated from birth date information. Gender is represented with a dichotomous variable (0 = male). Parent's educational level is calculated for the parent with

TABLE 2: Negative Binomial Regression Models Estimating Effects of Mother's and Children's Religious Characteristics on Adolescent Delinquency

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Mother's religiosity (Attendance and importance averaged)	-.09** (.03)		-.06** (.04)	.06 (.04)	.06 (.04)
Child's religiosity (Attendance and importance averaged)		-.06** (.02)	-.04 (.03)	-.09* (.04)	-.09** (.04)
Mother-child religiosity interaction (Mother's religiosity \times child's religiosity)				-.07*** (.02)	-.05*** (.02)
Mother's religious affiliation					
Black Protestant	.08 (.11)	-.02 (.10)	.07 (.11)	-.04 (.11)	-.01 (.11)
Evangelical Protestant	.03 (.10)	-.08 (.09)	.02 (.10)	-.09 (.10)	-.07 (.10)
Mainline Protestant	.07 (.09)	-.04 (.08)	.06 (.10)	-.06 (.10)	-.04 (.09)
Catholic	.06 (.10)	-.05 (.08)	.05 (.10)	-.05 (.10)	-.03 (.10)
Other religion	.08 (.11)	-.03 (.09)	.07 (.11)	-.04 (.11)	-.03 (.10)
Child argued with mother in last week					.16*** (.04)
Mother trusts child					.10*** (.02)
Family protective factors scale					-.14*** (.03)
Delinquency at wave 1 (1995)	.28*** (.01)	.27*** (.01)	.27*** (.01)	.27*** (.01)	.25*** (.01)
Race/ethnicity					
Black	.00 (.07)	.01 (.07)	.01 (.07)	.01 (.07)	.01 (.07)
Other race/ethnicity	.18*** (.06)	.18** (.06)	.19** (.06)	.18** (.06)	.18** (.06)
Age	-.07*** (.01)	-.08*** (.01)	-.08*** (.01)	-.08*** (.01)	-.09*** (.01)
Female	-.34*** (.04)	-.33*** (.04)	-.33*** (.04)	-.33*** (8.64)	-.37*** (.04)
Parent's education	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.01)
Two parent household	-.05 (.04)	-.05 (.04)	-.06 (.04)	-.06 (.01)	-.05 (.04)

TABLE 2: Negative Binomial Regression Models Estimating Effects of Mother’s and Children’s Religious Characteristics on Adolescent Delinquency (Cont’d)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Region ^a					
South	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.02 (.06)	-.03 (.04)	-.02 (.05)
Northeast	.12* (.07)	.12* (.07)	.11* (.07)	.11* (.07)	.13* (.07)
Midwest	.10* (.06)	.10* (.06)	.10* (.06)	.09* (.06)	.10* (.06)
Intercept	1.07	1.08	1.07	1.07	1.04
Log-likelihood	-15577.43	-15570.83	-15568.08	-15563.08	-15497.77
(N = 10,444)					

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors,
^a Reference group is mothers with no religious affiliation
^b Reference group is white
^c Reference group is West

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001 (one-tailed test)

the highest level of education (if mothers provided spousal information), with codes ranging from 0 = no formal education to 9 = graduate degree.¹⁰ Family structure is measured with a dichotomous variable that assesses whether the adolescent lives in a household with two married parents (including step-parents) at the time of the first interview (1 = two-parent family, 0 otherwise).¹¹ Last, we include dummy variables identifying in which region of the country the adolescent resides (West, South, Northeast, Midwest).¹² Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our analytical sample, incorporating survey weights, and indicates that our sample is fairly representative of the U.S. adolescent population.

Method of Analysis

To understand the links between religion and delinquency, we test our four hypotheses in the order that they are presented. Because of the unusual distribution of the delinquency index, with 0 being the most commonly reported value and a minority of adolescents reporting involvement in a large number of delinquent acts, the normality assumption of OLS cannot be approximated, even with a mathematical transformation (such as logging the

index). Negative binomial regression offers a more suitable technique because it is designed to handle continuous variables with distributions containing many zero values and large positive skews.¹³ In the negative binomial model, $u = \exp(\beta_j)$, which indicates that a one-unit increase in X_{ij} multiplies the expected delinquency index by a factor of $\exp(\beta_j)$ and conversely, a one-unit decrease divides the expected index by the same amount (Gardner, Mulvey & Shaw 1995). Therefore, coefficients in these models are easy to interpret by exponentiating the parameter estimates, subtracting one and multiplying this result by one hundred ($[e^\beta - 1] * 100$) which corresponds to the predicted percentage increase [or decrease] in the delinquency index for a unit increase in a given independent variable (see also Haynie, 2003 for a similar application of negative binomial regression estimation).

Because standard negative binomial models assume that regression coefficients are fixed between groups and error terms are not correlated, these models are inadequate for complex sampling designs in which individuals are nested within a larger macro unit (here schools) (Goldstein 1987; Lee & Bryk 1989; Raudenbush & Bryk 1986). Due to the clustering of the data and the correlated error structure resulting from the Add Health sampling design, statistical techniques that can correct for design effects and unequal probability of selections are necessary to achieve unbiased parameter estimates (Chantala & Tabor 1999). Therefore, all of our analyses incorporate survey weights that account for the stratified sample design. In addition we incorporate person-level weights allowing sample totals to serve as estimates of population totals. The software package STATA is used for all analyses. For our multivariate analyses we employ the STATA procedure, *svylogit*, a survey-based negative binomial regression procedure available in STATA version 8.

Results

THE INFLUENCE OF MOTHER'S AND CHILD'S RELIGIOSITY

Table 2 presents the results from negative binomial regressions estimating the effects of mother's and child's religiosity (both independently and interactively) on the teenage child's subsequent delinquency. In model 1 of Table 2, we find a negative and statistically significant effect of mother's religiosity, indicating that the more religious a mother is, the less delinquent her child is. Specifically, our model suggests that each unit increase in mothers' religiosity is associated with a 9% decline in her child's subsequent delinquency ($[\exp(-.09) - 1] \times 100$).

In model 2, we examine whether there is an effect of an adolescent's own religiosity on delinquency and find a statistically significant negative effect. Each increase in level of religiosity is associated with a 6% reduction in delinquency


($[\exp(-.06) - 1] \times 100$). To evaluate whether there are independent effects of mothers' and children's religiosity, we include them together in model 3. Here we find that the effect of mother's religiosity remains statistically significant, but the effect of the child's own religiosity does not. This is most likely due to the moderately high correlation between the two variables ($r = .60$), representing the intergenerational pathway of influence that we described earlier through which mothers socialize their children by teaching them about their own religious beliefs and practices that translate into the child's own practices and beliefs.

Beyond this intergenerational transmission model, we also hypothesized that when transmission does not occur and children differ from their mothers in religiosity, conflict may ensue and delinquency could become more likely. This effect would be revealed in a significant negative coefficient for the interaction term that multiplies the mother's and child's religiosity scores together.¹⁴ These results are reported in model 4 where we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the interaction term. Figure 1 illustrates the translation of this interaction term for the various categories of mother's and child's religiosity. Not surprisingly, the lowest risk for delinquency occurs for those adolescents who are highly religious themselves and have highly religious mothers. The highest risk for delinquency comes when a child is not religious but has a very religious mother or when the child is very religious and the mother is not. Risk of delinquency is relatively low for mother-child dyads that are similarly nonreligious. Indeed, nonreligious adolescents with similarly nonreligious mothers have lower risks of delinquency than adolescents who report being religious, but who have mothers reporting they are not religious, suggesting that the effect of mother-child religious homogamy is at least as important as the effect of an adolescent's own religiosity on their subsequent delinquency. In sum, religious influence is very different for adolescents depending on the context in which it is experienced. When adolescents are religiously similar to their mothers, especially at the highest levels, they are less likely to be delinquent than when their religiosity is at odds with their mother's religiosity (in either direction).

FAMILY-WELL BEING'S ROLE IN EXPLAINING THESE RESULTS

Our final hypothesis suggested that religious dissimilarity may affect delinquency because it potentially increases parent-child conflict and weakens family relationships. We examine this possibility by incorporating three measures of family well-being into model 5. The results provide evidence that the more often a child reports arguing with his/her mother, the greater the risk of delinquency. In contrast, the more a mother trusts her child and the higher a family scores on the protective factors scale, the less delinquent the child is. However, incorporating these dimensions of family well-being does

FIGURE 1: Predicted Delinquency Scores by Mother's Religiosity for Each Level of Teen's Religiosity



little to mediate the effects of intergenerational religious dynamics on delinquency. While there is a trivial decrease in the coefficient for the interaction between mothers' and child's religiosity, it remains statistically significant indicating that family well-being (as measured in these analyses) is unable to account for the effect of dissonance in mother-child religiosity on subsequent delinquency.

Conclusion

Using a nationally representative sample of adolescents and their mothers interviewed at two points in time, our results indicate that mother's and children's religiosity are both inversely related with children's subsequent delinquency *when* they are similarly religious. When mother and child are religiously different, children are likely to be more delinquent than children who share religious practices and beliefs with their mothers. This adds to the mounting evidence revealing religion to be an influential force in adolescent's lives and advances our thinking about this influence by showing the importance of conceptualizing religious influence within a family context. Most importantly, this study recognizes that the family context can be both integrative and divisive.

To more carefully evaluate how religious dynamics between mothers and children influence adolescent delinquency, we examine the role family well-being plays in these relationships. While family well-being is associated with delinquency, we find little evidence that these factors are the primary mechanisms for the religiosity effect or the effect of mother-child religious dissimilarity. Perhaps there are other dimensions of family well-being that could further help to explain what stems from, or causes, religious similarity and/or difference within families. For example, religious similarity may be important because it brings about the type of parent-child closure described in social control and differential association theories, and perhaps this closure is necessary to provide adolescent religiosity its protective power through dimensions such as moral order, learned competencies, and social and organizational ties (Smith 2003).

While our study is novel in its approach to examining the effects of mothers' and children's religiosity on adolescent delinquency, we are unable to evaluate the influence of fathers' religiosity on adolescent behavior. Future research should continue to explore the effects of family religious context by studying whether the effects of father's and children's religiosity also depend on one another. Further, the protection provided by family religious solidarity may be strongest when mother and father (if both are active in the child's life) are similarly religious, compared to when the parents are religiously different. Sibling similarities and differences could also play a role.

Beyond the family context, other contexts of adolescents' lives are also likely to condition the effect of religiosity in their lives. Stark and colleagues (Stark 1996; Stark et al. 1982) find that community religious context conditions the effect of religiosity. Perhaps neighborhood context, school context, or peer networks (see Haynie, 2001) also shape the influence that a teen's religious beliefs and practices have in their life. For example, adolescent religiosity is likely to be more protective when adolescents have friends who share similar beliefs and values, and to induce the strain and negative stimuli that lead to

delinquency when they do not. Future research should continue to explore the multiple contexts of adolescents' lives to deepen our understanding of religion's influence on their behaviors.

Our findings suggest that the influence of an adolescent's own religiosity on his/her participation in delinquent acts depends on how religious (or not religious) his/her mother is, which furthers the study of how religion affects delinquency. More broadly, these findings contribute to studies of religious influence on a variety of outcomes across the life course by demonstrating the importance of conceptualizing religious influence within a social context. Individuals are embedded in larger social structures, and for adolescents, it is critical to incorporate the family structure to decipher the ways in which religiosity shapes delinquency. In addition, studies of family well-being might benefit from incorporating family religious dynamics in models predicting other family and child outcomes such as intergenerational support and exchange or children's self-esteem.

Notes

1. The relationship between religion and delinquency may also operate in a reverse direction. It is possible that delinquency leads to lower religiosity (Benda 1997; Jang & Smith 1997; Johnson et al. 2001). We have tried to limit some of the reciprocal effects with our modeling strategies, but it is beyond the scope of this analysis to untangle the complicated reciprocal relationship between religion and delinquency.

2. We recognize the importance of fathers' or other family members' religious characteristics in adolescents' lives as well. However, in the data we are using, only one parent was interviewed and in 90% of the cases, the parent interviewed was a mother. Therefore, we have limited the sample to adolescents whose mothers were interviewed. We theorize generally about parents' roles in the family and how parent and child religious characteristics might influence delinquency, however our hypotheses and analyses focus on the mother-child relationship.

3. The primary sampling frame for Add Health was derived from the Quality Education Database, although Add Health added a stratified sample of 80 high schools to this sampling frame. Schools were stratified by region, urbanicity, school type (public, private, parochial), ethnic mix, and size. Schools varied in size from less than 100 to more than 3,000 students. The Add Health sample includes private, religious, and public schools located in rural, suburban, and urban areas of the country (see Bearman, Jones & Udry 1997 for more data details).

4. When comparing the sample of teens who completed in-home interviews at wave 1 and wave 2 and had a parent also complete a wave 1 interview to our restricted sample (made up of those cases where the parent respondent was a biological, step, or adoptive mother and for which none of the variables we use in analyses contain missing data), we find several minor but statistically significant differences. Within our subsample, the teens' most educated parents have an average of a half year more total education and 76% of the teens live with two parents at the time of the wave 1 interview compared to

68% of the unrestricted sample teens. These differences in parental education and family structure suggest we should take caution in interpreting our results, especially in contexts where parental education is low and when teens are living in single-parent homes.

5. We repeated all of our analyses using the wave 1 independent variables to predict wave 1 delinquency. Although findings indicated a stronger religiosity-delinquency association in the cross-sectional analyses, all substantive findings were replicated. Therefore, we present the more conservative longitudinal analyses here, as they give more reliable evidence that religiosity at one point in time is influencing subsequent delinquency.

6. Short and Nye (1958) introduced the self-report method of measuring delinquency. Subsequent work has established that adolescents do report their delinquent behavior, these reports tend to be internally consistent, and the reports relate to differences in official delinquency status and to other differences predicted by research and theory (Hindelang, Hirschi & Weis 1980).

7. Other analyses were carried out separately with responses to each delinquency item coded on the original ordinal scale (0 = never participating, to, 3 = participating 5 or more times) and with separate property and violent indices. Findings from these additional analyses closely dovetail those presented here for the overall delinquency involvement.

8. All parent and child respondents of the Add Health survey who gave no religious affiliation were skipped past all other religion questions. Based on descriptive analyses of the nationally representative General Social Surveys showing very low averages of church attendance and importance of religion for those with no religious affiliation, we assigned these respondents the lowest value in each category. We also conducted similar analyses on a restricted sample where all cases that had either a parent or child response of "no religious affiliation" were deleted from the analyses. The results obtained were virtually identical to the results we present in this article using the full sample.

9. In analyses not presented here, we also tested the direct and interactive effects of mothers' and children's religious service attendance and importance separately and the results are parallel to those presented here for the index of religiosity. To save space and avoid repetition, in this article we are presenting the results of analyses using the index of religiosity instead of separate measures for attendance and importance.

10. We also considered including a measure representing family income as reported by the mother. However, the high proportion of missing data on this indicator of family socioeconomic status suggested that inclusion of income could potentially bias our sample selection (due to missing cases) or bias the estimate of family income (using a multiple imputation procedure).

11. We assessed the influence of more detailed measures of family structure using categories for two married biological parents, one biological and one step-parent families, single-parent families, and a residual category capturing other family structures. Results from these analyses indicated that residing in a household with two married parents offered the greatest protective effect in terms of association with a reduction in self-reported adolescent delinquency. No significant differences were found among the other family structures.

12. Because prior research suggested that the religion-delinquency association is weakest in the western region of the U.S., we tested interactions between religion and the West

dummy variable in all models. These interaction terms were consistently insignificant and therefore were dropped from final models.

13. The negative binomial model differs from Poisson regression by the addition of a residual variance parameter that captures overdispersion in the dependent variable (which occurs when the standard deviation is greater than the mean). This overdispersion parameter accounts for unexplained variation among cases reflecting differences associated with unobserved predictors (Gardner, Mulvey & Shaw 1995).

14. Following Pearce and Axinn (1998), we initially tested the effect of a dummy variable measuring whether the mother and child had similar levels of religiosity, but on the advice of an anonymous reviewer we decided to measure the difference in a way that specified which member of the dyad had higher or lower religiosity if they did not match. Following Ellison et al.'s (1999) work on spousal religious homogamy, we coded dummy variables for mother-child dyads in which the mother was much more religious, a little more religious, the same, a little less religious, and a lot less religious than her child. While these results were interesting, they prevented us from distinguishing how much of the effect of a given dummy was a result of the homogamy (or dissimilarity) versus what part of the effect came from one or both of the individuals being religious. Taking all of this into consideration, we felt the best analytical strategy would be to use interaction effects telling us what the effect of an adolescent's religiosity might be for each level of what a mother's religiosity might be. This gives us more information about all the possible combinations of levels of mothers' and children's religiosity.

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To Help or To Harm? Food Stamp Receipt and Mortality Risk Prior to the 1996 Welfare Reform Act*

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Abstract

We use data from the National Health Interview Survey-Family Resources Supplement to examine the relationship between Food Stamp receipt and prospective adult mortality, among eligible households. We specify a switching probit model to adjust for observed and unobserved factors that correlate with selection into the Food Stamp Program and mortality, and to estimate mortality under counterfactual conditions that we do not observe. The average individual, based on observed characteristics, has higher mortality when participating than when not participating. But due to unobserved differences between participants and nonparticipants, those who self-select into participation experience lower mortality than if they did not participate. Our findings suggest that Food Stamps provide an important safety net that protects the health of those who are most likely to participate.

There are clear relationships between socioeconomic status (SES) and health and mortality outcomes: higher levels of income, education, and wealth; diverse income and wealth portfolios; home ownership; and an absence of credit card

** We acknowledge support from the National Science Foundation (grants SES-9906145, SES-9906080, and SES-0221093) and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (grant 1 R03 HS013996-01), and thank the National Center for Health Statistics for assembling the data herein. Earlier drafts of this article have greatly benefited from insightful comments from Laura Argys, Charles Becker, Jens Ludwig, Fred Pampel, Andrei Rogers, Rachel Silvey, Jay Teachman, Erin Trapp, and two anonymous reviewers, as well as presentation at the 2001 meetings of the American Sociological Association and the 2002 meetings of the Population Association of America. Finally, this manuscript presents the perspectives of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of any other organization, including the World Bank. Direct correspondence to Patrick M. Krueger, University of Colorado, Population Program, Institute of Behavioral Science, Campus Box 484, Boulder, CO, 80309-0484. E-mail: krueger@colorado.edu.*

debt consistently predict better health and lower mortality (Bond Huie et al. 2003; Drentea & Lavrakas 2000; Krueger et al. 2003; Robert & House 1996). But the associations between poverty-related aid and mortality among individuals who have limited access to other socioeconomic resources are unclear. Food Stamps are paradoxical when compared to more commonly studied forms of material well-being. On one hand, Food Stamp receipt indicates impoverishment, which often results in higher mortality risks (Adler et al. 1994; Rogers et al. 2000, 2004). On the other hand, Food Stamps may provide access to better nutrition and a buffer against economic shocks (Jencks 1992; U.S. House 1996) — factors that garner lower mortality risks. Although prior research has examined relationships between government aid and welfare dependency, fertility among teenage or single mothers, infant health, or labor supply, we instead evaluate the impact of the Food Stamp Program on adult mortality. Food Stamps are a central but understudied dimension of low SES, which may have important implications for understanding poverty, government aid programs, and ultimately, the health and mortality of our population.

Food Stamps and Mortality

The Food Stamp Program is a significant government program that redistributed roughly \$23.7 billion in means-tested aid and serviced nearly 27.5 million individuals in 1994 (Committee on Ways and Means 1996), roughly the period we examine here. Prior to the 1996 welfare reform act, the Food Stamp Program was administered according to national standards, rather than at the state level as with Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), making national level analyses more straightforward (U.S. House 1996). Food Stamps are a kind of noncash or “in-kind” aid, where participating households receive vouchers that they can use to purchase food. Households are defined as groups of individuals that share the purchase and preparation of their meals, and the requirements for participation are based on household rather than individual characteristics. Further, the structure of the Food Stamp Program entails different work, income, and health requirements for households headed by individuals aged 18 to 59 than for households headed by individuals aged 60 and older.

Selection bias potentially complicates any straightforward evaluation of the relationship between Food Stamps and mortality. Not all eligible individuals actually participate in the Food Stamp Program and participants often differ from nonparticipants in important ways (Blank & Ruggles 1996; Coe & Hill 1998; Daponte et al. 1999; Hirschl & Rank 1991). If individuals nonrandomly decide to participate based on characteristics that are unobserved by the researcher and if those unobserved characteristics correlate with the indepen-

dent and dependent variables, then models failing to account for selection would produce both biased and inefficient estimates — a problem akin to omitted variable bias (Heckman 1979). We specify a switching probit model that enables us to limit selection bias by simultaneously estimating selection into participation and then mortality risk for both participants and nonparticipants, while controlling for both observed and unobserved characteristics (Aakvik et al. 2000; Ridao-Cano 2002; Winship & Mare 1992). The switching model is more flexible than Heckman's (1979) two-stage modeling procedure and it provides both unbiased and efficient estimates. Further, some research suggests that local administrators may have discretion when selecting who, among interested and eligible individuals, will be allowed to participate. Although our data cannot address this process directly, it is worth noting, and we discuss it further in the methods and conclusions sections.

THEORETICAL LINKS

Various theoretical perspectives suggest that participation in the Food Stamp Program might have a positive, negative, or null relationship with adult mortality risk. Some research has found that means-tested aid, including Food Stamps, often predicts either negligible or harmful effects on the health for infants, children, and adults (Gibson 2001; Mayer & Jencks 1989; Rodriguez 2001; Smith & Kington 1997), although higher amounts of aid may ameliorate that negative impact (Cramer 1995). These authors note the importance of controlling for selection bias, but fail to specify their models accordingly.

Participation in the Food Stamp Program may lead to lower risks of premature mortality by providing a "safety net" for impoverished households (Jencks 1992), through two pathways. First, Food Stamps may directly impact health by assuring that some portion of income is spent on an adequate diet, a fundamental aim of the program itself (U.S. House 1996). Participants typically spend more on food than eligible but nonparticipating individuals, although they usually increase spending less than the total amount of aid received (Basiotis et al. 1987, 1998; Whitmore 2002). Participants may allocate more resources toward purchasing higher quality food when receiving Food Stamp vouchers than if they received cash benefits, whereupon they might skimp on food to purchase other goods (Wilde and Ranney 1996).

Second, the safety net provided by Food Stamps may diminish mortality risks by offering access to additional financial resources in times of need. Although Food Stamp aid cannot be used to purchase education or health care, it provides access to adequate nutrition, a necessity of daily life, while making other money available for alternate requirements. An additional source of aid may allow participants to purchase food while simultaneously allocating other earnings to health care, education, job training, or simply paying bills and reducing stress, all factors that might improve health (Grossman 1972; Link &

Phelan 1995). Further, unneeded vouchers might be sold or traded in underground markets to supplement household resources (Whitmore 2002). Access to a diverse array of socioeconomic resources often protects against poor health and premature mortality as individuals may be more resilient against the loss of any single resource and can substitute one for another in times of need (Adler et al. 1994; Bond Huie et al. 2003; Dreteia & Lavrakas 2000; Krueger et al. 2003; Robert & House 1996).

Participation in the Food Stamp Program, however, might lead to higher risks of mortality over time through three mechanisms. First, participating individuals might more likely work in lower quality jobs, work fewer hours, or remain unemployed than nonparticipants. The structure of the Food Stamp Program might entail a labor force disincentive where individuals may forgo an additional dollar of work income rather than reduce their level of aid (Caniglia 1996; Fraker & Moffitt 1988; Moffitt 1992). Or, high quality jobs may be unavailable (Hirschl & Rank 1991; Kodras 1986). In either case, participants may be "underemployed" and lack certain benefits of full-time, high quality work including regular and reliable income, social networks that support healthy activities, and more complete health insurance coverage (Clogg et al. 1990; Kim & Mergoupis 1997; Seccombe & Amey 1995). Thus, participants may forgo the "healthy worker" benefits that derive from high quality jobs, buffer against material hardship, and lead to lower mortality (Mayer & Jenks 1989; Monson 1986; Rogers et al. 2000, 2004).

Second, stigma prohibits many individuals from participating (Coe & Hill 1998) and once participating, individuals often try to mitigate that stigma by concealing the receipt of aid from their friends, families, or employers, or visiting government offices in neighborhoods unfrequented by their peers (Francis-Okongwu 1996). Stigmatized individuals may experience a sense of shame from failing to meet social ideals, and might have lower life chances due to differential treatment by nonstigmatized individuals (Goffman 1963). Further, participation may be stressful as it often entails a great deal of paperwork, the intrusion of government workers into one's personal life, and grappling with formalities associated with large federal bureaucracies (Coe & Hill 1998). This stigma and stress may not only provide a disincentive for participation, but might also lead to lower self-esteem, a diminished sense of control over one's life, engagement in risky behaviors including smoking, drinking, or drug use, and ultimately adverse health and mortality outcomes among participants (Adler et al. 1994; Anderson & Armstead 1995).

Third, participation may lead to higher mortality if individuals purchase food that is easier or faster to prepare, but nutritionally poor (Silberberg 1985). This may be most salient for participants who receive more Food Stamp aid than they might otherwise spend for food, as Food Stamps can less easily be substituted for nonfood items than other forms of income (Southworth 1945). In such a situation, individuals may allocate their aid toward more expensive

but highly processed food, rather than more nutritious grains or fresh fruits and vegetables (Butler & Raymond 1996; Whitmore 2002).

Finally, the null hypothesis is implicit in this theoretical formulation: participation in the Food Stamp Program may have no relationship with mortality risk. Although participation may provide a safety-net by enhancing nutrition or material means, these benefits may not be substantial enough to result in lower mortality. Alternately, the stigma and stress, poor quality jobs, or poorer nutrition among participants may not effectively increase mortality.

We examine mortality risk as it accurately reflects the importance of advantage and disadvantage in our society (Rogers et al. 2000, 2004). Mortality may be less sensitive to material well-being than other health indicators, but it is a salient, policy relevant, and in this case, theoretically appropriate measure of the significance of Food Stamps for our population. Although poor nutrition or health degradation might be of slight importance over the course of individuals' lives, especially if they later return to better health, mortality more clearly captures the extreme consequences associated with material disadvantage.

HYPOTHESES

In sum, participation in the Food Stamp Program may have a positive, negative, or no relationship with mortality. A negative relationship would indicate that Food Stamps function as a safety net and shield participants against mortality by providing an additional source of material aid or by enhancing nutrition. A positive relationship with mortality could indicate that participation is costly, either in terms of lower quality employment, stigma and stress, or the purchase of less healthy food. Finally, the null hypothesis would predict no relationship between Food Stamp receipt and mortality. Many of these factors likely occur in tandem: the stigma or stress associated with participating could occur simultaneously with the acquisition of additional material resources. Thus, we focus on whether the Food Stamp Program functions, on average, as a benefit or detriment to the mortality risk of participants, while accounting for selection into the program on both observed and unobserved factors.

Data and Methods

DATA

We use the Family Resources Supplement (FRS) to the National Health Interview Survey, for the years 1990, 1991, 1992, and 1994, to examine the relationships between Food Stamp receipt and mortality (NCHS various years).¹ The FRS data are representative of the noninstitutionalized U.S. civilian

population and contain detailed information on various income sources, including Food Stamps, as well as basic health, demographic, and household characteristics — essential factors when examining Food Stamps. Although other surveys collect more complete information on program participation, no other data set combines this degree of detail on Food Stamps with a current national sample and links to subsequent mortality.

We link the four years of cross-sectional FRS data to the National Death Index (NDI) via the Multiple Cause of Death (MCD) file, to establish whether individuals have survived or died between the month of interview and December of 1997 (NCHS 2000). The FRS-MCD is a prospective data set and allows us to follow vital status, but no other variables, over time. NCHS (2000) devised a probabilistic matching scheme that assigns weights to each of twelve items: social security number; first and last name; middle initial; race; sex; marital status; day, month, and year of birth; and state of birth and residence. This matching methodology gives each individual a weighted score for each potential match in the NDI, which is used to accurately assign vital status (Patterson & Bilgrade 1986).²

From the FRS-MCD data, we estimate a sample of individuals who are eligible to participate in the Food Stamp Program based on household characteristics. Eligible households must have gross incomes no greater than 130% of the federal poverty guidelines, after accounting for household size, excepting households headed by individuals aged 60 or older or with disabled residents (U.S. House 1996). We use employment income aggregated for the entire family, while adjusting for family size, to calculate eligibility.³ We examine adults in households headed by individuals aged 18 to 59, as they are greatly impacted by the adverse effects of mortality and have access to fewer sources of government aid than individuals in households headed by individuals aged 60 and older. Concatenating four years of the FRS-MCD yields a total sample of 79,096 eligible individuals, of whom 17,488 were participants and 61,608 were nonparticipants at the time of interview. Among the participants, 16,947 survived the follow-up period and 541 died; among the nonparticipants, 60,179 survived and 1,429 died. The large sample size and number of deaths ensure that the FRS-MCD is well suited for assessing the relationship between Food Stamps and mortality.

Two sources of error might result in the inclusion of ineligible individuals or exclusion of eligible individuals from our analyses when estimating our eligible sample (Daponte et al. 1999). First, the Food Stamp Program defines a household as those individuals who usually share the purchase and preparation of meals (U.S. House 1996), although the FRS-MCD defines a household as those individuals sharing a common residence (NCHS various years). Second, the Food Stamp Program determines eligibility based on both income and asset tests, but the FRS measures asset ownership for only two of the four years of

data. Thus, we rely solely on the income test, an approach that is common in the literature when asset data are unavailable (Blank & Ruggles 1996; Coe & Hill 1998).

We take the following measures to assess the impact of these sources of error. First, we compare those who receive Food Stamps and who are predicted as eligible to those who actually receive Food Stamps but are not predicted as eligible. We find that the predicted sample of eligible individuals includes over 95% of those individuals who actually receive Food Stamps, a number similar to other studies (Coe & Hill 1998). Upon inspection, many of those in the remaining 5% are quite close to the cut-point for inclusion. But some have very high personal and family incomes, indicating potential error in the data. The inclusion of this small number of individuals makes no substantive difference on our findings, so we exclude them from the analyses. Second, we compare results from samples including those within 125% and 140% of the poverty line to results from our sample of those within 130% of the poverty line. Both more and less inclusive samples find equivalent results, indicating that our findings likely mirror true relationships in the general population.

Third, the FRS-MCD provides information on interest and dividend income, but not on the value of the assets that generate those income streams. Coe and Hill (1998) assume that income from assets represents an 8% return on the value of assets, and use this to evaluate the asset test. But when we used this procedure to estimate household assets to address the asset test, no additional individuals were classified as ineligible. Finally, we ran separate analyses (not shown) that excluded all households that received any dividend income, an indicator of middle class standing (Krueger et al. 2003). Those results were substantively identical to the findings presented here, albeit less robust due to the diminished number of cases. Although our estimated eligible sample may contain individuals who are, in reality, too wealthy to participate in the Food Stamp Program, our efforts suggest that they do not substantially bias our analyses.

SELECTION BIAS AND THE SWITCHING PROBIT MODEL

The relationship between Food Stamp receipt and mortality risk is complicated by the possibility of self-selection bias. Because not all eligible individuals actually participate, and because participants might nonrandomly select into receipt based on unobserved characteristics that also correlate with mortality, the impact of Food Stamps on mortality may be asymptotically biased and inefficient — a problem akin to omitted variable bias (Heckman 1979). Our modeling procedure explicitly controls for self-selection because we are interested in the structural effect of participation on mortality, net of observed (e.g., race, sex, age) or unobserved characteristics (e.g., poorer money management skills, less motivation to work, unreported assets).

Although the Food Stamp Program is administered according to national standards during the time period we examine here (U.S. House 1996), a double selection process may take place. That is, program administrators may nonrandomly select participants from eligible and interested households (Schiller 1999). Although our data cannot account for differences among state or local policies and cultures, we include variables to capture regional and urban/rural differences in participation. Further, some work suggests that selection at the state level may be of minimal importance (Argys, Averett & Rees 2000). Nevertheless, future work with more detailed data must more fully examine this double selection process in tandem with health and mortality outcomes.

Following Ridao-Cano (2002), we specify a maximum likelihood switching probit model. This model simultaneously predicts mortality among participants and mortality among the nonparticipants, while accounting for selection into the program based on observed and unobserved characteristics. This approach specifically recognizes that individuals who appear similar based on observed factors may face differential survival prospects based on unobserved characteristics (Aakvik et al. 2000; Winship & Mare 1992).

Let M_i and P_i indicate the mortality outcome and participation in the Food Stamp Program, respectively. Households decide to participate ($P_i = 1$) or not-participate ($P_i = 0$), and conditional on participation, individuals experience the mortality outcome in the participating state (M_{1i}) or the mortality outcome in the nonparticipating state (M_{0i}). We assume that the observed participation and mortality outcomes reflect latent variables, denoted by P_i^* , M_{1i}^* , and M_{0i}^* , respectively, and are generated by the following process:

$$P_i = 1(P_i^* \geq 0) = 1(Z_i\beta_p + U_{pi} \geq 0) \tag{1}$$

$$M_{1i} = 1(M_{1i}^* \geq 0) = 1(X_i\beta_1 + U_{1i} \geq 0) \quad \text{iff} \quad P_i = 1 \tag{2}$$

$$M_{0i} = 1(M_{0i}^* \geq 0) = 1(X_i\beta_0 + U_{0i} \geq 0) \quad \text{iff} \quad P_i = 0 \tag{3}$$

where Z_i and X_i are vectors of observed characteristics generating participation and mortality outcomes, respectively; U_{pi} , U_{1i} , and U_{0i} are unobservable characteristics that generate participation, mortality among participants, and mortality among nonparticipants, respectively; and $1[.]$ is the indicator function. This model also estimates the direction and magnitude of the correlation between the unobserved factors predicting participation and mortality. We estimate ρ_{1p} as the correlation between the unobserved characteristics predicting participation (U_{pi}) and mortality in the participating state (U_{1i}), and ρ_{0p} as the correlation between the unobserved characteristics predicting participation (U_{pi}) and mortality in the nonparticipation state (U_{0i}). If

the ρ coefficients are statistically and substantively significant, then accounting for selection into participation is necessary to ensure unbiased and efficient estimates.

This model assumes that the error is normally distributed, and requires the inclusion of instruments, or variables in the vector Z_i that predict participation, are independent of mortality, and that are not included in the vector X_i . We detail the variables included as instruments below. The full set of equations is estimated simultaneously using the maximum-likelihood method, with the likelihood function given in Ridao-Cano (2002).

EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF FOOD STAMPS ON MORTALITY

This model allows us to generate mean treatment parameters by estimating the effect of participation on mortality under counterfactual conditions that we do not directly observe—in our case, the effect of “switching” from participation to nonparticipation.⁴ Identification of the bivariate distributions of (P, M_1) and (P, M_0) implies the identification of the mean treatment parameters. Let $\Delta = M_1 - M_0$, or an individual’s mortality risk in the participating state minus his or her mortality risk in the nonparticipating state. In our case, Δ can take three values: $\Delta = 1$ if the individual would die in the participating state but survive in the nonparticipating state ($M_1 = 1, M_0 = 0$); $\Delta = 0$ if the individual would die in either state ($M_1 = 1, M_0 = 1$) or survive in either state ($M_1 = 0, M_0 = 0$); or $\Delta = -1$ if the individual would survive in the participating state but die in the nonparticipating state ($M_1 = 0, M_0 = 1$). Although we have not observed individuals under both conditions, we can, based on the characteristics of the above distributions, estimate the effect of participation on mortality for both participants and nonparticipants. For our purposes, we calculate three treatment effects with each corresponding to an average value of Δ .

The Average Treatment Effect (ATE) is the average effect of participation for a person randomly selected from the population of eligible adults from households with household heads aged 59 or younger, with characteristics $X = x$, and is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta^{ATE}(x) &= E[\Delta | X = x] \\ &= \Phi[x\beta_1] - \Phi[x\beta_0]\end{aligned}\tag{4}$$

where Φ is the cumulative normal probability function. The effect of the Treatment on those Treated (TT) is the average effect of participation on

mortality for adults who actually participated in the Food Stamp Program and who have characteristics $X = x$, and is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta^{TT}(x, P = 1) &= E[\Delta \mid X = x, P = 1] \\ &= \Pr[M_1 = 1 \mid X = x, P = 1] - \Pr[M_0 = 1 \mid X = x, P = 1] \\ &= \frac{\Phi[x\beta_1, z\beta_p, \rho_{1p}] - \Phi[x\beta_0, z\beta_p, \rho_{0p}]}{\Phi[z\beta_p]}\end{aligned}\tag{5}$$

The Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) is the average effect of participation on individuals with characteristics $X=x$ who are indifferent between participation ($P=1$) and nonparticipation ($P=0$), at $U_p = u_p$, so that $u_p = -z\beta_p$. Thus, the MTE identifies the effect of a policy intervention on mortality for interventions that prompt participation among those who would most likely be induced to participate, and is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta^{MTE}(x, u_p) &= E[\Delta \mid X = x, U_p = u_p] \\ &= \Pr[M_1 = 1 \mid X = x, U_p = u_p] - \Pr[M_0 = 1 \mid X = x, U_p = u_p] \\ &= \Phi\left[\frac{x\beta_1 + \rho_{1p}u_p}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_{1p}^2}}\right] - \Phi\left[\frac{x\beta_0 + \rho_{0p}u_p}{\sqrt{1 - \rho_{0p}^2}}\right]\end{aligned}\tag{6}$$

In the results section, the ATE and MTE are evaluated as the population means of the X s (i.e., $x = \bar{x}$), and the TT is evaluated at the means of the X s and Z s for the participating population (i.e., $x = \bar{x}_p$ and $z = \bar{z}_p$). The treatment effects address our hypotheses as follows. The ATE indicates the average effect of participation on mortality for an average individual in the eligible population, based on observed characteristics, relative to his or her mortality risk in the nonparticipating state. The TT and MTE better capture the effects of unobserved factors and more directly address our hypotheses. The TT shows the average effect of participation on mortality for those who actually participate, given their observed and unobserved characteristics, relative to their mortality risk in the nonparticipating state. The MTE captures the effect of participation on mortality for those who are indifferent to participation based on observed characteristics. We graph the MTE across the unobserved factors that indicate higher or lower propensities to participate (U_p) to examine whether those who are most sensitive to the effects of policy interventions prompting individuals to participate would likely have higher or lower mortality, should they decide to participate. We use Stata 8.0 software to correct our estimates and standard errors due to the complex sampling frame used by the FRS-MCD (StataCorp 2003), and we employ the delta method to estimate tests of significance for the treatment effects.

VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT

A number of factors shape both the decision to participate and mortality, and are included in all equations. Sociodemographic variables include age, sex, race, and marital status. We examine adults in households headed by individuals aged 18 to 59. Within this age group, we further control for age as a continuous variable. Sex is coded as male or female (the referent). We code race as black and all others (the referent). Marital status is coded as currently (referent), previously, and never married at the time of survey.

Socioeconomic variables include education, employment status, and poverty status. We code education categorically as 0 to 11 years of school, high school degree, and any college (referent). Employment status is coded as employed (referent), unemployed, and not in the labor force. Poverty status is dichotomous and assesses whether individuals are above the poverty threshold (referent), or at or below the poverty line. This variable adjusts for purchasing power due to family size and accounts for annual inflation (U.S. Census Bureau 1999).⁵

Health status variables include functional health and body mass. We control for functional status because the physical ability to work correlates both with the risk of death and participation in the Food Stamp Program. We code functional ability as not limited (referent), limited in the ability to do some kinds of work or non-work activities, or unable to work. We use Body Mass Index (BMI) to assess body mass as it associates with mortality and partially controls for individuals' dietary practices (Krueger et al. 2004; Rogers et al. 2003). We compute BMI as weight in kilograms over height in meters squared, and categorize it into underweight (less than 18.5), normal weight (the referent: 18.5 to 24.9), and overweight or obese (25 and greater).

The participation equation includes four sets of instrumental variables — region of residence, Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), the dependency ratio, and household structure — that have a theoretical and empirical relationship with participation but that are uncorrelated with mortality. Region of residence is measured as West, Northeast, Midwest, or South (the referent). Regional variation in participation in means-tested programs potentially results from differences in regional labor markets or political cultures (Coe & Hill 1998; Kodras 1986). MSA is classified as central city, noncentral city, and farm or nonfarm (the referent), as a proxy for population density. The small number of participants in farm and nonfarm MSAs preclude our including them separately. Two possible factors lead to higher levels of participation in the Food Stamp Program in regions with higher population density, net of the socioeconomic or demographic composition of more urban areas (Hirschl & Rank 1991; Rank & Hirschl 1993). First, cultural or psychological factors may make participation more acceptable in urban areas. Second, government aid might be more accessible in urban areas due to the presence of numerous

government offices and reliable public transportation. Region of residence and MSA may also partially capture regional political or cultural differences that shape how administrators nonrandomly select interested and eligible individuals into participation (Argys et al. 2000).

We calculate the dependency ratio as the number of dependents aged 17 or younger divided by the number of adults in the household. Households with more dependents are more likely to participate in means-tested programs than are those with fewer dependents, potentially due to the extensive and long-term expenses associated with caring for children (Coe & Hill 1998; Rank 1986). Household structure is dichotomous and assesses whether a household has children and is headed by a nonmarried adult, or is some other household configuration (referent). Single parent households may be more likely to participate because they often have fewer economic and social resources (Browne 1997; McCrate & Smith 1998).

We take several steps to ensure that our instruments meet the assumptions of the switching probit model. First, they are significant predictors of participation. We use bivariate probit models (not shown) to examine the contribution of the instrumental variables in predicting participation, over and above the other independent variables. Indeed, the model that includes the instruments predicts participation significantly better than the model that includes only the other independent variables ($\chi^2 = 3555$, $df = 7$, $p < .0001$). Second, the instruments are independent of mortality in the eligible sample. By including the instrumental variables in all three equations in the switching model, we find that they are independent of mortality among both participants and nonparticipants. Finally, the instruments allow the switching model to converge and provide significant estimates for ρ_{1p} and ρ_{0p} , thus indicating that they associate with the unobserved factors that predict both participation and mortality.

The dependent variables for our analysis include participation in the Food Stamp Program at the time of interview, and vital status between the time of interview and December of 1997. Participation is coded as 1 for all members of participating households and 0 for members of eligible but nonparticipating households. Because the FRS-MCD is prospective, we cannot examine the duration or number of times that individuals participate, or whether nonparticipants later participate. But we likely capture individuals who participate more often and for longer periods of time in our analysis, as they are more likely to be participants at any single point in time. Vital status is a dichotomous variable with individuals coded as 1 to indicate that they died sometime between the date of interview and the end of the follow-up in December of 1997, or 0 to indicate that they survived.

A final note remains about the modeling procedure. The FRS-MCD file provides information on the month of death, which allows us to examine the risk of death over time. But we model whether individuals have died over the

follow-up period, regardless of the timing of the event. Because individuals were at risk of death for different lengths of time, we include a duration variable, coded as the number of months from the point of interview to either the month of death or December of 1997, as an independent variable in the mortality equations. This accounts for the duration at risk of death for both individuals who survived the follow-up period and those who died.

We use this approach for two reasons. First, event history approaches that convert individuals' records into person-year records (see Allison 1984) would assume that individuals select into participation each year that they survive, as only vital status changes over time. But we only have information about their participation at the point of interview. Second, switching hazard models are prohibitively difficult to program and would unlikely improve convergence or significantly change the estimates.

Although our approach is less than optimal, we are confident in the results for a number of reasons. First, our model provides reasonable estimates in the expected direction and magnitude for many variables with known relationships to participation and mortality. Second, we compared results from bivariate probit models that include duration as an independent variable and hazard models, and found results that were similar both in direction and magnitude. Finally, we reran our analyses with the duration variable coded to measure number of months from the point of interview until December of 1997. Although the duration coefficient changed direction, as those who were observed for follow-up for longer periods of time were more likely to die than those who were interviewed later, all other coefficients remained identical.

Results

Table 1 presents means and percentage distributions of the covariates by vital and participant statuses for the eligible sample. First, based on some observed characteristics, participants should have lower risks of mortality than nonparticipants. For example, 66% of the participants are female, but only 51% of nonparticipants are female, and females generally experience lower mortality risks than males. But other characteristics suggest that participants may be more likely to die than nonparticipants. For example, only 45% of the participants are currently married, but 63% of nonparticipants are married. Further, participants have fewer socioeconomic resources and poorer health than their nonparticipating counterparts. Finally, without adjusting for observed or unobserved factors, participants appear more likely to die than nonparticipants. Nearly 3% of the participants die over the follow-up period but just over 2% of the nonparticipants die.

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics by Participant and Vital Statuses, Eligible U.S. Adults, 1990 to 1997

	Participants		Nonparticipants	
	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead
Demographic status				
Age (mean)	32.7	42.1	35.9	45.7
Sex				
Female	65.6	48.2	51.4	33.8
Male	34.4	51.8	48.6	66.2
Race				
Black	61.6	54.7	82.6	80.4
Nonblack	38.5	45.3	17.4	19.6
Marital status				
Currently married	45.0	40.2	62.6	60.2
Previously married	23.7	30.9	13.2	23.1
Never married	31.4	29.0	24.2	16.7
Socioeconomic status				
Education				
0-11 years	44.5	58.0	21.1	33.7
High school graduate	40.4	31.0	39.7	36.0
Some college	15.2	11.0	39.2	30.3
Employment status				
Employed	37.3	22.1	63.8	42.2
Unemployed	10.9	8.8	6.2	5.9
Not in labor force	51.8	69.1	30.1	51.8
Poverty				
Above poverty line	39.1	35.5	81.1	83.3
At or below poverty line	60.9	64.5	18.9	16.7
Health status				
Functional status				
Not limited	74.7	40.3	83.4	49.0
Some limitations	9.8	9.8	8.6	11.3
Unable to work	15.5	49.9	8.0	39.8
Body mass index				
Under weight	4.2	4.6	3.5	4.8
Normal weight	44.7	45.7	51.7	42.4
Overweight or obese	51.1	49.6	44.8	52.8

Table 2 presents a probit model that regresses mortality on the substantive variables in our analysis, but without accounting for selection. We find that participants experience 5.3% higher mortality than nonparticipants. This difference persists after controlling for demographic, socioeconomic, and health

TABLE 1: Descriptive Statistics by Participant and Vital Statuses, Eligible U.S. Adults, 1990 to 1997 (Cont'd)

	Participants		Nonparticipants	
	Alive	Dead	Alive	Dead
Instruments				
Region				
West	20.7	14.9	23.7	23.3
Northeast	17.9	18.6	17.8	17.6
Midwest	22.9	21.3	23.2	19.6
South	38.5	45.3	35.4	39.6
MSA				
Central city	47.4	48.4	31.8	35.0
Noncentral city	28.6	25.5	42.6	39.1
Farm or nonfarm	24.0	26.1	25.6	25.9
Dependency ratio (mean)	1.2	0.7	0.6	0.3
Household structure				
Single parent household	39.1	25.4	9.1	6.3
Nonsingle parent household	60.9	74.6	90.9	93.7
Number	16,947	541	60,179	1,429
Percent dying over the follow-up		2.9		2.2

Source: Derived from NCHS various years.

Note: All values are percentages unless denoted as means.

characteristics with known relationships to both participation and mortality. This result would suggest that Food Stamp receipt would contribute to higher mortality, although it may be biased by unobserved characteristics.

Table 3 presents the results from the switching model. A number of important findings emerge. First, in the participation equation (P_i), individuals who are younger, nonblack, less socioeconomically advantaged, and less healthy are more likely to participate compared to their older, black, more socioeconomically advantaged, and more healthy counterparts. Thus, observed characteristics at least partially account for differential selection into participation. Further, individuals who reside in the West, Northeast, or central cities, or who live in households with more dependents or that are headed by single parents, are more likely to participate than individuals from the South, farm or nonfarm MSAs, or who come from households with fewer dependents or that are not headed by single parents.

Equation M_{1i} predicts mortality contingent on participation and equation M_{0i} predicts mortality contingent on nonparticipation. Some of the coefficients in both equations are similar and in expected directions. Individuals who are observed for shorter durations, older, male, or unable to work, have higher probabilities of dying over the follow-up period than their

TABLE 2: Probit Coefficients for Mortality, Eligible U.S. Adults, 1990-1997

	Model 1
Food stamps	
Participation	.053*
Demographic status	
Duration of observation	-.036***
Age (single years)	.029***
Sex (1 = male)	.324***
Race (1 = black)	-.077**
Marital status	
Currently married	ref
Previously married	.083**
Never married	.193***
Socioeconomic status	
Education	
0-11 years	.283***
High school graduate	.121***
Some college	ref
Employment status	
Employed	ref
Unemployed	.194***
Not in labor force	.155***
Poverty (1 = below poverty line)	-.012
Health status	
Functional status	
Not limited	ref
Some limitations	.151***
Unable to work	.490***
Body mass index	
Under weight	.084
Normal weight	ref
Overweight or obese	-.105***
Constant	-1.644***
Log-likelihood	-5,854

Source: Derived from NCHS various years.

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

counterparts who are observed for longer periods of time, younger, female, or healthier. But other variables associate with mortality differently for participants and nonparticipants. For participants (M_{1i}), those who are nonblack, less educated, not in the labor force, at or below the poverty line, or

TABLE 3: Probit Coefficients for Participation and Mortality, Eligible U.S. Adults, 1990–1997

	P_i	M_{1i}	M_{0i}
Demographic status			
Duration of observation		-.024***	-.022***
Age (single years)	-.012***	.035***	.008***
Sex (1 = male)	-.022	.414***	.191***
Race (1 = black)	-.362***	.281***	-.245***
Marital status			
Currently married	ref	ref	ref
Previously married	-.062*	-.207***	.242***
Never married	-.222***	.132*	-.086*
Socioeconomic status			
Education			
0–11 years	.648***	-.282***	.577***
High school graduate	.373***	-.169**	.343***
Some college	ref	ref	ref
Employment status			
Employed	ref	ref	ref
Unemployed	.384***	-.141	.187***
Not in labor force	.308***	-.166**	.266***
Poverty (1 = below poverty line)	.799***	-.605***	.442***
Health status			
Functional status			
Not limited	ref	ref	ref
Some limitations	.178***	-.026	.182***
Unable to work	.342***	.156***	.529***
Body mass index			
Under weight	.046	-.103	.105
Normal weight	ref	ref	ref
Overweight or obese	.117***	-.235***	-.009
Instruments			
Region			
West	-.013		
Northeast	.077*		
Midwest	.078*		
South	ref		
MSA			
Central city	.114***		
Noncentral city	-.098**		
Farm or nonfarm	ref		
Dependency ratio	.163***		
Household structure			
(1 = single parent)	.677***		
Constant	-1.286***	-.005	-1.034***
ρ_{1p}		-.879***	
ρ_{0p}		.866***	
Log-likelihood			-35,673

Source: Derived from NCHS various years.

* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

TABLE 4: Treatment Effects of Participation on Mortality, Eligible U.S. Adults, 1990 to 1997

Average treatment effect (ATE)	.282***
Effect of treatment on the treated (TT)	-.205***


Source: Derived from NCHS various years.
* $p \leq .05$ ** $p \leq .01$ *** $p \leq .001$ (two-tailed tests)

overweight or obese, have lower probabilities of dying than their black, more educated, employed, more affluent, and normal weight counterparts. These associations are counter to those found among nonparticipants (M_{0i}) and suggest that participants and nonparticipants may be quite different on unobserved factors that correlate with participation and mortality.

The parameters ρ_{1p} and ρ_{0p} show significant correlations between the unobserved factors predicting participation and mortality outcomes. The estimated ρ_{1p} (-0.879) indicates a significant and substantial negative correlation between the unobserved characteristics that predict selection into participation and mortality among participants. That is, the unobserved factors that predict a higher probability of participation also predict lower mortality among participants. The estimated ρ_{0p} (0.866) shows a strong and significant positive correlation between the unobserved characteristics that predict selection into participation and mortality among nonparticipants. Thus, the unobserved factors that indicate a higher propensity to participate also predict higher mortality among those who do not participate. In combination, these parameters suggest that individuals who are most likely to participate due to unobserved factors have lower mortality if they participate and higher mortality if they do not participate. Wald tests show that the estimated ρ_{1i} and ρ_{0i} coefficients are jointly significant, suggesting that the decision to participate is based in part on unobserved factors that correlate with mortality, thus confirming the need to account for selection bias.

Table 4 presents the estimated ATE and TT for the eligible sample. The ATE indicates that participation in the Food Stamp Program would predict a 28% increase in the risk of death for an individual drawn randomly from the eligible population, relative to their mortality if they did not participate. This effect is in the same direction as the results in Table 2, the model that does not control for selection. But the TT is negative and suggests that on average, those who select into participation have a 21% reduction in their risk of death, relative to their mortality if they did not participate. Thus, those who actually select into participation receive substantial mortality benefits due to unobserved differences between participants and nonparticipants.

FIGURE 1: Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) on Mortality by the Unobserved Propensity to Participate in the Food Stamp Program



Finally, Figure 1 graphs the MTE on mortality for individuals who are indifferent to participation based on the observed factors across the propensity to participate due to unobserved factors (U_p), which might indicate individuals with persistent economic need, few familial resources, or better access to information about Food Stamps. The graph shows that individuals with the highest propensity to participate based on unobserved factors will likely receive the greatest reductions in mortality from participation in the Food Stamp Program. In other words, a policy intervention that prompts individuals to participate would likely lower mortality for those who would be most likely to participate due to that intervention.⁶

Summary and Conclusions

The treatment effects best summarize the relationship between Food Stamp receipt and mortality risk. The ATE suggests that moving from nonparticipation to participation would lead to a 28% increase in the risk of death for the average individual in the eligible population. But the ATE fails to account for differential mortality due to unobserved characteristics within the eligible population. The TT indicates that individuals who select into participation experience a 21% lower probability of death, relative to their mortality if they did not participate. Thus, those who actually participate are likely in greater need and benefit most from participation. The MTE further indicates that policy interventions that encourage participation would likely bring lower mortality to those most likely to participate due to unobserved factors.

We find that individuals select into participation on a variety of observed characteristics, including poor health and socioeconomic need (Daponte et al. 1999; Smith & Kington 1997). But selection on unobserved factors is also important. Accounting for selection reverses the effect of participation on mortality for those who actually participate, thereby suggesting that individuals nonrandomly decide to participate based on unobserved characteristics that predict lower mortality for those who participate. Indeed, the health benefits for those who select into participation are dramatic when compared to the harmful effect found in analyses that fail to account for selection bias (Gibson 2001; Rodriguez 2001; Smith & Kington 1997), which may produce biased and inefficient estimates (Heckman 1979; Winship & Mare 1992).

Our findings support the hypothesis that the Food Stamp Program forms a social safety net, at least for those who select into participation, potentially through access to additional nutritional or economic resources (Jencks 1992; U.S. House 1996). Prior research is unclear about the relationship between participation and nutrition (Basiotis et al. 1987, 1998; Butler & Raymond 1996; Gunderson & Oliveira 2001; Whitmore 2002), although accurately measuring dietary adequacy is quite difficult. But much work finds that additional assets,

home ownership, or access to multiple income sources predict better health and lower mortality even net of income and education (Bond Huie et al. 2003; Krueger et al. 2003; Robert & House 1996). Thus, participation in the Food Stamp Program may allow individuals to purchase food while using other income to pay for additional schooling, purchase more complete health care, or simply relieve stress by paying bills on time.

However, for the average individual, participation in the Food Stamp Program leads to higher mortality. Some work has established that the Food Stamp Program provides a disincentive for seeking employment, and others have found that individuals may experience stigma and increased levels of stress once participating (Coe & Hill 1998; Francis-Okongwu 1996; Fraker & Moffitt 1988; Moffitt 1992). Further, compared to the more ingrained economic or nutritional need among those who participate, eligible nonparticipants may experience relatively short periods of economic hardship (Blank & Ruggles 1996; Daponte et al. 1999). Although Food Stamps help those with the greatest unobserved propensity to participate, feasibly due to more entrenched economic need, individuals who are least likely to participate wisely tend to avoid the program, perhaps due to the potential health costs.

Nonetheless, the Food Stamp Program alone is likely insufficient for protecting impoverished populations from premature mortality. Although increasing levels of participation or doling out higher levels of aid may improve our population's health, this may not seem politically or fiscally responsible to politicians or the public. Investing in alternate government aid programs or public health initiatives that reduce smoking or promote education might yield more efficient health benefits (Brien & Swaan 2001; Rogers et al. 2000, 2004). More research is needed before we could make unqualified statements about how best to mobilize scarce government resources to improve our population's well-being.

Future research could advance our findings in a number of ways. First, other data might allow researchers to examine the number of spells or the duration of time spent in the Food Stamp Program (Blank & Ruggles 1996; Daponte et al. 1999). Individuals with more and longer spells of Food Stamp receipt might receive larger health advantages from participation than less persistent users who may have less need for social safety nets. Our sample likely captures those who participate more often and for longer periods of time, as they are most likely to be participants at any given point in time. Further, the effect of participation captured at just one point in time clearly reduces mortality. But future work must more accurately follow individuals over time to better estimate the effect of Food Stamp receipt on mortality.

Second, future work might examine the relationships between multiple sources of government aid and mortality. Programs such as AFDC may interact with Food Stamps to provide greater benefits than could any program alone (Brien & Swann 2001; Murray 1994). Because some programs are administered

at the state level whereas others are run by national standards, our data cannot fully model eligibility and participation in multiple programs. Although excluding all households with children from our analysis would effectively remove those households that are also eligible for AFDC, our sample size would become prohibitively small. But future work with more extensive data sets could further clarify these relationships.

Third, although we find a reversal in the effect of Food Stamps on mortality, at least for participants, mortality is only one measure of health and well-being. We used mortality because it is an absorbing state that is sensitive to socioeconomic conditions (Rogers, Hummer & Nam 2000; Rogers, Hummer & Krueger 2004). But participation in means-tested programs may also affect chronic health conditions, obesity, stress related mental health, and familial economic stability (Gibson 2001; Smith & Kington 1997). Future research could reexamine our findings with alternate indicators of well-being.

Fourth, we examine participation and mortality among adults in households headed by individuals aged 18 to 59. Because the structure of the Food Stamp Program changes significantly for older households (U.S. House 1996), future work might model this relationship for older individuals. Indeed, if labor force disincentives prohibit younger workers from achieving stronger benefits from participation, then Food Stamps might be more beneficial for older individuals. Younger individuals may be more reliant on high quality jobs for health care and regular income, although older individuals may be able to rely on Medicaid or Social Security benefits to cover what Food Stamps cannot (Fraker & Moffitt 1988; Kim & Mergoupis 1997; Seccombe & Amey 1995).

Fifth, future research with detailed state and local data could examine the double selection process, where individuals and state or local agencies jointly determine who will participate (Argys, Averett & Rees 2000). We have shown that individuals nonrandomly select into the Food Stamp Program based on observed and unobserved characteristics that associate with mortality outcomes. But our data cannot examine whether or how administrators select interested and eligible households for participation. This is increasingly important after the 1996 welfare reform act that gave states more discretion to determine who will participate (Coleman & Rebach 2001; McCrate & Smith 1998).

Finally, our work focuses on participation in the Food Stamp Program prior to 1996. But, welfare reforms since then have effectively excluded large numbers of individuals due to increased work requirements, mandatory time limits, and restrictions on immigrants (Coleman & Rebach 2001; Wise, Chavkin & Romero 1999). Many fear that this will endanger the well-being of already impoverished individuals. Our findings suggest that population health might improve if more individuals with high unobserved propensities to participate did so, and others suggest that higher levels of aid may lead to health advantages (Cramer 1995).⁷ Although the juxtaposition of decreased funding with the health benefits that might result from program expansion bodes poorly for

impoverished individuals, further work must empirically examine the effect of welfare reforms on health.

Smith and Kington (1997) argue that income in the form of means-tested aid may be of little value in terms of understanding health and mortality outcomes, as they indicate poverty and persistent ill health. These concerns may be remedied, in part, by accounting for selection into means-tested programs based on poor health, low SES, demographic factors, and other unobserved characteristics. Future research must further clarify the complex relationships between means-tested aid and mortality, to ensure that government transfer programs effectively help those who are most in need. Indeed, the health and longevity of the most impoverished segments of the U.S. population depend, in part, on our clear understanding and appropriate implementation of these government programs.

Notes

1. The completion of the 1993 FRS data did not occur until 1999 because of problems with a NCHS subcontractor. But between 1993 and 1999, NCHS adopted stricter confidentiality requirements that now prevent the release of those data to researchers. Fortunately, four years of FRS data provide suitable detail for these analyses.
2. About 2% of the FRS records contain insufficient information to be matched to any death records. NCHS (2000) identifies these records so that they may be dropped from the analysis. If retained, these individuals would appear to live forever.
3. NCHS (various years) employs hot deck methods, which are also used for the decennial census and the Current Population Survey, to minimize missing data on income variables. This approach groups similar individuals into categories by employment status, activity limitation, family characteristics, race, sex, education, and other factors depending on the item to be imputed, and then allocates data from one complete record or item to another within the same group. Thus, hot deck methods compress the variability in the sample, and statistical results from analyses with imputed data will provide conservative estimates.
4. We cannot directly observe how moving into and exiting from the Food Stamp Program affects mortality because our data measure participation at only one point in time. Aakvik et al. (2000) suggest that panel data, where available, better allow researchers to identify the effect of counterfactual conditions on particular outcomes.
5. The poverty status variable fits the data slightly better than other income measures that adjust for family size, including family income divided by household size, although results with all variables are identical in direction, magnitude, and significance. We use an income measure that adjusts for family size to account for differential purchasing power across households and to ensure that the dependency ratio, one of our instruments, is independent of income.
6. Participation in the Food Stamp Program may have a greater effect on some causes of death than on others. For example, if Food Stamps provide better nutrition, they might

lower both cancer and cardiovascular disease mortality. But if they lower financial stress, they may lower only cardiovascular disease mortality. Finally, if Food Stamp receipt allows individuals to allocate other income to non-food expenditures, including education or health care, then they may lower mortality from all causes. Unfortunately, models that examine cause-specific mortality failed to converge due to the relatively small number of deaths from any given cause. Future work with data that have larger numbers of deaths might better be able to determine the mechanisms through which Food Stamp receipt leads to lower mortality.

7. We exclude a specific examination of the amount of Food Stamp aid received from our analyses for two reasons. First, the model technically assumes that the same variables will predict mortality in both the participating and nonparticipating states. But the inclusion of an estimated aid variable for nonparticipants would have no straightforward interpretation. Second, prior to 1996, the amount of aid received from the Food Stamp Program was structurally determined at the national level. Participation always implies some level of aid and family and individual economic and demographic factors determine the amount received, rather than individual initiative. Thus, the effect of the amount of aid received on mortality, net of participation, would hold little meaning.

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
Introduction to a Debate on Public Sociologies

CATHERINE ZIMMER, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
North Carolina Sociological Association*

Michael Burawoy's paper, and the three commentaries that follow it, first appeared as talks given at the annual meeting of the North Carolina Sociological Association (NCSA) on March 5, 2004. Burawoy volunteered to participate in the NCSA meetings as he had done for the sociological societies of many other states during his year as president of the American Sociological Association. Serendipitously, the theme I had chosen for the meeting was "Teaching, Research, and Service: Blurring of the Boundaries," which focused largely on multiple aspects of public sociologies.

Academia, including sociology, was less complicated when I started graduate school in 1980 than it is now. Back then I was basically presented with two choices. I could be a researcher at a university — along with being an adequate teacher and doing some service — or I could be a teacher at a college — along with being an adequate researcher and doing some service. Over the past ten years, we have all experienced accelerated expectations. Now, those of us at research universities, those of us at teaching colleges, and those of else elsewhere must do everything and do it well. We need to do important research; we need to be master teachers; and we need to bring our sociology to bear on our responsibility to society.

Academics have become quite creative as we find ways to link teaching, research, and service. The blurring of boundaries between these realms often leads to the public sociologies that Michael Burawoy advocates. David Brady, François Nielsen, and Charles Tittle rightly make us pause to question the value of the blurring boundaries and the pursuit of public sociologies that are occurring in the academy. I expect the readers of *Social Forces* will find this debate as intellectually stimulating and energizing as the members of the North Carolina Sociological Society did earlier this year.



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Public Sociologies: Contradictions, Dilemmas, and Possibilities*

MICHAEL BURAWOY, *University of California, Berkeley*

Abstract

The growing interest in public sociologies marks an increasing gap between the ethos of sociologists and social, political, and economic tendencies in the wider society. Public sociology aims to enrich public debate about moral and political issues by infusing them with sociological theory and research. It has to be distinguished from policy, professional, and critical sociologies. Together these four interdependent sociologies enter into relations of domination and subordination, forming a disciplinary division of labor that varies among academic institutions as well as over time, both within and between nations. Applying the same disciplinary matrix to the other social sciences suggests that sociology's specific contribution lies in its relation to civil society, and, thus, in its defense of human interests against the encroachment of states and markets.

In 2003 the members of the American Sociological Association (ASA) were asked to vote on a member resolution opposing the war in Iraq. The resolution included the following justification: "[F]oreign interventions that do not have the support of the world community create more problems than solutions . . . Instead of lessening the risk of terrorist attacks, this invasion could serve as the spark for multiple attacks in years to come." It passed by a two thirds majority (with 22% of voting members abstaining) and became the association's official position. In an opinion poll on the same ballot, 75% of the members who expressed an opinion were opposed to the war. To assess the ethos of sociologists

** This article was the basis of my address to the North Carolina Sociological Association, March 5, 2004. I would like to thank Cathy Zimmer for inviting me and for organizing three "public sociology skeptics" as my opponents. Thanks especially to Erik Wright for lending me his expertise in the analytics of matrix sociology, for insisting on the continuing problems in the definition of my four sociologies, but, above all, for his abiding support. Direct correspondence to Michael Burawoy, Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720. E-mail: Burawoy@socrates.berkeley.edu.*

today, it is worthwhile comparing these results with those of 1968 when a similar double item was presented to the membership with respect to the Vietnam war. Then two-thirds of the votes cast *opposed* the ASA adopting a resolution against the war and only 54% were individually opposed to the war (Rhoades 1981:60).

It is complicated to interpret this apparent shift in political orientation, given the different national and military contexts within which the voting took place, given the different wording of the questions. Still two hypotheses present themselves. First, the membership of the ASA, always leaning toward the liberal end of the political spectrum, has moved much further to the left. In 1968 the opinion of sociologists was close to the rest of the population (54% of sociologists opposed the war as compared to between 46% and 54% of the general public), whereas in 2003 the two distributions were the inverse of each other — 75% of voting sociologists opposed the war at the end of April, 2003, while at the same time 75% of the public supported the war.¹ One might conjecture that in 1968 a very different generation dominated the profession — a postwar generation celebratory of the U.S. and its “victory over fascism,” among them pioneers of professional sociology. Today’s post-Vietnam generations are more accustomed to criticizing the U.S. government and in particular its foreign policy. They are also less concerned about the purity of sociology as science and more likely to assume that our accumulated knowledge should be put to public use, whether in the form of member resolutions or policy interventions.

Second, the world itself is different. In 1968 the world seemed ripe for change for the better. The civil rights movements, the women’s movement, student movements around the world, antiwar marches and sit-ins captured the imagination of a new generation of sociologists who saw conventional sociology as lagging behind the most progressive movements; whereas today the world is lagging behind sociology, unapologetic about its drift into political and economic fundamentalism. Sociologists shift their critical eye ever more away from sociology toward the world it describes, a shift reflected in the insurgent interest in public sociology. In short, over the last 35 years there has been a scissors movement. The political context and the sociological conscience have moved in opposite directions, so that the world we inhabit is increasingly in conflict with the ethos and principles that animate sociologists — an ethos opposed to inequality, to the erosion of civil liberties, to the destruction of public life, and to discrimination and exclusion.

This shift in sociological ethos is not uncontroversial. It has, indeed, generated its own opposition. Dissatisfied with the political winds, 102 ASA members signed a petition, sent to the association’s Committee on Professional Ethics, charging that the anti-Iraq-war resolution violated the ASA’s code of conduct. Why? Because it did not rely on “scientifically and professionally

derived knowledge.” The complaint did not get far because, unlike other professional associations, there are no clear rules that limit the types of resolutions the ASA can endorse. Nonetheless, the 102 (and presumably many others) did take a principled position: scientific sociologists have no business making moral or political pronouncements. Taking a moral or political position is incompatible with scientific objectivity. Opposition to the resolution also took a more pragmatic form, fears that such a visible and public stance against the war (and I have not found another association to have taken such a stance) would undermine what legitimacy we have as sociologists, conceivably threaten research funding, and even prompt political reprisals. Alas, this is not so far fetched.

In contrast to these two arguments against adopting such a resolution, there are two arguments for considering the resolution to be within the ASA’s purview. First, there is the Weberian position that moral stances or value commitments are the *sine qua non* of any research program, so that there is no inherent contradiction in publicly declaring those commitments (although for Weber this should be done in the altogether separate sphere of politics). Second, there is the more Durkheimian position that we, as an association, constitute an actor in civil society and as such have a right and an obligation to participate in politics. To be sure the position adopted should be informed by our distinctive expertise, which in this case does indeed suggest that military conquest might be as easy as national reconstruction (of Iraq) is tortuous and self-defeating — a position Michael Mann elaborates in his *Incoherent Empire*.

The “pure science” position that research must be completely insulated from politics is untenable since antipolitics is no less political than *public engagement*. The more usual “abstentionist” position limits politics to *professional self-defense*: that we should enter the political arena only to defend our immediate professional interests. Thus, we might mobilize resources to oppose the defunding of research into sexual behavior (as was attempted in Congress recently), or to protest the closure or dramatic cuts in a sociology department (as in Germany today), or to protect the human rights of an individual (e.g., Egyptian sociologist, Saad Eddin Ibrahim), or, most recently, to defend a journal’s right to review and edit articles from “enemy” countries. In all these instances we enter the political arena, but solely to defend the integrity of our professional activities.

Between professional self-defense and public engagement there is a compromise position that moves from the defense of professional interests to *policy interventions*. Here the association takes a political position on the basis of an accumulated body of evidence whose validity is widely accepted and whose interpretation is unambiguous. One such example is the ASA’s recent statement that summarized the sociological literature on race: race exists, it has social causes, and it has social consequences. An extension of this was the

ASA's Amicus Curiae brief to the Supreme Court in the 2003 Michigan Law School affirmative action case, *Grutter v. Bollinger*. Again a body of sociological research was mobilized to show that racial discrimination exists and that efforts to diversify the student body would improve the educational experience of all.

So far, then, we have three possible political stances: "professional self-defense," "policy intervention" and "public engagement." There is, however, a fourth stance. The association is a political venue unto itself — a place to debate the stances we might adopt. We cannot advocate democracy for others if we are not internally democratic, if we do not attempt to arrive at public stances through maximal participation in collective deliberation. It is just such a critical debate that we are involved in today. The resolution against the Iraq War is but a dramatic instance of the broader issue we are discussing: what should be our involvement in the world beyond the academy? Recognizing we are part of the world we study, we must take some *stance* with respect to that world. To fail to do so is to take a stance by default.

We can problematize our place in society by asking two questions. The first was posed by Alfred McClung Lee in his 1976 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association: "Knowledge for Whom?" As sociologists are we just talking to ourselves? Are we to remain locked up in the antechambers of society, never really entering its tumultuous currents, hiding behind the barricades of professional insularity? Or can we, ever cautious, ever vigilant, wade forth into society, armed with our sociological expertise? If we are going to talk to others, which others and how shall we do it? This leads directly to the second question, famously posed by Robert Lynd (1939): Knowledge for What? Do we take the values and goals of our research for granted, handed down to us by some external (funding or policy) agency? Should we only concentrate on providing solutions to predefined problems, focusing on the means to achieve predetermined ends, on what Weber called technical rationality and what I call *instrumental knowledge*? In other words, should we repress the question of ends and pretend that knowledge and laws spring spontaneously from the data, if only we can develop the right methods? Or should we be concerned explicitly with the goals for which our research may be mobilized, and with the values that underpin and guide our research? Going further afield, should sociologists be in the business of stimulating public discussions about the possible meanings of the "good society"? Like Weber, I believe that without value commitments there can be no sociology, no basis for the questions that guide our research programs. Without values social science is blind. We should try to be clear about those values by engaging in what Weber called value discussion, leading to what I will refer to as *reflexive knowledge*. This communicative action, as Jürgen Habermas (1984) has called it, aspires to a dialogic character, although mutuality and reciprocity are often difficult to achieve in practice. Thus, empirical science can only take us so far:

TABLE 1: Division of Sociological Labor

	Academic Audience	Extra-academic Audience
Instrumental Knowledge	<i>Professional Sociology</i>	<i>Policy Sociology</i>
• Knowledge	Theoretical/empirical	Concrete
• Legitimacy	Scientific norms	Effectiveness
• Accountability	Peers	Clients/patrons
• Pathology	Self-referentiality	Servility
• Politics	Professional self-interest	Policy intervention
Reflexive Knowledge	<i>Critical Sociology</i>	<i>Public Sociology</i>
• Knowledge	Foundational	Communicative
• Legitimacy	Moral vision	Relevance
• Accountability	Critical intellectuals	Designated publics
• Pathology	Dogmatism	Faddishness
• Politics	Internal debate	Public dialogue

it can help us understand the consequences of our value commitments and inform our value discussions, but it cannot determine those values. Determining values should take place through democratic and collective deliberation.

Taking these two questions seriously generates a two-by-two matrix of the field of sociology (and indeed any discipline). Table 1 represents the four positions that are parallel to the distinctions I drew above in relation to associational politics. Professional and policy sociology are forms of instrumental knowledge focusing respectively on academic and extra-academic audiences. Critical and public sociology are forms of reflexive knowledge focusing respectively on academic and extra-academic audiences. Let me consider each in turn.²

Public sociology engages publics beyond the academy in dialogue about matters of political and moral concern. It has to be relevant to such publics without being faddish, that is subservient to publics. Public sociology comes in many forms. We can distinguish different forms of dialogue (mediated or unmediated, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) and different types of publics (national and local, thin or thick, hegemonic or counter-hegemonic, active or passive). I would also propose a distinction between elite and grassroots public sociology. The former reaches a wide but thin audience and would include books that stimulate reflexive debate (e.g., David Riesman's *The Lonely Crowd*, Gunnar Myrdal's *The American Dilemma*, Robert Bellah and collaborators' *Habits of the Heart*) or columns in national newspapers such as the *New York Times*. I call this form of public sociology *traditional* because, for the most part, it formulates a common public "interest" and it does so at arms length, in

contrast to an *organic* or grassroots public sociology that engages the particularistic interests of more circumscribed publics — neighborhood groups, communities of faith, labor organizations, and so on. Traditional public sociology assumes the limelight so we need to make the extra effort to validate the often invisible organic public sociologies. We need both forms of public sociology; indeed, each feeds off the other.

This distinction between traditional and organic public sociology finds its expression in teaching. Students are our first public. In the traditional approach we treat them as empty vessels to be filled with knowledge. The lecturer stands above the lectured in a position of unquestioned authority — the possessor and disseminator of truth. Dialogue, if it takes place at all, does so behind the back of the lecturer. In the organic approach to teaching, students are treated not as *tabula rasa* but as carriers of accumulated experience, brought to the surface and turned into knowledge through dialogue. That experience may be cultivated from a student's own biography and augmented through specific engagements (e.g. service learning) — the underlying presumption is that the teacher and taught have an organic relation, that the educator too must be educated.

Public sociology should be distinguished from *policy sociology*. While public sociology generates conversation or debate between sociologist and public on a terrain of reciprocal engagement, policy sociology focuses on solutions to specific problems defined by clients. The relation between sociologist and client is often of a contractual character in which expertise is sold for a fee. The sociologist, thereby, cedes independence to the client. All manner of organizations may contract sociological expertise, from business to state, from multilateral organization to the small NGO. What makes the relation instrumental is that the research terrain is not defined by the sociologist. It is defined narrowly in the case of a "client" or broadly in the case of a "patron."

There is no watertight distinction between public and policy sociology. Policy sociology can enter the public domain as in James Coleman's (1966) report to Congress on the advantages of racial integration in schooling, just as his later reversal of his advocacy of busing (Coleman 1975), one might say, took public sociology back into the arena of policy. Likewise the Moynihan Report (1965) on the black family, originally written for the Department of Labor, became a public document that was nationally debated as it related to questions of racism and the legacies of slavery. Diane Vaughan's (1996) book, *The Challenger Launch Decision*, which examined the contribution of the organizational culture at NASA to the Challenger disaster of 1985, started out as professional sociology, entered the public arena as a critical account of NASA and was then mobilized in the policy venue when the Space Shuttle Columbia met a similar fate in 2003. Her ideas about the inevitability of such disasters and the way organization can "normalize deviance" caught the public imagination,

propelling her into a key advisory role with the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (Vaughan 2004).

Public and policy sociologies could not exist without *professional sociology*, which provides legitimacy, expertise, distinctive problem definitions, relevant bodies of knowledge, and techniques for analyzing data. An effective public or policy sociology is not hostile to, but depends upon the professional sociology that lies at the core of our disciplinary field. Why do I call our disciplinary knowledge instrumental? As professional sociologists we are located in research traditions, sometimes going back to founding fathers (Weber, Durkheim, and Marx) and otherwise of a more recent pedigree (feminism, poststructuralism). These research traditions may be elaborated into self-conscious research programs — structural functionalism, stratification theory, sex-gender systems, experimental social psychology — with their grounding assumptions, distinctive questions, exemplary models and appropriate techniques of research. Research programs (Lakatos 1978) advance by resolving internal contradictions and absorbing anomalies (discrepancies between theoretical expectation and empirical observations). They require a community of scientists committed to working on the important (collectively defined) *puzzles* that the research program generates. Flourishing public and policy sociologies increase the stakes of our knowledge and thus makes the vigilant pursuit of coherent research programs all the more important.

In the world of normal science we cannot push forward the frontiers of knowledge and at the same time question its foundations. The latter task is the province of *critical sociology*. In much the same way that public sociology interrogates the value assumptions of policy sociology, so in a similar and more direct way critical sociology is the conscience of professional sociology. Robert Lynd (1939), C. Wright Mills (1959), Alvin Gouldner (1970), and, later in his life, Pitirim Sorokin (1956) were critical sociologists who questioned the moral foundations of existing professional sociology. They probed the very meaning of the sociological enterprise, posing the questions of “knowledge for what?” and “knowledge for whom?” More recently feminism and to some extent poststructuralism have challenged the received canon and reconfigured its research programs. A flourishing professional sociology always has to find space for such critical engagement to facilitate open discussion of what we are up to. Indeed, one might argue, it is this reflexivity that makes sociology an intellectual as well as a professional enterprise. Critical sociology engages first and foremost with professional sociology, but has also mounted critiques of policy sociology for putting values up for sale, and has infused moral commitments into public sociology.

Having outlined the four types of sociology in Table 1, we can elaborate the scheme in a number of directions. First, these are ideal types, each of which is internally complex. There are reflexive moments to both professional and

policy sociologies, just as there are instrumental dimensions to critical and public sociologies. Professional and critical sociology can border extra-academic audiences just as policy and public sociology have their interfaces with the academic world. Thus, for example, we can subdivide professional sociology into a core research quadrant serviced by a policy moment (ASA's defense of professional interests, the publication of *Footnotes*), by a more public face represented, say, by *Contexts* magazine, and by a critical moment that organizes debate and adjudication among competing research programs. One can even say that reflexivity is essential to puzzle solving. In its ideal typical form, however, the policy, public, and critical moments within the professional sociology "cell" are subordinate to their *raison d'être*, namely the promotion of professional sociology. We can perform the same subdivision, or what Abbott (2001) calls "fractalization," on the three other types of sociology.

The second qualification is that these are types of sociology. Sociologists can simultaneously inhabit more than one of the cells, although most concentrate their efforts in one. Over a sociologist's career the concentration may shift from one cell to another. In a typical trajectory, a graduate student enters sociology infused with moral commitment, then suspends that commitment until tenure whereupon he might dabble in policy work and end his career with a public splash. Alternatively, a graduate student might cling to her moral commitments, resisting the mortification of graduate school, and carry them through her entire academic career. Others, of course, may not be touched by moral concern at any point and may never leave the professional cell.

Not only individuals but research too can have its own moral career. Most articles published in scientific journals die a silent death, but occasionally they are picked up and develop a life of their own. Judith Stacey and Timothy Biblarz (2001) published an article on lesbian and gay parenting, "(How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?" in the *American Sociological Review*. Arguing against both those who say gay and lesbian parenting disadvantaged children and those who claim it makes no difference, Stacey and Biblarz found it did have small differential effects on children, including a greater openness to homoerotic relations. The article was infused with Stacey's critique of "family values," and her endorsement of multiple family forms, but that was not how it was always interpreted in the public realm where it was used to show the dangers of lesbian and gay marriage. Under interrogation, as an expert witness on the side of gay marriage, she found herself in the contradictory position of defending what she normally opposed, namely "positivist" research and the institution of marriage. Reflecting on her experience, she indicts public sociology: "under contemporary conditions of globalized, market-driven communication technologies and neoconservative discursive frames, to engage in public sociology is to reinforce positivist hegemony, whatever your epistemological convictions" (Stacey 2004:142). Her indictment, of course, applies less to public sociology than to policy sociology in which the sociologist

cedes the discursive terrain to her client.³ A critical sociologist holding values hostile to those prevailing in society might be well advised to steer clear of policy sociology, which by its nature defines the problem and acceptable solutions. A critical sociologist might be better off working with public audiences and in this indirect way influence policy.

Table 1 can also be conceived as a division of labor among four interdependent sociologies. Whereas it is obvious that professional sociology is a *sine qua non* for critical sociology (without it there would be nothing to criticize) as well as for policy and public sociology (legitimacy which depends on its expertise), a flourishing professional sociology itself depends on the challenges posed by the other three sociologies. Public sociology has been the transmission belt of the civil rights and women's movements that have transformed professional sociology, just as policy sociology has shaped professional agenda in areas such as criminology, education, and aging. Just as there is a mutual influence between professional and policy sociology, so there is a fruitful interplay between critical and public sociology.

This normative model of *reciprocal interdependence* is threatened by tendencies toward autonomization of the parts. In this respect, each type has its own pathology. Professional sociology has often been accused of sacrificing substance for method, of irrelevance, of making the obvious esoteric. This comes about when professional sociology cuts itself off from its moorings in the other three types, when it becomes self-referential, often in the name of "pure science." Policy sociology is often accused of the opposite pathology, of becoming a servant of power and sacrificing scientific integrity in the process. Likewise public sociology loses its moral integrity when it panders to public concerns, losing its connections to critical and professional sociology, and thus devolving into "pop" sociology. Finally, critical sociology has a tendency toward sectarianism and dogmatism, especially when unrestrained by serious engagement with the other sociologies and, in particular, with professional sociology. The flourishing of each depends on the flourishing of all.

But surely this is too simplistic and unreal. Where are power and history in this schema? These four sociologies also comprise an academic field of structured domination. Their interdependence may be reciprocal but it is also antagonistic. Professional sociologists do not like to have critical sociologists nipping at their heels, dismissing their painstaking research as trivial or irrelevant. Nor do they care to be reminded of the arbitrary foundations upon which their elaborate research programs are erected. Again, it is one thing to pursue abstract knowledge with its concepts and terminology, evaluated by peers on the basis of scientific norms, competing with other social science disciplines; it is another to pursue communicative knowledge accessible to and accountable to lay publics. It is difficult to contain these antagonistic forms of knowledge in a relation of stable interdependence without establishing a hierarchy. But there are hierarchies and hierarchies, intolerant despotisms and

negotiated hegemonies. These hegemonies attempt to recognize the interests of all, if not in equal measure.

There are different perspectives on the hierarchy within sociology. For example, today there is a dissident coterie who consider sociology to be bent too far in the reflexive direction. Beginning in the early 1990s a spate of books and articles appeared lamenting the dissolution of sociology. They include Jonathan Turner and Stephen Turner's (1990) *The Impossible Science*, Irving Louis Horowitz's (1993) *The Decomposition of Sociology*, and Stephen Cole's (2001) edited collection, *What's Wrong with Sociology?* In each case the argument is that sociology has suffered fragmentation, a loss of coherence, and ceased to be a cumulative science (if it ever was). The blame is placed on sociology's vulnerability to unmediated pressures from the external world, and specifically to the "political" invasion born out of the struggles of the 1960s and 1970s. This dissolution thesis is largely developed by sociologists who either lament the fall from grace of the putative consensus around structural functionalism or who wish to create a discipline with a single paradigm, perhaps rooted in a particular methodological technique.

My own view is rather different. Rather than looking backwards to the halcyon postwar years of the purported domination of sociology by a single overarching paradigm, I look forward to a unity based on diversity — a unity that incorporates a plurality of perspectives. In this vision, professional sociology, in order to safeguard its own enlightened self-interest, must be prevented from colonizing critical and public sociologies. We have to institutionalize these subordinate sociologies within the academy, alongside a hegemonic professional sociology.⁴ To make contributions to public sociology part of the assessment of professional sociology is fraught with problems, not least deciding the criteria of good public sociology and who should evaluate it. It will be opposed in many leading departments even though, I believe, the vitality of sociology would benefit.

One function of critical sociology is to show that the world does not have to be the way it is. Critical sociologists should be as attentive to alternatives to their own disciplinary world as they are to the world beyond the academy. We should destabilize the inevitability of the present by exposing the peculiarity of contemporary U.S. sociology. One useful starting point is to explore the history of the division of sociological labor in the United States. As Turner and Turner (1990) argue, professional sociology began in the middle of the nineteenth century as an engagement with diverse reform and religious groups. After World War I, sociology consolidated its presence in the university but became increasingly dependent on funding from foundations, such as the Rockefeller and Carnegie, and from the state in the form of the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Defense. The expansion of the university after World War II led to the rapid expansion and professionalization of sociology that, in turn, engendered a challenge from critical sociology in the

1960s and 1970s. Critical sociology had existed before, but it never had the widespread support it garnered in the 1970s. In each of these periods professional sociology was nourished by a distinctive dialogue: in the first period between public sociology and professional sociology, in the second period between policy sociology and professional sociology, and in a third period between critical sociology and professional sociology.

Are we now ready for a new dialogue between professional and public sociology? On the one hand, students of social capital, such as Robert Putnam (2001) and Theda Skocpol (2003), argue that publics are disappearing or, like Alan Wolfe (1998), imply that they are so far out of political kilter with sociology that they can offer no stable roots for a public sociology. On the other hand, the impulse from within sociology toward a public face is all the stronger as sociology becomes ever more critical of deepening inequalities, the erosion of civil liberties, and the crusader state. There are still many publics with whom we can converse. As Christian Smith and Robert Bellah have shown, communities of faith *are* within the orbit of sociology, just as the newly created ASA section on labor and labor movements has reconnected sociology to a still enormous public, desperate for new ideas. Nor should we forget that sociology itself creates categories of people who then often assume a public identity of their own. Social movements arise from new identities, often forged by intellectuals, and those identities in turn forge new publics. Indeed, sociologists do not need to search far and wide for publics, they are often waiting on our doorsteps.

In constituting a history of the discipline one danger is to introduce a false homogenization, a history written from the standpoint of the privileged. As sociology grew, its institutional base differentiated, so that today sociologists work both inside and outside academia. Those outside tend to occupy positions in government agencies, such as the census bureau or the department of corrections; in consulting companies for human resource management; or in international NGOs. Then, there are sociologists who are employed in professional schools — business schools, public administration, educational schools, agricultural extension, and so forth — where they may engage non-academic audiences. Equally important is the complex hierarchy of the university system which ranges from elite private universities, to the different tiers of state university systems, liberal arts colleges, and two year community colleges. The configuration of the division of sociological labor will vary with a department's location in this system. Thus, in state colleges where teaching takes up so much of one's time, research has a public or policy dimension, often driven by local issues. Based on my attendance at the meetings of state associations, such as the North Carolina Sociological Association, I have found public sociology to be both more widely practiced and more highly valued in state colleges than in most elite departments. I have found projects ranging from research on displaced workers, toxic waste, housing inequalities, and

educational reform, to advocacy for public health campaigns around HIV-AIDS or needle exchange to training community organizers to deal with the media. Sadly, all too often, this public (and policy) sociology, widespread though it may be, remains invisible and unrecognized because its practitioners lack the time or incentive to write it up.

History and hierarchy give one sense of the possible variation in the configuration of the disciplinary field, international comparisons give another. When one travels the world talking about public sociology, one quickly learns just how distinctively American the concept is, marking the unique strength of professional sociology in the U.S. In many countries it is taken for granted that sociology has a public face. Why else be a sociologist? The career of sociology in many Third World countries reflects the succession of different political regimes. One of the first acts of the Pinochet Regime in Chile was to abolish sociology. In South Africa sociology flourished in the late 1970s and 1980s as the anti-apartheid movement grew in strength, just as it has suffered amalgamation and budgetary cuts in the post-apartheid period. Soviet sociology, nonexistent under Stalinism, reappeared in the 1950s as an ideological and surveillance arm of the party state. Sociological opinion research was deployed as a weapon of critique, revealing public discontent in order to justify swings in policy. This instrumental use of sociology comes home to roost in the post-Soviet period where, increasingly, it has become a form of market research. If it is not co-opted or repressed by authoritarian regimes, sociology's reflexive side may sustain critical opposition, as was often the case in Eastern Europe. In the social democratic countries of Scandinavia, by contrast, it is the policy dimension that often stands out. Although when conservative parties assume power, the sociological winds shift direction from policy to public.

Here then are just a few hints at national variation, underlining once again just how peculiar is U.S. sociology. It is not just peculiar, it is also very powerful, dominating the world scene. Accordingly in the international division of sociological labor, professional sociology is concentrated in the resource rich United States, and to a lesser extent in Western Europe, while public sociology has relatively greater strength in the poorer countries — a distribution that mirrors the hierarchy within the U.S. Promoted by the World Bank, this global division of sociological labor effectively disrupts the synergy to be obtained from the articulation of all four types of sociology at a national level. Professional sociology parachutes in from the U.S., remote from the issues that concern local publics and even policy communities. An indigenous professional sociology needs to be elaborated from below that creates national syllabi, research programs, journals, and associational infrastructures on the basis of public engagement with local issues and with the aid of critical sociology. Furthermore, nourishing a transnational sociology of the global South could be a counterweight to the temptations and asymmetries of North-South interchanges. Transnational social movements, whether around human rights,

the environment, women's movements, or labor, could become the foundation of a global public sociology, and a springboard for the critique of U.S. sociology, provincializing its universalistic claims.

Moving from the U.S. and other national configurations to a global division of professional, policy, public and critical sociologies involves projecting the four-fold distinction in Table 1 from a lower unit of analysis to a higher unit of analysis. That is, instead of breaking up a national disciplinary terrain into its component parts, we locate each distinctive national configuration in a global division of labor. It is one example of "fractalizing up." Another instance of upward fractalization is the movement from sociology to other social sciences, distinguishing them by the emphasis they place on the different types of knowledge.

If today economics is especially effective in the policy realm, this is because of the legitimacy it has established as a profession, its unity as a science and its success in constituting its own object of knowledge — the economy. Its power as a policy science is reflected in the tight organization of its profession with its effective gatekeepers, who define and enforce relatively clear standards for the advancement of science. Indeed, economics may be likened to the communist party with its strict ideological controls and international dissemination, whereas sociology is more like an anarcho-syndicalist profession with decentralized participation in a system of democratic councils (its 43 sections). Sections vary in the weight they give to professional, policy, public and critical sociologies. One might say that the theory section is more focused on the professional, that the education section gives more weight to policy, sex, and gender to the public, and Marxism to the critical. Sociology's pluralism and its relatively well developed reflexivity may be a handicap in the policy world, but is an asset in reaching and influencing publics. Within political science the balance between instrumental and reflexive knowledge lies between economics and sociology. Internally it is more divided than economics but less pluralistic than sociology. To complete a map of the social sciences, how much of an exaggeration would it be to claim that economics and political science patrol the policy world, while philosophy dominates the critical world, leaving sociology along with anthropology to engage the public? This upward fractalization from the internal division of each discipline to the configuration of the social sciences is, it hardly needs emphasizing, confined to the postwar period and to the U.S. It looks very different in other countries and at other times.

Finally, we come to the critical question: what are the grounds for claiming sociology's affinity to the public? If political science's distinctive object of study is the state and its value the protection of political order, and if economics has as its distinctive object the economy and its value is the expansion of the market, then sociology's distinctive object is civil society and its value is the resilience and autonomy of the social. Sociology is born with civil society and dies with

civil society. The classical sociology of Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and Pareto arose with the expansion of trade unions, political parties, mass education, voluntary associations at the end of the nineteenth century, just as U.S. sociology was born amidst reform and religious organizations. Sociology disappears with the eclipse of civil society as in fascism, Stalinism or Pinochet's Chile, just as it quickly bubbles to the surface with the unfurling of perestroika in the Soviet Union or the civic and labor associations of South Africa's anti-apartheid movement.

One should beware, however, of a naïve and simplistic coding of the disciplines. Just as each discipline has a dominant project, each is also a contested field. Within political science the perestroika movement has challenged the hegemony of rational choice perspectives, just as economics has its own dissidents declaring the limits of the market, including such distinguished economists as Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz, and Amartya Sen as well as the movement for postautistic economics. Often, the subordinate or dissident movements in both these fields borrow ideas from sociology. No less important, sociology is itself a contested field, reflecting the ambiguity of civil society that reproduces dominations and segmentations, hegemonies and exclusions. Civil society can force markets and states to be democratically accountable, but it can also collude in the reproduction of oppression and inequality, absorbing suffering and diffusing resistance. Critical sociology, therefore, has the urgent task of clarifying the possibilities and dangers of defending civil society as a bulwark against encroachments by state and economy.

The burgeoning interest in public sociology and the unanticipated vote against the war in Iraq suggest to me that the stakes are indeed becoming clearer. In a world tending toward market tyranny and state unilateralism, civil society is at once threatened with extinction and at the same time a major possible hold-out against deepening inequalities and multiplying threats to all manner of human rights. The interest of sociology in the very existence, let alone expansion, of civil society (even with all its warts) becomes the interest of humanity — locally, nationally and globally. If we can transcend our parochialism and recognize our distinctive relation to diverse publics within and across borders, sociologists could yet create the fulcrum around which a critical social science might evolve, one responsive to public issues while at the same time committed to professional excellence.

Notes

1. Figures for public support of the Vietnam War come from Mueller (1973, Table.3.3), while figures for support of Iraq War come from Gallup Polls.

2. This scheme bears some resemblance to Talcott Parsons's four function (AGIL) scheme of adaptation, goal attainment, integration, and latency (pattern maintenance). The survival of any social system requires the performance of all four functions. Critical sociology corresponds to the latency function with its concern for value commitments whereas public sociology corresponds to the community basis of integration where influence is the medium of exchange. One might say that the policy sociology corresponds to goal attainment where the medium of exchange is power. It is difficult to think of professional sociology in the way that Parsons thinks of adaptation, as the economy based on money, since its medium of exchange is better understood as the expert credential. If one were to think in the terms of Pierre Bourdieu one would see disciplines as fields of power, each with their own dominant form of intellectual capital.

3. Another instance of the feminist expert witness unable to convey the complexity of the world was in the gender discrimination suit brought by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) against Sears, Roebuck and Co. Here Alice Kessler-Harris, called by EEOC, found her own scholarship being used (often out of context) against her. She was engaged in an uphill battle to demonstrate that the differential rate of acceptance of women into sales positions was due to employer preferences rather than the qualifications and preferences of female job applicants. Ranged against her argument of equal treatment for men and women was the expert testimony of Rosalind Rosenberg who argued that women are different from men and, therefore, should not be automatically allowed access to men's jobs. See, Ruth Milkman's (1986) excellent account of the predicament Kessler-Harris faced, and the structural bias of the context of the courtroom.

4. I am reminded here of Durkheim's ([1893]1984: book 3, chapter 1) treatment of Comte. Faced with the dissipative tendencies of the division of labor, Comte proposed the restoration of a consensus society with sociology as its new ideological cement. Durkheim maintained that in restoring a strong homogeneous collective conscience Comte was trying to resurrect a past that had disappeared forever, whereas he, Durkheim, proposed to move forward toward a new richer solidarity based on the division of labor, buttressed by a thinner, vaguer and differentiated ethos of social justice and individual dignity. Similarly, in sociology we need to leave behind dreams of a singular research program and instead must move forward to an elaborated division of labor based on a new critical ethos.

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The Vacant “We”: Remarks on Public Sociology*

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Temperamental Incompatibility

I am temperamentally incompatible with public sociology. As an introvert who prefers to deal with things and ideas rather than with people, I avoid activities that engage some public sociologists. When William Gamson and Charlotte Ryan describe their participation in countless meetings over several years discussing media strategies with grass-roots community organizations, my eyes glaze over. I want to go home and take a nap. I feel relief when Burawoy writes “there is no implication that we should all become public sociologists” (Burawoy et al. 2004:125). Thank you, Michael. Public sociology is not for me. I will happily remain in my professional cell. If public sociology is so much a question of personal choice, what could possibly be the matter? Research-oriented professional sociologists have, in fact, legitimate concerns with public sociology. There are concerns with assumptions of a common moral political agenda for sociologists, with the Marxist roots of public sociology, with its emphasis on advocacy, and with the role of public sociology within the American Sociological Association (ASA). I will discuss each of these issues in turn.

The Vacant “We”

The description of public sociology recognizes that practitioners are driven by their own ideological agenda, but it greatly overestimates the uniformity of the moral and political agenda of sociologists. This may be called the “illusion of unanimity.” Propping up the illusion must be important, because Burawoy makes a remarkable attempt to argue for a “natural” set of values for sociologists. He does this by associating the rise of sociology with the emergence of civil

** I am grateful to Robert Conklin, Lee Herring, Arne Kalleberg, Edward McDill, Mette Sørensen, Sy Spilerman, and Cathy Zimmer for contributing in various ways to the realization of this project. The opinions expressed are solely my own. Direct correspondence to François Nielsen, CB 3210, Department of Sociology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599.*

society in the nineteenth century. Since civil society provides the conditions of existence for sociology, the argument goes, it follows that sociology should identify with the values emanating from civil society. This swift line of argumentation is supposed to convince us that sociologists have an inherent collective interest, perhaps even a binding moral duty, to oppose “the erosion of civil liberties, the violation of human rights, the degradation of the environment, the impoverishment of the working class, the spread of disease, the exclusion of ever greater numbers from the means of their existence, and deepening inequalities” (Burawoy et al. 2004:125). Never has the *ought* been derived so glibly from the *is*.

Not satisfied with proclaiming a natural moral imperative for sociology, public sociologists also like to press supposed methodological commonalities into service to construct a factitious “we sociologists,” e.g. draping themselves in the “sociological method,” “the sociological approach,” or “sociological principles” as if they knew what they are talking about; as if *anyone* knew what one is talking about.

The actual diversity of values held by sociologists is illustrated in a sobering anecdote that may be historically distant enough to be neutral relative to current passions. Burawoy identifies with some admiration Marx, Durkheim, and Weber as early practitioners of public sociology. Durkheim and Weber were contemporaries. The biggest event of their adult lives, World War I, provides a quasi-experiment of their reactions as public sociologists. Their reactions are described by Aron ([1967] 1999):

When the war broke out, Durkheim was a passionate French patriot, and his only son died in the war; Max Weber was a passionate German patriot. Both Durkheim and Weber wrote studies on the origin of the war, and neither study adds to its author’s scientific reputation. Although they were scientists, both men were citizens as well. . . . the truth is that there was nothing in Durkheim’s sociology which predisposed him to react differently from any other man. . . . Durkheim reacted, not as the optimistic professor and pupil of Comte, but in the same way as the vast majority of Frenchmen, intellectuals and non-intellectuals alike (pp. 323-4).

These founding figures of sociology, supposedly driven by the lofty moral values of the civil society, in fact each succumbed to the prevalent nationalistic passion for their own country. So much for the ideals of the “transnational civil society” (Burawoy 2004). Why did these early public sociologists disagree concerning the engagement of their respective countries in World War I? Did they not make appropriate use of the sociological method? Was Durkheim’s methodology better than Weber’s, or vice versa? Maybe the reality is just the way Aron suggests, that of two men driven by their own moral-political passion that has nothing whatsoever to do with any privileged sociological insight into the nature of social phenomena. And I suggest that the values espoused by

modern public sociologists are just that also, individual moral values that do not derive any additional authority from the fact that they are espoused by sociologists. Burawoy's attempt to derive a moral obligation for sociologists from alleged roots in the civil society is as much a non sequitur as any other attempt to derive ethical principles from statements about objective reality.

The Genealogy of Public Sociology

One hears of public sociologies more and more just as one hears of Marxist sociology less and less. Is this a coincidence? There would be an interesting study to be made of the overlap in "personnel" between these two approaches. What proportion of public sociologists trace their roots to Marxist sociology? For those who do, why the new identity? By its very existence the Soviet Union, even when criticized by western Marxists as reactionary or misguided, did provide useful support to the status of Marxist intellectuals. There was considerable prestige in being associated, however distantly, with the socialist universe. The Second World (how quickly has this expression aged!) was a permanent reality check for Marxist ideologies. Now that Marxist-Leninist regimes have been rejected by their own people and Europe is littered with unemployed professors of Marxist political economy, identification with Marxism has lost much of its luster.

Marxist sociologists have reacted to the collapse of the Eastern block just like the sect members that Leon Festinger once observed waiting on the hill for the end of the world. When the expected cataclysm did not happen, there was no acknowledgement that anything had been wrong in the faith. Instead there was immediate ideological activity to reinterpret the faith and justify postponement to another day (Festinger, Riecken & Schachter 1956). It seems that the fall of the Berlin Wall has rendered Marxist sociologists speechless. One wonders if public sociology is a new avatar of denial, a new packaging of the old ideas, a new ideological mantle to cover up the embarrassing shortcomings of the "really existing Socialist societies" (Lenski 2001).

Why is the issue of the elective affinity between Marxist ideology and public sociology worth bringing up? As large chunks of the economic foundations of Marxism, including the labor theory of value, have been rejected by Western social scientists and even (more discreetly) by neo-Marxist ones, it takes admirable determination to proclaim today that Marxism is a viable scientific program, as Burawoy (1990) does in an *American Sociological Review* article. (What interesting timing. The Berlin Wall must have fallen between the time the paper was accepted and the time it appeared in print.) Marxism has been most effective not as a scientific approach but as an ideology of social movements. This may be due in large part to the dramatic structure of Marxism, with its underlying struggle between good and evil; it is a dragon-slaking myth

for modern times. Revolutionary Marxism has not produced any just society, but has been exceedingly effective at justifying oppression of the people by an oligarchy. It is opium for the people more potent than any of the traditional religions identified as such by Marx. Thus when I hear Western intellectuals claim inspiration from Marxism, I have lingering suspicions that they might be using Marxist ideology as a vehicle for their own personal advancement and drive for power — under the guise of collective concerns. Is this too paranoid? Perhaps it is, but since there seems to be an overlap of personnel between Marxist sociology and public sociology one would like to hear public sociologists reflect on their own career association with Marxism, and the role this experience has played in their new vocation in public sociology. One feels that ex-Marxists turned public sociologists owe us a debriefing on the lessons they draw from the end of Soviet Marxism; a little *autocritique*, if you wish. This is an area where public sociologists might profitably unleash their “dialogic” yearnings; there is a lot of explaining to do.

Public Sociology and Values

A fundamental feature of public sociology is that it is driven by a moral-political agenda. Notwithstanding Burawoy's blanket assessment of the sociological profession as being politically “left,” the moral-political agenda of individual sociologists are diverse. Even if a high degree of consensus seems to reign at any one time, circumstances will change and issues arise that will activate dormant ideological fractures and precipitate sociologists on different sides, just like World War I did for Durkheim and Weber. Professional sociology is admittedly not value-free either, despite the hopes of some. As psychologist Sandra Scarr (1997:32) writes in relation to effects of intelligence on educational and occupational achievement: “As has been said so many times, *Science is not value-free*, and it operates in a context of disputes about moral/ethical issues of distributive justice and a just society.” But the existence and justification of professional sociology rest on the very attempt to separate the values from the research procedure, to prevent the values from directly affecting research results. This means a constant vigilance to identify values and renounce advocacy in the conduct of research.

Public sociologies do not believe in such arm's length handling of moral values. Public sociologists wallow in values. Because of this basic difference in orientation, I am not as optimistic as Burawoy concerning the prospect of peaceful coexistence, let alone synergistic alliance, between public sociology and professional sociology. With its emphasis on advocacy based on a moral-political agenda, the outlook of public sociologists may be inherently incompatible with that of scientifically or scholarly oriented professional sociologists. The conflict between advocacy for moral political values and the ethics of research is

illustrated by the encounter between the late Alfred McClung Lee (American Sociological Association [ASA] President 1976), whose presidential address Burawoy (2004) cites admiringly, and the late James S. Coleman (ASA President 1992). Coleman was arguably himself a great public sociologist, although maybe not the kind Burawoy has in mind. Coleman's early work on school achievement, the *Coleman Report*, had been received approvingly by the liberal left and the civil rights movement because his results were seen as justifying the use of busing to desegregate school systems (see Coleman 1990). In the mid-1970s Coleman published another study suggesting that massive busing to desegregate urban school systems resulted in "white flight" to the suburbs. The net result of this demographic effect, according to Coleman, was to *increase* residential segregation, especially in urban districts with large black populations. The reaction of the liberal establishment was strident. As Coleman analyzes the situation (1990):

One can understand the outrage with which many advocates of massive desegregation plans . . . greeted the report by recognizing the heterogeneous nature of the coalition on which the social movement depended. Although the principal leaders of the school desegregation movement, black and white, saw this as a movement to establish the rights of blacks in American society, the strength of the support for busing plans depended on the achievement of the announced intention: bringing about effective desegregation. Many of the supporters of desegregation plans supported them for this reason alone . . .

The vehemence with which many of the leaders and most ardent supporters of busing plans greeted the publication of this report stemmed from the report's potential for destroying this heterogeneous coalition by leading those interested only in achieving desegregation to withdraw support: If busing were shown to be ineffective in its announced intention, through its indirect resegregating effects, then the movement would lose a large fraction of the support on which it depended (p. 167).

Alfred McClung Lee, a prominent liberal, took advantage of his position as President of the ASA to mount a campaign against Coleman described as "vicious" by one witness, "irresponsible" by another, and "an ignominious act that almost succeeded" by Sørensen (1991:2). Lee tried (unsuccessfully) to have the ASA censure (i.e., expel) Coleman; he also organized opposition to Coleman's candidacy to the ASA presidency, succeeding in delaying Coleman's election to that position by many years (Bulmer 1996; Coleman 1989).

Posterity will judge the contributions of James S. Coleman and Alfred McClung Lee to sociology. What is instructive in that episode is that a sociologist driven by a strong political agenda was able to use the resources of a professional association of sociologists to mount an attack *ad hominem* against a man whose research results he disliked. Lee did not engage in research to disprove

Coleman's results; he tried to squash the person. Proponents of public sociology will certainly understand that episodes like this one make scientifically oriented sociologists wary. Professional sociologists may well view the public sociologists' emphasis on moral and political values as a potential motive, and ready-made pretense, for disregarding professional standards of scholarship and persecuting researchers who have dared come up with politically incorrect findings.

Public Sociology and the American Sociological Association (ASA)

Despite the above concerns there is no a priori reason why the different kinds of sociologists — the professional ones and the public ones — could not coexist peacefully doing their own thing in relative ignorance of each other, in the same way for example as quantitative and qualitative sociologists often behave today. The possibility of peaceful coexistence may be precluded by the close association between Burawoy's promotion of public sociology and the adoption by the ASA in 2003 of a resolution against the "War against Iraq," which was voted by a majority of 66 percent of voting members. Many among the 34 percent who voted against the resolution, presumably some of those who did not vote, and perhaps even a few who voted in favor, are strongly opposed in principle to the adoption by the ASA of resolutions that are manifestly political in nature. Opponents view resolutions such as these as blatant pieces of partisan politics that are outside the purview of any professional or scholarly association. They feel that the "adoption" of such resolutions by the ASA abusively associates their name with a political opinion with which they disagree, represents contemptuous disregard for their minority opinion, and really aims at suppressing dissent among members under cover of a false unanimity.

The Iraq resolution was sponsored by another association, Sociologists Without Borders (SWB), that has since confirmed its partisan credentials by endorsing a Global Defeat Bush Network (SWB at <http://www.sociologistswithoutborders.org/> [accessed 2 April 2004]). Even though the Iraq resolution did not originate in the public sociology movement, the movement is perceived as closely associated with it. Public sociology has thereby made enemies of many professionally oriented members who dislike having their personal opinions on political issues preempted by a vote of their professional association, an organization to which they have not surrendered any such right.

The practice of public sociology does not necessitate endorsement or sponsoring by the ASA, as the paradigms of public sociology described in Burawoy et al. (2004) clearly show, so it seems at first that this is a fight the public sociology movement is picking up gratuitously. Has the movement painted itself into a corner by its association with the Iraq resolution,

compromising its own goals of legitimation and weakening the ASA in the process?

How does the Iraq resolution threaten the ASA? A parallel may be useful. Without in the least impugning Michael Burawoy's drinking habits, about which I know nothing, I would like to suggest that he take a serious look at Alcoholics Anonymous (AA). This voluntary association, founded in 1935, has been immensely successful. AA currently has chapters in 150 countries of the world, more than 100,000 local groups, and over 2 million members (AA World Services at <http://www.alcoholics-anonymous.org/> accessed March 2004). Surely one would expect that AA would take advantage of its unique expertise in matters of alcohol abuse to take positions on such issues as the causes and treatment of alcoholism, drinking age regulation, drinking and driving, the organization of treatment centers, advertising for alcoholic beverages, and many more. Readers will be forgiven for not remembering AA's latest position on these issues: AA does not have any. As a matter of organizational tradition, AA eschews any public position on anything it considers an outside issue, i.e. anything that is not directly related to personal recovery from alcoholism. Bill W., the organizational genius who co-founded AA, embodied that wisdom in the "10th tradition of AA," which reads "Alcoholics Anonymous has no opinion on outside issues; hence the A.A. name ought never be drawn into public controversy." This radical minimalism is the secret of AA's organizational longevity. AA would be infinitely better justified, on grounds of expertise, to take positions on matters of alcohol abuse than the ASA is concerning the war in Iraq. By renouncing the taking of positions on *any* public issue, AA permits internal diversity of opinion among members, at once minimizing centrifugal forces that might threaten organizational unity and eliminating contention with outside forces (Kurtz 1988; Seabright & Delacroix 1996).

Burawoy recognizes that most professional organizations, unlike the ASA, have bylaws that exclude political activities such as the Iraq resolution from the purview of the organization. This suggests that other professional organizations have, like AA, grasped a principle of organization theory that the ASA has not, namely that taking positions on outside issues is a major threat to the survival of voluntary organizations. This blind spot is rather ironic, since a good case can be made that organization theory rightfully "belongs" to the field of sociology. Members who have been offended by the Iraq resolution are now contemplating their options. If the ASA continues to engage in political activities, there will be a strong motivation on the part of many to either (1) organize within the ASA for annulment of the Iraq resolution and the exclusion of political activities in the future, or (2) resign from the ASA and join, or become more active in, other professional associations that refrain from politics. (There is a wide choice among regional sociological associations, research committees of the International Sociological Association, and

interdisciplinary associations), or (3) participate in the creation of a new, purely professional and scholarly sociological association in the U.S. as an alternative to the ASA.


One might think that proponents of public sociology would see the dangers of bringing in controversy over political issues within the ASA and refrain from doing this for the sake of preserving unity within the association. The potential benefit does not seem worth it. What can they possibly gain in pursuing an aggressive strategy of control within the association, except for the right of engaging in their chosen activities, a right they already have? There is, in fact, an advantage to be gained by taking control of the association. The prize is editorial control of the ASA publications, in particular the *American Sociological Review* (ASR). There is a potential windfall here, as editorial control might open the pages of ASR to public sociology pieces, and perhaps even set up a quota of pages reserved for public sociology. (Maybe new terms will be needed: ASR might soon be publishing "editorials," "pamphlets," and "manifestos," alongside "articles" and "commentaries.") Is this far-fetched? It may be relevant to recall that when Michael Burawoy was Chair of the Publications Committee of the ASA a few years ago he tried to impose the committee's choice of editorial team for ASR, and resigned in protest when that attempt failed. Maybe professional sociologists do have reason to worry.

Conclusions

Because it promotes advocacy based on moral political values and overestimates the consensus on values, and because there are unresolved issues concerning its association with a Marxist political agenda, public sociology does not fit easily within a profession oriented to norms of scientific-scholarly objectivity. Despite this awkwardness, public sociology could conceivably coexist with professional sociology on the basis of a mutual agreement to let everyone carry out their chosen activities without interference. Coexistence may not be possible because of the close association of public sociology with the successful attempt to force adoption of a partisan position concerning the 2003 war in Iraq — a "resolution" in the name of the entire membership of the ASA — and an apparent attempt by the leader of the movement to seize editorial control of a major ASA journal. These events can be expected to generate growing resistance against the legitimation of public sociology by professionally oriented sociologists opposed to further politicization of the ASA.

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Why Public Sociology May Fail*

DAVID BRADY, *Duke University*

When first confronted with this year's ASA theme of public sociology, I thought there was nothing controversial. I figured "public sociology" would be a positive, if vacuous, theme — one we could all agree upon. The early indications were that my hunch was correct. Much of the public sociology rhetoric seemed to be preaching to the choir. Most sociologists would agree that sociology should have a larger public role in society. While other ASA presidential addresses (e.g., Gans 1989) have raised this topic before, Burawoy could rally the troops and boost our morale. One of the most important things that public sociology might accomplish is to undermine the pessimistic view that the discipline of sociology is in steep decline.¹ In some of Burawoy's recent work, this is, in fact, what we find.

If those are Burawoy's goals, I think he might succeed.² By other criteria, however, I am afraid public sociology will fail. The failure of public sociology will be driven mainly by serious shortcomings in its agenda and program. In what follows, I begin by clarifying the value and meaning of public sociology. Then, I discuss five reasons why I anticipate that Burawoy's public sociology may fail.

The Value and Meaning of Public Sociology

To clarify, I am positive about the idea of sociology becoming a more public social science (Wilson 1993). I would be delighted to learn that I was wrong about Burawoy's public sociology. Nevertheless, some elements of public sociology need to be clarified. The confusion over some of these elements has, in my view, been a major source of the skeptical reactions. So, the first part of this commentary is a defense of Burawoy.

It seems to me that public sociology essentially involves two ideas: reaching a public audience and serving to improve the public's well-being. I would argue

** This article was prepared for the North Carolina Sociological Association meetings. I thank Cathy Zimmer for sponsoring the panel and inviting my participation. Thanks also go to Michael Burawoy, Francois Nielsen, and Charles Tittle and the members of the NCSA for a stimulating discussion. Direct correspondence to David Brady, Department of Sociology, Box 90088, Duke University, Durham, NC, 27708. E-mail: brady@soc.duke.edu.*

that all sociologists either are in agreement with these goals or should be. Supporters of public sociology may respond that these two claims are sufficiently innocuous that they do not warrant mention. Still, I hope skeptics and critics of public sociology keep these in mind.

The first matter — reaching a public audience — involves gaining a broader and larger reception for sociological research and theories. In short, a public audience includes anyone beyond the discipline of sociology. Realistically, all sociologists would appreciate more readers of their scholarship. Even if the broader public audience is merely limited to other social science disciplines, even critics of public sociology would welcome this. If sociologists want the opportunity to reach a broader audience, then they are implicitly wanting to be public sociologists in at least one form. Many times, sociologists — even those most skeptical of public sociology — desire the opportunity to have power holders and adversarial disciplines as audience members. All Burawoy is doing is calling for our audience to include mass democratic publics along with those that are normally welcome.³ Ultimately, if one seeks a public audience (of any kind), this seems consistent with public sociology.

The second matter — serving to improve the public's well-being — involves seeking to contribute to the betterment of society and the lives of its members. This may strike more readers as controversial. Others may be concerned that if one is seeking to change the world, one cannot be a serious scholar. However, I do not think public sociology necessitates a utopian vision. Rather, public sociology is simply the acknowledgement that sociology must *ultimately* seek to improve the lives of people.⁴ The betterment of society can be indirect, remote and in the very long run. But, we should aim for a lasting outcome to sociological research that links to improved human well-being. This does not necessitate that sociologists engage in immediate direct action. But sociology must maintain at least an indirect connection to improving society. As Durkheim (1984) wrote in *The Division of Labor in Society* that,

Yet, because what we propose to study is above all reality, it does not follow that we should give up the idea of improving it. We would esteem our research not worth the labour of a single hour if its interest were merely speculative. If we distinguish carefully between theoretical and practical problems it is not in order to neglect the latter category. On the contrary, it is in order to put ourselves in a position where we can better resolve them. (xxvi)

Relatedly, if critics respond that theory and research need no connection to improving society, I would ask: why should public resources be used to support sociology? If there is absolutely no connection between sociology and public well-being, sociology may be profoundly undeserving of research grants (especially government funds), tuition dollars, administrative support, and land-grant campus space. If sociology does not maintain even a distant connection with improving society, the public has no responsibility to support

our discipline. Surely, there is a better use of tax revenue than transferring it to the well-being of middle-class professionals with no concern for public society. I anticipate that most readers endorse the public support that sociology receives. I question whether it is contradictory, however, that some sociologists prefer to remain completely detached from public society while at the same time completely dependent on public resources. I raise for debate the question that if we support public sociological funding of research, we have a consequential responsibility to public sociology.⁵ All that public sociology is doing is calling on sociologists to recognize this responsibility. Perhaps we should even embrace it.

The Shortcomings of Public Sociology

Despite my hope for public sociology, I am afraid that Burawoy's agenda for public sociology will fail. There are five reasons for this: there are no concrete proposals for practice; there are no incentives in professional sociology; civil society is not problematized; the state is demonized; and there are no tangible measures of success.

NO CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR PRACTICE

One of the contributions of Gans's (1989) earlier presidential address for public sociology was his set of proposals for practice. Among other matters, Gans suggested that undergraduate sociology classes should focus on the analysis of institutions (e.g., church, school, government, etc.); the discipline should recruit and encourage public intellectuals; we should revitalize social criticism; and we need to get more sociology into the media.⁶ While there may be limitations to Gans's plan, this was a valuable contribution. Unfortunately, Burawoy does not offer any set of concrete proposals for practice. After the ASA meetings, many of us may be wondering how we can pragmatically implement public sociology.

The examples of successful public sociology that Burawoy has offered are rather unconvincing. Most are individual cases of a dedicated sociologist toiling away. Few present a program that can practically be generalized to other settings and adopted by other sociologists. One of Burawoy's examples of public sociology is the ASA's new magazine, *Contexts*. To be clear, I think this is a wonderfully engaging, well-written, intellectually rich journal. Also, I think the journal has been extremely successful in presenting an alternative for members of our discipline. However, I doubt it is accomplishing the goal of being a forum for sociology to reach a broader public. I am afraid this journal is not really accomplishing Burawoy's idealized public sociology.⁷ After looking in many different cities over a substantial period of time, I finally found *Contexts* in a

bookstore. Unfortunately, the bookstore was in Greenwich Village and the price was ten dollars. Both of these guarantee that very few nonsociologists will ever buy or read it. Ultimately, I am skeptical that *Contexts* has reached a broader public beyond our discipline (see also Best 2004).

For public sociology to make a real impact, we need a concrete set of proposals. We need practical steps that individual sociologists and departments can implement. At the North Carolina Sociological Association (NCSA) meetings, Burawoy called on sociologists to engage in debate over potential practical proposals. This may be a good thing. But I would also argue that the president has an incumbent responsibility to lead on this matter as well. One step might be for the ASA president to challenge *Contexts* to reach a broader audience beyond sociology.⁸ Another step might be for Burawoy to identify successful strategies for the public presentation of sociology. As mentioned above, one of the recurring difficulties of public sociology is that the presentation of research and theory to a broader public often leads to diluted and counterproductive debate (Best 2004; Schram 2002; Stacey 2004). Surely, however, there have been successful attempts to reach a broader audience. Burawoy could lead by distilling general lessons learned from the disparate individual cases and articulating the patterns among those who have successfully reached a broader audience.⁹ Hopefully, others can propose additional concrete proposals. Without realistic means by which to achieve the goals of public sociology, I am afraid it will not make much of a difference. For public sociology to have an impact, we need a plan.

NO INCENTIVES IN PROFESSIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Perhaps the biggest problem that public sociology faces is that there are few rewards for it in professional sociology. I am not a rational choice theorist. But I think we need to take seriously the lack of incentives for public sociology within most universities. Most scholars' (and especially young scholars') lives are focused on two things: managing the exigencies that dominate our time, and attempting to meet the professional standards of our disciplines and departments. Much of our time is taken up by exigencies: writing letters of recommendation, service work, advising students, pushing paperwork, etc. Though these activities are, of course, crucial, they often leave time for little else. The remainder of our time is justifiably used to publish scholarship that will get us raises, promotions, prestige, and advance the intellectual enterprise. Our scholarly pursuits are often framed within the relatively clear incentive system that our discipline and departments construct: publish in mainstream sociology journals, publish books at "big" university presses, and so on. Regardless of whether this incentive system is justifiable, the reality is that faculty are not likely to deviate from this unless new incentives emerge for

public sociology.¹⁰ I am skeptical that this will occur, and without new incentives for public sociology, I imagine that public sociology will remain an island within academia.

In Gans's (1989) presidential address, he called on sociology to recruit and encourage public intellectuals. He asserted that public intellectuals should be more than popularizers. He argued that they should be empirical researchers, analysts or theorists that are particularly thoughtful, imaginative, and original. And they should have three key traits: communicating in simple college-educated English, have a breadth of sociological and intellectual interests, and avoid the pitfalls of undue professionalism. Burawoy's arguments seem consistent with Gans on this issue. The problem is that it appears that sociology has not changed significantly since Gans's call. So I am skeptical that sociologists will eschew the disciplinary incentive system and respond to Burawoy's new call for public sociologists. To be fair, Burawoy deserves credit for trying to change our discipline's norms on this matter, and if he is successful, his efforts may do something to change the culture of sociology.

CIVIL SOCIETY IS NOT PROBLEMATIZED

The major domain in which Burawoy anticipates sociology making a contribution is in civil society. In fact, Burawoy (n.d.) has argued that civil society is "indeed the only, terrain for sociologists to organize their public initiatives," and "states and markets are of great interest to sociologists but from the standpoint of their connection to civil society." However, he offers little evidence for his claims of the primacy of civil society. Instead, Burawoy (2004) just asserts that sociology has a comparative advantage in civil society and that "Sociology is born with civil society and dies with civil society." Instead of bold assertions, it may do us well to appraise what has been learned about how intellectuals or sociology can shape civil society from the vibrant literature on civil society. Without empirical evidence, I am skeptical that sociologists can have much impact on U.S. civil society. I am more confident of this potential in other countries.

Civil society in the U.S. today is hardly the idealistic public sphere that Burawoy romanticizes. The civil societies of New York City or Berkeley are radically, even entirely, different from the civil societies in which the vast majority of Americans live. It is ironic that Burawoy presented this address in North Carolina, the state with the lowest unionization rates in the U.S. By contrast, California has a relatively strong, if recently battered, labor movement. Burawoy (n.d.) presents California's Institute of Labor and Employment as a model of academic-civil society collaboration. However, the efforts for labor mobilization that we see in California would probably fail in North Carolina (and maybe the entire U.S. South). That is to say, our successful cases of civil

society may not extrapolate to a broader set of cases. We may even be counterproductive if we sample on the dependent variable — focusing attention on civil society success stories — and attempt to infer a process by which to influence civil society. Moreover, we may be unrealistically misguided by neglecting how academic-civil society collaboration often fails.

Though it remains open to debate whether civil society is declining in the U.S., U.S. civil society hardly seems the ideal domain for the progressive politics that Burawoy and most sociologists would hope to cultivate. In fact, U.S. civil society contains very reactionary, extremist, and exclusionary movements. After all, U.S. civil society is the wellspring for the teaching of creationism in public schools, the militia movement, and the religious right. Burawoy (n.d.) idealistically suggests that feminism has shown the way for intellectuals to change civil society. But it seems that Burawoy neglects the resistance and backlash against feminism that is so present in civil society. Also, Burawoy's hope for civil society seems to neglect the widespread disinterest and apathy for politics in the U.S. By and large, it is very difficult today for sociologists to get their students even remotely interested in, much less passionate about, politics. Hence, I doubt that civil society would be receptive to the sociological imagination or the progressive politics that often go with it.

THE STATE IS DEMONIZED

Burawoy's romanticization of civil society is even more striking when one compares it with his unbalanced indictment of the state. Burawoy's public sociology appears thoroughly hostile to the state. Burawoy (n.d) even deploys Ashcroftian political rhetoric by referring to the "terrorist state" and "terrorizing states" (Burawoy et al. 2004).¹¹ Burawoy does not even acknowledge the many good things that a state can accomplish if guided by sociological research and theory. This appears to be part of a broader Marxist tendency to almost nihilistically deny that the state can do any good at all. Of course, sociologists have shown how the state can reduce poverty, fight disease, enhance well-being, and educate children. In this era of welfare retrenchment and neoliberal privatization, is sociology really best served by demonizing the state?

Burawoy (2004) extends this unbalanced indictment of the state by disdaining "policy" sociology. He begins by constructing a false dichotomy between public and policy sociology — even though he later recognizes that, "There is no watertight distinction between public and policy sociology." He also arbitrarily places success stories under the label of "public" sociology when they could just as easily be labeled "policy" sociology (research on displaced workers, toxic waste, housing inequalities, and educational reform, to advocacy for public health campaigns around HIV-AIDS or needle exchange to training community organizers to deal with the media). One might wonder if the

boundary that Burawoy draws between public and policy sociology is any less problematic than the boundaries that he has criticized professional sociologists for constructing between professional and public.

Even more problematically, Burawoy (2004) unfairly caricatures policy sociologists by arguing that they are "putting values up for sale" since "expertise is sold for a fee" in an instrumental contractual relationship with a client or "patron." Burawoy and colleagues (2004:104-105) also implies policy sociologists are "a servant of power . . . trapped in the dictates of money or power." Would Burawoy have us believe that all criminologists, poverty researchers, medical sociologists, and applied sociologists working for the government are "putting values up for sale?" This is a crude and unreasonable way to define Ph.D. sociologists I know who work on youth and family violence at the Center for Disease Control. I hope that I am reading him incorrectly here, because Burawoy is precariously close to impugning the integrity of sociologists who do any form of policy or evaluation research.

Burawoy (et al. 2004:127) writes, "When it comes to policy, we cannot compete with economists." This defeatist view neglects that if we leave policy to the economists, many sociologists would be uncomfortable with the results. Are economists the only ones who have something valuable to contribute to policy on poverty, health care, education, etc.? For that matter, are sociologists really in agreement with the theoretical, methodological, and political assumptions that economists would bring to policy work? I would argue that sociologists have something very different and valuable to contribute to policy. For example, status attainment stratification sociologists have provided convincing evidence that much of one's socioeconomic status is inherited. I hope those sociologists do not remain silent when calls are made to repeal the estate tax.

NO TANGIBLE MEASURES OF SUCCESS

The final concern I have with Burawoy's public sociology is that he offers no tangible measures of success. I would encourage readers to reflect upon this ASA theme ten years from now, and I expect they will confront a dilemma of vague uncertainty. How will we know if public sociology has succeeded? We need to have some clear indications of success or failure. Burawoy can lead as ASA president by setting some measurable goals. Certainly, some change will have to be an amorphous cultural change that is notoriously difficult to assess. Nevertheless, we need to have something that can be measured to judge progress. In my opinion, these goals should be measurable and ambitious.

Related to my first criticism of public sociology, I think there is a link between the lack of concrete proposals for practice and the lack of tangible measures for success. It is doubly problematic that public sociology lacks both

a plan and a goal. Articulating some tangible measures of success will force us to craft a concrete plan, and any concrete plans should be oriented by those goals.

Conclusion

Public sociology seems an admirable grand theme. But, as is often the case, grand themes can be less promising upon close inspection. Though I appreciate the central ideas of public sociology — reaching a public audience and serving the public society — I am afraid that public sociology will fail. As I stated at the outset, I would be pleased to look back in ten years on this theme and article, and conclude that I was wrong about the potential success of public sociology. But I would argue that public sociology's limitations are serious: no concrete proposals for practice; no incentives in professional sociology; civil society is not problematized; the state is marginalized; and no tangible measures of success. The first and last of these limitations could be correctable. The middle two may be more fundamental theoretical problems with Burawoy's public sociology. Ultimately, the fortunes of public sociology look limited.

Notes

1. One noteworthy feature of the pessimistic view of disciplinary decline is its ahistoricism (Ault 1997). In several prior historical periods, prominent sociologists have made almost identical arguments about sociology's decline. Twenty years ago, former ASA president Blalock (1985:256) complained about "laissez-faire graduate-training" as the source of our discipline's decline. Blalock (1987:19) later elaborated, "Our expectations are simply too low, and, as a result, we do not attract the kinds of undergraduate majors and graduate students that we believe we deserve." Blalock (1987: 20) added, "What I do not see in sociology curricula, either at the graduate or undergraduate levels, are what I would characterize as tough, intellectual challenges of the type that a student in mathematics or physics encounters. These are challenges that push the student to the limit of his or her abilities and that require a sustained effort to master." If pessimists are correct, they need to account for why prior pessimism does not square with the present vibrancy of the field (the number of undergraduate majors, academic jobs, etc.). Also, if contemporary pessimists were trained in the era Blalock considered (1970s & 1980s), one may wonder how they would have perceived Blalock's criticisms at the time.
2. I do not mean to completely downplay the role of ASA president for boosting disciplinary morale. Certainly, the ASA president can be effective simply by productively affirming and publicly presenting the value and contribution of sociology.
3. Of course, attempting to communicate with a broader public has the danger of diluting one's scholarship — or worse, even functioning to legitimate the status quo (Best 2004;

Schram 2002; Stacey 2004). However, as I argue below, this is a dilemma we should attempt to overcome.

4. This is meant to be consistent with Wilson's (1993) call for sociology for the public agenda.

5. For that matter, what is the point of teaching undergraduates sociology if it has absolutely no connection to people's well-being? This second issue is actually quite uncontroversial when one considers that many other fields (e.g., economics, medicine, psychology, public policy, etc.) presume that their work has some ultimate potential to improve public society. I imagine that most economists, for example, do not believe that social science should exist solely for itself. I should acknowledge that this point has origins in Gans's (1989) claims that sociology should focus on salient issues and subjects, that sociologists should debunk common misconceptions and myths, and that sociology should do more study of current events (also Wilson 1993).

6. At the end of every semester when I am teaching undergraduate research methods, I have my students read Gans's address. Compared to professors, my students have consistently been far more enthusiastic about the potential of public sociology and far less tolerant of the view that sociology is incapable of achieving it.

7. An exception to this may be that Contexts is a very useful teaching resource, so it may be reaching the "public" of undergraduates.

8. I am skeptical about Burawoy and colleagues' (2004:126) suggestion of "including articles of a public sociology within the *American Sociological Review* or *Social Problems*." On one hand, this could be like the "Practice" section of the *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* (the official journal of the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management). On the other hand, I doubt extradisciplinary broader publics will read *American Sociological Review* or *Social Problems*.

9. There is a literature that may prove instructive in this analysis (Campbell 2002).

10. Let me be clear, it is an open question as to whether fundamentally challenging the incentive system of professional sociology — so as to elevate the rewards for public sociology — is always a good or bad thing. While I am positive about public sociology, we need to be careful to not foster a "star" system where academic celebrities are privileged regardless of the actual quality of their scholarship or value of their contributions. It is a realistic possibility that attempts to move the discipline's incentive system might highlight self-indulgent celebrities at the expense of solid scholars who are less self-promoting, photogenic, or television friendly.

11. While disdaining the state, Burawoy (n.d) appears internally inconsistent since he calls for democratic socialism (marriage of state and society over market?) and routinely cites Karl Polanyi, whose key contribution was to emphasize how the state guides the market. Also, the ASA meetings program that Burawoy has helped construct features public intellectuals that have all clearly and directly engaged the state (Cardoso, Ehrenreich, Krugman, Piven, Robinson and Wilson).

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The Arrogance of Public Sociology*

CHARLES R. TITTLE, *North Carolina State University*

My job is to introduce a little tension into an otherwise harmonious system. Public sociology, along with its cousin policy sociology, are currently very popular. My guess is that the vast majority of the audience is in agreement with Burawoy's call for an enlargement of public sociology. And I suspect that most people in the U.S. today who call themselves sociologists somehow want to be molders of society. It is important, therefore, to challenge some issues implied by the call for more public sociology.

Yet, criticizing Burawoy's argument in a cogent way is difficult because his position is not entirely clear. Because what he means by "public sociology" is somewhat problematic, almost anything I say can be countered by a disclaimer that the object of my comment is not, in fact, part of his position or that it is not what he meant. Nevertheless, I will react to what I understand his points to be and to what I interpret his statements about public sociology to imply.

As I understand it, Burawoy argues that (1) public sociology bears an interactive and mutually stimulating relationship with other forms of sociology, particularly what he calls "professional sociology," (2) public sociology is a desirable activity to be encouraged; indeed, that it is vital to the health of the entire sociological enterprise, (3) public sociology depends on a base of strong professional sociology and that the two are not fundamentally incompatible. Further, from his remarks here and from his writings, I gather that public sociology encompasses many things, including: (1) engagement in political activities to promote somebody's conception (I guess his) of social justice, (2) actively revealing to nonprofessional audiences the knowledge that sociologists think they have or the truths they think they know, (3) orienting our research and writing around moral issues, (4) engaging the public in debate about moral questions based on sociological insights, and (5) helping various "publics" solve problems or gather information relevant to their concerns, or helping to create such publics.

If my interpretation of the meaning of "public sociology" is correct, then a program encouraging sociologists to become more "public" would appear to be a mistake. In my opinion, "public sociology" (1) involves some false assumptions, (2) endangers what little legitimacy sociology has, thereby helping

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to undermine the chances of sociological knowledge ever being taken seriously in public arenas, and (3) is, in fact, incompatible with good "professional sociology." Moreover, urging "public sociology" is contrary to one of the bases of a good society that Burawoy would probably endorse — participation on a more or less equal basis by all citizens.

Before setting forth my reasoning about these matters, I want to make it clear that I believe in the power of morality. I believe that moral questions are and ought to be at the center of human life, and that moral education is highly desirable. I take a back seat to no one in concerns for human suffering or the state of contemporary societies. Moreover, I believe that sociology and other social sciences hold the promise of providing information and insights that ultimately can be used to manipulate social conditions. My complaint with public sociology does not stem from lack of feeling or from lack of concern about the human condition. Rather, it flows from what I regard as defects in the notion itself.

First, public sociology appears to embrace some dubious assumptions. Advocates seem to think that what is "socially just" is clear and easily agreed upon among people with good will or sociological training. Actually, almost every social issue involves moral dilemmas, not moral clarity. What is or is not "just" is almost never unambiguous. Two examples will illustrate the point. In one of his writings Burawoy lists preventing the spread of disease as one of the goals of a just society and therefore one to be pursued by "public" sociologists. On a superficial level, most people would readily agree. Preventing diseases, however, often involves restrictions on human freedom and hard decisions about allocation of scarce products or services. During the rise of the AIDS epidemic, for instance, a strong effort to suppress any form of nonmarital sex probably would have helped prevent the spread of that disease. But, does sociological training, or the fact of being a sociologist, provide any basis for deciding whether restricting freedom is better than chancing a possible disease epidemic? Do sociologists have any way of knowing the proper tradeoff of sacrificing X amount of freedom for saving Y number of lives? Or consider the case of vaccinations against disease. Almost every vaccine itself kills or injures a certain number of people. Does sociology equip us to know how many people should be sacrificed in order to save a given number of potential victims of the disease? Does sociology give us any basis for judging which diseases are worth costly efforts at prevention? I do not think it does. And because it does not, there is no reason to imagine that sociologists have a claim to superiority in questions of "social justice," or even to imagine that sociologists themselves agree. To assume that we do have such superiority and to expect people to accord us respect on that basis is really quite arrogant.

Moreover, the notion of "public sociology" assumes that sociologists actually have good knowledge that can be applied to human problems. In fact, however,

our supposed knowledge is quite shaky. In the two areas of sociology about which I know the most, criminology and urban sociology, there is not a single issue about which even a modestly demanding critic could be convinced. For example, despite what some of my professional colleagues would like to believe, we cannot say with even reasonable certainty what causes crime, we do not know with much assurance whether or under what conditions arresting domestic abusers deters their future misconduct, we do not know whether gun control prevents violence, and we do not even know for sure the extent to which the death penalty curbs capital crime. In every case, there is conflicting evidence. This is not surprising since research is limited, and our data are always incomplete, error prone, and accepted as supporting an argument if it simply shows something "better than chance." Indeed, most sociologists are thrilled to explain 25% of the variance in some dependent variable.

Yet many of us want to go forth to tell others what to do about crime or help them to arrive at the same conclusions we currently hold. The fact is, criminologists and other sociologists are as likely to be wrong as right and in the process they can easily cause damage. Here we are not talking about innocuous outcomes but instead about matters of human life, safety, and freedom. Being wrong can be very costly. To my way of thinking it is not acceptable to dismiss such damage by saying that we simply act on what we think we know at a given point in time. Knowledge evolves from the accumulation of large bodies of research evidence collected with the guidance of theoretical direction. One, or even several studies, do not make a science. What we think we know today may prove contrary to what we learn tomorrow, as has been shown in so many instances. Knowing this, why would we assume that we now have sufficient knowledge to share with the public and why would we assume that lay persons are equipped to judge the strength of the evidence?

In addition to its questionable assumptions, public sociology is a bad idea because it endangers what little legitimacy sociology currently has, which is precious little. When we do public sociology, especially when we collectively do it by acting as an association, we shift our collective status from generators of knowledge to advocates of one thing or another. And, even if the positions we advocate may be "right," by advocating them we become just another interest group in competition with the legions of interest groups already out there. If we define ourselves as an interest group, we can expect to be treated like other interest groups; that is, we will be credible only if we have money or influence over a large electoral bloc. Sociology has neither of those and almost certainly never will have. Instead, our claim to credibility must rest on the reliable body of knowledge that we may accumulate. At the moment, though, sociologists do not have that body of reliable knowledge and the public pretense that we do actually undermines any hope of influencing society or of obtaining the support necessary for developing such knowledge. Lay people know we have weak knowledge and in response they accord us little credibil-

ity. We, in turn, continually undermine the little respect we might otherwise have by trying to promote our ideas (a form of ideology) in the guise of superior knowledge. Most of the time we actually do not know as much as we pretend and even when there is a chance we might provide or compile useful information, people do not trust us. One of the more fascinating pieces I have read recently traces a debate in the legislature of a state noted for its educated population. The debate concerned a bill to restore the death penalty, which had previously been rescinded. The record is clear in showing that the legislators did not regard sociologists or criminologists as scientists, did not believe their research, and most of all, did not trust their motives in interpreting accumulated research and setting forth its implications. In the end the legislators ignored the testimony of the social scientists and restored the death penalty. Similarly, many states and the federal government have embraced capital punishment despite the fact that the American Society of Criminology, composed mostly of sociologists, has had an official position in opposition to capital punishment for a long time (the one and only official position ever taken by that association).

Thus, if we ever expect our work to influence society, we must gain public credibility by building a body of reliable knowledge. But building such a body of knowledge is actually inhibited by the commitments involved in public sociology. The most useful and reliable knowledge is likely to be that developed following the canons of science. Those canons are not value free but instead tout a particular set of values — those of science. Scientific values require theory that, in the case of sociology, is designed to explain human behavior and social organization as well as changes to each. It mandates that such theory be thoroughly tested and confirmed by empirical studies in which the possibility of negative evidence is seriously entertained. Finally, it demands that such work satisfy a community of critics who are themselves trained in the rigors of science. To the extent that we orient our work around moral principles, we are less likely to attend to theoretical issues. The greater the extent to which we favor particular outcomes, the less able are we to design our work to actually access such outcomes. And the more ideologically oriented our objectives, the less the chance that we can recognize or assimilate contrary evidence. In other words, rather than good professional sociology being mutually interactive with public sociology, I believe that public sociology gets in the way of good professional sociology. Moreover, if sociologists cannot neutralize the intrusion of other, personal, values into the process of knowledge building — through such techniques as peer review, rewarding those who design research to reveal things contrary to their personal values, and training in the rigors of science — the enterprise is inherently doomed, further weakening a claim to credibility.

Even the objective of helping various “publics” solve problems or helping them to gather information relevant to their concerns threatens to further erode the public image of sociology and appears to offer little help in the larger

project of building reliable knowledge. "Publics" usually begin with a set of interests they want affirmed, or the public sociologist tells them what those interests ought to be. To the extent that they want sociologists' help, they want us to find evidence that supports those interests. Publics rarely want to find the "truth" in the sense of looking at the full array of positive and negative evidence. Are the sociologists then free to pursue the evidence fully or are they simply handmaidens of their clients? What do public sociologists do if the research contradicts the initial contentions or assumptions of the public being served (if such a thing is even possible when doing public sociology). Recently a public sociologist presented some of his work to my department. Seems he was called in by a community group because they believed they were suffering from pollution from a particular source. They wanted him to find supportive evidence they could use as ammunition to fight back in court and in the legislative halls. Presumably they did not want him to find out if they were the victims of pollution; they wanted him to show that they were. Not surprisingly, he assisted his clients by providing data supporting their position. But, I could not help but wonder, given his moral bent, whether he had allowed or even could have allowed sufficiently for the possibility that pollution was not occurring or was not due to the culprit that the clients wanted indicted. Indeed, I wondered how he would have mollified the clients had his research turned up evidence contrary to their desires. Would he have simply ignored or suppressed it?

Finally, to urge that we should engage societal processes as sociologists rather than as citizens is contrary to the principles of participatory democracy. In my opinion, everybody has a duty to be a public person and in performing that duty people employ knowledge, values, and skills obtained in many ways, sometimes through specific training as a sociologist. But to imagine that sociologists, qua sociologists, should exercise more influence in public affairs than other citizens is to embrace a form of inequality that in other contexts Burawoy would probably abhor. Moreover, for individuals to engage in public activities wearing hats identifying themselves as sociologists is often a ploy to claim respect that is not deserved. Better that we have two hats — one we wear while performing as sociologists and another we don in our roles as citizens. And it is far better that we wear these respective hats at different times and in different contexts, not at the same time.

In summary, if public sociology encompasses the activities that I have surmised that it does, it is not a desirable thing. It assumes an unjustified moral superiority. It jeopardizes accomplishment of goals that would make sociology genuinely useful. It is somewhat dishonest in claiming more than can be delivered and in the process undermines sociological credibility. And it often patronizes those outside the profession.

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Book Reviews

The European Union: A Political Sociology.

By Chris Rumford. Blackwell Publishing, 2002. 312 pp. Paper, \$9.95.

Reviewer: LIAM O'DOWD, Queen's University Belfast

European Union (EU) studies is now a major interdisciplinary field, albeit one where sociology is seriously underrepresented. In assessing the EU through the prism of a critical, and at times combative, evaluation of leading perspectives in political sociology, Rumford's book is a welcome and stimulating addition to the literature. The book will be most accessible to those with a good grasp of recent theoretical debates around globalization, the nation-state, civil society, and new forms of transnational governance. Indeed, in places, the book appears to be more focused on what the EU can tell us about political sociology than on what the latter can tell us about the EU.

In one form or another the cross-disciplinary paradigms dominating EU studies pose questions about the extent to which the EU is a product, or the "Other," of the nation-state. Rumford seeks to break with this thinking by asking different questions — what the variety of forms are that the "government" of the EU takes and what the range of agencies and partners are involved in the business of governing. Drawing on a particular version of globalization theory as well as on Foucault and the "governmentality" theorists influenced by him, he portrays the state as only one form of governing among many — global, local, nonstate, corporate, and private. Even though he sometimes acknowledges the nation-state's continued significance, he insists that the EU must not be viewed through the lens of the nation-state.

The book provides many useful critiques of the political sociology literature. For example, Rumford sees the widespread use of the concept "civil society" as excessively liberal, optimistic, and dependent on the sociology and imagery of the nation-state. He concludes that there is still no real basis for a "political community" in the EU and correctly argues that EU institutions are only one influence among many in shaping contemporary Europe. For the author, there are many European spaces and many Europes, which are not, and cannot be, easily contained by the EU. And yet, somewhat puzzlingly, he wants to retain a rather inchoate concept of European society. In chapters 1-4, he describes how political sociology might be refashioned to study the EU, outlines the relationship between globalization the EU, the "European state" and "European society." From this base he goes on to examine some key issues: unemployment,

social exclusion and citizenship, cohesion policy and regional autonomy, rethinking core-periphery relations, Europe and democracy, and EU enlargement *via* a case study of Turkey.

Rumford's adoption of a Foucauldian framework and his downgrading of the nation-state lead him to obscure the role of elite actors and the intentions behind the specific political projects driving European integration. This stance also risks diminishing the contribution of sociology to the analysis of European integration. His favored metaphors of network, flow, scape, and mobility themselves serve to render invisible the reframing and reconfiguring of territorial borders. Political sociology needs to pay attention to borders and immobilities as much as to flows and mobilities. After all, a single labor market has not been created in the EU — few EU citizens leave their own states to live in another member state. The intensifying concern with regulating migration and with "security" points to a growing rather than a diminishing concern with the territorial borders of member states and the EU as a whole. Rumford's somewhat abstract and ahistorical concept of the nation-state obscures the variability of EU member states, their different histories and different taxation, welfare, policing, and military regimes.

Such variability needs be understood against a history of (failed) attempts to unify Europe and recurring intellectual attempts to imagine Europe as cultural unity, albeit one with shifting and contested frontiers. The changing geopolitical framework and the relativization of Europe's claims to universalism have encouraged sociologists such as Therborn, Crouch and Touraine, who are not discussed here, to address the specificity of the EU society and state-society relations *vis à vis* other macro-regional entities such as the U.S. and Asia.

These criticisms do not detract from the considerable strengths of this book. Rumford has illuminated successfully one important "moment" of European integration, i.e., that which is regulatory, diffuse, and border-transcending. However, in the process, he risks obscuring an alternative "moment" or tendency, which is border creating and border maintaining and which reflects an ongoing elite search for an European cultural identity and a new synthesis between durable aspects of the nation-state and the EU as an emerging transnational polity. Both "moments" merit sociological study. This book deserves a wide readership for its study of the first moment — in the process revealing the potential of political sociology to illuminate new forms of "governing" European spaces.

Cities in the International Marketplace: The Political Economy of Urban Development in North America and Western Europe.

By *H.V. Savitch and Paul Kantor*. Princeton University Press, 2002. 432 pp. Cloth, \$34.95.

Reviewer: DAVID GRAZIAN, University of Pennsylvania

Case studies of urban development tend to produce generalized theories of political decision making and economic growth and decline. However, in the last thirty years cities have responded to the great challenges of contemporary urban restructuring — the transformation from a manufacturing to a postindustrial economy, the deconcentration of urban downtowns, and the globalization of labor and capital — in surprisingly different ways. In their mammoth volume, Savitch and Kantor account for these differences through a comparative study of ten cities that have taken different paths to success and crisis. Five of these cities are prosperous global centers — New York, Paris, Milan, Toronto, Houston — while the authors politely identify the remainder as “distressed”: Detroit, Glasgow, Liverpool, Marseilles, and Naples. In the end, Savitch and Kantor argue for a theory of urban change that recognizes cities as strategic actors with the ability to shape their own destinies.

According to the authors, economic forces combine with political realities to shape the bargaining contexts in which cities operate as they vie for capital investment and other resources. As might be expected, favorable market conditions play a strong role in determining how much leverage a city may be able to wield against powerful interests; for example, Milan’s bargaining strength lies in its commercial diversity as a center of professional services and technology as well as high fashion. But in addition, the integration (or diffusion) of the intergovernmental systems surrounding such cities plays a substantial role as well. For this reason, the strong linkages among city, regional, and national authorities in western European nations such as France and Italy tend to be fiscally beneficial to their metropolitan regions. Policies of national intervention not only boost cities in enviable market positions such as Paris but consistently bail out otherwise endangered urban centers such as Naples. Meanwhile, federal aid to U.S. cities has decreased considerably in recent decades, which has led New York to pursue entrepreneurial strategies that generously subsidize private developers and business firms, while leaving Detroit to sink even further into urban despair.

At the same time, cities strategically pattern their decision making according to their more local particularities, including their political cultures and regimes of popular control. For example, Toronto plays host to an active constituency whose goals are informed by postmaterialist values, such as community preservation and sprawl control. Consequently, its civic leaders

regularly opt for social-centered development projects that limit neighborhood clearance while promoting land conservation and mixed-use policies. Meanwhile, cities with urban cultures influenced by more materialist concerns, such as jobs, position themselves accordingly by relying on tax deferments, wage credits, environmental deregulation, and other incentives to attract large-scale employers.

To be sure, urban scholars will not necessarily be surprised by most of the findings presented here: indeed, comparisons between Paris and Detroit rarely produce shocking results. Nevertheless, *Cities in the International Marketplace* makes three important contributions to the field of urban political economy. First, the authors frame development as a strategic choice made by cities operating as social agents rather than as powerless victims in the world system. As opposed to simply following the interests of capital, cities can and do make investment choices in accordance with their own local political landscapes, and often these decisions run counter to a growth-oriented approach.

Second, Savitch and Kantor recognize that even as globalizing trends remake our world capitals into the cookie-cutter shapes and sizes configured by Disney, Starbucks, and Microsoft, the individual trajectories of cities continue to diverge from one another as well. Although it is true that many global cities have achieved a certain aesthetic convergence by adopting similarly postmodern lifestyles accentuated by shopping malls, gentrified tech corridors, and fast-food franchises, great diversity exists with regard to how national policies, governing arrangements, city resources, local popular control, and political cultures affect how cities operate within the international urban economy. Finally, urban studies of the postindustrial city tend to limit their comparisons to a small sample of two or three cases, or else they introduce such a large constellation of examples that the finer elements of qualitative research that demonstrate their uniqueness get lost in the numbers. In contrast, the authors here present a thoughtful global study in which the reliability of their comparative work is enriched by the details provided by local knowledge and empirical specificity.

New York and Los Angeles: Politics, Society, and Culture: A Comparative View.
Edited by David Halle. University of Chicago Press, 2003. 558 pp. Paper, \$25.00.

Reviewer: ERIC KLINENBERG, *New York University*

New York City and Los Angeles are the two largest, most alluring, and global U.S. cities, but Chicago has long been the world capital of urban sociology, and the various methods and theories we call Chicago School remain influential after decades of criticism. Today an emerging group of urban geographers and planners in Los Angeles (led by Michael Dear, Allen Scott, and Edward Soja)

are trying to establish their own school too, and sociologists from both coasts promote their cities as ideal living laboratories for studying twenty-first-century metropolitan development. Now David Halle, bicoastal professor of sociology at UCLA and the CUNY Graduate Center, has edited a book of essays comparing Los Angeles and New York City, introduced with his own essay on the key features of the Los Angeles and New York City Schools (the latter of which he identifies and invents), and organized around four themes: demography, social problems, politics and conflict, and culture. The high quality of each section makes *New York & Los Angeles* a marvelous anthology, full of demythologizing analyses and surprising discoveries about the two metropolises. Yet curiously, few of the authors adhere to or appear motivated by the model of urban scholarship associated with his or her city, and so implicitly the volume calls into question the utility and status of these new schools.

Halle's introduction provides useful intellectual history and working definitions of the New York and Los Angeles paradigms. Urbanists will be familiar with the focal points of the Los Angeles School: sprawl and peripheral growth, polycentrism, political fragmentation, economic diversity, cultural innovation, change through immigration, and cynicism about capitalist development. (I would add political ecology, with special attention to problems of sustainable development, transportation, and infrastructure.) Halle acknowledges that "none of these ideas is new, and all have been stated about other urban regions," yet he argues that the particular assemblage is unique to the Los Angeles school. Halle constructs the New York school through its interest in and preference for central cities over suburbs and its engagement with urban reform projects. He concedes that "the New York researchers have not, so far, been explicitly identified as a 'school,' in part because they do not tend to identify themselves explicitly in this way." But Halle claims that writers such as Jane Jacobs, Richard Sennett, William Whyte, and Sharon Zukin have forged a separate tradition of urban inquiry. Unfortunately, neither he nor the contributors say much about how they have influenced urban studies or what is at stake in calling them a school. Readers will have to turn to the specialized urban journals to pursue these questions.

A major theme of New York and Los Angeles is that several famous differences between the two cities have been wildly overstated — even, or perhaps especially, by urban intellectuals. In a poignant chapter, Andrew Beveridge and Susan Weber show that the New York City metropolitan area spans four states, includes multiple urban centers and more than twenty counties, has a mostly nonwhite core, and looks quite like Los Angeles. A chapter on segregation by Halle, Robert Gedeon, and Beveridge confirms that the central areas of New York City, especially Queens, Brooklyn, and Manhattan, are more divided than central Los Angeles. But at the metropolitan level, the non-Hispanic white/black and non-Hispanic white/Hispanic dissimilarity

indices are strikingly similar. Surprisingly, the authors claim that reports of declining white populations in the two cities have been greatly exaggerated. More than a third of Hispanic/Latino residents in Los Angeles and New York City classified themselves as white on the 2000 census, and — though it's unclear whether other groups in the city perceive them this way now — the authors interpret this to mean that, like the Irish, Italians, and Jews before them, Latinos are becoming white. According to Karen Kaufmann's chapter on mayoral politics, group interests related to ethnic shifts like this one help explain the inherent instability of rainbow coalitions and the return of centrist white mayors in both cities during the 1990s.

In the last decade one of the major public misperceptions of the two metropolises is that Los Angeles has suffered a plague of gang crime and police corruption, while an efficient, aggressive zero-tolerance campaign by the New York City Police Department has restored order to Gotham. Jack Katz's masterful chapter shows how journalists, political officials, criminal justice systems, and public responses to immigration collectively produced these crime myths — effectively reversing an old story in which New York City was a hotbed of ethnic gangs and the Los Angeles Police Department was professional, courteous, and effective (think *Dragnet*). Katz and Julia Wrigley (in a chapter on public schools) explain that Los Angeles's key political institutions are weak, dispersed, and disorganized compared to New York City's. Yet both cities experienced steep declines in violent crime, high-profile cases of police brutality against African Americans, and, as a powerful chapter by Halle and Kevin Rafter shows, large riots related to police violence. Only in Los Angeles, where the organs of popular culture production pressed to explain changes in the metropolis related to immigration and the increase in "minority" youth, and the police department is subjected to little political oversight, did the dramatic encounter between corrupt cops and treacherous youths take center stage. The context explains more than the crime.

Chapters on more conventional forms of cultural production constitute the volume's final section. In "Hot and Cool," András Szántó traces the evolution of elite art movements on both coasts through an engaging narrative. New York City, with its strong ties to the European art market and its rich supply of local patrons, has retained its dominance through booms (around abstract expressionism, pop art, and neo-expressionism), and busts. The New York gallery scene, though, is now just as sprawling as the market in Los Angeles. While the Chelsea/Meat Market district has become the Manhattan core, the high costs of working on the island have driven many of the most innovative artists and galleries to the periphery. Today "Williamsburg is New York's true center of artistic production," with Greenpoint, Red Hook, Long Island City, Jersey City, and Hoboken moving into the picture. Saverio Giovacchini's "Hollywood Is a State of Mind," dissects one of the deepest myths about Los Angeles, arguing

that New York intellectuals are largely responsible for misrecognizing the Los Angeles film industry's history of unionization, political dissent, and hybrid ("high and low culture") films, and in turn miscasting Hollywood as a villainous force in U.S. cultural life. *Annie Hall*, with its glorious images of New York City and its portrait of Los Angeles as "dead-brainville," is Giovacchini's example. But he notes that even Woody Allen's record is ambivalent, since Allen's narrative films have "gone Hollywood linguistically," even while the *auteur* has maintained his Manhattan address. As Katz concludes, Los Angeles and New York City have become "distorted reflections" of one another, not oppositional urban forms. *New York and Los Angeles* shows where the images crack, and Halle's synthetic conclusion suggests how to piece them together. Halle has assembled an exciting work of comparative urban sociology, and challenged a field built upon case studies to follow.

For the Common Good? American Civic Life and the Golden Age of Fraternity.
By Jason Kaufman. Oxford University Press, 2002. 286 pp. Paper, \$24.00.

Reviewer: PAMELA PAXTON, *Ohio State University*

Armed with associational lists gleaned mainly from city directories, Jason Kaufman tackles a number of important questions about the history of American associationalism in *For the Common Good?* Two overriding questions orient the book. (1) Why and how did the associational boom of the late nineteenth century begin and grow? (2) What role did this associational boom play in the consequent political development of America? Along the way, Kaufman addresses a number of additional interesting questions, such as, Is there variation in the use of fraternal organization across racial, ethnic, gender, or religious lines? How does associationalism in the U.S. compare to associationalism in western Europe?

For the Common Good? is divided into three main parts. The first tracks the rise of associations, with a particular emphasis on fraternal organizations, from 1870 to 1920. In this section, Kaufman argues that two main factors initiated the boom: the need for affordable burial and sickness insurance and a desire for segregated social outlets to counteract increasing immigration. Once the boom began, it was fueled by organizational competition between groups. Ease of exit from voluntary associations allowed existing groups to splinter easily, creating a surge in the overall numbers. In the second section of the book, Kaufman argues that this golden age of fraternity led to a number of political consequences: (1) a special-interest-dominated political system, (2) a politically weak labor movement, (3) opposition to the development of an American welfare state, especially universal health care, and (4) the growth of

a strong gun lobby. Each of these political outcomes is discussed in a different chapter, with different types of evidence presented in each. The final section of the book describes the decline of fraternal organizations and describes racial and ethnic differences in the formation of associations.

A key argument throughout the book is that the growth of associations created and exacerbated ethnic and religious cleavages in the U.S. Kaufman argues that the process of organizational competition, especially the continual splintering of groups, led to more homogeneous associations over time and instilled a sense of difference among Americans. Further, he makes a strong argument that the explosion of groups during this time period *created* interests, rather than being fueled by existing interests. Kaufman sees these cleavages, more than other features of the golden age, as leading to the problematic political consequences highlighted in the second part of the book.

It is important to note that this argument is predicated on an unstated assumption — that there was little contact between associations and between the members of associations. As he notes throughout the text, Kaufman rarely has information on individual members of fraternal organizations and must rely instead on information at the level of the association. The lack of data is unfortunate, since it makes contact between associations, or between members of associations, hard to judge. Although never explicitly stating this assumption, Kaufman assumes little to no contact between associations and no crosscutting individual memberships. The book therefore lacks a serious consideration of the implications of multiple (and potentially crosscutting) memberships for its conclusions. It is only by assuming little contact between associations and no crosscutting individual memberships that the onus of social cleavage can be placed on fraternal organizations. However, while there is substantial evidence that individuals had multiple memberships, and that fraternal organizations of all types had contact with one another, this information is not incorporated into the arguments of the book. While it is highly likely that membership in a single type of fraternal organization (e.g., a religious organization or an ethnic organization) would preclude membership in another organization *of that type*, individuals might have chosen to join fraternal orders of other types that reflected different aspects of their selves — the very shifting of interests that Madison counted on in the *Federalist Papers*.

The real strengths of this book lie in its description of and explanations for the rise and decline of fraternal organizations during the time period. Kaufman marshals an impressive array of data, as well as cogent arguments, to support his contentions. Another strong point is the cautionary tale presented by Kaufman against assuming unreflexively too many positive outcomes of associations.

The book is marginally weaker when it turns to the political ramifications of this fraternal boom. Kaufman himself admits that he stretches in places, and

many of the arguments in the middle section of the book do at times feel forced, with less compelling empirical evidence presented and weaker qualitative claims. Still, Kaufman's stretches in the negative direction must be considered in the context of previous work on the subject, which is stretched equally in the positive direction.

This is a good book. It is dense with information, well written, logically argued, and methodologically rigorous and adds structure to arguments where it was desperately needed. Overall, Kaufman takes on some cherished myths of American association. Viewed as an essential antidote to the generally positive views of associationalism in the late nineteenth century, *For the Common Good?* should be read by anyone interested in association, trust, social capital, civil society, or any other form of prosocial behavior.

The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society.

Edited by David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander Tabarrok. University of Michigan Press/The Independent Institute, 2002. 462 pp. Paper, \$26.95.

Reviewer: JASON KAUFMAN, Harvard University

Sociologists seriously interested in the role of private organizations in modern cities may well find *The Voluntary City* narrow, pedantic, and remarkably short on detail, as I did. Though the editors have done a nice job bringing together chapters that target a wide range of urban issues, the volume as a whole fails to do more than reiterate a few hackneyed themes. Empirical support is varied and imaginative but often lacking in depth. And in almost every piece, a single historical anecdote is taken as proof of a universal law. Overall, this book might best be used as a sort of how-*not*-to primer for beginning undergraduates in the social sciences.

What is this book about? As Paul Johnson writes in the foreword,

The argument, as I used to present it to Margaret Thatcher when she was prime minister [wink-wink, nudge-nudge], runs as follows. The state is and always will be inefficient at doing things. Hence, its activities ought to be confined to those activities that must be done but that cannot be done by the people themselves.

The rest of the book follows this dictum more or less to the letter, arguing repeatedly that there is *nothing* private associations cannot do better than state agencies, even cost-ineffective things like roads and police protection. Nonetheless, the authors do engage two important questions germane to the public/private debate.

First, how do we explain the existence of private schemes to provide goods and services that economists have long thought beyond the reach of the private

sector (specifically, urban services that should not normally be provided by private market actors under ordinary market rationality)? Though one might expect some sort of elegant mathematical reasoning here, the authors' answers in this respect are remarkably ad hoc. In cases ranging from private police protection to private toll roads and bridges, the authors admit that arms need to be twisted in order to avoid nonparticipation and free riding. The early U.S. roads and turnpikes almost all lost money, for example, but abutters were coerced into investing in them nonetheless. In other words, the invisible hand may work here, but only when it has long, grasping fingers and wickedly sharp nails.

Social solidarity, à la Robert Putnam, seems to be another failsafe for these erstwhile libertarians. In the absence of state sovereignty, group ties will prevail over selfish individualism in promoting the common good. Though none of the authors explicitly state how this might work, I suspect they have such pleasantries as humiliation, excommunication, and perhaps even physical coercion in mind. Of course, states also possess such powers, but the authors seem to envision something both more banal and more extreme than majoritarianism or even consensus building. Some unnamed person or group will somehow supply and enforce measures deemed best for all. Fascism, anyone?

The second major theme of the book anticipates another obvious objection to the voluntarist ken: Why, if private sector schemes are really so much better than state-run schemes, do so many public ventures still prevail? Here again the authors fall back on the insouciant logic of libertarianism: The state is a horrible monster with a will of its own. It will "crowd out" each and every private initiative in its path. Or, in the words of Paul Johnson "what the state can do, it usually will do — unless firmly resisted by powerful interests. More sinister still, centuries of 'crowding out' may well have killed our very ability to do things for ourselves." Any remnants of state activity cannot possibly reflect the utility therein. They are simply the result of that inexorable leviathan, the state. (At least one author lauds feudalism as an "ingenious" alternative to state power!)

Worse still, the authors almost unanimously fail to delineate the difference between public and private ventures. Given how thin the line between public and private corporations can be — many major urban service industries today are run by so-called public/private ventures, for example — the difference between public and private really deserves serious attention in a book so staunchly dedicated to "privatization."

Nor do these authors given any serious thought to questions about the quality, equity, and accessibility of the goods and services in question. If, for example, law enforcement in England was once handled through private "prosecution associations," does that mean all such associations are preferable to state-run police protection? What happens to those who cannot afford to pay for such services? What if those who can afford it nonetheless refuse to

participate? One author, Alexander Tabarrok, even advocates abandoning the “one person-one vote” rule in cities and replacing it with a system that allocates votes in proportion to property ownership. Would any but the rich benefit under such a system? (Perhaps, though Tabarrok does not tell us how.)

The truly troubling element of these essays is not that the authors hold such a firm stance on the public/private issue but that they so obviously fail to consider alternative points of view. No public scheme is ever good. No private scheme for urban management ever seems to have a downside. Issues related to leadership, honesty, and collective choice receive no serious attention.

In sum, these authors assume a frictionless universe in which individuals are equally free move to those types of cities and join those types of proprietary organizations that suit them best, whereupon they reach simple, lasting agreements with those other individuals collected there. If only the world were so simple. This book, like those imaginary cities, seems to work only when preaching to the choir.

Policing World Society: Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation.

By Mathieu Deflem. Oxford University Press, 2002. 301 pp. Paper, \$35.00.

Reviewer: JOACHIM J. SAVELSBERG, *University of Minnesota*

Policing World Society is a very scholarly and sociological, and thus fascinating, book. It provides a theoretically founded and empirically rich account of the history of international police cooperation during the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries, focusing on, but not limited to, Germany and the U.S. The author offers impressive and most thoroughly researched empirical information that is crucial to all who do research on policing, social control, and the state. He also addresses theoretical themes that appeal to a broad sociological audience: Weberian sociology, ideal types, and bureaucracy; international and historical comparison; and globalization.

These are the central arguments: First, the chance that police organizations engage in international cooperation increases with their growing institutional independence from their respective political centers. Second, this structural precondition needs to be joined by operational motives to lead to international cooperation, or, in John Meyer and Brian Rowan’s classic formulation, by organizational “myths” that “define problems and suggest solutions in terms framed by and for the bureaucracy.” Third, international police activity and organization are always guided by national interests.

From these premises, Deflem takes the reader through an exciting journey. It begins with the early (primarily European) history of international policing

during the middle and late nineteenth century, initially directed at the control of political movements and based on legal arrangements at the intergovernmental level. In line with Deflem's theoretical arguments, the success of such efforts had to remain — and did remain — limited. Yet institutional independence of police increased and efforts shifted from political to crime control. They were interrupted but not terminated by World War I. The 1920s finally led to the establishment of the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) with its headquarters in Vienna, known as Interpol. The ICPC, however, was hijacked by the Nazi government after the annexation of Austria in 1938. Political will again destroyed what institutional autonomy and professionalism had constructed. Yet the end of the war and the newly emerging international order resulted in a revival of international cooperation. Only eastern Europe remained excluded — not because the character of police work was inherently political, but because state socialist police was not institutionally autonomous vis-à-vis its respective political centers.

I see two major achievements in this book. First, despite the presentation of some details that will interest only aficionados of police history, Deflem's book is a scholarly jewel in a sea of literature on policing, too much of which is either descriptive or ideologically loaded. While Deflem challenges any a priori assumption about the political nature of policing, critics would have to misrepresent the argument if they wanted to label the book uncritical and blind to the political implications of policing. Political interventions are very much in view. Only they typically do not succeed in creating sustained international police cooperation.

Second, the book offers a major and unusually differentiated perspective on globalization. It does show, for the case of police work, how international cooperation increases throughout the study period. Yet the historic account leaves no doubt that the process is not automatic. Historical events interfere and cause setbacks. National interests ever again affect international policing activities. Finally, and paradoxically, internationalization may lead to the strengthening of national police bureaucracies and their particularities, thereby reinforcing national specifics. Globalization is "always uneven, with trends toward homogeneity counterbalanced by existing or new heterogeneity."

Every good book reaches beyond itself, and *Policing World Society* is no exception. Future work may ask for the conditions of organizational myths. How come police organizations in different countries perceive a common task and jointly recognize international cooperation as the appropriate solution? Not finding an answer to this question makes for a very thin and treacherous line between Deflem's approach, which stresses the constructed nature of problems as one central precondition for international cooperation, and a functionalist one that assumes a problem to which any action is (tautologically) interpreted as a response. Deflem occasionally refers to moral entrepreneurs as producers

of myths. What other actors and social forces might play a role? What myths are attractive, why, where, to whom, and under what circumstances? Under what conditions do which attempts at myth building succeed? Such questions warrant further exploration and suggest links to the sociology of knowledge.

In short, Deflem's book should find a large readership. Scholars, including graduate students, in the social sciences will greatly benefit from it, especially those who work on policing, social control, bureaucracy and its relation to politics and the state, and those working on globalization as a complex interplay between transnational, national, and local forces.

Frontiers and Ghettos: State Violence in Serbia and Israel.

By James Ron. University of California Press, 2003. 262 pp. Cloth, \$49.95; paper, \$19.95.

Reviewer: ANTHONY OBERSCHALL, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

What restrains coercive state actions by a dominant group against an unwanted, rebellious subordinate? In particular, why does a state use different methods and degrees of coercion? In a topical and fascinating research, Ron argues a novel hypothesis based on a ghetto/frontier distinction and rejects three competing explanations on the strength of paired comparisons within Serbia, within Israel, and Israel to Serbia of state responses to opposition and insurgency. The dependent variable is the dichotomy of ethnic cleansing, "the forcible removal of unwanted populations through violence and terror," and ethnic policing, which includes "corporal punishment, mass incarceration and administrative harassment, but [leaves] the unwanted population in place." The pivotal explanatory concept is the ghetto/frontier distinction, "the extent to which a state controls these areas and feels a bureaucratic, moral and political sense of responsibility for their fate." In the ghetto the state has unrivaled control and is bound to some extent by legal and moral obligations to its inhabitants, i.e., it is answerable to both domestic critics and international actors (other states, treaties and conventions, NGOs). In the frontier, at the periphery of the state's core, it has less control and much weaker responsibilities. Thus Israeli repression of Intifada One (1987-92) in the West Bank and Gaza ghettos was far milder and less destructive of life and property than the 1982 war on the South Lebanon "frontier," just as Serbia engaged in ethnic policing against non-Serb minorities within Serbia but ethnic cleansing in the Bosnian frontier of 1992-93 and switched from policing to cleansing in Kosovo when Kosovar insurgency and international intervention changed the province from ghetto to frontier.

The rival hypotheses, briefly considered and rejected, are regime type (Israel, a democracy, and Serbia, an autocracy, responded to ghetto and frontier in

similar fashion), cultural nationalism (a constant cannot explain variable state repertoires), and objective threat (insurgency in the ghetto is more threatening to the state than on the frontier, yet ghetto punishment is milder). Ron has a gift for weaving military, political, and diplomatic analysis into a compelling narrative. He comes up with fascinating details that make the footnotes as pleasurable to read as the main text. In particular, the story of how the West Bank and Gaza became labor-exporting ghettos, ethnic policing of Palestinians ("a mixture of restraint and brutality"), and of the PLO's emergence as an internationally state-seeking body is a little masterpiece, a book within a book.

Engaging and promising as the ghetto/frontier hypothesis is, the argument and evidence in support has some weaknesses. The ethnic policing versus cleansing distinction is too crude for a legal and normative evaluation of state actions against opponents. The Israeli "policing" response to protesters in Intifada One (1987-91) was 750 Palestinians killed (mostly civilians), 13,000 wounded, 350 homes demolished, and thousands arrested and detained, whereas Serb "policing" against protests, general strikes, and noncooperation with the authorities in Kosovo for a decade before the KLA armed insurgency was hundreds killed and wounded, mass arrests and imprisonment, state of emergency, and military occupation.

The frontier concept is applied in an inconsistent manner. I question the Lebanon "frontier" and Bosnia "frontier" comparison. In the spring of 1992, there did not exist any threat from the Muslims in Bosnia to the Serbs in either Serbia or Bosnia itself. The Muslims/Bosniaks had no army and few weapons; the Serbs everywhere were heavily armed. Serbs were aggressors against mostly defenseless Muslims. In South Lebanon, Palestinian paramilitaries killed Israeli civilians in cross-border military actions, were heavily armed, and resisted Israeli counter insurgency by taking cover among reluctant civilians. Ron argues that western recognition of Bosnia as an independent state changed Bosnia to a frontier, which exaggerates the impact of external powers on the Yugoslav conflict. General Spigelj got it right when he maintained that however much the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany may have been involved in everything, they still had far less impact on events in Yugoslavia than the forces within it.

Take the Prijedor "frontier" district ethnic cleansing on pages 54-56. Prijedor had not been a ghetto. An equal number of Muslims and Serbs lived peacefully there until the troubles started. It was not a threatened Serb "frontier" either: it was only 30 miles from Banja Luka, the later Serb capital. Prijedor Serbs made up almost the entire police force and had organized heavily armed militias with the help of the Yugoslav army. Similarly, Ron's account of how Kosovo changed from ghetto to frontier after KLA insurgency and external state diplomatic and military intervention, in particular the timing and extent of ethnic cleansing, is at variance with the Report of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo and of the American

Association for the Advancement of Science. In view of the other twentieth-century cases of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, central Europe, post-Soviet Caucasus, and so on, ethnic cleansing is at the core of state formation justified by a homogeneous nation-state ideology. In the Bosnia case, that state and ideology was Greater Serbia. Much information on who was responsible for type and degree of repression in Bosnia and in Kosovo is surfacing during the prosecutions at the International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia.

Ron rejects the "objective threat" hypothesis too hastily. Threat is best conceived not as potential but as the actual means and weaponry employed by the challenger, from noncooperation and nonviolent resistance to guerrilla warfare and international war. One should not be surprised then that the Serbs did not ethnically cleanse Sandzak and Vojvodina, and Kosovo before 1999, when less drastic coercion contained opposition, and one should not be surprised that they ethnically cleansed in Bosnia when the Bosniaks stood in the way of Greater Serbia. Ron has made a promising start probing the ghetto/frontier hypothesis; other comparisons (Sandzak versus Israeli Arabs, Intifada One versus Intifada Two, ethnic cleansing in Croatia and the Croat-controlled section of Bosnia in the war years) for the same state clusters and conflicts will provide further insight into the reach and validity of his explanation. Ron writes, "conventional wisdom suggests that when faced with a threat, states use the most efficient methods to get the job done. This book has suggested an alternative approach, emphasizing the role of institutional settings, legality and norms." Maybe, but one would like to know more about when "getting the job done" trumps legality and norms. Despite some reservations, I promise that *Frontiers and Ghettos* is a fun read that will be hard to put down before the final page; you will learn a great deal and Ron will make you think.

Opportunity and Uncertainty: Life Course Experiences of the Class of '73.

By Paul Anisef, Paul Axelrod, Etta Baichman-Anisef, Carl James, and Anton Turittin, in collaboration with Fred Ashbury, Gottfried Paasche, and Zeng Lin. University of Toronto Press, 2000. 327 pp. Cloth, \$65.00; paper, \$24.95.

Reviewer: DEBORAH CARR, *Rutgers University*

Opportunity and Uncertainty: Life Course Experiences of the Class of '73 tracks the educational, work, and family experiences of men and women who graduated from Ontario high schools in 1973 and follows both the anticipated trajectories and unanticipated turning points in their lives over the next twenty years. The main findings are not surprising: upward occupational mobility is common, and both poor socioeconomic resources and being born female constrain one's opportunities, just as in previous birth cohorts. Rather, the authors' most important contribution is their thoughtful discussion of the complex interplay

between agency and structure and the importance of adaptation and resilience as they track a cohort whose lives were punctuated by educational reform during their childhoods in the 1960s, evolving norms about gender and sexuality during their early teen years in the early 1970s, and a flagging economy as they entered the labor market during the mid-1970s. For members of the class of 1973, the life course is characterized by individuation and creative adaptation, rather than strict adherence to institutional timelines and early-life expectations.

Opportunity and Uncertainty is based on data from the Class of '73 study. The study began in 1972, when the Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities (MCU) first measured the educational aspirations of high school students as a way to gauge future enrollment patterns. The original sample included roughly 2,500 grade 12 students from randomly selected classrooms in Ontario. Anisef and colleagues then conducted structured follow-up interviews in 1973, 1974, 1988, and 1994 and in-depth qualitative interviews with a small subsample in 1995.

Drawing on rich data spanning more than twenty years, *Opportunity and Uncertainty* documents patterns of educational attainment, intergenerational social mobility, the school-to-work transition, marriage, and childbearing among adults now in their mid-40s. Several important themes of life course sociology resonate throughout the analysis. First, the authors underscore the persistent impact of social structure and the constraints imposed by gender, class, region, and ethnicity. Second, birth cohort is a useful construct for conceptualizing the complex interplay between biography and history, yet within-cohort variations may be more telling than between-cohort variation in life course experiences.

Third, and perhaps most important, Anisef and colleagues show the power of personal agency in the life course. The qualitative data highlight the ways that personal preferences, such as a passion for travel; personal crises, such as substance abuse; personal revelations, such as discovering that one is gay; and chance events, such as an encounter with a potential role model who discovers a young adult's unrecognized talent, may open doors to unexpected opportunities. Although idiosyncratic experiences may be powerful forces that set the individual's life course on an uncharted direction, these experiences typically are not measured in large-scale data sets. The authors underscore that the standard linear models typically used in life course research may not be appropriate for modeling and characterizing the lived experience of young adults today. Most quantitative approaches to studying the life course focus on the "normative" path, or on identifying the specific characteristics that affect the timing and likelihood of important life transitions such as marriage and entry to the labor market. By considering the powerful impact of nonnormative experiences on the life course, the authors bring into sharp focus the meaning

of agency; agency is best invoked and enacted when the road map for one's future is uncertain.

Despite its many strengths, *Opportunity and Uncertainty* is still susceptible to the criticisms aimed at most studies based on nonrepresentative longitudinal data sets. Response rates are not optimal; the 1994 sample includes only 31 percent of the original sample. However, a detailed appendix documents the sources of sample attrition, and the authors take great efforts to contrast characteristics of their analytic sample with data from the census of Canada, thus minimizing worries about the generalizability of their findings. Second, the book is very rich in analytic detail and thus is not an easy or quick read. To the authors' credit, they do not lose sight of their central framing question and their discussions are quite lucid. Although the presentation of quantitative data is dense, the tables are generally limited to basic cross-tabulations and frequency distributions.

Opportunity and Change is a valuable contribution to the rich (and growing) collection of cohort studies produced over the past three decades, including Michael Wadsworth's *Imprint of Time* (England) and John Clausen's *American Lives*, Glen Elder's *Children of the Great Depression*, and William H. Sewell and Robert M. Hauser's *Education, Occupation and Earnings: Achievement in the Early Career* (U.S.). Anisef and colleagues, observe that the findings from their study may have the most powerful impact when examined in contrast with the experiences of other birth cohorts, in Canada and elsewhere. This observation is probably correct; such comparisons may help to highlight the distinctive opportunities, obstacles, and sources of uncertainty in a cohort of Canadian young adults who came of age in a period of economic, social, and normative instability.

Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life.

By Annette Lareau. University of California Press, 2003. 331 pp. \$21.95.

Reviewer: LISA D. PEARCE, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Numerous studies link family-of-origin class status and later life economic well-being, but none expose the processes through which inequality is reproduced like Annette Lareau's *Unequal Childhoods*. Using observations from two elementary schools, interviews with 88 students' parents, and more than a year of observation in the homes of 12 of these nine- and ten-year-old children, Lareau explores how parenting and childhood vary by social class. Some may argue her small observation sample limits cross-class and cross-race comparisons, but what is sacrificed in breadth is more than compensated for with depth. What she and her assistants hear from parents and observe through soccer games, neighborhood play, car and bus trips across town, homework

sessions, morning routines, doctor and dentist appointments, and parent-teacher conferences demonstrate striking class-based differences in the organization of children's daily lives, their language development, and their ability to interact with social institutions. Further, these class-based distinctions translate into a sense of entitlement among middle-class offspring and a sense of restraint among children growing up in poorer households. While other studies allude to these class differences, especially in school contexts, this study takes readers even deeper into the lives of children than most. The result is a richer understanding of how cultural repertoires imparted to children vary by class in ways that entrench class inequality at early ages.

The first of the two approaches to child rearing identified by Lareau is "concerted cultivation." This style is predominant in middle-class homes. Parents using this approach constantly foster and assess their children's talents by involving them in organized activities, molding their reasoning skills, and intervening on their behalf with teachers and coaches. Through rich description of children's daily lives, readers see how middle-class parents challenge children to formulate questions for doctors, teach them to shake hands and look adults in the eye, broaden their vocabularies, and model how to demand action from social institutions. Lareau calls the logic of child rearing among working-class and poor families "natural accomplishment of growth." This approach is more spontaneous, focusing on providing children's basic needs while allowing talents to develop naturally. These children's lives take place near home with fewer structured activities, more interaction with siblings, and more clear boundaries between adults and children. Lareau nicely contrasts the two styles with her detailed descriptions of how working-class and poor children are expected to be silently obedient in the presence of adults while their parents model unease and restraint in their interactions with school officials and medical professionals. These contrasts demonstrate how middle-class children learn to demand what they want while working-class and poor children learn to accept what is.

While children raised with the "concerted cultivation" logic are better prepared to achieve within social institutions like school and work, Lareau also outlines down sides to this approach. Middle-class children are generally more stressed and exhausted, less creative, and fight more with siblings than working-class or poor children. Ultimately, Lareau suggests parents and society should expose all children to the beneficial features of both approaches and be wary of the harmful aspects.

One unsatisfying feature of the book is its limited discussion of race's role in shaping childhood and framing futures. Lareau argues that social class is more determinative of the organization and experience of childhood than race. In her study, middle-class black children's lives are organized more similarly to middle-class white children's lives than to poorer black children's lives.

However, one similarity across class categories is that black children all encounter racism. Mention is made of how black children and parents in each class category face discrimination. These confrontations with race make childhood and how children see their futures different for black and white children, regardless of class. Further, the interesting dynamic may be less in comparing the relative impact of two closely intertwined social forces and more about how the two intersect. For example, do middle-class black parents make a more “concerted” effort to teach their children strategies for dealing with racism than working-class or poor black parents? Also, does either child rearing approach seem more or less beneficial as it interacts with the child’s race? Attention to these issues would contribute to knowledge about how class and race interactively shape childhood experience and family life.

All in all, this is a thought-provoking book sure to become a classic for scholars working to understand how inequality is reproduced. In addition, its readability and clear expression of basic sociological ideas about social class, inequality, and family life make it ideal for use in undergraduate classes covering any of these topics.

Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies.

Edited by Richard Shweder, Martha Minow, and Hazel Rose Markus. Russell Sage Foundation, 2002. 485 pp. Cloth, \$49.95.

Reviewer: DOUGLAS HARTMANN, *University of Minnesota*

Because of its reliance on consent and moral regulation as well as its ideals of tolerance and inclusion, liberal democracy has always had problems with cultural difference. But in recent years — with the social changes brought by global trade and mass communications, massive transnational migration, the liberalization of citizenship laws, and the appearance of democratic institutions and ideals in many new places — these problems appear more acute and multifaceted than ever. So, how now to deal with them?

Scholars, it seems to me, have at least two distinct contributions to make in answering this question: One involves producing knowledge about the form and content of various cultural differences; the other with clarifying the practical and moral choices (and their consequences) these differences give rise to. Needing both, we are fortunate that three noted scholars from the fields of anthropology, law, and the behavioral sciences have collaborated to bring us this wonderful new collection of essays on the challenge that multiculturalism poses in contemporary liberal democracies.

Engaging Cultural Differences is composed of 21 individual contributions — primarily case studies of some type — grouped into four parts. Part 1 focuses

on the legal status of groups that exercise beliefs and customs that threaten established national practice; part 2 on cultural accommodation and its limitations; part 3 on debates about human rights; and part 4 on how difference is understood and practiced in different (albeit mostly U.S.) social contexts. There is also a brief, 15-page introduction from the editors.

Neither the organization of the volume nor the theoretical framing is particularly memorable. Indeed, I was surprised to see the volume characterized as “concerned with the aims of tolerance” since this formulation is far less provocative than the active language of engagement employed in the title. (It is also in stark contrast to the way these essays were packaged when a handful of them previously appeared in a special issue of the journal *Daedalus*.) Additionally, I was disappointed there wasn’t more on how cultural diversity is conflated with and complicated by the realities of social inequality. The intersections between difference and inequality receive considerable attention in many related fields, including the ethnic and racial studies with which I am most familiar. Indeed, the more critical strains of this work (e.g., whiteness studies, critical race theory) suggest that liberal democratic ideals are not so much opposed to prejudice, discrimination, and exclusion as in fact required by them. (A concluding chapter written by Rose Markus along with Claude and Dorothy Steele called “Colorblindness As a Barrier to Inclusion” seems intended to address such notions; however, it concentrates almost exclusively on educational practice and is a bit too-little, too-late.)

But what I think may be missing from the volume should by no means detract from the mountain of rich, stimulating material that is collected here. There are contributions on topics ranging from women and religion to interethnic relations, the culture of property, and debates about circumcision and asylum. And who would have guessed that hearings about an eighteen-year old Norwegian girl “kidnapped” by her parents and brought back to Morocco would have created a national and international spectacle? (See “Nadia’s Case” by Unni Wikan.) This sheer range aptly demonstrates the complexity of the multicultural challenge, and the various chapters impressively chart how this challenge can be engaged. A discussion of each individual piece is obviously not possible here, but I know that I will be using David Chambers’s chapter on marriage customs in post-apartheid South Africa, the piece from Karen Engle on the tortured role the American Anthropological Association has played in the evolution of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and Victoria Plaut’s study of cultural models of diversity in the U.S. in my own teaching and research. Shweder’s piece on female genital mutilation is a model of empirically grounded, morally engaged cross-cultural exposition. You will not agree with all the arguments and conclusions of the contributors (indeed, they sometimes contradict each other), but they all bring concrete empirical research to bear on their questions and make clear the moral decisions and stakes implicated therein.

The more I think about it, the absence of a singular theoretical frame may be the ultimate point and contribution of this volume. It forces readers to realize that there are no easy answers to the omnipresent multicultural challenge. The challenge cannot be “solved” by some omniscient power or all-encompassing moral system, only continually “engaged” with as clear an understanding of the social facts and moral choices involved in each case and context as possible. This may be the best that liberal democratic theory and research has to offer.

Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflict in the Global Community.

By Elizabeth Heger Boyle. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002. 188 pp. Cloth, \$36.00.

Reviewer: KAMMI SCHMEER, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Female genital cutting is an institutionalized cultural practice that has been the source of international conflict for several decades. Although female genital cutting is normative in the communities where it is practiced (mainly in Africa), many outsiders view the practice as barbaric and oppressive to women and have pushed for its eradication. In *Female Genital Cutting: Cultural Conflict in the Global Community*, Boyle explores the development of an international anti-female genital cutting movement, and nations' and individuals' responses to it. In applying a neoinstitutional theoretical framework, Boyle finds the diffusion of anti-female genital cutting norms to be largely a top-down globalization process driven by international standards that reject the practice on medical and human rights grounds. However, Boyle also provides evidence that the adoption of anti-female genital cutting norms differs across countries and individuals and correlates with their structural locations and local contexts. Boyle uses qualitative and quantitative data at the international, national, and individual levels to demonstrate the complexities and conflict around changing institutionalized cultural practices such as female genital cutting. In doing so, Boyle provides both an in-depth understanding of anti-female genital cutting efforts, and a unique multilevel approach to evaluating global cultural conflict.

Boyle's specific purpose is to use the anti-female genital cutting case as an example of how (1) global norms drive national policies, (2) the structural location of groups affects their actions related to adapting internationally institutionalized norms, and (3) conflict around norms creates space for changing institutions. After describing the development of international norms against female genital cutting, Boyle demonstrates the power of these norms in defining national policies and actions in a many countries. The influence of international norms is also evident in Boyle's analysis at the individual level.

She uses demographic and health survey data from six African countries to show how women's attitudes and behaviors, as measured in the mid-1990s, are reflective of their exposure to international ideas. One of the most creative aspects of the book is the chapter on individual resonance with international frames. Boyle finds that many women in female genital cutting-practicing countries not only state that they are against the practice but also provide a medical or human rights explanation for rejecting it, mirroring the reasoning articulated by the international community.

Although national policies and women's attitudes and behaviors suggest an increasing conformity around international norms that reject female genital cutting, Boyle uses several chapters of her book to highlight how the social contexts surrounding national governments and individuals condition their acceptance of international anti-female genital cutting norms. At the national level, Boyle uses case studies of Egypt, Tanzania, and the U.S. to demonstrate how a country's world system position, national resources, and prevalence of female genital cutting affect the meaning of its anti-female genital cutting policies. Although the use of these countries' experiences is illustrative, a quantitative analysis that includes additional countries would provide more concrete evidence of how national situations interact with international norms in defining state actions. At the individual level, Boyle effectively uses multilevel modeling and survey data to show how women's personal experiences and national, regional, and local contexts affect their views of female genital cutting and reasons for rejecting the practice.

Boyle's final objective is to provide evidence that conflict between institutionalized norms creates space for change. At the international level, this occurred when national sovereignty, the international norm that allows countries to determine their own cultural matters, was challenged by the universal human rights perspective. At the national level, Boyle shows that conflict occurred when female genital cutting was particularly salient to the country and when the country had sufficient international power and national resources to resist international pressure. Finally, Boyle maintains that institutional conflict is most apparent at the individual level where local contexts (such as religion) provide meaning systems alternative to international norms. Although Boyle effectively demonstrates the presence of conflict at all three levels, it is not clear how this conflict, as opposed to simply the presence of new ideas and norms, creates change. Furthermore, at the individual level, women's views are measured only at one point in time, making conclusions about change somewhat speculative.

Overall, the book is a great contribution to international and political sociology in providing a useful approach to investigating the development of global cultural norms and how these norms may interact with national and local contexts. Boyle demonstrates the power of international norms to import change, while at the same time showing how governments and individuals often

resist such change in predictable ways. One limitation of the book is the lack of systematic analysis of how country and individual responses may affect the definition and spread of international norms. Boyle demonstrates that nations and individuals sometimes reject the norms, but it is not clear how this rejection feeds back into the development of the norms at the global level. Although a neoinstitutional perspective would predict that country and individual reactions do not affect international norms, this proposition was not directly evaluated in an otherwise thorough analysis of worldwide responses to anti-female genital cutting efforts.

Surgeons and the Scope.

By James R. Zetka Jr. Cornell University Press, 2003. 224 pp. Cloth, \$29.95.

Reviewer: STEVEN H. LOPEZ, *Ohio State University*

Surgery, James Zetka Jr. observes, is craft work. Unlike other handicraft workers, however, surgeons have been able to maintain occupational control by delivering quantifiable results that could not be duplicated via alternative modes of work organization. Moreover, by shifting the basis of surgical virtue from “good hands” to the cognitive bases of successful surgery – the idea of “surgical judgment” — surgeons have largely been able to defend the prestige of their handicraft, even in the face of challenges from research-oriented scientific medicine in the second half of the twentieth century. Surgeons retain unilateral control over the routines and rituals of the operating theater, where they execute virtuoso performances of handicraft skill, and they are legendary for successfully resisting workplace changes that might pose challenges to this control.

Thus, it seems unlikely that surgeons would ever willingly accept a new technology that was highly disruptive of their traditional skills. Yet this is exactly what has happened, as general abdominal surgeons have embraced laproscopic surgical techniques over the last fifteen years. In laproscopic procedures, no large incision is made; instead, surgical instruments and a tiny video camera are inserted through small ports in the abdomen. The laproscopic surgeon’s only view of the operation is provided by the video monitor, and the surgeon’s only access to internal tissues and organs is via instruments inserted into the abdomen but manipulated from outside. Zetka convincingly demonstrates that the transition from open surgery to laproscopic techniques required surgeons to master completely new surgical skills. Many accomplished traditional surgeons were never able to make the transition successfully. Moreover, the transition required surgeons to embrace new forms of teamwork that conflicted with strongly held notions about the independence of the individual surgeon. Zetka’s descriptive account of these changes, based on direct observations of

surgical practices and on interviews with 37 laproscopic surgeons, makes fascinating reading.

So does his argument about why general abdominal surgeons embraced these wrenching changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Moving out from his microanalysis of changes in work skills and practices in the operating theater, Zetka builds a nuanced historical argument about the relationships among occupational groups as they respond to new technologies. During the 1970s and 1980s, general surgeons faced turf challenges from academic medicine, which was producing a wide variety of effective medical treatments to problems that previously required surgery. New drugs and noninvasive therapies (such as the use of sonic waves to break up gallstones instead of extracting them surgically) were encroaching on the general abdominal surgeon's traditional preserve.

Among the most serious of these challenges was the growing practice of operative endoscopy by nonsurgeons such as gastroenterologists. Endoscopy, the insertion of a viewing instrument into a bodily orifice in order to examine the inside of the organ (for example, the large intestine), had long been used in such specialties as a diagnostic tool, but by the 1980s these practitioners had begun to perform operations endoscopically, including the removal of stones from the biliary tract. This precipitated a turf war. Abdominal surgeons argued that only they possessed skills needed to deal with the particular nature of pathology and anatomy in real time; only they could deal with complications; and only they could revert to open surgery when emergencies arose. These arguments, however, failed to wrest operative endoscopy away from the gastroenterologists — not only because the gastroenterologists had already established themselves as endoscopic practitioners, but more important, because of their upstream position in the division of labor: Family practitioners continued to refer patients to gastroenterologists for operative endoscopies, and the gastroenterologists themselves did not pass on such patients to surgeons.

But while surgeons failed to take operative endoscopy away from gastroenterologists, they did succeed in asserting similar claims in the case of laproscopy. Here, Zetka argues, interoccupational relationships and timing were the decisive factors. As soon as operative laproscopic techniques were developed in the late 1980s, surgeons seized on them in order to protect themselves against further turf losses by offering less-invasive alternatives to open surgery themselves. And, unlike endoscopy, which gastroenterologists had pioneered and were prepared to defend, laproscopy was not already controlled by a downstream specialty, allowing claims about the special nature of surgical expertise to carry the day.

Zetka's study, combining as it does ethnographic and historical materials, is a model of methodological precision. His argument contributes to the sociology of professions by showing clearly how the outcomes of turf conflicts may not turn so much on the quality of a profession's theoretical knowledge

base as on interoccupational dynamics. And finally, despite Zetka's theoretical sophistication, the book is very readable and would be suitable for use in undergraduate as well as graduate courses.

Women in Science: Career Processes and Outcomes.

By Yu Xie and Kimberlee A. Shauman. Harvard University, 2003. 318 pp. Cloth, \$59.95.

Reviewer: ANGELA M. O'RAND, Duke University

The trend toward equality of educational and occupational attainment between women and men in the U.S. continues. However, buried beneath the aggregate statistics are what Yu Xie and Kimberlee Shauman refer to as "stubborn exceptions," particularly persistent gender inequalities in doctoral degrees in mathematics and some of the sciences and in the maintenance of scientific careers after the Ph.D. in these fields. By 2000 women accounted for nearly half of doctorates across academic fields; and while their representation in some sciences approximated this average (e.g., biology and biochemistry), their representation persisted as among the lowest in some engineering fields, physics, and mathematics. Across the sciences, women's career persistence and mobility after the degree fall well below their doctoral attainment levels.

The explanations for these persistent trends have eluded previous researchers, who have resorted to an intuitive metaphor — *the leaking science pipeline*. The pipeline metaphor is predicated on the assumption that the scientific career begins in middle and secondary school science and mathematics classes and persists in a necessary sequence of educational career transitions beginning with intentions to major in math/science in college and followed in order by majoring and graduating in math/science, attending graduate school, receiving the masters and Ph.D., attaining postdoctoral placements, and progressing through formal academic careers as scientist/professor. The leaking pipeline portrays the cumulative loss of women along the way without specifying the mechanisms that propel the loss.

Xie and Shauman offer a set of empirically derived explanations for this attrition and findings that contradict the pipeline metaphor. They do so by following a life course perspective and using rigorous multivariate demographic methods on microdata from multiple (17) longitudinal and census sources to predict gender differences. The life course perspective proposes that life transitions are interdependent across education, family, and work domains and that later transitions are contingent on (but not determined by) earlier transitions. Hence, the science pipeline does not operate in a social vacuum. To track this multidimensional and dynamic process, Xie and Shaumann concatenate a set

of limited longitudinal datasets that permit the construction of synthetic cohorts that can be followed from middle school to postdegree career years.

They begin in the middle- and secondary school years by using 6 datasets to compare gender patterns of mathematical and science performance (National Longitudinal Study of the Class of 72; High School and Beyond Senior and Sophomore Cohorts, respectively; National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988; and the Longitudinal Studies of American Youth, cohorts 1 and 2). In chapter 2, they find that gender differences in mathematical ability are minimal except at the upper extreme of the distribution, but that male students participate more in scientific curricula. In chapter 3, they find large gender differences among high school seniors in expectations to major in science and engineering in college, by a ratio of 2 males to 1 female. However, in chapter 4 they find that after entering college women are more likely than men to enter a science and engineering major after starting a nonscience major.

Chapters 5 and 6 track post-B.A. and M.A. degree career paths (using the Baccalaureate and Beyond Longitudinal Study and the New Entrants Surveys). Here, as life course theory would predict, things get more complicated. First, while women are more likely to major in some biological sciences, the majors in these fields are less likely overall than other science majors (e.g. engineering and physics) to pursue science and engineering careers. And, controlling for major, women are 25% as likely to work in science and engineering careers. Finally, all else equal, married women, and those with children, are less likely to continue science and engineering careers. Hence, gender segregation by major (biology versus engineering/physics) and familial roles hinder women's career progression.

Chapters 7-10 employ microdata from the census (PUMS 1960-90) and five other datasets to examine four post-degree career patterns: employment, geographic mobility, research productivity, and the status of immigrant scientists and engineers. These analyses find an increase in female participation in science and engineering careers over time, but continual disadvantage in employment and positional status for married women and those with children. This disadvantage also negatively affects geographic mobility in the early career, although dual-career marriages appear to have no effect on women's geographic mobility. The most disadvantaged in employment and positional status are married foreign-born women scientists.

Earlier literature based on limited cross-sectional samples and (largely) bivariate analyses has repeatedly raised concerns over the productivity puzzle, the seemingly persistent lower research productivity of women scientists. The cohort-based multivariate results in this study challenge the productivity puzzle. Research differences in productivity are negligible once we control for life course variables.

This masterful project cannot overcome some familiar problems of comparability of measurement across datasets and the absence of measured school

and workplace characteristics that may interact with family variables, but it should be recognized as rigorous sociology that has entered a contentious debate and provided the last word.

Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State.

Edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. Oxford University Press, 2002. 366 pp. Cloth, \$70.00; paper, \$21.95.

Reviewer: DANA R. FISHER, *Columbia University*

David Meyer begins this edited volume by pointing out that “the essays in this volume represent a concerted effort to build bridges among people researching collective action and social movements and to encourage the construction of comprehensive and synthetic approaches to the study of social movements.” To achieve these goals, Meyer and his coeditors have enlisted the efforts of social movement scholars who focus on a variety of topics in this extensive collection. The book is broken down into three sections: States and Policies; Organizations and Strategies; and Collective Identities, Discourse, and Culture. Most of the chapters are case studies. The purpose is to explore the mesolevel of research on collective action and social movements. In other words, this volume is focused on the social processes that take place between the micro and macro levels of society. Suzanne Staggenborg’s contribution to the volume (chapter 7) provides a very good review of the social movement scholarship that focuses on the mesolevel and calls for the kinds of research that is included in the volume.

The fourteen chapters of these sections are rather uneven — coming from multiple theoretical perspectives and focusing on very different scales of analysis. Even though Whittier identifies this diversity as an additional benefit, it is confusing for the reader and detracts from the overall depth of the case studies. The section on states and policies, for example, includes five chapters with very different research foci: one compares movements in Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines; one looks at the National Union of Mineworkers’ attempt to organize miners in the South African gold mines; one looks at women’s movements in India; one looks at the development of the lesbian and gay movement in Vermont; and one looks at the civil rights movement in the U.S. Although these chapters all explore the ways that movements interact with the state and represent different scales of analysis the relationship among these very different cases is not laid out strongly enough. The sections on organizations and strategies and collective identities, discourse, and culture provide similar levels of variety that make it difficult to keep track of the focus of the book. Nonetheless, the chapters from these sections provide rich case studies about social movements around the world.

In the conclusion, Nancy Whittier states that the chapters in the book “outline a new theoretical approach to social movements, which, in this view, are not self-contained. State structures, dominant cultures, and civil society shape movements, and, in turn, movements can reshape states, policies, civil societies, and cultures within which they operate” (289). Without a doubt, this approach is very useful and important, and Whittier lays out a functional approach to such mesolevel research. Unfortunately, the strength of this approach gets lost in the sixteen chapters. Rebecca Klatch, however, contributes a particularly useful example of this type of research in her chapter on identity and consciousness among movements of the left and right (chapter 11). This chapter is consistent with the framework laid out by Whittier, exploring the effects of internal and external factors on movements of the left and right in the 1960s. This volume will be very useful for advanced undergraduate classes that are studying social movements. With its impressive breadth, students will be able to get a taste of much of what research in social movements has to offer.

Political Power and Social Theory.

Edited by Diane E. Davis. Elsevier Science, 2002. 315 pp. Cloth, \$95.00.

Reviewer: JOHN K. GLENN, *Columbia University*

This year's annual review of political power and social theory highlights three concerns. The first section focuses on postauthoritarian Latin America, calling for the disaggregation of the concept of the state. The second addresses colonialism and postcolonialism, arguing for attention to culture and discourse, and the third concerns race and class in the U.S. While the essays as a whole are strong, a long essay by George Steinmetz stands out as meriting wider attention.

In part 1, Gianpaolo Baiocchi and Jeffrey Rubin argue that one must break down the concept of the state as a unitary actor to understand the impact of cultural systems upon states and the difference between the center and its local and regional components. Baiocchi compares local governments in Porto Alegre, Brazil, where one regime elected during the transition to democracy by the forces of civil society (trade unions and social movements) led to its subsequent demobilization, but a successive regime encouraged greater civic activity. He highlights the latter local government's sponsorship of greater involvement in the municipal “participatory budget” and a subsequent increase in neighborhood associations in poorer areas.

Rubin seeks to apply “post-structuralist insights to analysis of states by conceptualizing the state as a culturally and historically situated ‘subject.’” He develops these arguments by attention to the breakdown of the authoritarian state in Mexico in the 1980s, calling for a shift to sub-national analysis to

highlight how states are produced and how they change. The last essay in this section by Patrick Barrett analyzes the continuity of harmonious relations between the Chilean economic elite and the Augusto Pinochet regime as well as the post-authoritarian ruling center-left party. While I agreed with the authors in this section that there are significant differences between different levels of the state, the essays did not seem to consider the impact of the political transformations in the states they were analyzing and the limitations of comparisons of single countries at different times. Subsequent regimes are influenced by their predecessors, and as post-authoritarian regimes consolidate and take root over time, state-society relations are frequently influenced by the policy learning that informs successive governments.

George Steinmetz, who has also edited a volume on the state and culture, offers the sharpest contribution in part 2. He analyzes German native policy towards five colonized peoples in three countries and observes the limits of theories based on political and economic interests, as well as on features of the colonized. Steinmetz calls for attention to the representations of cultures by German officials and the struggles among those officials to implement a particular preferred approach to native policy. In this way, Steinmetz offers a multifaceted analysis of power with the multivocal nature of culture. He is further interested in what he calls the psychic side of native policy that explains the apparently irrational nature of much colonial policy, all of which makes for a complex analysis. But he balances clear case summaries with extended analysis, grounded by focusing on variation in policy. His approach is strengthened by his framing the article by addressing the limits of previous approaches in explaining variation, rather than simply rejecting them or calling for a general integration of culture and the state. The range of scholarship marshaled across a wide range of cases is impressive, demonstrating both the potential and the demands of this approach.

Karin Roseblatt concludes part 2 with an analysis of the construction of the Chilean nation that highlights the influence of Spanish colonial discourses of family and sexuality. She analyzes political discourse arguing that Chileans should maintain patriarchal families, with women demonstrating sexual propriety and domestic virtue.

Part 3 contains a debate on the work of Adolph Reed Jr., who argues that race and class have been misunderstood in the U.S. because they have been analyzed as distinct phenomena. Instead he argues they should be seen as "equivalent and overlapping elements within a singular system of social power and stratification rooted in capitalist labor relations." He calls for a more historically embedded analysis that accounts for the influence of political institutions. His commentators largely agree with him. Ellen Meiksins Wood suggests that a "general conception of capitalism" can be useful to highlight the distinct, if related, ways that race and class interact. Maurice Zeitlin agrees that history matters and suggests it does so even more than Reed argues, and

Steven Gregory stresses the role of the state in capitalist systems. All the authors in the symposium argue on behalf of an engaged social science that, in Reed's words, should "fight effectively for a better world."

Brains, Practices, Relativism: Social Theory after Cognitive Science.

By Stephen P. Turner. University of Chicago Press, 2002. Cloth, \$46.00; paper, \$19.00.

Reviewer: JOHN R. HIPPE, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*

Turner's book is a collection of previously released work that holds out the promise of providing an alternative path for social theory. Turner, a philosopher, combines an outsider's perspective (on sociology) along with a solid understanding of such key social theorists as Mead, Durkheim, Weber, and Geertz. Including the term *cognitive science* in the title suggests an approach taking into account the recent findings in that field for constructing a new social theory. However, it is not always clear whether his proposed "new approach" intends to build a new model of social theory based on a cognitive science viewpoint of individual action (that is, counterposed to the more common rational choice model often employed), or whether it simply wants to use the findings of recent cognitive science work to provide a new metaphor for viewing social life.

Regardless, Turner argues forcefully that theory must begin at the level of the individual. His model of individual action builds on the cognitive psychology of connectionism: "humans are multilayered neural networks that learn, under the continuing pressure of experience, by the gradual modifications of the strengths or 'weights' of their myriad synaptic connections." The importance of this viewpoint is that "every mind is the product of a distinctive and individual learning history." This historical view of individual thinking processes suggests problems for a rational choice model, but, other than occasionally echoing Weber's view that rational thinking occupies only a small part of a social world shared with emotions and habit, Turner's real target is theories positing units at higher levels of analysis than individuals. He argues that the proper goal is to develop a theory of emergence where higher-level concepts emerge from individual activity.

His justification for a theory built at the individual level is parsimony, arguing that adding "logics" unnecessarily complicates things conceptually. That is, higher levels of theorizing require a whole set of causal links from these abstract objects to the actors who actually do the proximate explanatory work. But while Turner desires to avoid the theoretical complexity of James Coleman's "boat" showing the linkages between the micro and the macro, the burden of

proof then lies upon his effort to show that such structure is not necessary for explaining individual action, and it is not clear that he succeeds.

For Turner, the perspective of connectionism views the brain as a parallel distributed processing system that is given a learning algorithm (but no detailed rules) and is then trained up by feeding it data and giving feedback for “correct” answers. Thus we can view attitudes as nodes in connectionist learning networks. The key question then is whether this model can account for higher mental processes. This suggests interesting implications, not the least of which is that it problematizes the neo-Kantian “shared premises” approach of much social theory: There is no need for shared premises from some initial starting point, but instead societal norms and values simply arise from interaction over time. Thus we are left with a path-dependent model of social structure.

Chapter 1 does a nice job of laying out Turner’s argument. In chapter 2 he strongly critiques Searle and models requiring a “higher level” of intentionality: we-intentionality rather than simply I-intentionality. Chapter 3 displays his emulationist model, arguing that interactions over time can explain the emergence of culture. In chapter 4 he critiques the necessity for the shared premises model, arguing that other models are possible, including his path-dependent approach. Chapter 5 argues that relativism ultimately results in presuppositions and, as a result, a model where change is difficult to explain. In chapter 6 he dives into the question of normativity, pointing out the difficult distinction between a “norm” and “training” and providing the provocative conclusion that we simply read normativity into the world. The later chapters seem to stray from the model, rather than pushing forward the argument. Chapter 7 provides a discussion of presentism and contextualism, though it hardly seems to provide arguments that would be controversial for sociologists. Chapter 8 discusses practice in real time, while chapter 9 is simply a paean to Edward Shils.

Turner’s model is an intriguing one, and certainly provocative. But while this strategy seems promising, the reader walks away from the applications in the second half of the book unconvinced that the Holy Grail of social theory has been discovered. But, then, perhaps the quest is all that’s important?

Out of Wedlock: Causes and Consequences of Nonmarital Fertility.

Edited by Lawrence L. Wu and Barbara Wolf. Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. 412 pp. Cloth, \$39.95.

Reviewer: ALLAN M. PARNELL, *Cedar Grove Institute for Sustainable Communities*

Peter Laslett wrote, “Illegitimacy has been called a social problem for the last two centuries and a moral problem from time immemorial. A problem can in

principle be solved, and in trying for a solution here moralists, administrators and social scientists have written a very great deal." The social problems of nonmarital childbearing are the effects on children and their parents and the community's fiscal role in the support of the single parents and their children. This volume, based on papers presented originally at a 1999 Institute for Poverty Research conference, adds greatly to social science literature on this most-dramatic shift in family formation of the later twentieth century.

First, the volume extends our understanding of the rapidly changing demography of nonmarital births, cohabitation, and marriage in the U.S. and western Europe through the mid-1990s. In particular, the authors examine the changing role of cohabitation, nonmarital childbearing at ages after the teen years, state-level variations in nonmarital childbearing, and trends in western Europe. The comparative patterns in the U.S. and Europe both suggest similar structural forces accounting for the decline of marriage and childbearing. However, there are notable differences, in particular the disproportionate level of nonmarital births among African Americans and the greater stability of cohabiting unions in Europe.

Second, the roles of community support and unwed fathers are examined. Conservatives argue that state and federal support through TANF and other programs is a key factor in the rise of nonmarital births. The federal government has instituted state-level initiatives to reduce the illegitimacy ratios. While there is an extensive literature on possible welfare effects, the two articles addressing this question make significant substantive and methodological contributions. Two other articles examine both the willingness and ability of fathers in social and economic support, including child support.

Third, four chapters examine the consequences of nonmarital childbearing on the health and development of mothers and children, the effects of being born out of wedlock on educational success and early childbearing, and the effects of nonmarital childbearing on formation and stability of the mothers' subsequent unions.

All the articles in this volume are of exceptional high quality, with innovative, state-of-the-art research designs (e.g., Korenman, Kaestner, and Joyce) and statistical analysis (e.g., Moffitt) of a range of survey data. They contribute greatly to the technical literature on the social and policy problems associated with nonmarital childbearing. However, as Lundberg points out in her summary of the implications of the research in volume for family economics, it is difficult for researchers to keep up with the rapidly changing processes of family formation. We are several years from having survey data on any shifts in nonmarital childbearing associated with the economic stagnation that followed the dotcom bubble, but they are likely. Further, the theoretical understanding of the decline of marriage, especially in relation to childbearing,

remains underdeveloped. Economic analysis based on constrained-choice models is analytically useful, but limited in scope.

As Laslett noted, social scientists have “written a very great deal” on out-of-wedlock childbearing. This volume ranks among the most innovative and interesting of this large literature.

Chinese Urban Life under Reform: The Changing Social Contract.

By Wenfang Tang and William L. Parish. Cambridge University Press, 2000. 388 pp. \$24.95.

Reviewer: HANCHAO LU, *Georgia Institute of Technology*

Over the past quarter-century, China's post-Mao reforms seem to have taken social scientists on a constant race with reality. The social theories they have employed to interpret China's fast-moving society are usually hard-pressed to stay abreast of developments. The pace of change is such that it often bewilders the most perspicacious China watchers and quite ruthlessly outdates their interpretations. Tang and Parish's book on urban life in the reform era is among a few works that have enduring values. Using data from a wide range of sociological surveys undertaken between 1987 and 1992 and other sources, the authors use the evidence to construct broad theoretical interpretations that are not only still relevant but remain critical to China today.

A central theme of the book is the change of the social contract in urban China from socialist idealism, wherein basic living standards were assured in return for political quiescence, to capitalist pragmatism, wherein increasing individual freedom has been obtained at the cost of competition and less social security across the social spectrum. The authors examine the impact of this dramatic transition, including numerous corresponding policy and institutional changes, on ordinary urbanites and look particularly at how they have responded to the vicissitude of life during the unsettling years of the reform era. The scope of the book is ambitious: job, education, labor-management relations, bureaucratic privilege, political participation, gender, family, and so on, all come in for scrutiny.

The authors' careful examination of the data and vigorous engagement with previous theorizing has resulted in well-grounded and balanced interpretations. The authors suggest, for instance, that the bargaining power of China's bureaucrats may have been overstated. The advantages enjoyed by party members and cadres can be emulated by people outside the privileged circle of officialdom through means other than bureaucratic prominence, such as education. On issues of gender, contrary to the view that a market-oriented economy tends to reduce women's employment opportunities since management is now largely free of state control, the authors present a more

complex picture in which Chinese women continued to do well in white-collar jobs. Their income as a percentage of male income is extremely high by international standards (chapter 9, by Parish and Sarah Busse). Likewise, readers learn that urban women's status in the family has risen, especially among younger generations, but this has not necessarily resulted in mutual satisfying relations within the family (chapter 10, by Parish and James Farrer).

In terms of chronological coverage, the book focuses on the five-year period that centers on the Tiananmen incident of 1989, the most delicate and uncertain time of the reform. With data in hand the authors point out — perhaps at the risk of being judged “politically incorrect” — that the authoritarian state control imposed after Tiananmen in fact had some positive consequences — such as tight monetary control and a low rate of inflation — that in an important way allowed for the continuation of the reform. The authors approach their subject comparatively, bringing in cases from Russia, East European countries, and the U.S. to cross-examine the Chinese experience. An entire chapter is devoted to comparisons between the mainland and Taiwan. Although in size, regional variety, and complexity the mainland is largely incomparable to Taiwan, the shared cultural and historical origins of the two and what has often been referred as the East Asian pattern do make the path of Taiwan in recent decades the most relevant benchmark for China.

It might be said that the book is about the “average” segments of urban society. It largely neglects the disadvantaged and has virtually nothing to say about the floating population and migratory workers in the city. While the issues of bargaining power and labor-management relations are extensively discussed, laid-off workers (*xiagang gongren*) formerly employed in state-owned enterprises are surprisingly absent from the picture. The authors state that the study “is focused on the urban caste.” Indisputably, however, cities do not stand isolated. Rural migrants in recent years have had a tremendous impact on urban life. One of the major reforms in post-Mao China has been the loosening of state control on population mobility. Rural migrants, despite their uncertain legal status in the city, have become China's most vibrant new urbanites and have fundamentally changed the nature of the social contract. They, together with the large army of laid-off workers, are an indispensable part of “Chinese urban life under reform.”

Aside from these disappointing lacunae, the book is written in a systematic way: Supporting evidence drawn from survey data and government statistics are carefully analyzed, succinctly presented, and engagingly interwoven with theories and issues under debate. The book will be a useful reference for China specialists and will be accessible to undergraduate students and general readers interested in China's epoch-making changes in recent years.

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Referees

We are grateful to our colleagues who assisted us from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2003. Their reviews of several hundred manuscripts provided a valuable service to the authors, journal, and readers.

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
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
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